An application for leave under this rule shall be made by a notice 5 of application”. [13] It is trite that the exercise of the Court’s power to discontinue an action upon terms under O.21 r.3 ROC 2012 is an exercise of discretion as held by the Court of Appeal in Newlake Development 10 (supra) and Punj (supra). At para 24 the Court of Appeal in the former case held - “In summary, the discretion to allow the application to discontinue an action and the discretion to impose the terms accompanying it, depends very much on the facts and circumstances of each case”. 15 (Emphasis added) [14] In Fox v. Star Newspaper Company [1898] 1 QB 636, a case cited with approval by the Court of Appeal cases of Newlake Development and Punj, Chitty LJ held at p.639 - 20 “The principle of the rule is plain. It is that after the proceedings have reached a certain stage the Plaintiff, who has brought his adversary into court, shall not be able to escape by a side door and avoid the contest. He is then to be no longer dominus litis, and it is for the judge to say whether the action shall be discontinued or not and upon what terms … The 25 substance of the provision is that, after a stage of the action has been reached at which the adversaries are meeting face to face, it shall only be in the discretion of the judge whether the plaintiff shall be allowed to withdraw from the action so as to retain the right of bringing another action for the same subject-matter”. 30 [15] Further the Court of Appeal in Newlake Development held at para 23 that before granting the order for discontinuance of the action, the Court must be satisfied - “i) if a defendant is dominus litis, the general rule is to refuse leave to 35 discontinue (see Overseas Union Finance Ltd v. Lim Joo Chong [1971] 2 MLJ 124); ii) the case is not at an advanced stage; if so, care must be taken not to permit discontinuance. What constitutes an advanced stage depends on the facts and circumstances of the case (see Fox v. 40 Star Newspaper Company [1898] 1 QB 636; 12 iii) the plaintiff may have gained an interim interlocutory advantage 5 between the date of issue of the writ and the point of time he seeks to discontinue (O'Neal v. Mann [2000] FCA 1680); iv) there is no miscarriage of justice occasioned by its refusal to permit the discontinuance; v) it will not prejudice the opponent to the application or take away 10 from him any advantage to which he is fairly and reasonably entitled”. [16] In Hanhyo’s case (supra), Lim Beng Choon J (as he then was) stated the principles in respect of discontinuance at p.1791 A-D as 15 follows: “[T]he Court would not compel a plaintiff to continue his action against a defendant if he does not want to do so provided no injustice is caused to the defendant. Injustice would be caused to the defendant if: