(ii) whether the learned judge erred in dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim over the balance or the rest of the areas of land within the boundary marked in exhibits P27, P28 and P29. Civil Appeal No. Q-01-368-09/2014 15 [35] We do not propose to set out in detail the arguments advanced by the respective parties in this grounds of judgment. Suffice to state that for the plaintiffs, it was submitted that the learned judge made no error in granting the plaintiffs’ claim for NCR over the specific patches of cleared areas in exhibits D80 and D81. Learned counsel submitted that his Lordship had made findings on the plaintiffs’ claim and had arrived at the decision upon a critical assessment of the evidence and upon testing it against other evidence on record and against the probabilities of the case. The learned judge had also relied on exhibits D80 and D81 in finding for the plaintiffs. [36] On the balance of the areas claimed, learned counsel submitted that the learned judge fell into error in doubting exhibits P27, P28 and P29 and in not giving weight to the community map and in not recognizing the plaintiffs’ NCR over the balance of the land which was not cultivated or used for farming and gardening. [37] In opposing the plaintiffs’ appeal and in support of its cross appeal, the fourth defendant argued that the alleged tana’ dalleh of the plaintiffs comprise of both cleared land and primary jungle. Following the majority decision of the Federal Court in Director of Forest, Sarawak v TR Sandah Tabau & Ors and another appeals [2017] 3 CLJ 1 (“TR Sandah”), tana’ dalleh is not NCR land. [38] It was also argued for the fourth defendant that the plaintiffs’ appeal that relates to the balance of claimed area must fail because the plaintiffs have no NCR over the land claimed in the first place and even if they have, the plaintiffs have lost that right to logging which had taken place pursuant to various timber Civil Appeal No. Q-01-368-09/2014 16 licences for more than 20 years without any objection or complaint on the part of the plaintiffs. [39] The crux of the fifth defendant’s submission was that the plaintiffs’ right cannot prevail over the fifth defendant’s indefeasible title to Lot 10 Punan Land District and that the plaintiffs’ action against the fifth defendant is time barred under the Sarawak Limitation Ordinance. [40] For the first to the third defendants, it was submitted that the learned judge should not have granted the plaintiffs’ claim for the specific labelled areas in exhibits D80 and D81 as the application of Temenggong Nyipa from Uma Kahei for the development of the NCR land at Sg. Pih Block 2, Belaga had been approved by the first defendant in 2009 (see exhibit D45). For the balance of the areas claimed by the plaintiffs, the first to the third defendants likewise submitted that based on the judgment of the Federal Court in TR Sandah, the plaintiffs cannot claim for the jungles not cleared for cultivation. [41] The interveners submitted that the cleared areas labelled as No. 38 and 39 in exhibit D80 is part of Sungai Pih (Block 2 Belaga NCR Development Area). The development had been approved by the first defendant, the Government of Sarawak, to be the NCR development area of Uma Kahei. This fact, according to the interveners, proves that the first defendant had recognized the labelled areas No. 38 and 39 to be the NCR of Uma Kahei. Civil Appeal No. Q-01-368-09/2014 17 Our Findings [42] In respect of the plaintiffs’ appeal, we were unanimous in our view that by the decision of the Federal Court in TR Sandah, which we were bound to follow, the plaintiffs were not entitled to the balance of the area claimed, being the virgin jungle not cultivated. [43] In TR Sandah, among the questions of law posed for determination by the Federal Court was “whether the pre-existence of rights under native laws and customs which the common law respects include rights to land in the virgin/primary forests which the natives, like the respondents and their ancestors (who are Iban by race), had not felled or cultivated but were forests which they have reserved for food and forest produce”. The Federal Court, by majority answered the question in the negative. [44] The plaintiffs’ appeal against the dismissal of their NCR claim over areas not cultivated therefore has no merits and was consequently dismissed. [45] Insofar as the cross-appeals were concerned, we were unable to agree with learned counsel for the plaintiffs that the learned judge had critically evaluated the evidence. [46] Having perused the records of appeal, we found that the evidence led by the plaintiffs were not sufficient to establish a claim over the said lands labelled as No. 4, 5, 9, 16, 25, 36, 37, 38 and 39 in exhibit D80 and labelled as No. 27 in exhibit D81. The plaintiffs have not proved that they or their ancestors had cleared those specific areas shown in Exhibits D80 and D81. Civil Appeal No. Q-01-368-09/2014 18 [47] It is trite that the burden is always on the plaintiffs to prove their NCR claim. In the instant case, the learned judge doubted the accuracy of the maps produced by the plaintiffs and had instead relied on exhibits D80 and D81 prepared by DW1 to find that the plaintiffs have acquired NCR over the specific areas labelled as No. 4, 5, 9, 16, 25, 36, 37, 38 and 39 in D80 and labelled as No. 27 in D81. This approach was rejected by this Court in Bohari bin Jaya & Ors v Naim Land Sdn Bhd & Ors [2016] 4 MLJ 631 where Varghese George JCA said at pg. 645: “[24] What the plaintiffs appear to be relying upon to identify the claimed NCR land limits was merely the material that had been introduced instead by the defendants in their evidence. … [25] In our considered view, this ‘fall-back’ approach that has been taken by the plaintiffs to identify the exact alleged encroached area ought not to be condoned by the courts, that is notwithstanding the application of a flexible approach as judicially encouraged with respect to dealing with NCR claims. If such a latitude was allowed wherein the plaintiffs’ required proof of the location was based solely on the defendants’ evidence, this would, in our assessment, amount to the courts approving a shifting of the burden of proof (which was always upon the plaintiffs), …”. [48] Further, the learned judge acknowledged that the area claimed by the plaintiffs had been settled and cultivated by others, as apparent from the following findings of the learned judge: “23. From the evidence adduced, the Batang Belaga and its hinterland have been settled by the Kayan, Kenyah, Lahanan and Penan, and subsequently by the Iban, along or near to rivers or streams which they used for water and mode of travel years ago. These settlements have been documented in the Sarawak Civil Appeal No. Q-01-368-09/2014 19 Gazette in 1882, 1916, 1924, 1936 and 1949 (see exhibits D10, D11, D12, D13, D15, D16, D17, D18 and D19). DW1 had on behalf of 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants produced two maps tendered as exhibits D47 and D48 in respect of the areas covered by the PL. These maps showed that some areas of land had been cleared for cultivation inside the PL based on serial photographs taken in 1951 and 1963. The total of these cleared areas in 1951 amounted to 410.2 hectares. These confirmed that there were settlements along and in the hinterland of the Batang Belaga. Therefore NCR would have been created, acquired and or inherited in the Batang Belaga areas by these peoples.”. [49] In the light of the learned judge’s express finding that the NCR would have been created, acquired and/or inherited in the Batang Belaga areas by Kayan, Kenyah, Lahanan, Penan and Iban, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs have proved, on a balance of probabilities their NCR claim for the land. [50] In addition, the learned judge found that logging had taken place for over 20 years. The concept of continuous occupation has always been recognized as an essential feature of NCR to land. In Director of Forests, Sarawak & Anor v Racha ak Urud @ Peter Racha Urud & ors and other appeals [2017] 4 MLJ 42, the respondents claimed that following the grant by the Director of Forests, Sarawak, of timber licences and licences to plant forests to the four appellant companies, the latter had trespassed onto lands over which the respondents had acquired NCR. The Federal Court held that on the facts, the respondents no longer possessed, planted or maintained their NCR lands in their previous settlements where logging activities by the appellants had been carried out for about 20 years before the commencement of the suit against the appellants. The Federal Court stated that it was inconceivable that the respondents would not have known of the presence of the logging activities on the land for over a Civil Appeal No. Q-01-368-09/2014 20 period of 26 years had they been in occupation of the land and that the uncontradicted evidence was inconsistent with ‘occupation’. [51] Similarly in the instant case. Given the finding of fact by the learned judge that logging had been carried out for more than 20 years, even if the plaintiffs could establish any rights, which was not the case, the plaintiffs’ right would have been lost when the plaintiffs permitted the land to be used by Perbadanan Perusahaan Kemajuan Kayu Sarawak, the licensee of Timber Licences No. T/3190 and T/4176 and Kastima, the logging contractor who are not natives. [52] The conduct of PW2 in asking for permission to use Kastima’s logging roads within LPF/0013 in relation to the application and renewal of the belian licence is conclusive evidence of the fact that the plaintiffs did not occupy the claimed areas logged by the fourth defendant. [53] As for the PL issued to the fifth defendant, the law is settled that the rights of the plaintiffs cannot prevail over the indefeasible title of the fifth defendant. In TH Pelita Sadong Sdn Bhd & Anor v TR Nyutan Jami & Ors and Other Appeals [2018] 1 CLJ 19, Raus Sharif CJ said at pg. 35: “[28] It can be seen that although s. 132 of the Sarawak Land Code is not similarly worded as s. 340 of the National Land Code (NLC), the net legal effect of the indefeasibility accorded to s. 340 of the NLC may admit to the same construction as s. 132 of the Sarawak Land Code. In the absence of fraud, upon registration of a charge, the party in whose favour the registration has been effected will obtain an indefeasible title to/or interest in the land. This is a given. … Civil Appeal No. Q-01-368-09/2014 21 [32] We agree that titles should not be issued over land encumbered with NCR unless they have been extinguished; but with respect, we hold the view that, once titles are issued, indefeasibility of title sets in … [33] The disputed lands being registered entities accorded protection to the interested parties under the aegis of indefeasibility. The orders made by the trial judge to nullify the provisional lease or to exclude areas claimed by the plaintiff as their NCR, where no fraud has been alleged against the registered owners of the land under the provisional leases or registered charge thereof, thus, would be contrary to the doctrine of indefeasibility of title embodied under s. 132 of the Sarawak Land Code. …”. [54] The provisional lease was issued to the fifth defendant in April 1997. This action was filed by the plaintiffs 13 years later, in 2010. On the authority of Litus Jau & Anor v Boustead Pelita Tinjar Sdn Bhd & Ors [2014] 1 CLJ 880, we found that the plaintiffs’ claim was time barred. In Litus Jau, Raus Sharif PCA (as the CJ then was) said at pg. 898: “[33] The issue now is when the plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued. Looking at the facts objectively it is safe to conclude that the plaintiffs’ cause of action against the second and third defendants accrued after the issuance of the provisional lease in