Untuk melaksanakan kerja-kerja tersebut untuk Blok B, Plaintif memerlukan set tambahan Tunnel Form untuk Blok B dan telah menulis surat kepada Defendan bertarikh 15/7/2020 untuk menyatakan hasrat Plaintif untuk membeli Tunnel Form tambahan dan Plaintif telah memberikan sebut harga (“quotation”) kepada Defendan yang berharga RM820,000.00 untuk purchase of the tunnel form. The respondent’s letter dated 13 July 2020 issued to the appellant which attached a quotation for the purchase of the tunnel form, referred to the Project. Similarly, a purchase order dated 15 July 2020, issued by the appellant to the respondent for the purchase of directly to the Project, and as such, the dispute regarding the purchase of the tunnel form is a matter arising from the contract between the parties, committed an error in fact and in law in assessing the issue of the respondent’s payment for the tunnel form and the appellant’s failure to return the tunnel form separately from the purpose of the purchase of the failed to assess the dispute between the parties in its entirety. Such a narrow approach in the consideration of the nature of the dispute and in “soft fit panel & vertical panel” termasuk “working platform, wing nut, stop end and all the necessary accessories”. (emphasis added) [22] It is clear from paragraph 5 that the requirement for an additional tunnel form arises from works to be completed for Block B of the Project. [23] I also considered documents issued by the parties for the the tunnel form also referred to the Project. [24] It is therefore clear that the purchase of the tunnel form relates and is subject to the arbitration agreement. [25] In this regard, I find that the learned Sessions Court judge tunnel form for the Project. [26] In adopting such reasoning, the learned Sessions Court judge agreement. This includes flexibility, privacy, and control over the dispute an arbitration agreement is entered into, the purpose of the parties would necessarily be to ensure that the benefits of arbitration would apply to the entirety of the matter which is subject to the arbitration agreement. The approach adopted by the learned Sessions Court judge is inconsistent Clause 34.5(a) of the PAM COC requires any dispute or difference arising encompass all possible nature of causes of action, as this would give the full commercial and practical effect to the arbitration agreement (see KNM Process Systems Sdn Bhd v Missions Biofuels Sdn Bhd [2013] 1 CLJ view, lacks commercial sense. [27] There are various reasons why parties enter into an arbitration resolution process, including the selection of the arbitrator(s). Thus, when with such purpose. [28] The construction of the arbitration agreement is also of guidance. between an employer and a contractor regarding: “any matter of whatsoever nature arising under or in connection with the Contract”, to be referred to arbitration. [29] The provision ought to be given a wide interpretation, taking into account commercial reality and the intention of the parties (see Press Metal Sarawak Sdn Bhd (supra)). Further, the linking words (“… arising 993). the interpretation of the provisions of the arbitration agreement, in my under or in connection with the Contract”) ought to be interpreted to based on unjust enrichment does not place the dispute outside the scope [2018] 5 CLJ 299, where the Court Appeal considered whether the arbitration agreement would cover causes of action of conspiracy to defraud / injure and the imposition of constructive trust. The provisions of the arbitration agreement in that case (i.e. “… any dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement... shall be referred to and finally interpreted widely, and that the claims premised on allegations of conspiracy and the imposition of a constructive trust fall within the arbitration clause. The following passages of the judgment are instructive: [30] Finally, I am of the view that the respondent’s cause of action of the arbitration agreement. [31] I am guided by Protasco Bhd v Tey Por Yee & another appeal settled by arbitration ...”) are similar to the present case. [32] The Court of Appeal ruled that the arbitration agreement must be “[59] The position is even clearer in Malaysia by reason of s. 10 which grants a mandatory stay of court proceedings so as to give effect to the arbitration agreement. Applying Fiona Trusts, it follows that Protasco and PT ASU as rational business people would have wanted the entirety of their dispute determined by an arbitral tribunal and not just that part relating to a dispute arising out of the contract. In other words, both the conspiracy to injure/defraud and the imposition of a constructive trust dispute would be dealt with in any putative arbitration. [60] Our conclusion is fortified, and we are indeed bound by the decision of the Federal Court in Press Metal Sarawak Sdn Bhd v. Etiqa Takaful Bhd [2016] 9 CLJ 1; [2016] 5 MLJ 417 in this respect. In that case, the apex court held that in determining the scope or precise nature of the dispute intended to be submitted to arbitration, the clause ought to be interpreted widely. The commercial purpose was of primary importance. In arriving at this decision, it was held that the approach adopted in the case of KNM Process Systems Sdn Bhd v. Mission Biofuels Sdn Bhd [2013] 1 CLJ 993 by Mohamad Ariff Yusof J (later JCA) was correct and approved accordingly.” (emphasis added) [33] As such, I found that the dispute in the Sessions Court between the parties falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement.