Ding Ming Ming v 1. ) LIM Su Jin (JA-23NCvC-4-04/2021)

LIM SU JIN

LIM SU LING (NRIC : 900102-01-5574) …DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT 28/10/2025 14:47:39

The Plaintiff sues the Defendants for defamation arising from Facebook and WhatsApp postings in February 2020, alleging that the Defendants accused her of causing serious injury to the Second Defendant during an acupuncture procedure, practising without a proper licence, and evading responsibility. The Defendants deny liability, contending that the postings were either true, constituted fair comment, or were confined to a limited audience, and emphasise that the Plaintiff lacked a valid Malaysian practising licence and had performed an invasive procedure.

The trial began before Justice Nurulhuda Nur’Aini binti Mohammad Nor on 21–23 January 2025 and, following her transfer to the Kuala Lumpur High Court, resumed before me on 26–27 August 2025. Written submissions were filed by 12 September 2025, oral submissions were heard on 17 September 2025, and judgment was fixed for 14 October 2025.

The Plaintiff, Ding Ming Ming, is a beautician and certified acupuncturist who practised mainly in the Klang Valley and occasionally in Johor Bahru. The First and Second Defendants, Lim Su Jin and Lim Su Ling, are siblings and former customers of the Plaintiff who had received beauty and acupuncture treatments from her.

The dispute arises from publications made in February 2020. The Plaintiff alleges that on or about 8 and 9 February 2020, the First Defendant, using the Facebook account “Yuki Lim”, posted statements alleging that the Plaintiff lacked proper qualifications, practised without legitimacy, and caused serious medical complications to the Second Defendant following a thread-embedding acupuncture procedure (TEA) performed in November 2019.

The Plaintiff further alleges that on or around 5 and 6 February 2020, the Second Defendant circulated similar statements via WhatsApp messages to a third party known as “Shehvon”, a business partner of the Plaintiff associated with “Little Nail Cottage”, a beauty salon in Johor Bahru where the Plaintiff occasionally provided services.

The Defendants deny defamation, contending that the Facebook posts were private communications viewable only by friends, that the Plaintiff’s translations were inaccurate, and that the statements were either substantially true, fair comment, or made on an occasion of qualified privilege.

The Defendants have also filed a counterclaim alleging that the Plaintiff defamed them by spreading false accusations and circulating the writ of summons, thereby causing them embarrassment and reputational harm. The Plaintiff denies these allegations in her Reply and Defence to Counterclaim.

Based on the agreed facts in Enclosure 55, it is common ground that the Plaintiff is a Malaysian citizen residing in Puchong, Selangor. The First Defendant is a Malaysian citizen residing in Johor Bahru, Johor, while the Second Defendant, also a Malaysian citizen, resides in Singapore with a common address for service in Johor Bahru. The Defendants are siblings.

The parties further agree that the Plaintiff is also known as “Chris” and that the First Defendant published two Facebook postings on 8 and 9 February 2020 under her account “Yuki Lim”, accessible via the following URLs:

(a)https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=27743095159 56827&id=100001334174665 (post dated 8 February 2020); and

(b)https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=27760018091 20931&id=100001334174665 (post dated 9 February 2020).

It is also agreed that “Little Nail Cottage”, a beauty salon in Johor Bahru where the Plaintiff occasionally provided services, featured in the dispute following the said publications. The parties further agree that the First Defendant had friends and followers on her Facebook account, and that certain friends and family members of the Defendants were also customers of the Plaintiff.

Based on the statement of agreed issue for trial in Enc. 33, the following agreed issues arise for determination:

whether the Facebook posts dated 8 and 9 February 2020, together with the comments thereunder, were published or caused to be published by the First Defendant and contain words that are defamatory of the Plaintiff;

whether the WhatsApp messages sent by the Second Defendant to a person known as Shehvon on or around 5 February 2020 contain words that are defamatory of the

whether the Defendants have established any of their pleaded defences, namely truth (justification), fair comment, or qualified privilege; and

if liability is established, the appropriate quantum and form of relief to be awarded.

There are 6 witnesses who testified before this court as follows:

SP1 - Michael Lim Kah Chai;

SP2 - Christina Wong Lee Yee;

SP3 - Ong Shek Wen (Shehvon);

SP4 - Ding Ming Ming (Plaintiff);

SD1 - Lim Su Ling (2nd Defendant); and

SD2 - Lim Su Jin (1st Defendant).

The trial proceeded in two phases. On 21–23 January 2025 (before Justice Nurul Huda), SP1 - SP3 completed their evidence and SP4 was part-heard. On 26–27 August 2025 (before this Court), SP4 completed cross-and re-examination, followed by SD1 and SD2.

The law on defamation is well established. The Court of Appeal in Lim Guan Eng v. Datuk Tan Teik Cheng & Anor [2025] CLJU 388 with reference to Mkini Dotcom Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd [2021] 7 CLJ 145; [2021] 5 MLRA 37; [2021] 5 MLJ 79; Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd v. Hue Shieh Lee [2019] 3 CLJ 729; Ayoh Saud v. TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 CLJ Rep 321; [1989] 1 CLJ 152; [1988] 1 MLRH 653; [1989] 1 MLJ 315; Kian Lup Construction v. Hong Kong Bank Malaysia Bhd [2002] 7 CLJ 32; [2002] 2 MLRH 389; [2002] 7 MLJ 283; [2002] 3 AMR 3554, explains as follows: “[3] To succeed in his claim for defamation, the appellant has to prove three elements as follows:

The words are defamatory;

(ii) It referred to him; and

(iii) It was published, that is, communicated to a third party”.

Guided by the abovesaid principles, my assessment and findings are as follows:

Defamatory Meaning

The Defendants initially objected to the admissibility of the Plaintiff’s translations of the impugned publications. Both the Facebook and WhatsApp messages were originally written in Mandarin. The Plaintiff tendered certified Bahasa Malaysia and English translations, each bearing the seal of a registered translator from Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka (DBP). These were included in Part B of the parties’ Common Bundle of Documents.

For reasons not fully explained, the Defendants also filed their own bundle containing alternative translations of the same publications. While maintaining that the Plaintiff’s versions were inaccurate, the Defendants did not specify any material variance between the two sets of translations. No expert evidence was led to substantiate that the Plaintiff’s certified translations were unreliable.

The Defendants further contended that the translations were inadmissible under the Evidence Act 1950 unless produced by a duly qualified interpreter. The Plaintiff, however, relied on the DBP certification, which is the official authority for Malay/ English translation, and submitted that such certification satisfies the evidentiary requirement for accuracy.

I note the decision of the Court of Appeal in Rekha Munisamy v. Ortus Expert White Sdn Bhd & Anor [2021] 7 CLJ 353, which reaffirmed that the exact defamatory words must be pleaded in their original language and accompanied by a certified translation in Bahasa Melayu, failing which the action is defective. (See also Lim Kit Siang v Datuk Dr Ling Liong Sik & Ors [1996] CLJU 106).

In the present case, the impugned Facebook and WhatsApp publications, together with their certified English translations, appear in Part B of the Common Bundle. Under Order 34 rule 2(2)(e)(i) of the Rules of Court 2012 (ROC 2012), documents in Part B are those whose authenticity is not disputed though their contents remain contentious. As explained in Abiramee A/P Ramalingam (berniaga atas nama Posh Medispa v Nur Isabella Bt Abdullah & Ors [2023] MLJU 3145, Naidu a/l Appasamy [2021] MLJU 1232, such documents are admissible as to existence, with objections on authenticity and weight preserved for trial.

Applying Rekha Munisamy and Abiramee A/P Ramalingam, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff’s translations, certified by DBP, are properly admissible. I will therefore rely on the original Mandarin text and its certified translation in determining the natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of, giving appropriate weight to the Defendants’ objections.

The Court must now determine whether the words complained of are defamatory. The test is an objective one. As stated in Rekha Munisamy, citing Gatley on Libel and Slander (9th edn, 1998), there is no single comprehensive definition of a defamatory imputation, though three formulations are influential:

whether the imputation would tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society;

whether it would tend to cause others to shun or avoid the plaintiff; and

whether the words would expose the plaintiff to hatred, contempt, or ridicule.

The Court of Appeal in Chok Foo Choo v. The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 CLJ 461 adopted the same test, asking whether the words, in their natural and ordinary meaning, impute to the plaintiff any dishonourable or discreditable conduct or motives or a lack of integrity. Similarly, in Keluarga Communication Sdn Bhd v. Normala Samsudin & Another Appeal [2006] 2 CLJ 46 Court of Appeal emphasised that the test is objective, requiring the words to be construed as they would be understood by an ordinary reasonable reader, and that the publication must be considered as a whole.

Applying these principles, the Court must first consider the natural and ordinary meaning of the impugned Facebook and WhatsApp publications, viewed in their entirety and in the context in which they were made. The meaning is to be drawn not by strained analysis but by how the words would be understood by the ordinary reasonable person who reads them once, with common sense, and without the mindset of a lawyer searching for subtle implications.

The Plaintiff relies on (a) two Facebook posts dated 8 and 9 February 2020 published from the account “Yuki Lim”; and (b) WhatsApp messages sent by the Second Defendant to Shehvon (SP3) of Little Nail Cottage.

The pleaded sting is that the words meant the Plaintiff was unqualified, irresponsible, dishonest, and had endangered D2 by performing an illegitimate procedure (thread-embedding acupuncture, (“TEA”)), resulting in serious medical complications, known as pneumothorax.

I find, the question at this stage is whether an ordinary, reasonable reader, reading the whole publication in context, would regard the words as having a tendency to lower the Plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society.

The 8 February post recounts that the Second Defendant underwent TEA, experienced chest pain and breathing difficulties, and that the “counterparty” (unnamed) downplayed the symptoms. It adds that legal advice was being sought and that the “counterparty” had blocked the Second Defendant. In the comment thread, when asked to name the person, the First Defendant refused and spoke generally- “she is a beautician… operates in a hotel when in JB”.

The 9 February post expands on the Second Defendant’s account, mentioning hospitalisation and expressing disappointment that the “counterparty” did not accept responsibility. The words again do not name the Plaintiff or her business. The tone remains experiential, not accusatory.

Viewed objectively, the Facebook posts are capable of conveying that whoever performed the Second Defendant’s TEA acted incompetently or irresponsibly. Whether those words would be understood as referring to the Plaintiff depends on the question of identification, addressed below.

The WhatsApp messages were sent to SP3, the proprietor of Little Nail Cottage, where the Plaintiff practised. The messages explicitly attribute the Second Defendant’s injury to “Chris”, criticise her conduct, and urge caution about allowing her to continue practising there. In their natural and ordinary meaning, if “Chris” refers to the Plaintiff, the messages carry imputations of professional incompetence and irresponsibility. These words are plainly capable of being defamatory.

Accordingly, my findings on whether the words complained of are defamatory are as follows:

the Facebook posts are capable of carrying a defamatory sting if the Plaintiff is identified; and

the WhatsApp messages are inherently defamatory in meaning to their recipient.

Whether The Defamatory Publications Refer To The Plaintiff

The Court of Appeal in Komarkcorp Berhad v. The Edge Communication Sdn Bhd [2025] CLJU 1929 reaffirmed the established principle that a plaintiff must prove that the words complained of were published “of and concerning” her. The onus is firmly upon the plaintiff; failure to discharge it is fatal to the claim.

As stated by Lord Donovan in Morgan v. Odhams Press Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 1239, it is not necessary that the plaintiff be named expressly, provided that reasonable persons acquainted with her, having regard to the surrounding circumstances, would understand the words to refer to her. This principle, first articulated in Knupffer v. London Express Newspapers Ltd [1944] A.C. 116, and has been consistently applied in Malaysia (see : Chok Foo Choo; and Komarkcorp).

The principle is well established in Malaysia. In Institute of Commercial Management United Kingdom v. New Straits Times Press (Malaysia) Bhd [1993] 2 MLJ 408, the Court of Appeal emphasised that the test is whether a reasonable person, with knowledge of the surrounding circumstances, would understand the words as referring to the plaintiff — not whether the general public at large would do so. The same approach was later affirmed in Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd v. Hue Shieh Lee [2019] 3 CLJ 729, which recognised that identification may arise within a limited but relevant circle of readers familiar with the plaintiff and the context.

The Facebook posts did not expressly name the Plaintiff or her business. The only marker was the forename “Chris”, which coincides with the Plaintiff’s name.

SP2 (Christina Wong) testified that she immediately understood the posts to concern the Plaintiff, as they described a procedure performed by “Chris” that matched the Plaintiff’s practice and timeline. SP1 and SP3, who knew the Plaintiff personally and were familiar with her service, similarly said they understood the posts to refer to her.

The First Defendant admitted that her Facebook posts were visible to her circle of friends, many of whom were mutual acquaintances of the Plaintiff. She also acknowledged that the practitioner referred to was “Chris” but said she chose not to name her directly.

Applying the test in Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd and Institute of Commercial Management, the relevant inquiry is not whether every reader could identify the Plaintiff, but whether those acquainted with her — the relevant control group — would reasonably understand the words as referring to her. On the evidence, those familiar with the Plaintiff’s identity and practice could only have understood the posts to concern her.

Accordingly, I hold that within the relevant circle of readers, comprising mutual friends, clients, and acquaintances on Facebook, the Facebook posts referred to the Plaintiff.

The WhatsApp messages were sent directly by the Second Defendant to SP3, and explicitly named “Chris” in connection with the incident. Given SP3’s personal knowledge of the Plaintiff and her role at Little Nail Cottage, the identification was immediate and unequivocal.

On any application of Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd and Komarkcorp Berhad, the Plaintiff has clearly established that the WhatsApp messages referred to her.

Accordingly, I find that the Plaintiff has discharged the burden of proving the element of reference for both the Facebook posts and the WhatsApp messages.

Publication

The third element concerns publication to a third party. In Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd, the Federal Court, referring to Hebditch v. Macilwaine and others [1894] 2 QB 54, affirmed that “the material part of the cause of action in libel is not the writing, but the publication of the libel”.

The essence of the tort lies in the communication of the defamatory matter to at least one person other than the plaintiff. As explained in S Pakianathan v. Jenni Ibrahim & another case [1988] 1 CLJ 771, publication is complete once the words are made known to a third party. The extent of dissemination goes only to damages, not to liability.

The two Facebook posts, dated 8 and 9 February 2020, were published from the account “Yuki Lim”. The First Defendant admitted she authored and uploaded them to her Facebook account, which was accessible to her friends and followers.

The Plaintiff’s witnesses, SP1, SP2 and SP3, each confirmed that they saw and read the impugned posts on Facebook. Their evidence, which the Court accepts, establishes that the words were in fact communicated to third parties. This suffices to satisfy the element of publication.

The Defendants argued that the posts were set to “friends only” and therefore not public. That contention cannot stand. Even limited visibility to one or more “friends” constitutes publication in law. Each friend is a third party for this purpose. The authorities make clear that once the words pass beyond the plaintiff herself, publication is complete (see: Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd; and S Pakianathan). The degree of circulation may be relevant to damages, but not to liability.

Further, the comment threads accompanying the posts show responses from other users and follow-up replies by the First Defendant. Each interaction amounted to a fresh communication to the same or wider audience, reinforcing that publication occurred on multiple occasions.

The WhatsApp messages sent by the Second Defendant to SP3, stand on even firmer footing. SP3 confirmed that she received and read them. That evidence alone satisfies the requirement of publication to a third party.

It matters not that the messages were sent privately or to a single recipient. The law requires only that the words be communicated to someone other than the plaintiff. A one-to-one message therefore constitutes publication, although its private nature may mitigate the extent of damage.

The Plaintiff has properly pleaded and proved publication by:

reproducing the exact impugned words in their original Mandarin text with certified English/ Malay translations;

identifying the specific Facebook posts and WhatsApp messages complained of; and

adducing direct evidence of receipt by third parties. These steps comply with the evidential requirements articulated in Ayob Saud v. T.S. Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 CLJ 152.

Having considered the evidence and the applicable authorities, I find that publication has been clearly established in respect of both:

the Facebook posts dated 8 and 9 February 2020; and

the WhatsApp messages sent by the Second Defendant to SP - 3.

The Defendants’ argument that the posts were “private” or of limited reach does not negate publication; it may only bear on the measure of damages.

Having found that the impugned words were both defamatory of the Plaintiff and published to third parties, the Court now turns to consider whether the Defendants may nevertheless escape liability through any of the recognised defences in law, namely, justification, fair comment on a matter of public interest, or qualified privilege.

Justification

The law will not allow recovery for statements that are substantially true. The onus lies squarely on the defendant to prove the truth of the words complained of, either literally or in their substantial sense. It is insufficient if parts are true but the sting remains false.

In the present case, the Defendants pleaded justification, maintaining that the impugned words were true and substantially accurate. However, paragraph 75 of their Amended Defence and Counterclaim reads as follows: “The Defendants deliberately accused the Plaintiff in public to destroy and/or damage the Plaintiff’s business.”

This averment constitutes a judicial admission under Order 18 rule 13(1) of the Rules of Court 2012 and section 17 of the Evidence Act 1950 [Act 56]. By their own pleading, the Defendants have acknowledged that they publicly made the accusation against the Plaintiff with intent to cause harm. This pleading binds the Defendants (see : Yam Kong Seng & Anor v Yee Weng Kai [2014] 4 MLJ 478).

The Defendants further contended that the Plaintiff was not certified under the Traditional and Complementary Medicine Act 2016 [Act 775] and was therefore practising unlawfully. This argument is misconceived. The Plaintiff produced certificates of training and practice in thread-embedding acupuncture, issued by an institution in China where she received her professional training. At the material time, Act 775 had not been fully implemented and the registration framework for practioners was not yet operational.

Moreover, no evidence, whether expert, official or otherwise, was adduced from the Ministry of Health or the Traditional and Complementary Medicine Division to show that her practice contravened Act 775. More importantly, the issue before this Court is not regulatory compliance, but whether the Defendants were justified in publishing that she was unqualified and had caused serious injury. The defence of justification cannot rest on speculation or unproven breaches of statute.

This pleading admission is inconsistent with any plea of truth or innocent motive and is binding upon the Defendants.

The plea of justification requires the Defendants to prove that the defamatory imputations are substantially true (Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Berhad Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56). Mere belief or suspicion is insufficient. Evidence of truth must be clear and cogent. In this case, the Defendants led no expert or independent medical evidence to establish that the Plaintiff’s procedure was unlawful, unqualified, or that it caused the Second Defendant’s alleged injury.

By contrast, the Plaintiff’s evidence, supported by SP3 and the certificates, shows that she was trained in thread-embedding acupuncture and that the Second Defendant had voluntarily undergone the procedure after due explanation. The medical complications subsequently experienced were not proven to be attributable to negligence or malpractice on the Plaintiff’s part.

In these circumstances, the Defendants have failed to discharge the burden of proving the truth of their allegations. Their own judicial admission at paragraph 75 of the Amended Defence and Counterclaim, —acknowledging that they had “deliberately accused the Plaintiff in public to destroy and/or damage her business” is inconsistent with any plea of truth or innocent motive. The plea of justification is therefore untenable.

Fair Comment On A Matter Of Public Interest

The Defendants alternatively rely on the defence of fair comment. This defence, long recognised in Malaysian law, protects expressions of opinion on matters of public interest, provided the comment is based on true facts, made honestly, and not actuated by malice. The Court of Appeal in Chok Foo Choo and Keluarga Communication Sdn Bhd reaffirmed that to succeed, the defendant must show:

the words complained of are comment, not assertions of fact;

the comment is based on true facts;

the comment concerns a matter of public interest; and

the comment was made without malice.

More importantly, the Federal Court in Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd reaffirmed these principles, holding that expressions of concern or criticism on issues of genuine public interest, such as environmental health and safety, may attract protection, but only if made fairly, upon true factual foundations.

Applying these principles, the Defendants assert that their publications were fair comment, contending that they reflected genuine concern regarding an alleged medical mishap and served as a warning to others. The issue therefore turns on whether the impugned statements constitute comment or assertion of fact, and whether they were made fairly on a factual basis.

Having reviewed the impugned publications, I find that the words used were presented as factual assertions, not as comment or opinion. The Defendants did not express a value judgment (“I believe,” “in my view,” or “it seems”), but made direct factual imputations that the Plaintiff had acted irresponsibly and caused injury. Such statements go beyond fair comment. They amount to allegations of fact that require proof of truth.

Even if some statements are construed as comment, the underlying facts on which they were based ie. the alleged negligence or misconduct of the Plaintiff, have not been established as true. As Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd makes clear, the defence of fair comment cannot stand if the factual substratum is untrue or unproven.

Moreover, the tone and language of the WhatsApp messages, in particular, reflect animosity and a call for the Plaintiff’s exclusion from the workplace. These circumstances negate the element of honesty and suggest personal motive rather than public interest.

I therefore find that the Defendants have not satisfied the requirements of the defence of fair comment. Their statements were assertions of fact, not fair opinions grounded in truth, and were made in circumstances inconsistent with fair and honest comment on a matter of public interest. The defence accordingly fails.

In any event, paragraph 75 of the Amended Defence and Counterclaim, where the Defendants expressly pleaded that they had “deliberately accused the Plaintiff in public to destroy and/or damage the Plaintiff’s business,” negates any inference of honest motive. This admission, coupled with the absence of factual foundation, conclusively defeats both the pleas of justification and fair comment.

Qualified Privilege

The Defendants also invoke the defence of qualified privilege. This defence protects communications made in discharge of a legal, moral, or social duty, where the recipient has a corresponding interest in receiving the information. The rationale is to allow free and candid communication between parties with a legitimate interest, provided the communication is made honestly and without malice.

The principles were clearly set out in Ayob Saud v. T.S. Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 CLJ 152, where the Court held that once a defendant establishes that the publication was made on an occasion of qualified privilege, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove express malice. The same approach was followed in Rajagopal v Rajam [1972] 1 MLJ 45 and affirmed in Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd.

In applying the defence of qualified privilege, the Court must identify:

the nature of the duty or interest of the maker of the statement;

the corresponding duty or interest of the recipient; and

whether the communication exceeded what was reasonably necessary for the fulfilment of that duty or interest.

In the present case, the Defendants have not pleaded or demonstrated any legal, moral, or social duty to make the Facebook posts to the public at large. The alleged purpose of “warning others” does not fall within the scope of qualified privilege. As held in Ayob Saud, publication to persons who have no corresponding duty or interest in the information defeats the privilege.

The WhatsApp messages, though sent privately, were addressed to the proprietor of Little Nail Cottage, where the Plaintiff practised. While there may arguably exist a limited mutual interest concerning workplace safety, the tone and content of the messages went beyond what was reasonably necessary to discharge that interest. The language used was accusatory and disparaging, not a neutral warning.

Even if a prima facie occasion of privilege existed, the evidence discloses malice. Malice, in this context, includes any improper motive or recklessness as to the truth of the statement. As defined in Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135 and adopted in Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd, malice is established when the defendant is actuated by spite, ill-will, or any motive other than the duty or interest giving rise to the privilege.

The First Defendant’s deliberate decision to publicise the matter on Facebook, coupled with her persistence in commenting after being asked to desist, and the Second Defendant’s accusatory tone in the WhatsApp messages, demonstrate recklessness and hostility inconsistent with good faith. These factors negate the protection of privilege.

Accordingly, I find that the Defendants have failed to establish the defence of qualified privilege. The communications were neither made on a privileged occasion nor free from malice, and the defence therefore fails.

Malice

Although the Court has already found that the Defendants’ pleaded defences of justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege have failed, I address briefly the issue of malice as it arose squarely on the evidence.

Malice in the law of defamation does not necessarily mean spite or ill-will in the popular sense. It encompasses any dominant motive inconsistent with the sense of duty or public interest that would otherwise justify the publication. As stated in Horrocks, and approved by the Federal Court in Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd, malice exists where the defendant publishes words knowing them to be false, recklessly without caring whether they are true or false, or for some improper motive.

Evidence of malice may be inferred from conduct before, during, or after publication, including persistence in repeating the allegations, failure to verify facts, or exaggeration of the charge. The presence of malice defeats all qualified defences such as fair comment or qualified privilege.

In this case, the Defendants’ own pleading at paragraph 75 of the Amended Defence and Counterclaim admits that they had “deliberately accused the Plaintiff in public to destroy and/or damage the Plaintiff’s business”. This admission alone evidences a motive inconsistent with any honest or responsible intention.

The First Defendant’s conduct in publishing the allegations on a social media platform, accessible to her circle of friends and mutual acquaintances, coupled with her refusal to remove or correct the posts despite the Plaintiff’s demands, demonstrates persistence and recklessness.

The Second Defendant’s tone in her WhatsApp communications was accusatory and vindictive rather than cautionary. These factors, taken cumulatively, support a finding of express malice.

The Court is therefore satisfied that the Defendants were actuated by malice when making the impugned publications. This finding reinforces the rejection of their pleaded defences.

Damages And Relief

The law of damages in defamation aims to compensate the Plaintiff for injury to reputation, vindicate her good name, and console her for the distress and humiliation suffered. As reaffirmed in Syed Husin Ali, the Court has wide discretion to award general damages, taking into account the gravity of the libel, the standing of the plaintiff, the extent of publication, and the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

The question of regulatory compliance under Act 775 bears no relevance to the assessment of damages, as liability for defamation is founded upon publication of false imputations, not regulatory status.

The defamatory imputations here were serious, going to the core of the Plaintiff’s professional competence and integrity as a licensed acupuncturist. The allegation that she caused serious medical injury, acted irresponsibly, and sought to evade liability strikes at the heart of her vocation and public reputation.

The evidence shows that the Plaintiff’s clientele and professional reputation suffered following the publications. SP1, SP2, and SP3 all testified that the postings were circulated among mutual acquaintances and clients, resulting in loss of trust and bookings. The Plaintiff also experienced emotional distress and humiliation, as corroborated by her testimony.

Further, I observed that aggravating factors are present. The Defendants made no attempt to apologise or retract the statements. Instead, they persisted in their assertions throughout these proceedings and went so far as to plead that their purpose was to damage the Plaintiff’s business. Such conduct warrants an award at the higher end of the general damages spectrum.

While the WhatsApp publication was more limited in reach, it was highly targeted, being directed to the proprietor of the very premises where the Plaintiff practised. The Facebook posts, by contrast, were accessible to a broader circle and carried the risk of repeated circulation through shares and comments. Both therefore caused distinct but significant harm.

In the absence of evidence of actual monetary loss, the award will focus on general damages for injury to reputation and distress. Nevertheless, the deliberate and malicious nature of the conduct justifies an additional award of aggravated damages. As stated in Chok Foo Choo, aggravated damages are appropriate where the defendant’s conduct has increased the hurt to the plaintiff’s feelings or has shown contumelious disregard for her reputation.

In assessing damages, I have also considered the Plaintiff’s submissions which highlighted the gravity of the defamatory imputations, the loss of professional reputation, and the aggravating conduct of the Defendants. While the Plaintiff claimed special, general, aggravated, and exemplary damages, the evidence supports a global award under the combined heads of general, aggravated, and exemplary damages. The Defendants made no detailed submission on the measure of damages, save to contend that publication was limited and no serious harm was proven.

Having considered the gravity of the defamatory imputations, the malice established, and the Defendants’ persistence and lack of remorse, I am satisfied that this is an appropriate case for a consolidated award under the combined heads of general, aggravated, and exemplary damages. The publications struck directly at the Plaintiff’s professional integrity and were made with a clear intention to damage her reputation and livelihood.

Although the Plaintiff claimed special damages, there was no specific or documentary proof of actual pecuniary loss, and the general damage component is subsumed within the aggravated and exemplary elements.

The Court therefore makes a global award of RM350,000.00 under the combined heads of general, aggravated, and exemplary damages. This reflects both the seriousness of the defamatory attack and the malicious manner in which it was made.

In making this global award, the Court has taken into account the Defendants’ conduct both before and after publication; — the deliberate and repeated publication of false allegations, refusal to apologise, and continued justification despite lack of proof. The sum awarded compensates the Plaintiff for the injury to her reputation and distress suffered, and serves to vindicate her name and deter reckless and malicious defamation.

For the reasons set out above, on the balance of probabilities, my findings on the agreed issue for determination as stated in paragraphs 11 above are as follows:

Issue (a): Facebook posts The posts were authored and uploaded by the First Defendant and published to third parties. On meaning, they are capable of bearing a defamatory sting, and the Plaintiff is identified within the relevant circle. Accordingly, Issue (a) is answered in the Plaintiff’s favour.

Issue (b): WhatsApp messages The Second Defendant’s messages to SP3 were defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning, referred to the Plaintiff, and were published when received and read by SP3. Issue (b) is answered in the Plaintiff’s favour.

Issue (c): Defences The Defendants have not made out justification, not made out fair comment, and not made out qualified privilege. Issue (c) is answered against the Defendants.

Issue (d): Relief For reasons stated aboved and the Orders mention herein, the Court awards a global sum of RM350,000.00 under the combined heads of general, aggravated, and exemplary damages; special damages are disallowed; and the injunction/apology/removal orders are granted. Issue (d) is answered as set out in the Orders.

As to the Defendants’ Counterclaim, I find no credible evidence to substantiate their allegations that the Plaintiff had defamed or maliciously injured them. The pleadings and evidence fall short of proving any actionable defamation or damage. The counterclaim is accordingly dismissed with costs.

Accordingly, the court order and direct as follows:

General, aggravated, and exemplary damages (global) – RM350,000.00, payable jointly and severally by the

Special damages, disallowed for want of proof;

An order compelling the First Defendant to forthwith remove the Facebook posts dated 8 and 9 February 2020, together with all ensuing comments or any republication containing similar defamatory material;

An order compelling the Second Defendant to forthwith remove the defamatory Facebook comment and relevant WhatsApp communications;

An injunction restraining the Defendants, whether by themselves, their servants or agents, or otherwise, from further publishing or causing to be published any part of the defamatory publications or words of similar effect concerning the Plaintiff;

An order compelling the Defendants to issue and deliver to the Plaintiff, within seven (7) days from the date of this judgment, a written letter of apology signed by both Defendants, unequivocally apologising to the Plaintiff for the defamatory publications in a form approved by this Court. The Defendants shall publish the said apology on their respective Facebook pages publicly without restriction, and the Plaintiff shall be at liberty to publish the apology on any media platform without limitation of time;

Interest on the sum of RM350,000.00 at 5% per annum from the date of judgment until full settlement; and

Costs of RM50,000.00 to the Plaintiff subject to allocator. Dated : 14 Oktober 2025 Dr. Noradura binti Hamzah Judicial Commissioner High Court Civil 2 Johor Bahru Peguamcara : Ding Ming Ming Tetuan SF Lim Peguamcara : Lim Su Jin (D1) : Lim Su Ling (D2)