The Defendant further relies on proceedings previously commenced by CK Rubber Industries Sdn Bhd challenging the Plaintiff's acquisition of the property. During the hearing of the present application, it was brought to the attention of this Court that the said suit, namely Civil Suit No. AA-22NCvC-76-09/2025 had already been struck out pursuant to the striking out application. It is against this factual and procedural background that the Court is required to determine whether the Defendant has established any bona fide triable issue sufficient to warrant a full trial or whether the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment under Order 14 of the Rules of Court 2012. THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS FOR ORDER 14 [4] The threshold requirements for an application under Order 14 are well settled. In National Company for Foreign Trade v Kayu Raya Sdn Bhd [1984] 1 MLRA 190; [1984] 2 CLJ 220; [1984] 2 MLJ 300, the Federal Court held that before the Court may exercise its jurisdiction to enter summary judgment, three preliminary conditions must first be satisfied, namely that the defendant has entered appearance, the statement of claim has been served. The affidavit in support verifies the facts of the claim and states the deponent's belief that there is no defence to the action. [5] Having examined the record before me, I am satisfied that the threshold requirements have been fully complied with. The application is therefore properly before this Court for determination. PLAINTIFF'S REGISTERED TITLE [6] The Plaintiff has established a prima facie case by producing the issue document of title, which shows that it is the registered proprietor of the property, having purchased it from CK Rubber Industries Sdn Bhd for RM4.5 million. Under section 340 of the National Land Code, the title is indefeasible unless impeached under a recognised statutory exception. However, none has been properly pleaded by the Defendant. Although the Defendant relied on Civil Suit No. AA-22NCvC-76-09/2025 to challenge the Plaintiff's title, that suit has been struck out, and no stay has been obtained pending appeal. The Federal Court in Teh Bee v K Maruthamuthu [1977] 1 MLRA 110; [1977] 2 MLJ 7; [1977] CLJU 134 reaffirmed the fundamental principle of the Torrens system that the registered title prevails until set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. Ali Ag CJ (Malaya) observed: "Consistent with Teh Bee v K Maruthamuthu [1977] 1 MLRA 110, where His Lordship emphasised that "the register is everything" in that until a registered title is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction, it remains valid and effective in law.” His Lordship then endorsed the following passage from the Privy Council decision in Creelman & Anor v Hudson Bay Insurance Co.: "There is also another much more important reason why this appeal should be allowed. Under the Torrens System the register is everything. So said SK Das on page 102 of his book on the Torrens System in Malaya." Underline emphasized [7] Accordingly, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff has established its proprietary right and its corresponding entitlement to immediate possession of the property. [8] The Defendant's defence is founded entirely on an alleged tenancy with the previous owner, CK Rubber Industries Sdn Bhd. However, the written tenancy agreement clearly shows that the tenancy expired on 31 January 2024, and no written extension until 2027 has been produced. A bare assertion cannot override the express terms of the agreement. Furthermore, the tenancy was entered into solely between the Defendant and CK Rubber Industries Sdn Bhd. The tenancy agreement created rights and obligations only between CK Rubber Industries Sdn Bhd and the Defendant. The Plaintiff, not being a party to that agreement, cannot be compelled to recognise or continue the alleged tenancy. This is a direct application of the doctrine of privity of contract affirmed by the Federal Court in Schmidt v Kepong Prospecting Ltd & Ors [1964] 1 MLRA 482; [1964] 1 MLJ 416; [1964] CLJU 183, whereto the Federal Court reaffirms the doctrine of privity of contract by approving the following statement of Lord Haldane: "In the law of England certain principles are fundamental. One is that only a person who is a party to a contract can sue on it. Our law knows nothing of a jus quaesitum tertio arising by way of contract. Such a right may be conferred by way of property, as, for example, under a trust, but it cannot be conferred on a stranger to a contract as a right to enforce the contract in personam." The Federal Court further observed that the agreement was "a perfectly good contract" between the contracting parties, but its enforcement was confined to those parties: "Certainly, that agreement was not enforceable by the appellant. But it was not void. It was a perfectly good contract... As far as the enforceability of their promise is concerned they might just as well have promised to pay the tribute to the Lost Dog's Home, only again the promise would not have been enforceable by that institution but by Mr. Tan." [9] Accordingly, the Plaintiff's registered title and right to immediate possession remain unimpeached, whilst the Defendant's alleged tenancy confers no enforceable right against the Plaintiff. WHETHER TRIABLE ISSUES EXIST [10] Once the Plaintiff established a prima facie case, the evidential burden shifted to the Defendant to disclose bona fide triable issues. Applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail Ali Johor & Ors [1992] 1 MLRA 190; [1992] 1 CLJ 627; [1992] 1 MLJ 400, I find that the Defendant's allegations are speculative, lacking in precision, and inconsistent with the contemporaneous documentary evidence. They therefore do not constitute bona fide triable issues capable of resisting summary judgment. The majority judgment of His Lordship Mohd Azmi SCJ in Bank Negara Malaysia (supra) states: "Under an O 14 application, the duty of a Judge does not end as soon as a fact is asserted by one party, and denied or disputed by the other on affidavit. Where such assertion, denial or dispute is equivocal, or lacking in precision or is inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or other statements by the same deponent or is inherently improbable in itself, then the Judge has a duty to reject such assertion or denial, thereby rendering the issue as not triable." [11] The Defendant principally relied on Civil Suit No. AA-22NCvC-76- 09/2025 to contend that the Plaintiff's title is under challenge. However, that suit has already been struck out by the High Court. Although an appeal has been filed, no stay of the striking-out order or stay of these proceedings has been obtained. Accordingly, there is no subsisting legal impediment restraining this Court from determining the present application for summary judgment. The Defendant's remaining allegations likewise do not raise any genuine dispute concerning the Plaintiff's registered title, the expiry of the tenancy on 31 January 2024, or the absence of contractual privity between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. They amount only to collateral matters which cannot defeat the Plaintiff's immediate proprietary right to possession. [12] I therefore find that the Defendant has failed to disclose any bona fide triable issue sufficient to justify the matter proceeding to a full trial. MESNE PROFITS [13] The Plaintiff has produced an independent valuation report assessing the reasonable market rental at RM65,000 per month, supported by comparable rental data and a proper valuation methodology. Although the Defendant disputes the valuation, it has not produced any contrary valuation report or expert evidence. The dispute, therefore, concerns only the quantum of mesne profits and does not affect the Plaintiff's entitlement to vacant possession. Accordingly, I direct that mesne profits be assessed separately after judgment, with liberty for the Defendant to adduce evidence on the quantum claimed. [14] In deciding this case, three (3) distinct principles can be distilled from above: a) A registered proprietor's title remains valid and enforceable until judicially set aside. As such, any pending challenge or appeal, in the absence of a stay, does not suspend the proprietor's ownership rights; b) A tenancy binds only its contracting parties; a subsequent purchaser is not obliged to recognise or continue an expired tenancy without agreement; and c) Once a prima facie case is established, the Defendant must disclose genuine triable issues; speculative or collateral disputes cannot defeat summary judgment. CONCLUSION [15] Having considered the pleadings, affidavits, documentary evidence, valuation report, written submissions, and the applicable authorities, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff has established its entitlement to vacant possession of the premises. [16] The Defendant has failed to disclose any bona fide triable issue warranting a full trial. The defences raised are speculative and collateral in nature and do not displace the Plaintiff's rights as the registered proprietor under section 340 of the National Land Code. Accordingly, Enclosure 9 is allowed with the following orders: a) Summary judgment is entered in favour of the Plaintiff for vacant possession of the premises known as Lot 25, Medan Tasek, Tasek Industrial Estate, Ipoh. b) The Defendant shall deliver vacant possession of the said premises within thirty (30) days from the date of this judgment. c) The Plaintiff's claim for mesne profits shall proceed for assessment by way of affidavit evidence, with liberty for the Defendant to file an affidavit in reply and adduce evidence in relation to the valuation report and the quantum claimed. d) Enclosure 20 is dismissed as there is no subsisting suit capable of consolidation following the striking out of Civil Suit No. AA- 22NCvC-76-09/2025, and no basis for the interim stay sought. e) The Defendant shall pay costs of RM10,000.00, subject to allocator, to the Plaintiff. f) The Defendant is at liberty to appeal. Any application for a stay pending appeal shall be made by way of a formal application, and no stay is granted at this stage. Dated : 14th July 2026 [MOSES SUSAYAN] JUDGE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT IPOH, PERAK Counsel : For the Plaintiff : Tan Sri Darshan Singh (together with Surinder Singh) Advocates and Solicitors [Messrs Darshan, Syed, Amarjit & Partners] Ipoh, Perak For the Defendant : N. Ahilan Natarajah Advocates and Solicitors [Messrs N. Ahilan & Associates] Georgetown (Notice: This Grounds of Decision is subject to official editorial revision) Headnotes: CIVIL PROCEDURE: Summary judgment – Application under Order 14 Rules of Court 2012 – Vacant possession – Registered proprietor seeking immediate possession – Defendant relying on expired tenancy granted by previous owner – Whether registered title under section 340 National Land Code remained valid and enforceable – Whether subsequent purchaser bound by tenancy agreement to which it was not a party – Doctrine of privity of contract – Whether pending suit challenging title, subsequently struck out without stay, constituted a bona fide triable issue – Whether speculative and collateral disputes defeated summary judgment – Assessment of mesne profits by affidavit evidence.