E Far Motors v 1. ) Tribunal Tuntutan Pengguna (PA-25-33-10/2025)

ADNAWATI BINTI AHMAD (No. K/P: 770825-07-6044) ... RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN

This is an application by the Applicant for judicial review pursuant to Order 53 of the Rules of Court 2012.

The Applicant challenges the decision and award made by the First Respondent and seeks an order of certiorari to quash the said decision and award.

The Applicant further seeks an order for the notes of proceedings and the grounds of judgment to be furnished, together with a consequential order for leave to file additional affidavits upon receipt of the same.

Leave pursuant to Order 53 rule 3(1) of the Rules of Court 2012 was granted by this Court on 18 November 2025. The present judgment concerns the determination of the application on its merits following an inter partes hearing.

The central issue before this Court is whether the impugned decision is vitiated by illegality, irrationality and/or disproportionality, and if so, whether this Court ought to intervene, not only in relation to the decision-making process but also, where appropriate, the substance of the decision.

The genesis of the present judicial review application arises from the sale of a vehicle, namely a Ford Ranger 2.2L XLT 4WD bearing registration number VAG5583, by the Applicant to the Second Respondent.

The Applicant is a dealer in second-hand vehicles.

By an award dated 25 July 2025, the First Respondent ordered, inter alia, that the sale be rescinded, the purchase price of RM45,000.00 be refunded to the Second Respondent, and the vehicle be returned to the Applicant.

The Applicant's case is that the vehicle in question was, at all material times, operated primarily by the brother of the Second Respondent.

It is the Applicant's position that the vehicle was collected on 29 August 2023 by the Second Respondent and/or her brother, and that upon collection, the Second Respondent acknowledged that the vehicle was in good condition and satisfactory. Reliance was placed on a delivery receipt evidencing such acknowledgment.

The Applicant further contended that the vehicle was sold together with a one-year warranty covering various components, including the gearbox and engine. According to the Applicant, the Second Respondent was expressly informed that the warranty would be voided if repairs were undertaken at non-authorised workshops.

In addition, the Applicant emphasised that the vehicle had undergone inspection by PUSPAKOM prior to the sale and was certified as fit for transfer of ownership, with no issues identified at that stage.

Shortly after delivery, an issue relating to the gearbox sensor was reported. The Applicant asserted that the Second Respondent was advised to send the vehicle to the Applicant's authorised panel workshop, which was duly done, and the issue was rectified.

However, approximately one month later, the same issue was said to have resurfaced. The Applicant maintained that although the Second Respondent was again advised to return to the panel workshop, she instead chose to engage a non-authorised workshop, thereby voiding the warranty.

The Applicant further submitted that nearly two years later, in or around January 2025, the vehicle suffered a complete breakdown and was towed to the panel workshop. At that point, the cause of failure was identified as engine failure, which, according to the Applicant, was unrelated to the earlier gearbox issue.

In light of the above, the Applicant contended that the warranty had either been voided due to unauthorised repairs or had in any event expired by the time of the breakdown. The Applicant therefore denied any further responsibility for the condition of the vehicle.

Following the breakdown, the Second Respondent filed a claim before the Tribunal for Consumer Claims, alleging that the vehicle was defective and seeking, inter alia, a refund of the purchase price.

The Applicant filed its defence before the Tribunal, asserting that the engine failure was attributable to the Second Respondent's negligence and failure to properly maintain the vehicle.

The Applicant challenged the said award on several grounds grounded in judicial review principles.

First, the Applicant contended that the decision was procedurally improper in that no adequate grounds of judgment were furnished.

Second, the Applicant argued that the decision was irrational and contrary to established legal principles, particularly in ordering rescission of the sale after a prolonged period of use. Submissions on Illegality, Irrationality and Procedural Impropriety

The Applicant relied on established principles of judicial review, namely illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety, as articulated in authorities such as Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] 1 AC 374 and R Rama Chandran v Industrial Court of Malaysia [1997] 1 MLJ 145; [1996] 1 CLJ 147; [1996] 1 MLRA 725.

It was submitted that the First Respondent's award was tainted by irrationality in that it failed to properly consider material evidence and relevant circumstances.

The Applicant emphasised that the vehicle was a second-hand vehicle, and that a reasonable purchaser ought to expect defects to arise over time. In this regard, reliance was placed on Bartlett v Sidney Marcus Ltd [1965] 2 All ER 753.

The Applicant further submitted that the Second Respondent had expressly accepted the condition of the vehicle at the point of delivery and had continued to use the vehicle for an extended period.

It was also contended that the First Respondent failed to give due weight to the PUSPAKOM certification indicating that the vehicle was in satisfactory condition at the time of sale.

The Applicant argued that the First Respondent erred in attributing liability to the Applicant for engine failure occurring nearly two years after delivery, particularly in light of the alleged failure by the Second Respondent to properly maintain the vehicle.

In this regard, the Applicant relied on section 32(5) of the Consumer Protection Act 1999, submitting that the manner in which the vehicle was used and maintained by the Second Respondent was inconsistent with that of a reasonable consumer.

The Applicant submitted that the Second Respondent was aware of the requirement to carry out repairs at authorised panel workshops.

By opting to use a non-authorised workshop, the Second Respondent was said to have voided the warranty.

In any event, the Applicant contended that the warranty had expired by the time of the engine failure.

The Applicant further argued that the First Respondent erred in law in treating reliance on the warranty as an attempt to contract out of statutory liability.

The Applicant submitted that the Second Respondent was deemed to have accepted the vehicle within the meaning of section 42 of the Sale of Goods Act 1957.

It was emphasised that the Second Respondent continued to use the vehicle for a substantial period of time without rejecting it, and only sought rescission after the breakdown nearly two years later.

The Applicant contended that the First Respondent's decision to allow rejection in such circumstances was irrational and contrary to established legal principles.

The Applicant further contended that the First Respondent committed procedural impropriety by accepting unsubstantiated oral testimony, particularly in relation to alleged repair costs, without supporting documentary evidence.

Reliance was placed on authority to the effect that invoices or assertions alone do not constitute proof of payment.

It was also argued that the First Respondent failed to adequately consider the Applicant's evidence, including the panel workshop's findings regarding the cause of engine failure.

In summary, the Applicant contended that the First Respondent's award was vitiated by illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety, and ought therefore to be quashed.

The Second Respondent's case was that the vehicle had exhibited persistent defects and breakdowns shortly after purchase, culminating in substantial repair costs amounting to approximately RM41,000.00, against a purchase price of RM65,000.00.

In her Affidavit in Reply, the Second Respondent asserted, inter alia, that within two days of taking possession of the vehicle, a warning sensor light was triggered, followed by a series of mechanical issues which ultimately led to total engine failure.

The Second Respondent further maintained that the vehicle had, at certain points, been sent to the Applicant's panel workshop for repairs, and that attempts were made to contact the said workshop in relation to defects encountered.

It was also contended that the learned Tribunal Chairman had, contrary to the Applicant's assertions, furnished reasons for the decision.

The Second Respondent opposed the present application on the basis that it did not meet the threshold for judicial review, and that the Applicant was in substance seeking to re-litigate the merits of the First Respondent's decision.

Reliance was placed on established principles governing judicial review, particularly the limited scope of intervention as articulated in Perbadanan Pengurusan Sunrise Garden Kondominium v Sunway City (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2023] 2 MLJ 621; [2023] 2 CLJ 333; [2023] 2 AMR 313; [2023] 3 MLRA 44, which reaffirmed the grounds of illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety.

In response to the Applicant's contention that no grounds of judgment were furnished, the Second Respondent submitted that this argument is misconceived.

It was argued that the law does not require written grounds to be furnished immediately, and that oral reasons would suffice, as established in Hazlina binti Hamzah v Kumon Method of Learning Centre [2006] 2 CLJ 933; [2006] 3 MLJ 124; [2006] 3 AMR 390.

The Second Respondent further contended that the grounds of judgment were in fact provided and exhibited, and that any delay in furnishing written reasons did not amount to procedural impropriety.

It was also emphasised that the Applicant did not pursue any remedy, such as mandamus, to compel the production of grounds, thereby undermining its present complaint.

The Second Respondent rejected the Applicant's contention that the First Respondent's decision to order rescission was irrational.

It was submitted that the First Respondent correctly applied the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act 1999, in particular the implied guarantees as to acceptable quality and fitness for purpose.

The Second Respondent contended that the Applicant cannot rely on the warranty to exclude or limit its statutory obligations, as such an attempt would amount to impermissible contracting out under the Act.

In this regard, it was argued that the issue of whether repairs were carried out at authorised or non-authorised workshops was immaterial to the Applicant's statutory liability.

The Second Respondent maintained that the vehicle was fundamentally defective from the outset, with defects manifesting shortly after purchase.

It was submitted that no reasonable consumer would have purchased the vehicle had they been aware that it would incur repair costs of such magnitude.

The Second Respondent further argued that the signing of the delivery note does not preclude reliance on latent defects which only became apparent after the vehicle was put into use.

In relation to the PUSPAKOM inspection, the Second Respondent contended that such certification is limited in scope and does not attest to the overall mechanical soundness or absence of latent defects.

The Second Respondent disputed the Applicant's contention that the right of rejection had been lost.

It was argued that the persistent defects and ultimate engine failure constituted a substantial failure within the meaning of the Consumer Protection Act 1999, thereby entitling the Second Respondent to reject the vehicle.

The Second Respondent further submitted that the continued use of the vehicle did not amount to acceptance in circumstances where the vehicle was plagued by ongoing defects and required repeated repairs.

In response to the Applicant's reliance on the duration of use, the Second Respondent contended that such use cannot reasonably be characterised as "enjoyment" given the extent of the defects and repair costs incurred.

The Second Respondent emphasised that the Tribunal had carefully considered the evidence before it, including:

The number and nature of breakdowns experienced;

The cumulative repair costs incurred;

The applicability of statutory guarantees;

The condition of the vehicle as reflected in independent assessments; and

The explanations advanced by both parties.

It was further submitted that the First Respondent's findings were based on a proper evaluation of the evidence, and did not meet the high threshold required to establish irrationality under the Wednesbury principle.

In summary, the Second Respondent contended that the present application is devoid of merit and is, in substance, an attempt to appeal against the First Respondent's findings of fact and law.

It was therefore submitted that the application ought to be dismissed, with costs.

Conscious that the present matter arises by way of a judicial review application, this Court is guided by the well-settled principles governing such applications, as articulated by the apex court of this country. Those principles confine judicial review to the established grounds of illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety.

Having carefully considered the submissions of both parties, together with the authorities relied upon, this Court is not persuaded that the present case falls within any of the recognised grounds warranting judicial intervention.

At the outset, this Court addresses the Applicant's complaint that the First Respondent failed to furnish grounds of judgment. On the evidence before this Court, it is clear that the grounds of judgment were in fact provided, albeit not immediately. The reasoning of the learned Tribunal President is set out in the Grounds of Judgment dated 31 December 2025, exhibited as TLK-E of Enclosure 15. Further, the Notes of Proceedings, exhibited as TLK-F, provide additional context as to the matters considered by the learned Tribunal President.

In this regard, this Court accepts the Second Respondent's submission that the mere delay in furnishing written grounds does not, in and of itself, amount to procedural impropriety. What is material is whether reasons were ultimately provided, and whether such reasons disclose the basis upon which the decision was reached. In the present case, that threshold has been satisfied.

Turning to the allegation of irrationality, this Court is mindful of the high threshold required to establish Wednesbury unreasonableness. It is not sufficient that the decision may be regarded as harsh, or that another tribunal may have arrived at a different conclusion. The decision must be shown to be so unreasonable that no reasonable tribunal, properly directing itself on the law and the facts, could have arrived at such a conclusion.

On the material before this Court, such a threshold has not been met. The Grounds of Judgment disclose that the learned Tribunal President had considered the competing versions advanced by the parties, including the condition of the vehicle, the sequence of breakdowns, the costs incurred, and the applicability of statutory guarantees under the Consumer Protection Act 1999.

The Applicant's complaints, in substance, invite this Court to reevaluate the evidence and to substitute its own findings in place of those made by the First Respondent. This, however, falls outside the proper scope of judicial review. The First Respondent, as the trier of fact, is entitled to assess the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented.

Similarly, the Applicant's arguments relating to the warranty, the alleged failure by the Second Respondent to utilise authorised workshops, and the issue of acceptance of the vehicle are matters which were placed before the First Respondent and form part of the merits of the dispute. The fact that the First Respondent did not accept the Applicant's position on these issues does not, without more, render the decision unlawful or irrational.

This Court also finds no merit in the contention that the First Respondent acted in breach of natural justice. There is nothing to suggest that the Applicant was denied an opportunity to be heard, or that the proceedings were conducted in a manner that was procedurally unfair.

In the final analysis, this Court is satisfied that the decision of the First Respondent did not run afoul of any of the established grounds for judicial review. The decision was made within jurisdiction, was supported by reasons, and does not meet the high threshold of irrationality required to warrant intervention.

For the reasons set out above, the application for judicial review is dismissed.

The Second Respondent is awarded costs in the sum of RM10,000.00. Dated: 1 May, 2026 JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA, PENANG PENANG HIGH COURT 2 Counsel: For the Applicant Ooi Zie Yiong Ooi Yik Jie (Messrs Phee, Chen & Ung) For the $ 2^{\mathrm{n d}} $ Respondent Kuldeep Singh Gill Vignaharan A/L Sanjilatheeban Angad Singh Khalsa (Messrs Kuldeep Singh Gill,