Ec Piles Sdn Bhd v Chang Kian Chiang (JA-29NCC-518-09/2022)

Pemiutang Penghakiman (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai JC) telah membawa tindakan terhadap Long Kee Piling Works Sdn Bhd dan dua yang lain, termasuk Penghutang Penghakiman (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai JD) di Mahkamah Sesyen Johor Bahru bagi jumlah bayaran tertunggak bagi barang-barang yang dijual dan dihantar serah kepada syarikat tersebut.

Selanjutnya, permohonan JC untuk Penghakiman Terus telah dibenarkan Mahkamah pada 26.6.2022. Berdasarkan penghakiman tersebut, JC telah memfailkan Notis Kebankrapan terhadap JD pada 1.9.2022. Notis Kebankrapan tersebut telah disempurnakan penyampaian kepada JD pada 7.11.2022 berdasarkan Perintah Penyampaian Ganti bertarikh 18.10.2022 (Lampiran 10).

JC seterusnya memfailkan Petisyen Pemiutang (Lampiran 13) pada 21.11.2022. Lanjutan itu, JD memfailkan Saman Dalam Kamar (Lampiran 18) pada 6.12.2022 untuk membatalkan dan/atau mengetepikan Petisyen Pemiutang yang menjadi subjek pertikaian di hadapan Mahkamah. Analisis dan keputusan Mahkamah (Lampiran 13) Bantahan awal pertama: Sama ada permohonan JD adalah pra-masa

JC berhujah bahawa permohonan JD untuk mengetepikan Petisyen Pemiutang adalah pra-masa kerana semasa permohonan tersebut difailkan pada 6.12.2022, Petisyen Pemiutang masih belum diserahkan kepada JD. Petisyen Pemiutang hanya diserahkan kepada JD pada 18.12.2022.

Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada seksyen 5(3) Akta Insolvensi 1967 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai Akta Tersebut) yang memperuntukkan bahawa:- “(3) A petitioning creditor shall not be entitled to commence any bankruptcy action-

against a social guarantor; and

against a guarantor other than a social guarantor unless the petitioning creditor has obtained leave from the court.”

Berdasarkan peruntukan tersebut, seseorang JC perlu mendapatkan kebenaran Mahkamah terlebih dahulu untuk memulakan tindakan kebankrapan terhadap mana-mana JD yang merupakan penjamin (bukan sosial). Dalam hal ini, adalah penting untuk menentukan tafsiran permulaan (commencement) tindakan kebankrapan.

Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan Liew Hon Kong v Bank Pertanian Malaysia Bhd [2022] 1 MLJ 836; [2021] 9 CLJ 82; [2021] 6 MLRA 641; [2021] AMEJ 1158 di mana dalam mentaksirkan permulaan tindakan kebankrapan, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[61] Whilst we accept that bankruptcy proceedings is a two staged process, we do not accept the argument that the BN was issued "administratively" and therefore merely "kickstarts" the process… [68] Rather, as was rightly submitted by counsel for the JC, the moment an application is made for the issuance of the BN, the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is invoked and the jurisdiction continues until the very end, ie, beyond the AO and RO… [71] Next, in so far as the two-staged process ie, BN followed by CP is concerned, this merely means that there are two steps to be taken. But they are nevertheless steps within a single legal proceeding, namely, as in this case, within BC4238… In our view, bankruptcy proceedings commenced upon the issuance of the BN, and such proceedings are to be treated as "pending" for purposes of s. 60 of the

Berdasarkan kes tersebut, tindakan kebankrapan bermula sebaik sahaja Notis Kebankrapan telah difailkan. Dalam hal ini, menurut kes Per: Lim Sue Beng v AmBank (M) Berhad & Ors [2022] MLJU 3147; [2022] 1 LNS 2822, berdasarkan tafisran Mahkamah Rayuan tersebut dalam kes Liew Hon Kong (supra), seseorang JC perlu mendapatkan kebenaran Mahkamah terlebih dahulu sebelum memfailkan Notis Kebankrapan terhadap seseorang JD yang merupakan penjamin. Dalam menjelaskan perkara ini, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[17] Based on Liew Hon Kong (supra) and a literal reading of section 5(3) of the Insolvency Act 1967 wherein:

17.1 the said express words "unless the petitioning creditor has obtained leave from the court" appears, I hold that the same is clear and unambiguous to mean that the JC has to apply for leave first from the Court before the said BN can be issued; and

17.2 the words "to commence any bankruptcy action" in the said section is to be treated as referring to the BN as the BN is the initiation of a bankruptcy action / proceedings as the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction is invoked [18] In this respect, I find that the Federal Court case of Hong Leong Bank Berhad v. Khairulnizam bin Jamaludin [2016] 7 CLJ 335; [2016] 4 MLJ 302 relied on by learned counsel for the Judgment Creditor (JC) is not applicable to the facts before me as that case was decided pre the Insolvency Act 1967. …[20] In the circumstances, the BN is in my decision pre maturely issued. I also hold that the prayer in paragraph (a) of Enclosure 12 filed by the JC ie, for leave to commence the bankruptcy proceedings against the JD, which is the subject of the appeal in Enclosure 46, is retrospective in nature as the said application was only made almost 7 months after the said BN was issued. This, in my view, is prejudicial to the JD and against the spirit of Section 5(3) of the Insolvency Act 1965 ie, the protection of guarantors and appears to be an afterthought. [21] It is trite that Bankruptcy Proceedings are not only damaging to the reputation and standing of the JD but that such Bankruptcy Proceedings are quasi criminal in nature and that as such struct adherence must be made to the provisions and requirements in the Insolvency Act 1967 and the Insolvency Rules 2017. [22] I therefore agree with learned counsel for the JD that the said defects aforementioned are, at this stage, incurable and will cause substantial injustice and prejudice to the JD.”

Dalam pada itu, Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Hong Leong Bank Berhad v Ong Moon Huat & Another Appeal [2018] MLJU 1576; [2018] 1 LNS 1612; [2018] MLRAU 504 pula memutuskan bahawa JC berhak untuk memfailkan permohonan kebenaran memulakan tindakan kebankrapan tersebut sehingga sebelum Petisyen Pemiutang difailkan. Dalam menjelaskan prinsip tersebut, Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa:- “[15] For these reasons we are of the view that on a proper reading of Khairulnizam which is wholly relevant coupled with section 5(3)(b) as well as Rule 97 it is open to a judgment creditor to file an application for leave to proceed against a guarantor either upon the issuance of the bankruptcy notice, or even prior to that, up to and immediately prior to the filing of a creditor's petition. This gives leeway to the judgment creditor to obtain such leave as it deems fit in the circumstances of a particular case. This will in no way prejudice the judgment debtor/guarantor who is protected by the legislation which requires such leave to be obtained as a prerequisite to the grant of receiving and adjudication orders.”

Berdasarkan nas-nas di atas, seseorang JD boleh memfailkan permohonan untuk mengetepikan Notis Kebankrapan yang dikeluarkan terhadap seorang penjamin tanpa memperolehi kebenaran Mahkamah menurut seksyen 5(3)(b) Akta Tersebut terlebih dahulu dengan mengikuti kes Lim Sue Beng (supra); atau memfailkan permohonan mengetepikan Petisyen Pemiutang yang difailkan tanpa mendapat kebenaran yang sama terlebih dahulu setelah Notis Kebankrapan difailkan berdasarkan kes Ong Moon Huat (supra). Dalam kes ini, JD telah memfailkan permohonan untuk mengetepikan Petisyen Pemiutang dan permohonan tersebut boleh didengar Mahkamah berdasarkan nas Ong Moon Huat (supra).

Persoalan seterusnya yang perlu ditentukan Mahkamah adalah sama ada permohonan JD adalah pra-masa memandangkan Petisyen Pemiutang masih belum diserahkan kepada JD semasa permohonan untuk mengetepikan Petisyen Pemiutang difailkan. Mahkamah dalam hal ini berpendapat bahawa persoalan sama ada seseorang litigant berhak memfailkan permohonan pengenepian tanpa dokumentasi diserahkan kepadanya adalah persoalan fakta yang perlu diputuskan Mahkamah. Umpamanya, dalam kes OCBC Bank (M) Bhd & Anor v Livision Sdn Bhd & Ors [2001] 5 MLJ 129; [2001] 5 CLJ 433; [2000] 4 MLRH 278, Defendan Keempat dalam kes tersebut memfailkan permohonan antara lain untuk mengetepikan Penghakiman Ingkar Kehadiran yang telah diperolehi Plaintif terhadapnya. Berdasarkan fakta kes, Defendan Keempat tidak pernah diserahkan dengan Penghakiman Ingkar yang dimasukkan terhadap beliau.

Defendan Keempat memfailkan permohonan untuk mengetepikan penghakiman ingkar berdasarkan carian fail yang telah dilaksanakan beliau. Dalam membenarkan permohonan Defendan Keempat, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “It is not disputed that the said judgment-in-default of appearance was never served on the 4th defendant. Therefore O. 42 r. 13 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 does not apply here… The 4th defendant came to know about this judgment from the search of the court docket on 6 February 1999 and within a month took out this application on 8 March 1999 to set aside the judgment. It is also pertinent to note that the 4th defendant had filed this application on 8 March 1999, ahead of the plaintiff's application (filed on 31 May 1999) to amend the said judgment-in-default (which was later withdrawn). It is clear that this application was filed with reasonable promptitude and is bona fide.”

Berdasarkan pemerhatian ini, Mahkamah akan menilai fakta kes di hadapan Mahkamah. Dalam kes ini, JC telah menyempurnakan penyampaian Notis Kebankrapan terhadap JD secara penyampaian ganti dan perintah tersebut tidak pernah diakas atau dicabar JD, maka penyampaian tersebut adalah sempurna terhadap JD. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Development & Commercial Bank Berhad v Aspatra Corporation Sdn Bhd & Anor [1995] 3 MLJ 472; [1996] 1 CLJ 141; [1995] 2 MLRA 116; [1996] 3 AMR 3627 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti berikut:- “The order of substituted service of the High Court, a superior Court of competent jurisdiction, must be obeyed by every one save in a few and rare exceptions and it can only be challenged as regards its validity by the only way of having it set aside by proceedings instituted for the very purpose. It cannot be challenged thus collaterally in any proceedings as regards its validity save in a very few rare exceptions, (such as a Bankruptcy Court going behind a judgment of any Court on credibly raised issues of collusion, fraud, etc. only on hearing a bankruptcy petition), which all do not apply here…”

Sebagaimana diputuskan dalam nas-nas di atas, tindakan kebankrapan bermula sebaik sahaja Notis Kebankrapan difailkan. Maka, dengan penyempurnaan penyampaian BN kepada JD, JD dianggap mempunyai notis konstruktif berkenaan tindakan kebankrapan yang dimulakan terhadap JD. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes RHB Bank Bhd v FGG Wood Mouldings Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors [2001] 4 MLJ 86; [2001] 3 CLJ 661; [2000] 4 MLRH 129 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “The service of the writ of summons, it is clear from the affidavit in reply of the plaintiff's bank officer (encl. 40) was effected by means of a substituted service by an advertisement in the Malay Mail dated 21 May 1998 and by a posting on the notice board of the court. The 4th defendant never disputed the regularity of the substituted service itself. Counsel for the plaintiff was therefore perfectly right in submitting that the place of residence of the 4th defendant was not an issue. The 4th defendant must under the circumstances be deemed to have constructive notice of the issuance of the summons against him, wherever he may have resided.”

Malah, berdasarkan pemerhatian Mahkamah kepada minit-minit Pengurusan Kes dalam sistem e-review, Mahkamah dapati JD telah mengetahui tentang prosiding kebankrapan ini dan hadir (melalui peguam) semasa Pengurusan Kes seawal 18.10.2022, iaitu sebelum Notis Kebankrapan itu sendiri diserahkan kepada JD. Dengan pengetahuan berkenaan prosiding kebankrapan yang difailkan terhadap JD dan berkenaan dokumen-dokumen yang difailkan JC terhadap JD, adalah lumrah untuk JD mengambil tindakan bersesuaian termasuklah memfailkan permohonan untuk mengetepikan Petisyen Kebankrapan di sini tanpa perlu menunggu untuk penyampaian dokumen tersebut kepada JD.

Mahkamah juga dapati pada prosiding pada 9.11.2022, apabila peguam JC memaklumkan bahawa penyampaian Notis Kebankrapan telah disempurnakan secara penyampaian ganti, peguam JD telah meletakkan peguam JC dalam notis bahawa JD akan memfailkan permohonan untuk pembatalan setelah Petisyen Pemiutang difailkan. Minit pada 9.11.2022 yang relevan adalah seperti berikut:- “Peguam Pemiutang Penghakiman 1: Dengan izin Tuan. Pihak kami telah membuat penyampaian ganti seperti berikut: a) 5.11.2022 - penampalan di premis Penghutang Penghakiman b) 6.11.2022 - pengiklanan di Nanyang Siang Pau c) 7.11.2022 - penampalan di papan notis Mahkamah Tinggi Johor Bahru Peguam Pemiutang Penghakiman 1: Kami percaya bahawa penampalan dan pengiklanan tersebut adalah dianggap penyampaian sempurna dan cukup Notis Kebankrapan ke atas Penghutang Penghakiman atas penamatan tujuh (7) hari selepas tarikh akhir penampalan dan pengiklanan tersebut iaitu pada 14.11.2022. Peguam Penghutang Penghakiman 1: Dengan izin Tuan. Saya T S Goh mewakili Penghutang Penghakiman, Arahan anak guam kami adalah untuk memfailkan pemohonan pembatalan selepas Petisyen Pemiutang difailkan.”

Maka, jikapun permohonan JD untuk membatalkan atau mengetepikan Petisyen Pemiutang adalah pra-masa kerana JC belum menyampaikan Petisyen Pemiutang kepada JD, tiada prejudis dialami JC kerana JC telah diberi notis sewajarnya dan dengan demikian prosiding yang dibawa JD tidak menjadi terbatal sebagaimana diperuntukkan dalam seksyen 131 Akta Tersebut seperti berikut:- "No proceeding in bankruptcy shall be invalidated by any formal defect or by any irregularity, unless the court before which an objection is made to the proceeding is of opinion that substantial injustice has been caused by the defect or irregularity and that the injustice cannot be remedied by any order of that court."

Berdasarkan penemuan tersebut, Mahkamah menolak isu bantahan awal yang dikemukakan JC. Bantahan awal kedua: Sama ada kegagalan JD merujuk kepada Seksyen 5(3) Akta Tersebut dalam permohonan JD (lampiran 18) adalah fatal?

JC seterusnya menghujahkan bahawa JD telah gagal menunjukkan sebarang ketidakpatuhan kepada Kaedah-kaedah Insolvensi yang dilakukan JC semasa memperolehi Petisyen Pemiutang tersebut. JC mendakwa JD berhujah berkenaan seksyen 5(3) Akta Tersebut tanpa membuat rujukan kepadanya dalam lampiran 18. Maka, JC memohon Mahkamah membatalkan lampiran 18 kerana permohonan tersebut adalah defektif.

JC merujuk kepada kes Cheow Chew Khoon (t/a Cathay Hotel) v Abdul Johari bin Abdul Rahman [1995] 1 MLJ 457; [1995] 4 CLJ 127; [1995] 1 MLRA 679; [1995] 1 AMR 759 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa:- “In my judgment, this matter, which is a point of practice and procedure, is to be resolved by reference to the fundamental principle that a party must not take his opponent or the Court by surprise. It is my opinion that an originating process requiring an intitulement must state, with sufficient particularity, either in its heading or in its body, the statute or Rule of Court under which the Court is being moved: otherwise it would be an embarrassing pleading and be may be liable to be struck out, unless sooner amended.”

Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Tan Hoo Heng v Timbalan Pendakwa Raya & Ors [2018] MLJU 1197; [2018] 1 LNS 1257; [2018] MLRHU 991; [2018] AMEJ 1008 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “2.4.2 The Defendant argued that the procedures for the Court to allow the examination of witnesses who deposed affidavits, being the subject matter of the Notice of Application in Enclosure 17, is provided under O. 38 ROC 2012.

2.4.3 But as the Plaintiff had failed to specifically state that provision of the ROC 2012 in the intitulement of the said Notice of Application, such irregularity is fatal and not curable.

2.4.4 The Defendant submitted that following the principle laid down by the Court of Appeal in Cheow Chew Khoon v. Abdul Johari bin Abdul Rahman [1995] 4 CLJ 127; [1995] 1 MLJ 457 and Uthayakumar Ponnusamy v. YAB Dato' Sri Najib Tun Razak, Perdana Menteri Malaysia & Ors [2017] 6 CLJ 297, this Court must, on that ground alone, struck out the Notice of Application in Enclosure 17.

2.4.5 The Plaintiff's Counsel submitted that as shown in their affidavits, the Defendants are fully aware of the nature and character of Enclosure 17. In this regard, the Plaintiff referred to the case of Chin Wooi Keat v. Isberg Corp Sdn Bhd (in receivership) & Anor [2014] 1 LNS 48; [2014] 10 MLJ 1 where the Court ruled that the issue in question is that "... the second defendant had not been misled by the omission...". The decision of the Supreme Court in Sunkyong International Inc v. Malaysian Rubber Development Bhd [1992] 1 CLJ Rep 310; [1992] 2 MLJ 146 was also relied upon. In that case, Justice Peh Swee Chin SCJ clearly held as follows:- " .... While it was far better to quote section and verse or specific order or rule in any application, it was never fatal to any application to omit to do so where the applicant can bring himself within any relevant specific order or rule."

2.4.6 This Court had perused the authorities submitted by both parties on this issue. This Court is persuaded to apply the binding principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the 1992 case of Sunkyong International Inc v. Malaysian Rubber Development Bhd [1992] 1 CLJ Rep 310; [1992] 2 MLJ 146. This Court found that paragraph 5 of the Plaintiff's Counsel's Written Submission dated 2/5/2018 had in actual fact brought this application under Enclosure 17 within the specific provision of O. 38 r. 2(2) ROC 2012. This Court further noted that the Defendants were not in any manner prejudiced by the absence of such provision stated in the intitulement to Enclosure 17 as paragraph 15 of the Defendants' Counsel's Written Submission clearly indicated that they are aware that the procedure for this application is found in O. 38 of the ROC 2012.

2.4.7 Based on the above finding, this Court rule that the Defendants' Preliminary Objection on this issue is dismissed.”

Berdasarkan nas di atas, sama ada kegagalan JD dalam menamakan peruntukan undang-undang dalam memohon mengetepikan Petisyen Pemiutang adalah fatal atau tidak adalah bergantung kepada sama ada JC telah terkeliru (misled) dengan permohonan yang dibuat JD. Dalam penilaian mahkamah kepada kertas-kertas kausa yang difailkan di Mahkamah berkenaan lampiran 18, Mahkamah dapati JC langsung tidak terkeliru dan dengan jelas mengetahui sifat permohonan JD. Perkara ini dapat dilihat apabila JD dengan jelas telah menyatakan alasan-alasan permohonan dalam lampiran 18 itu sendiri seperti berikut:- “2. Menurut undang-undang sedia ada dan selaras dengan Akta Insolvensi 1967 dan Kaedah-Kaedah Insolvensi 2017, Pemiutang Penghakiman haruslah mendapatkan kebenaran daripada Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini sebelum pemfailan suatu Petisyen Pemiutang terhadap Penghutang Penghakiman yang merupakan seorang penjamin.

Pemiutang Penghakiman tidak memperolehi kebenaran daripada Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini sebelum pemfailan Petisyen Pemiutang bertarikh 21.11.2022.”

Seterusnya, penelitian Afidavit Jawapan JC menunjukkan JC memahami sifat permohonan JD apabila JC membalas seperti berikut:- “6. Tanpa prejudis kepada ketidakpatuhan serius Lampiran 18, saya sesungguhnya percaya dan menyatakan bahawa permohonan yang difailkan JD adalah langsung tidak berasas. Untuk makluman Mahkamah yang mulia ini, perjanjian yang dirujuk oleh JD adalah “Joint & Several Continuing Guarantee & Indemnity”. JD bukan sahaja menandatangani perjanjian tersebut sebagai penjamin tetapi juga merupakan penghutang utama (principal debtor).

JD juga gagal memaklumkan kepada Mahkamah yang Mulia ini bahawa JD semasa dalam menentang permohonan penghakiman terus tersebut telah menafikan kapasitinya sebagai seorang penjamin”

Penelitian kepada kandungan afidavit JC dengan jelas menunjukkan bahawa JC langsung tidak terkeliru (misled) dengan permohonan JD dan dengan demikian, berdasarkan kes Tan Hoo Heng (supra), yang telah mengikuti kes Mahkamah Agung Sunkyong (supra), bantahan awal JC yang kedua juga adalah ditolak. Merit permohonan JD

JD berhujah bahawa JC tidak seharusnya memfailkan Petisyen Pemiutang terhadap seseorang penjamin sebelum mendapat kebenaran Mahkamah dan sehingga JC telah membuktikan bahawa JC telah melengkapkan kesemua tindakan pelaksanaan terhadap penghutang prinsipal.

Dalam membincangkan merit permohonan JD, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa adalah penting untuk mengkaji asal usul dan objektif penggubalan seksyen 5(3) Akta Tersebut. Dalam mengkaji tujuan atau objektif peruntukan tersebut, seksyen 17A Akta Interpretasi 1948 & 1967 adalah relevan di mana peruntukan tersebut memperuntukkan bahawa:- “In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or not) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object.”

Rujukan juga dibuat kepada kes Mahkamah Persekutuan, Ismail Nasaruddin Abdul Wahab v Malaysian Airline System Bhd [2022] 6 MLJ 414; [2022] 9 CLJ 801; [2022] 6 MLRA 696; [2022] 7 AMR 641 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[50] It is trite that the interpretation of an Act should be undertaken with the purpose and object of the Act in mind. In Bursa Malaysia Securities Bhd v. Mohd Afrizan Husain [2022] 4 CLJ 657, this court referred to s. 17A of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 and expressed the view that in the construction of statutes, any reading which is purely textual, as opposed to contextual, is to be rejected…”

Dalam menentukan tujuan atau objektif peruntukan seksyen 5(3) Akta Tersebut digubal, Mahkamah boleh merujuk kepada Hansard Parlimen. Perkara ini ada diputuskan dalam kes Pengusaha, Tempat Tahanan Perlindungan Kamunting, Taiping & Ors v Badrul Zaman Ps Md Zakariah [2018] 12 MLJ 49; [2018] 8 CLJ 273; [2018] 6 MLRA 177; [2018] 5 AMR 733 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa:- “The Federal Court in DYTM Tengku Idris Shah Ibni Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah v. Dikim Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor [2002] 3 CLJ 69; [2002] 2 MLJ 11; and Chor Phaik Har v. Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1994] 4 CLJ 285; [1994] 3 MLJ 345 had adopted the purposive approach by making reference to the Parliamentary reports or Hansard as an aid to statutory interpretation in interpreting the provisions of Acts of Parliament. In that case, Haidar FCJ, in delivering the judgment of the court remarked: "It will give statutory force to the courts to look the policy speech of the Minister or the promoter of the Bill in Hansard for the purpose of an aid to the interpretation of statutes."

Mahkamah merujuk kepada hansard Parlimen berkenaan pindaan kepada Akta Insolvensi 1967 pada 29.3.2017 di mana Menteri dalam membentangkan pindaan kepada Akta Insolvensi 1967 telah menyatakan seperti berikut:- “Kerajaan amat prihatin isu-isu kebankrapan terutama di mana mereka diisytiharkan bankrap disebabkan mereka menjadi penjamin kepada peminjam yang gagal menjelaskan pinjaman. Golongan ini tidak sepatutnya dipertanggungjawabkan sepenuhnya tanpa tindakan terhadap peminjam prinsipal terlebih dahulu untuk menjelaskan pinjaman yang diambil… …Kerajaan telah mempertimbangkan lapan perubahan dasar untuk meminda Akta Kebankrapan 1967 seperti berikut:

tindakan kebankrapan tidak boleh diambil terhadap penjamin sosial. Walau bagaimanapun penjamin bukan sosial boleh dibankrapkan setelah mahkamah berpuas hati dengan tindakan-tindakan yang dibuat oleh pihak pemiutang;…”

Mahkamah seterusnya merujuk seksyen 5(4) Akta Tersebut yang memperuntukkan bahawa:- “(4) Before granting leave referred to in paragraph (3)(b), the court shall satisfy itself that the petitioning creditor has exhausted all modes of execution and enforcement to recover debts owed to him by the debtor.”

Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Ong Moon Huat (supra) memutuskan bahawa perkataan “the debtor” dalam sub-seksyen (4) merujuk kepada peminjam prinsipal. Dalam menjelaskan perkara ini, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[5] The only reasonable construction that can be accorded is that "debtor" in section 5(4) refers to the principal debtor or the borrower. The fact that the word "borrower" was not used does not preclude the construction we have adopted. On the contrary such a construction is fully in accord with the purposive approach to be adopted in construing the section as outlined above.”

Maka, berdasarkan nas-nas di atas, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa niat parlimen dalam menggubal seksyen 5(3) dan 5(4) Akta Insolvensi 1967 adalah untuk melindungi Penjamin bukan sosial dari diambil tindakan kebankrapan sebelum tindakan pelaksanaan selesai diambil terhadap peminjam prinsipal. Perkara ini turut dijelaskan dalam kes Rusli Ab Ghani; Ex-Parte: CIMB Bank Berhad [2018] 1 LNS 1528; [2018] MLRHU 1180 di mana dalam mentaksirkan peruntukan di bawah seksyen 5 Akta Insolvensi 1967, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[11] Subsections 5(3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) are new provisions which were inserted vide Act A1534 and came into force on 6.10.2017 and at the same time the Rules were introduced replacing the Bankruptcy Rules 1969. Prior to these amendments a petition creditor had to prove that he had exhausted all avenues to recover debts owed to him by the debtor before he could commence a bankruptcy petition against a social guarantor. However, with effect from 6.10.2017 a social guarantor is absolutely protected and cannot be made a bankrupt. That protection is now accorded to other guarantors who were not protected before the amendment… This simply means that a judgment creditor must ensure that all modes of execution and enforcement have been exhausted against the debtor who is the borrower before he can go against the guarantor. Once that is shown then leave will be granted by the court for the judgment creditor to commence bankruptcy petition against the guarantor.”

Manakala, Mahkamah dalam kes Ong Moon Huat (supra) ada memutuskan bahawa:- “[3] A purposive construction of the section as a whole discloses that the section seeks to introduce protection for the guarantor against whom bankruptcy proceedings are to be brought. The protection comes in the form of ensuring that enforcement has been exhausted in respect of the principal debtor prior to proceeding against the guarantor. It is to remedy the mischief of judgment creditors proceeding against the guarantors directly in bankruptcy rather than executing and enforcing against the principal debtor.”

Maka, kedudukan undang-undang berkenaan tindakan kebankrapan terhadap seorang penjamin adalah jelas iaitu Pemiutang Penghakiman hendaklah menyelesaikan kesemua tindakan pelaksanaan terhadap penghutang prinsipal sebelum mengambil tindakan terhadap penjamin kepada penghutang tersebut.

Dalam hal ini, walaupun dalam kes ini perkataan jaminan (guarantee) muncul berulang kali dalam Perjanjian di antara pihak-pihak, fakta tersebut dengan sendiri tidak menjadikan perjanjian tersebut sebagai perjanjian jaminan. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah bersetuju dengan peguam JC bahawa Mahkamah perlu menilai keseluruhan perjanjian tersebut untuk menentukan niat sebenar pihak-pihak semasa memasuki perjanjian tersebut. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Sia Siew Hong & Ors v Lim Ghim Chian & Anor [1995] 3 MLJ 141; [1996] 3 CLJ 26; [1995] 2 MLRA 356; [1996] 3 AMR 3651 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa:- “No doubt it is described as a guarantee. But in the construction of contracts the court is not bound by the labels that parties choose to affix onto the particular document. In all such cases the duty of the court is clear. And that duty is to construe the document as a whole and to determine from its language and any other admissible evidence its true nature and purport…Although the contract in the present appeal is termed a guarantee by the parties thereto, the document when read as a whole appeared to me in truth to be an indemnity…Secondly, the deeming provision upon which I have laid emphasis certainly points to the document being an indemnity rather than a guarantee.That clause imposes upon the appellants the primary obligation of a principal debtor and not merely a secondary obligation of a surety."

Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd v Tan Chong Whatt & Ors [2022] MLJU 1148; [2022] 1 LNS 1186; [2022] AMEJ 0587; [2022] MLRHU 1000 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[31] According to the Defendants, the words "guarantee" or "guarantor" were in fact being used almost 93 times in the Guarantee, whereas "indemnify" only appears 2 times in the entire document. This can only support the argument that the intention of the parties at all material times was for the agreement to be a contract of Guarantee, and not an Indemnity. [32] With respect, I disagree with the Defendants' contentions. [33] Clause 19 of the Guarantee is entitled the "principal debtor clause". The language of the clause is clear and unambiguous. It states that "... as between You and us", namely as between the Plaintiff and the 1st to 3rd Defendants "... we are to be deemed and to be treated in every way as principal debtors in respect of all the moneys, liabilities and obligations guaranteed by this Guarantee...". [34] In fact, the last sentence in Clause 19.1 makes it clear that the 1st to 3rd Defendants' liability under the Guarantee shall not be discharged or affected in any way whatsoever by anything whatsoever which would not discharge their liability if they had in fact been the principal debtors. This means that even in circumstances where the Defendants would not have been liable as guarantors, they would nevertheless assume liabilities as principal debtors.”

JC dalam kes ini berhujah bahawa Perjanjian yang ditandatangani JD adalah bukan sahaja perjanjian jaminan semata-mata, tetapi juga perjanjian jaminan dan indemniti. JC berhujah bahawa memandangkan JD telah bersetuju untuk membuat pampasan kepada JC, maka Akta Insolvensi dan Kaedah-kaedah Insolvensi berkenaan permohonan untuk kebenaran adalah tidak terpakai dalam kes ini.

Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada klausa-klausa perjanjian tersebut yang memperuntukkan bahawa:- “Klausa 1- ...I/We the undersigned…do hereby jointly and severally guarantee and indemnify you, as principal and not merely surety, the proper and punctual repayment and payment on demand of all monies due to you and discharge of all the trading liabilities incurred to you by the Customer…” “Klausa 3- …to treat the Customer in all respects as though I/We am/are jointly and severally liable together with the Customer as principal debtors to you and not merely as sureties for the Customer. This includes any part of the indebtedness which may not be recoverable from me/us by reason of any legal limitation which might be a defence for me/us, shall nevertheless be recoverable from me/us as principal debtor(s)”

Penelitian Mahkamah kepada klausa-klausa tersebut dengan jelas menunjukkan bahawa JD adalah bertanggungan bukan sahaja sebagai penjamin malah seolah-olah sebagai peminjam prinsipal kepada jumlah yang tertunggak yang perlu dibayar kepada JC. Dalam menjelaskan perbezaan antara sesuatu Perjanjian Jaminan dan Perjanjian Indemniti, Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd v Andrew Lee Siew Ling [2012] 3 CLJ 708; [2012] 5 MLRA 76 memutuskan bahawa:- “[39] The principal debtor clause contained in cls. 9 and 17 and the indemnity given in cl. 21 without doubt created, as between the guarantors and the appellant, a contract of indemnity, which is a separate and independent contract, involving the undertaking on the part of the guarantors to pay any amount due under the loan, as well as interest thereon, regardless of the fate of the appellant's claim against the borrower, or its claim on the assets of the borrower in winding up. [41] Simply put, a contract of indemnity as defined by s. 77 of the Contracts Act 1950 is a contract entered into by two parties, namely, the promisor and the promisee, by which the promisor promises to save the promisee from loss caused to the promisee by the conduct of the promisor himself or by the conduct of any other person. A contract of guarantee, on the other hand is as defined by s. 79 of the Contracts Act 1950. It is a contract which involves three parties, namely the principal debtor, the surety and the creditor. The surety gives a guarantee that he (the surety) will perform the principal debtor's promise, or will discharge the principal debtor's liability, to the creditor if the principal debtor fails to do so. …[43] It is very clear by the terms of the letter of guarantee and indemnity executed by the respondent that the contract entered into between the appellant and the respondent (and Mok Hwee Huan) is a separate and independent contract and that contract is a contract of indemnity…”

Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Lim Lek Yan v Yayasan Melaka [2012] MLJU 546; [2013] 1 CLJ 1081; [2012] MLRHU 571 di mana dalam menjelaskan perbezaan di antara kedua-dua perjanjian jaminan dan perjanjian indemniti, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “…In the book The Modern Contract of Guarantee by Dr James O'Donovan and Dr John Philips, the learned authors have outlined the effect of a Contract of indemnity as follows: The performance of an obligation or the payment of a debt of another may be secured not by a Guarantee, but by a Contract of indemnity. The distinction between a Contract of Guarantee and a Contract of indemnity is that in a Contract of indemnity a primary liability is assumed whether or not a third party makes a default whilst, as has been seen, in a Contract of Guarantee the surety assumes a secondary liability to the creditor for the default of another who remains primarily liable to the creditor. The Contract of indemnity, therefore is "a Contract by one party to keep the other harmless against loss" and is not dependant on the continuing liability of the principal debtor. The obligation has no reference in law to the debt of another. In other words, an indemnity imposes a primary obligation which is independent of the continuing obligation of another. (emphasis added)”

Berdasarkan perbezaan ini, ternyata perjanjian yang dimeterai JD dengan JC adalah bukan sahaja perjanjian jaminan semata-mata tetapi juga sebenarnya perjanjian indemniti. Maka, menurut undang-undang, tiada keperluan bagi JC membuktikan bahawa JC telah mengambil sebarang tindakan pelaksanaan terhadap peminjam prinsipal sebelum mengambil tindakan terhadap JD kerana tindakan terhadap JD adalah kausa tindakan berasingan dan berdiri dengan sendiri. Perkara ini dijelaskan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Andrew Lee Siew Ling v United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd [2013] 1 MLJ 449; [2013] 1 CLJ 24; [2013] AMCR 165; [2013] 1 MLRA 547; [2013] 1 AMR 573 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[23] It is our considered view that in the present case the appellant, being a person who has given a guarantee and more importantly an indemnity, is primarily liable for losses which the principal borrower could not have been made liable. His liability is not dependent or secondary to the liability of the principal borrower. He is a principal debtor himself. The liability under a contract of indemnity does not depend on whether the principal debt is enforceable. It has no reference in law to the obligation of any third person. In essence, the liability of the person who has given an indemnity can be more extensive than that of the liability of the principal borrower. (See the cases of (1) Yeoman Credit Ltd v. Latter & Anor [1961] 2 All ER 294 and

Chung Khiaw Bank Ltd v. Soi Huan & Ors [1985] 1 LNS 71].”

Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Bank Pembangunan Malaysia Bhd v Ketheeswaran M Kanagaratnam [2022] MLJU 796; [2022] 6 CLJ 513; [2022] 5 MLRA 353 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa:- “[24] Therefore, from a reading of both cls. 2.2 and 2.3 of the guarantee, the respondent had given both a guarantee and an indemnity as a principal obligator or principal debtor. This has been reaffirmed by cl. 5.3, which provides that the obligations and liabilities expressed to be undertaken by the respondent/guarantor under the guarantee are those of a primary obligor and not merely as a surety. [26] In other words, even if the lender (bank) cannot recover the loan from the principal borrower (ABN) for any reason, the principal obligor (respondent) is still liable to the lender (bank) under the principal obligor clause. Accordingly, we are of the considered opinion that the respondent is primarily liable to the bank under the principal obligor clause for the principal borrower, ABN's indebtedness. The respondent's liability is not dependent on or secondary to the liability of the principal borrower, ABN. The guarantee is a stand-alone agreement where the respondent has agreed to be the principal debtor himself. Therefore, when an 'event of default' has occurred and the sum of RM236,796,198.64 is due and owing by ABN to the bank, the bank is entitled to claim the said sum from the respondent as a principal debtor under the terms of the guarantee.”

Maka, berdasarkan nas-nas di atas, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa terdapat merit dalam hujahan JC dalam kes ini. Adalah jelas dari perbincangan di atas bahawa niat parlimen dalam menggubal seksyen 5(3)(b) dan seksyen 5(4) Akta Tersebut hanya terpakai kepada seseorang penjamin semata-mata di mana JC perlu membuktikan bahawa ia telah melengkapkan kesemua tindakan pelaksanaan terhadap peminjam prinsipal terlebih dahulu sebelum memulakan tindakan terhadap penjamin. Kausa tindakan terhadap JD adalah berasingan (independent cause of action) berdasarkan perjanjian jaminan dan indemniti tersebut dan JC tidak perlu membuktikan bahawa ia telah mengambil sebarang tindakan pelaksanaan terhadap peminjam prinsipal. Perkara ini dapat jelas dilihat dalam klausa 16 (d) kepada Perjanjian Jaminan dan Indemniti tersebut yang mana JC tidak mempunyai obligasi mandatori untuk mencairkan sebarang sekuriti yang dijamin bagi pinjaman tersebut terlebih dahulu sebelum memulakan tindakan pelaksanaan terhadap JD. Klausa 16 memperuntukkan bahawa:- “16. It is hereby expressly agreed and declared by me/us as the guarantor(s) that my/our obligation to make payment in connection with this Guarantee & Indemnity:-

constitute separate and independent obliagations;

shall give rise to separate and independent causes of action;

shall apply irrespective of any waiver or indulgence granted by you in respect of any other obligations; and

shall remain in full force and effect despite any judgment, order, claim or proof for a liquidated amount in respect of some other obligation and may be relied upon and enforced by you independently of or simultaneously with or without having to commence any other action under such obligations or having first exhausted any remedy or having sold or disposed of any assets, properties, undertaking which may be provided as security to you from time to time”

Maka, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa seksyen 5(3)(b) Akta Tersebut tidak terpakai dalam kes ini. Dengan demikian, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa permohonan JD dalam kes ini wajar ditolak.

Berdasarkan keputusan-keputusan yang diputuskan di peringkat Mahkamah Rayuan dan Mahkamah Persekutuan, terdapat perbezaan yang nyata di antara Perjanjian Jaminan dan Perjanjian Indemniti. Memandangkan dalam kes ini, klausa-klausa Perjanjian Jaminan dan Indemniti tersebut menunjukkan bahawa liabiliti JD dalam kes ini adalah untuk mengindemniti JC dalam kemungkiran peminjam prinsipal, dan kausa tindakan tersebut ternyata berasingan dan bebas dari kausa tindakan JC terhadap peminjam prinsipal, maka seksyen 5(3)(b) dan seksyen 5(4) Akta Tersebut adalah tidak terpakai kepada JD di sini.

Dengan demikian, permohonan JD adalah dengan ini ditolak dengan kos RM1,000.00 dibayar JD kepada JC, tertakluk kepada fi alokatur. Bertarikh: 27 April 2023 Disediakan oleh, ………………………………….

Tetuan The Chambers of KC Chan Peguambela & Peguamcara Peguam Pemiutang Penghakiman No. 2-1-47, Tingkat 1, Wisma Rampai, Jalan 34/26, Taman Sri Rampai, Setapak, 53300 Kuala Lumpur (Ruj: CKC/LIT/2021/09/120) …

Tetuan S.K. Song Peguambela & Peguamcara Peguam Penghutang Penghakiman No.44A, Jalan Dedap 4, Taman Johor Jaya, 81100 Johor Bahru, Johor (Ruj: J/30543) … Goh Tiong Sin Kes-kes yang dirujuk:

Liew Hon Kong v Bank Pertanian Malaysia Bhd [2022] 1 MLJ 836; [2021] 9 CLJ 82; [2021] 6 MLRA 641; [2021] AMEJ 1158

Per: Lim Sue Beng v AmBank (M) Berhad & Ors [2022] MLJU 3147; [2022] 1

LNS 2822 Hong Leong Bank Berhad v Ong Moon Huat & Another Appeal [2018] MLJU 1576; [2018] 1 LNS 1612; [2018] MLRAU 504

OCBC Bank (M) Bhd & Anor v Livision Sdn Bhd & Ors [2001] 5 MLJ 129; [2001] 5 CLJ 433; [2000] 4 MLRH 278

Development & Commercial Bank Berhad v Aspatra Corporation Sdn Bhd & Anor [1995] 3 MLJ 472; [1996] 1 CLJ 141; [1995] 2 MLRA 116; [1996] 3 AMR 3627

RHB Bank Bhd v FGG Wood Mouldings Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors [2001] 4 MLJ 86; [2001] 3 CLJ 661; [2000] 4 MLRH 129

Cheow Chew Khoon (t/a Cathay Hotel) v Abdul Johari bin Abdul Rahman [1995] 1 MLJ 457; [1995] 4 CLJ 127; [1995] 1 MLRA 679; [1995] 1 AMR 759

Tan Hoo Heng v Timbalan Pendakwa Raya & Ors [2018] MLJU 1197; [2018] 1

LNS 1257; [2018] MLRHU 991; [2018] AMEJ 1008 Ismail Nasaruddin Abdul Wahab v Malaysian Airline System Bhd [2022] 6 MLJ 414; [2022] 9 CLJ 801; [2022] 6 MLRA 696; [2022] 7 AMR 641

Pengusaha, Tempat Tahanan Perlindungan Kamunting, Taiping & Ors v Badrul Zaman Ps Md Zakariah [2018] 12 MLJ 49; [2018] 8 CLJ 273; [2018] 6 MLRA 177; [2018] 5 AMR 733

Rusli Ab Ghani; Ex-Parte: CIMB Bank Berhad [2018] 1 LNS 1528; [2018]

MLRHU 1180 Sia Siew Hong & Ors v Lim Ghim Chian & Anor [1995] 3 MLJ 141; [1996] 3 CLJ 26; [1995] 2 MLRA 356; [1996] 3 AMR 3651

United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd v Tan Chong Whatt & Ors [2022] MLJU 1148; [2022] 1 LNS 1186; [2022] AMEJ 0587; [2022] MLRHU 1000

United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd v Andrew Lee Siew Ling [2012] 3 CLJ 708; [2012] 5 MLRA 76

Lim Lek Yan v Yayasan Melaka [2012] MLJU 546; [2013] 1 CLJ 1081; [2012]

Andrew Lee Siew Ling v United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd [2013] 1 MLJ 449; [2013] 1 CLJ 24; [2013] AMCR 165; [2013] 1 MLRA 547; [2013] 1 AMR 573

Bank Pembangunan Malaysia Bhd v Ketheeswaran M Kanagaratnam [2022] MLJU 796; [2022] 6 CLJ 513; [2022] 5 MLRA 353