Dk Naval Technologies Sdn. Bhd. v Grisek Jaya Sdn Bhd. (JA-24NCC-66-11/2025)

BETWEEN DK NAVAL TECHNOLOGIES SDN BHD (COMPANY NO. : 1282839-D) …PLAINTIFF AND GRISEK JAYA SDN. BHD. (COMPANY NO. : 96262-H) …DEFENDANT GROUND OF JUDGMENT

There are two applications before this Court, as follows –

the Defendant's application vide Enclosure 11, a Notice of Application dated 8 January 2026 seeking, inter alia, an order to set aside the ex parte injunction order dated 17 November 2025 (Enclosure 6) and to dismiss the Originating Summons (ex parte) (Enclosure 1); and

the Plaintiff's application under Enclosure 1 for an inter partes injunction.

Both parties have filed affidavits and written submissions addressing both Enclosures. By the Court's direction recorded at Enclosure 19 paragraph 2(d)(4), the decision of both Enclosure 1 and Enclosure 11 was fixed for today, 13 April 2026.

The material facts, which are largely undisputed, may be briefly stated. The Defendant, as landlord, entered into a Tenancy Agreement dated 1 March 2021 ("TA-1") with the Plaintiff, as tenant, to rent a piece of land measuring approximately 0.5 acres at PTD 1603, Mukim Tanjung Kupang, Iskandar Puteri, Johor for the Plaintiff's ship building and maintenance business.

Thereafter, the parties entered into a Supplemental Agreement dated 1 September 2021 ("TA-2") whereby the tenanted premises were relocated to a larger parcel of approximately 0.66 acres ("the Premises") at the same rent.

A dispute arose between the parties. The Plaintiff alleges breaches of contract by the Defendant, including failure to obtain licences and permits for ship docking, interference with the Plaintiff's operations, and the issuance of invalid Notices of Termination dated 9 August 2024 and 29 November 2024. The Defendant denies these allegations and contends that the Plaintiff is in breach of the tenancy terms.

The litigation history between the parties is significant. Prior to the commencement of these proceedings, the Plaintiff had filed a Civil Suit vide Johor Bahru High Court Civil Suit No. : JA-22NCVC-10- 01/2025 ("the Previous Civil Suit") in January 2025, in which the Plaintiff had also applied for an injunction vide Enclosure 15 therein. A Consent Order was recorded on 7 August 2025, under which the Plaintiff withdrew the Writ, the Statement of Claim and the injunction application (Enclosure 15), with liberty to file afresh.

The Defendant subsequently filed Civil Suit No. : JA-22NCVC-128- 10/2025 ("Civil Suit 128") on 1 October 2025, claiming inter alia a declaration that TA-1 and TA-2 have been terminated, vacant possession, double rent, and damages. The Plaintiff filed a Defence and Counter Claim in Civil Suit 128, seeking declarations that TA-1 and TA-2 remain valid, that the termination notices are void, specific performance and damages.

Notwithstanding the pendency of Civil Suit 128 (in which the Plaintiff has a live Counter Claim raising the very same substantive issues), the Plaintiff commenced these present proceedings by way of Originating Summons (ex parte) on 13 November 2025 (Enclosure 1), seeking only injunctive relief under Section 50 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 and Order 29 of the Rules of Court 2012.

The Plaintiff also filed a further Originating Summons vide JA- 24NCVC-1710-11/2025 claiming substantially the same reliefs as the Counter Claim in Civil Suit 128.

The ex parte injunction order was granted on 17 November 2025 (Enclosure 6), with the inter partes hearing originally fixed for 12 January 2026.

The Defendant's Enclosure 11 prayer (a) seeks an order that the ex parte order dated 17 November 2025 be set aside.

The ex parte order was, by its own terms, expressed to subsist "sehingga keputusan muktamad pendengaran inter-parte di dalam prosiding ini", that is, until the final decision of the inter partes hearing in these proceedings. The Court is now hearing the matter inter partes. Both parties have had the full opportunity to file affidavits and written submissions. Whatever arguments the Defendant says were suppressed at the ex parte stage (including the alleged non-disclosure of the Previous Civil Suit, the Consent Order, the existence of Civil Suit 128, and related matters) are now fully before the Court.

Once this Court makes a decision on the inter partes application, that decision supersedes and replaces the ex parte order. There is no further utility in separately determining whether the ex parte order was properly obtained.

Therefore, Enclosure 11 prayer (a) is accordingly dismissed as academic.

Enclosure 11 prayer (b) seeks an order that the Originating Summons (ex parte), being Enclosure 1 be dismissed. The Defendant raises what is in substance a preliminary objection : that the Originating Summons discloses no subsisting cause of action, that it is an abuse of the process of the Court, and that the injunctive relief sought cannot be granted in these proceedings.

I propose to deal with this preliminary objection first, as it goes to the root of whether Enclosure 1 is a proper vehicle for the relief sought. If the preliminary objection succeeds, there is no need to consider the merits of the injunction application.

The Plaintiff commenced these proceedings under Section 50 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 [Act 137] and Order 29 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC 2012”). It is therefore necessary to examine the statutory framework governing preventive relief under the Act.

Section 4 of Act 137 provides that specific relief is given by five methods –

recovering possession of property;

ordering a party to perform an obligation;

preventing a party from doing what he is under an obligation not to do;

declaratory decrees; and

appointing a receiver.

Section 5 of Act 137 provides that specific relief granted under Section 4(c) of Act 137, i.e., preventing a party from doing what he is under an obligation not to do, is called "preventive relief". The injunction is the remedy by which preventive relief is granted. It follows that the injunction is not a cause of action per se but a form of relief ancillary to an underlying obligation.

Section 50 of Act 137 provides simply : "Preventive relief is granted at the discretion of the court by injunction, temporary or perpetual". This is a discretionary power provision. It identifies the mechanism by which preventive relief is delivered. It does not create an independent cause of action or a standalone right to seek injunctive relief divorced from any underlying obligation or suit.

Section 51 of Act 137 draws the distinction between temporary and perpetual injunctions. Section 51(1) of Act 137 provides – "Temporary injunctions are such as are to continue until a specified time, or until the further order of the court. They may be granted at any period of a suit and are regulated by the law relating to civil procedure".

The words "at any period of a suit" are significant. A temporary injunction presupposes the existence of a suit within which it operates. It is an interlocutory measure granted during the pendency of a suit to preserve the status quo pending the determination of the substantive rights of the parties.

Section 51(2) of Act 137 provides – "A perpetual injunction can only be granted by the decree made at the hearing and upon the merits of the suit".

Again, the word "suit" appears. A perpetual injunction is the final relief granted upon the merits of a substantive suit.

Section 52 of Act 137 identifies the substantive basis for a perpetual injunction. It may be granted "to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in favour of the applicant, whether expressly or by implication". This provision confirms that the foundation of injunctive relief is the existence of an obligation, whether arising from contract or from the invasion of a proprietary right, whose breach is threatened or occurring.

Reading Sections 4, 5, 50, 51 and 52 of Act 137 together, the statutory scheme is clear : the injunction, whether temporary or perpetual is a remedy, not a right. It is the instrument by which specific relief is delivered in respect of an underlying obligation or cause of action. It cannot stand on its own in a vacuum, divorced from any substantive proceedings in which the rights and obligations of the parties fall to be determined.

The policy rationale for this statutory scheme is plain. Part III of Act 137, in its structure, treats the injunction as a form of specific relief that serves the administration of justice by protecting substantive rights, not as an end in itself. To permit an injunction to be sought and obtained in proceedings that contain no substantive claim for the determination of rights would be to convert the remedy into a free-standing cause of action, untethered from the very obligation it is meant to protect. This the Act does not countenance.

It might be argued that Section 50 of Act 137, by conferring a discretion to grant injunctions "temporary or perpetual", empowers the Court to entertain a standalone application for injunctive relief by way of originating summons without any further substantive relief being claimed. I do not accept this. Section 50 confers a power; it does not create a cause of action. The power must be exercised within the framework prescribed by the Act - a framework which requires an underlying obligation (Section 52), a suit within which the temporary injunction operates (Section 51(1)) and a hearing on the merits upon which a perpetual injunction may be decreed (Section 51(2)). To read Section 50 of Act 137 in isolation, divorced from Sections 51 and 52 of Act 137, would be to ignore the architecture of the Act.

Against this statutory backdrop, I turn to examine the nature of Enclosure 1. The Originating Summons (ex parte) prays for the following reliefs –

an injunction restraining the Defendant from entering the

an injunction restraining the Defendant from offering tenancy of the Premises to third parties;

an injunction restraining the Defendant from obstructing the Plaintiff's access to and use of the Premises;

an undertaking as to damages;

costs; and

other relief.

Conspicuously absent from Enclosure 1 are any prayers for a declaration (whether as to the validity of TA-1 and TA-2, or as to the invalidity of the termination notices), any prayer for specific performance, any prayer for damages, or any other substantive relief. The only reliefs sought are the three injunctions at (a) to (c), all of which are expressed to subsist "sehingga keputusan muktamad pendengaran inter-parte di dalam prosiding ini" - that is, until the conclusion of the inter partes hearing in these very proceedings.

The implications of this are stark. Once the inter partes hearing concludes, as it has today, the injunctive reliefs, even if granted, would immediately expire by their own terms. There is no substantive suit to speak of. There is no trial. There are no rights to be determined on the merits. The Originating Summons is, in substance, a bare vehicle for injunctive relief that has no life beyond the inter partes hearing.

This is precisely the situation contemplated by the House of Lords in Siskina (Cargo Owners) v Distos Cia Naviera SA, The Siskina [1979] AC 210, where Lord Diplock held that the right to obtain an interlocutory injunction is not a cause of action. It is dependent upon there being a pre-existing cause of action against the defendant arising out of an invasion, actual or threatened, of a legal or equitable right. The interlocutory injunction is merely ancillary and incidental to the pre-existing cause of action. It is granted to preserve the status quo pending the ascertainment by the court of the rights of the parties and the grant to the plaintiff of the relief to which the cause of action entitles him.

This principle is consistent with the position in other jurisdictions that share a common legislative heritage with Act 137. The Specific Relief Act 1950 [Act 137] is derived from the Indian Specific Relief Act 1877 (now re-enacted as the Specific Relief Act 1963). The Indian Supreme Court, in a Constitution Bench decision in State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta AIR 1952 SC 12, held that an interim relief can be granted only in aid of, and as ancillary to, the main relief which may be available to the party on final determination of his rights in a suit or proceeding. This was affirmed in Cotton Corporation Limited v. United Industrial Bank AIR 1983 SC 1272, where the Supreme Court held that the power to grant temporary injunction was conferred in aid of or as auxiliary to the final relief that may be granted and that if the final relief cannot be granted in the terms sought for, a temporary relief of the same nature cannot be granted.

The convergence of these authorities across jurisdictions reinforces the principle that an injunction, whether temporary or perpetual, is a remedy ancillary to a substantive cause of action and cannot exist independently of it. Section 54(i) of Act 137 - Equally Efficacious Relief Available

I now come to what I consider the strongest statutory ground for refusing the injunction sought under Enclosure 1. Section 54(i) of Act 137 provides – "An injunction cannot be granted –

when equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of proceeding, except in case of breach of trust".

The Plaintiff has Civil Suit 128 pending before this Court. In Civil Suit 128, the Plaintiff has filed a Defence and Counter Claim seeking the following substantive reliefs –

A declaration that the Tenancy Agreement dated 1 March 2021 (TA-1) and the Additional Agreement dated 1 September 2021 (TA-2) are still valid and in force;

A declaration that the Notices of Termination dated 9 August 2024 and/or 29 November 2024 are null and void;

Specific performance against the Defendant to comply with its obligations under TA-1 and TA-2;

Special damages;

General damages; and

Exemplary damages.

Civil Suit 128 is the proceeding in which the substantive tenancy dispute between the parties falls to be determined. The Plaintiff's Counter Claim in Civil Suit 128 raises the very same factual and legal issues that underpin the injunctive relief sought in these proceedings, the validity of the tenancy agreements, the alleged breaches by the Defendant and the invalidity of the termination notices. The Plaintiff could have and I find, should have applied for an interlocutory injunction in Civil Suit 128 as an equally efficacious mode of proceeding.

The prohibition in Section 54(i) of Act 137 is clear and unambiguous. Where equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of proceeding, the injunction cannot be granted. The word used is "cannot" it is mandatory, not discretionary. An interlocutory injunction application in Civil Suit 128 would constitute an "other usual mode of proceeding" that is equally efficacious, if not more so, because it would be anchored to the substantive proceedings where the parties' rights will ultimately be determined.

The principle may be stated thus : where an applicant has a pending suit before a court of competent jurisdiction in which the same substantive issues are being litigated and in which an interlocutory injunction application could be made, the commencement of a separate originating process solely for injunctive relief is barred by Section 54(i) of Act 137. The pending suit constitutes an "other usual mode of proceeding" that is "equally efficacious" within the meaning of the provision. To hold otherwise would be to permit the very multiplicity of proceedings that Section 54(i) of Act 137 is designed to prevent. While the Defendant did not invoke Section 54(i) of Act 137 by name, the substance of the objection, that the Plaintiff had a pending suit (Civil Suit 128) in which the same relief could and should have been sought and that the commencement of these separate proceedings was an unnecessary duplication, was squarely raised in the Defendant's Written Submissions (Enclosure 13, paragraphs 15 and 17) and Reply Submissions (Enclosure 19). The Plaintiff was therefore on notice of and had the opportunity to meet, that substance. It offered no explanation, whether in the Affidavit Jawapan (Enclosure 17) or in the Written Submissions (Enclosure 15), for why the injunction was sought by way of a separate Originating Summons rather than by way of an interlocutory application in Civil Suit 128. The Plaintiff's Written Submissions in Enclosure 15 proceed entirely on the American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 merits and do not engage with the availability of relief in Civil Suit 128 or with the threshold validity of the Originating Summons. Section 54(f) of Act 137 Read with Section 20(1)(g) of Act 137

I also make an observation on Section 54(f) of Act 137, which provides that an injunction cannot be granted "to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced" and Section 20(1)(g) of Act 137 provides that a contract cannot be specifically enforced where "the performance of which involves the performance of a continuous duty extending over a longer period than three years from its date".

The Defendant's Reply Written Submissions (Enclosure 19) at paragraph 13(e)-(f) identifies that the Tenancy Agreement (TA-1) provides for automatic renewal under Clause 8 and that Section 6 of