Where goods or services are supplied by an agent acting on behalf of a principal, the supply shall be deemed to be made by the principal and not by the agent. [68] We must state the obvious that section 65(1) provides that it can only be invoked when the appellant taxpayer, as the agent, actually makes a supply on behalf of DOPL (its principal). The supply is deemed to be made by the principal and not by the agent only if the goods or services (such as the R&D services) are supplied by the agent acting on behalf of a principal (DOPL). There must be goods or services supplied by the agent to a third party on behalf of DOPL for section 65(1) to be applicable. [69] Section 65(1) is manifestly irrelevant to the present case. Instead, given the facts of this case, and we are referring to the R&D services supplied by the appellant, the relevant provision applicable here is section 65(3) of the GST Act which states that where a service is supplied through an agent acting in his own name, the supply shall be treated as a supply by the agent. It reads: “(3) Where goods or services are supplied through an agent acting in his own name, the supply shall be treated as a supply to the agent and as a supply by the agent.” [70] It is of interest to note that as correctly submitted by the appellant, the respondent did not actually identify what supply the appellant taxpayer, as agent, is making on behalf of DOPL. In this connection, we must reiterate that this appeal is concerned solely with the issue of whether the R&D services supplied by the appellant taxpayer to DOPL is a zero-S/N iCWeuEPz8kqy6lUfk78nA rated supply pursuant to Item 12 of the Second Schedule to the Zero-Rated Order. This appeal is definitely not about the liability to GST of any goods and services supplied by DOPL to Malaysian entities. [71] It is clear to us that the R&D services were supplied by the appellant in its own capacity, and not in the capacity as DOPL’s agent. Significantly, the relevant contract between the appellant and DOPL - the R&D Agreement - which was executed on 8 November 2012 well before the GST Act came into effect on 1 April 2015 plainly stated in its recital and clause 2 that the appellant is providing the R&D services to DOPL as the service recipient; and for DOPL to make payment to the appellant for the R&D services under Clause 9.2. [72] There is, we reiterate, additionally nothing that gives the appellant the authority to enter into any business transaction on behalf of DOPL. And as averred by the appellant, consistent with the Letter of Appointment and the provisions of the GST Act, as an agent appointed under section 65(6), it has no power to enter into any business arrangement or transaction on behalf of DOPL, which the respondent did not dispute in affidavit. We repeat that we are satisfied that there is no evidence that the appellant taxpayer had actually supplied goods and services as agent for DOPL to DOPL’s customers or carried on business on DOPL’s behalf in Malaysia. Indeed, the appellant, as an agent under section 65(6) is neither competent nor authorised to do so. [73] Thus, under no circumstance of this case can it be stated that DOPL is both the service provider and service recipient of the R&D services at the same time. Otherwise, if the R&D services were deemed provided by DOPL, then the inescapable inference must be that the R&D services were S/N iCWeuEPz8kqy6lUfk78nA deemed supplied by DOPL to itself - which would offend the rule against constructing statute in a fashion that would result in an absurdity. Thus Section 65(1) of the GST Act, much relied on by the respondent, is only applicable to a supply provided by an agent on behalf of a principal. It has no application to the facts of the instant case because the R&D services were not provided by the appellant as an agent on behalf of DOPL. [74] In the final analysis, in our view, on a true construction of section 65(6) of the GST Act, the appointment of the appellant taxpayer as a GST agent does not result in DOPL being considered to be a person belonging in Malaysia, as incorrectly found by the High Court, but that instead Section 65(6) highlights that the appellant is deemed not to belong in Malaysia vis-à-vis its agency functions. [75] As such, it is our judgment that the conclusion of the learned High Court Judge that by virtue of the appellant’s appointment as DOPL’s agent under section 65(6) of the GST Act, the appellant is construed as DOPL’s “fixed establishment” in Malaysia, resulting in DOPL being considered to be belonging in Malaysia for the purposes of the Zero-Rated Order – thus refusing the claim of the appellant for zero-rated GST in respect of the supply of R&D services to DOPL - to have been made in error. We are also of the view that the High Court had not correctly construed section 65(1) of the GST Act in holding that the appellant taxpayer’s appointment under section 65(6) meant that the appellant’s supplies are deemed to be made by DOPL under section 65(1), such that DOPL is erroneously considered to be in Malaysia at the time the services were provided. [76] We further agree with the submission of the appellant that even if assuming DOPL were deemed to have fixed establishment in both S/N iCWeuEPz8kqy6lUfk78nA Singapore and Malaysia (with the appellant as DOPL’s fixed establishment), there is still the need to meet the second criterion of the test under aforementioned paragraph 2(2)(b)(iii) of the Zero-Rated Order, which is whether DOPL’s establishment which is most directly concerned with DOPL’s supplies is in Malaysia (in order to attract standard rate GST). [77] As such, the analysis by the High Court which found that DOPL as belonging in Malaysia under the Zero-Rated Order by reason that DOPL has a fixed establishment in Malaysia is therefore one made without considering the entirety of the provision in paragraph 2(2)(b)(iii). This is significant since the appellant’s case is that DOPL’s establishment which is most directly concerned with its supply is in Singapore, not Malaysia. [78] The making of taxable supplies of the Dyson products in Malaysia by DOPL does not necessarily mean that the supplier, such as DOPL must belong in Malaysia. That much is clear based on section 65(6). And applying Item 12 of the Second Schedule to the Zero-Rated Order, we again hold that the R&D services provided by the appellant to DOPL is a zero-rated supply because firstly, it is supplied under the R&D Agreement; secondly, as discussed earlier, DOPL is a “person who belongs in a country other than Malaysia”; and thirdly the R&D services directly benefitted DOPL who was outside Malaysia at the time the R&D services were performed. Further, fourthly, even if the appellant constituted DOPL’s fixed establishment in Malaysia (which we found not to be the case), given that DOPL undoubtedly operates in Singapore and could also therefore be expected to have a fixed or business establishment in the Republic, there was nonetheless no determination or evidence referred to by the respondent or the High Court that the “fixed establishment” that is “most directly concerned with” the DOPL’s supply is in fact in Malaysia, as S/N iCWeuEPz8kqy6lUfk78nA compared to Singapore, within the meaning of paragraph 2(2)(b)(iii) of the Second Schedule to the Zero-Rated Order. [79] As for other issues, apart from the respondent, as did the High Court, inaccurately in the context, having regard to section 14(2) of the GST Act (but omitted reference to section 14(1) which clearly states that section 14 is only applicable to the determination of the place of belonging of a supplier of services such as the appellant taxpayer, and not that of a service recipient such as DOPL), the respondent also applied the definition of “fixed establishment” under the Royal Malaysian Customs Guide on Supply dated 13 February 2017 (which has no force of law) which led to the conclusion that DOPL is deemed to have a fixed establishment in Malaysia through the appellant’s appointment as the agent. [80] We need only mention for emphasis that the construction of not only statutes, but also of written documents, such as the said Royal Malaysian Customs Guide on Supply and the aforementioned Letter of Appointment is a question of law for determination by the Court, such that even witness evidence is irrelevant (see the Court of Appeal decision in NVJ Menon v The Great Eastern Life Assurance Company Ltd [2004] 3 MLJ 38). [81] The other issue with the stance of the respondent concerns the claim that the appellant had, following the audit by the respondent, failed to produce documentary proof, specifically in the form of the export declaration form (“K2 Form”) in order to prove export. The High Court too mentioned this, as follows: “[47] The facts before this court demonstrate that the Bill of Demand was issued after an audit was undertaken. There was a failure on the part of the Applicant to provide proof of documents S/N iCWeuEPz8kqy6lUfk78nA (Borang Kastam 2). Hence, it is the considered view of this court that the Respondent had taken into account the facts and circumstances of the Applicant. It cannot be said that the Respondent had exercised its authority arbitrarily”. [82] We would readily accept the appellant’s contention that whilst the K2 Form is a prescribed declaration form under the Customs Act 1967 for exported goods, the supply by the appellant taxpayer here to DOPL in Singapore is the R&D services. Thus, K2 Form is not necessary because it is not a requirement with respect to the export of services such as the R&D services. There is also some merit in the assertion that if there is no proof of supply, it follows that no GST should be raised on the taxpayer in the first place, considering the principle that GST is a tax on supply, not a tax on income. [83] Now, it is well-established that judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review on the manner a decision is made (see Harpers Trading (M) Sdn Bhd v National Union of Commercial Workers [1991] 1 MLJ 417). The three often quoted areas when a Court would interfere as decided in the Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister of Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 are on the grounds of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. [84] In light of authorities authorising judicial intervention in judicial review cases such as the Court of Appeal decision in Malaysian Oxygen Bhd v Soh Tong Wah and another appeal [2015] 3 MLJ 730 we find that in making the impugned decision, the respondent had so manifestly taken into consideration factors that ought not to have been taken into account and had at the same time failed to take into account factors that ought to have S/N iCWeuEPz8kqy6lUfk78nA been taken into consideration. It is also settled that this Court can, by way of judicial review, interfere with the respondent’s decision on the ground of illegality by scrutinising the decision not just for the process, but also for substance (see the landmark Federal Court decision in R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145). [85] The respondent did not also adequately consider the express provisions of the GST Act and Zero-Rated Order, the well-established principles of construction of taxing statutes, and the generally understood concept of GST that is concerned with the levy on the supply of goods or services made within local jurisdiction. [86] At the same time, such errors were exacerbated by the respondent having taken into consideration matters it should not have (such as section 14(2) of the GST Act, the requirement for K-Forms), and omitting matters it should have (such as not invoking section 65(3)), when applying the key provisions of section 65 of the GST Act and Item 12 of the Second Schedule to the Zero-Rated Order. We must emphasise that a failure to take into account some relevant facts or that irrelevant facts had been taken into account renders the decision of the relevant authority such as the respondent, one which is tainted with illegality as stated in the Federal Court decisions in R Rama Chandran v Industrial Court [1997] 1 MLJ 145 and Ranjit Kaur Gopal Singh v Hotel Excelsior (M) Sdn Bhd [2010] 6 MLJ