Empressa Rubber Sdn Bhd v 1. ) Pengarah Perhutanan Negeri Pahang (CA-21NCvC-15-09/2023)

KERAJAAN NEGERI PAHANG DEFENDANTS (Heard together with Cases No. CA-21NCvC-16-09/2023, No. CA- 21NCvC-17-09/2023, No. CA-21NCvC-18-09/2023 and No. CA- 21NCvC-19-09/2023)

Introduction [1] These are my Grounds of Judgment in respect of five (5) separate applications filed by the respective Plaintiffs in Cases No.CA-21NCvC-15-09/2023 (Enclosure 12), CA-21NCvC-16 09/2023 (Enclosure 11), CA-21NCvC-17-09/2023 (Enclosure 11), CA-21NCvC-18-09/2023 (Enclosure 13) and No. CA- 21NCvC-19-09/2023 (Enclosure 12). [2] Each application was brought pursuant to Order 14A and/or Order 33 rule 2 of the Rules of Court 2012 ("ROC 2012"), seeking determination of preliminary questions of law arising from forestry or land lease agreements entered with the Government of Pahang or its agencies. [3] All five applications were heard together as they share a common legal architecture: long-term concession or lease agreements, alleged termination by the State authority and challenges by Plaintiffs asserting that such termination was unlawful and/or in breach of contract. [4] After hearing full submissions, I dismissed all five applications. I now provide my reasons.

Governing Statutory Framework [5] Order 14A rule 1 ROC 2012 provides: "The Court may... determine any question of law or construction of any document... if it appears to the Court that—

such question is suitable for determination without a full trial; and

such determination will finally determine the whole cause or any claim or issue therein." [6] Order 33 rule 2 further provides that: "The Court may order any question or issue arising in a cause or matter, whether of fact or law or both, to be tried before, at, or after the trial..." [7] These provisions must be read strictly, as they confer a summary jurisdiction which is exceptional in nature. [8] The Federal Court in Thein Hong Teck & Ors v Mohd Afrizan Husain [2012] 1 MLRA 712 emphasised: [47] It is trite law that Order 14A of the Rules of the High Court 1980 may only be resorted if there is no dispute by the parties as to the relevant facts, or that the court, upon scrutinising the pleadings concludes that the material facts are not in dispute (see Dream Property Sdn Bhd v Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd [2007] 2 MLRA 495; [2007] 6 CLJ 741. Where the issues of fact are interwoven with legal issues raised, it will be undesirable for the court to split the legal and factual determination for to do so would in effect be to give rulings in vacuo or in hypothetical ruling, which the court will not do so (see State Bank of India v Marjani Marketing 1 March 1991, CA Transcript No. 91/0304)” [9] Similarly, in Dream Property Sdn Bhd v Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd [2007] [2007] 2 MLRA 495, the Court of Appeal held: "(10) For the court to exercise its power to summarily dispose an action under Order 14A of the RHC, there should be not be any dispute by the parties as to the relevant facts. Here the affidavits filed by the Defendant in opposing the Plaintiff Order 14A application showed there were serious dispute as to the material facts vis-à-vis the date of delivery of vacant possession of the school to the defendant (para 7)" [10] The Federal Court in Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan v Petroliam Nasional Bhd [2014] 7 CLJ 597 reiterated that the Court must be satisfied that the matter is suitable for summary disposal and that material facts are not in dispute.

Legal Threshold [11] The jurisprudence establishes a clear threshold: Order 14A is not a mechanism for resolving contested narratives of breach, performance or contractual compliance. [12] As succinctly stated in Kok Kon Sang v CIMB Bank Bhd [2023] MLRHU 628: "(9) For that to take place, on plain reading of O 14A ROC as well as case authorities which are applicable and binding on this court, succinctly elaborating on the operation and enforceability of O 14A entails, in order for this court to exercise its power to summarily dispose of an action, there shall be no dispute between plaintiff and defendant on the relevant and material facts pleaded". [13] The principle is grounded in procedural fairness on which a party must not be deprived of its right to viva voce evidence and crossexamination.

Common Factual Matrix Across all Cases [14] Each of the five cases involves long-term forestry or land concession agreements entered between the Plaintiffs and the State. [15] The Defendants allege that the Plaintiffs failed to comply with core contractual and statutory obligations, including: i. failure to develop or maintain plantation works; ii. failure to submit mandatory forest management or reforestation plans under Section 20 of the National Forestry Act 1984; iii. failure to comply with planting requirements or approved species; iv. non-payment or late payment of rental or premiums; and v. abandonment or inactivity of project sites. [16] The Plaintiffs, in turn, deny these allegations and assert that: i. they had complied with contractual obligations; ii. termination was unlawful; and iii. the Defendants acted prematurely or without contractual justification. [17] These competing narratives reveal not merely interpretive disputes, but deep factual controversies requiring evidential determination.

Case by Case Determination Case No. 15 (En 12) [18] Case No.15 concerns a lease agreement dated 1.11.2005 and its termination on 9.6.2021 and/or 14.3.2023. [19] The Plaintiff sought declarations that termination was unlawful and that the agreement remains valid. [20] The Defendants allege breaches including: i. failure to implement plantation obligations; ii. failure to submit development plans under Section 20 National Forestry Act 1984; and iii. failure to comply with licensing and reforestation requirements. [21] The Federal Court in Thein Hong Teck cautioned: "Where issues of fact are interwoven with legal issues... it will be undesirable for the court to split the legal and factual determination." [22] In this case, whether plantation works were performed at all is a pure question of fact, not construction of law. As such, I held that Case No.15 is unsuitable for Order 14A determination. Case No.16 (En 11) [23] Case No.16 concerns cancellation following MMK decision (17.03.2021) targeting inactive forestry projects. [24] The Defendants rely on: i. alleged inactivity of plantation site; ii. planting of unapproved species (Aquilaria malaccensis); and iii. non-compliance with forestry approval conditions. [25] The Plaintiff disputes these allegations. [26] The central issue whether the project was "inactive" is inherently factual. [27] Here, the dispute is not interpretive but evidential. Case No.16 therefore fails the threshold requirement. Case No.17 (En 11) [28] Case No.17 involves termination of forestry lease due to alleged breaches of contractual obligations over time. [29] The Defendants assert: i. failure to maintain plantation progress; ii. non-compliance with statutory forestry planning requirements; and iii. failure to meet operational timelines. [30] The Plaintiff disputes these allegations. [31] The Court of Appeal in JAKS Resources Bhd v Star Media Group Bhd [2023] 6 MLJ 114 held: "(4) An application under O 14A of the ROC 2012 would be inappropriate if there were conflicting allegations of facts; material facts in dispute; and if the factual issues were interwoven with the legal issues. Based on a comparison of the parties' pleading, there clearly were material and serious factual disputes between the parties which could only be resolved by taking viva voce evidence through a trial". [32] The disputes here are precisely of that nature. Case No.17 cannot be resolved without oral testimony. Case No.18 (En.13) [33] Case 18 concerns termination via letter dated 9.6.2021 alleging non-compliance with forestry obligations. [34] The Defendants contend: i. no plantation progress recorded; ii. failure to submit mandatory forest management plans; and iii. breach of Clause 10.1 termination conditions. [35] The Plaintiff disputes compliance findings. [36] Whether termination was contractually valid depends on whether breaches occurred, not merely interpretation of clauses. [37] That exercise cannot be done here due to factual conflict. Case No.18 is therefore unsuitable for summary judgment. Case No.19 (En.12) [38] Case No.19 concerns cancellation following MMK decision and alleged unlawful planting of Aquilaria malaccensis. [39] The Defendants rely on: i. alleged failure to comply with Section 20 National Forestry Act 1984; ii. non-submission of forest development plans; and iii. breach of core contractual obligations. [40] The Plaintiff disputes all material allegations. [41] Section 20 National Forestry Act 1984 provides: "20. Unless otherwise exempted by the State Authority, before any licence is issued, the Director shall require the applicant to do any or all of the following:-

to demarcate on the ground the area or part thereof covered by the licence, the situation and extent of which shall be determined by the Director in accordance with the provisions of the licence, within which operations will be carried out by the applicant on becoming a licensee;

to prepare -

a forest management plan or forest harvesting plan; and

(ii) a reforestation plan in the manner to be specified by the Director; National Forestry 25

to register with the Director a property mark which is approved by the Director " [42] Whether such statutory compliance occurred is a question of fact requiring documentary and oral evidence.Accordingly, Case No. 19 fails the Order 14A threshold.

Overaching Judicial Finding [43] Across all five cases, I find: i. serious disputes of material fact exist; ii. contractual performance is contested; iii. statutory compliance is disputed; and iv. termination validity depends on factual findings. [44] To grant these applications would require the Court to determine liability without hearing witnesses. [45] That would amount to adjudication "in vacuo", which the appellate courts have consistently warned against.

Writ Actions vs Originating Summons [46] A significant contextual feature in all five cases is that the Plaintiffs elected to commence proceedings by way of Writ of Summons, rather than Originating Summons. [47] While this is not determinative of the availability of Order 14A, it is nevertheless a relevant contextual indicator. [48] The procedural distinction is well understood: i. Originating Summons is typically employed where the dispute turns on pure questions of law or construction without substantial factual controversy; whereas ii. Writ proceedings are used where disputes involve contested facts requiring oral evidence and cross-examination. [49] The election to proceed by writ therefore reflects, at the very least, an acknowledgement that the disputes are not confined to pure questions of contractual interpretation. [50] As a matter of principle, while Order 14A may still be invoked in writ actions, the Court must be especially cautious, as writ proceedings usually signal the presence of fact-sensitive disputes requiring trial. [51] In the present cases, this procedural context is consistent with what the pleadings and affidavits clearly demonstrate: substantial factual controversies between the parties.

Conclusion [52] These applications, though presented as questions of law, are in truth deeply rooted in contested facts requiring full trial. [53] The Plaintiffs' attempt to invoke Order 14A would improperly bypass the evidential process. [54] Justice requires that parties be afforded the opportunity to prove their case through viva voce evidence. [55] Accordingly all five applications in Cases No.15,16,17,18 and 19 are dismissed with costs of RM2000.00 for each case subject to allocatur. Dated: 19 May 2026 (SAMRY BIN MASRI) Judicial Commissioner High Court Kuantan Counsel for the Plaintiff : Tetuan Daljit Singh Partnership Peguam Bela & Peguam Cara Unit 301, Blok B, Level 3 Pusat Dagangan Phileo Damansara 2 15, Jalan 16/11, Jalan Damansara 46350 Petaling Jaya Selangor Darul Ehsan (No. Ruj: 20230547.97) Peguam Kanan Persekutuan Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Pahang Tingkat 3, Wisma Sri Pahang Jalan Tun Ismail 25000 Kuantan Pahang Darul Makmur (No. Ruj:PUN.PHG.F/100/38/1/47/2023 (MT))