Endless Corporate Sdn. Bhd. v 1. ) Gs Realty Sdn. Bhd. (WA-24NCvC-2327-08/2022)

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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR (BAHAGIAN SIVIL) SAMAN PEMULA NO: WA-24NCVC-2327-08/2022 BETWEEN ENDLESS CORPORATE SDN. BHD. [Company No.: 1418645-D] … PLAINTIFF

Lampiran

Lampiran 169 dibayar dalam tempoh 5 hari dari tarikh perintah ini. 4) Penggantungan bagi hukuman tahanan yang dikenakan terhadap D3 seperti yang telah diperintahkan akan dibatalkan tanpa sebarang perintah lanjut oleh Mahkamah sekiranya terma-terma untuk penggantungan tahanan adalah dilanggar dan tidak dipatuhi oleh D3. BRIEF FACTS [6] The Plaintiff is a company incorporated in Malaysia under the Companies Act 2016 with its registered business address at No. 20-2, Jalan Puteri 5/2, Bandar Puteri Puchong, 47100 Puchong, Selangor Darul Ehsan. Plaintiff offers services for business management consultancy. [7] D1 is a company incorporated in Malaysia under the Companies Act 2016 with its registered business address at No 2-1, Jalan Metro Pudu, Off Jalan Loke Yew, Fraser Business Park, 55100, Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur. D1 operates business of real estate, housing and land agent, brokers, commission agents, auctioneers of all categories of movable and immovable property and to purchase sell and deal in all kinds of freehold or leasehold property, houses, building and land. [8] D2 is a legal firm registered under the Malaysian Bar with its address of service at A1-1-6, Solaris Dutamas, No 1, Jalan Dutamas 1, 50480 Kuala Lumpur. [9] D3 is an advocate and solicitor of the High Court of Malaya and a sole proprietor of D2. [10] The Plaintiff filed an originating summons (Enclosure 1) which was allowed on 30.10.2023 (Order). The Order is as follows- 1. Satu (1) deklarasi bahawa Plaintif merupakan perkhidmat Defendan Pertama berkenaan dengan notis taksiran tersebut di bawah Akta Cukai Perkhidmatan 1975; 2. Satu (1) deklarasi bahawa Plaintif berhak kepada yuran professional dan yuran persediaan Plaintif sebanyak RM4,343,450.00 di bawah invois-invois Plaintif bertarikh 10-01-2022; 3. Satu (1) deklarasi bahawa Defendan Kedua dan Defendan Ketiga adalah pemegang amanah (trustee) kepada Plaintif berhubung jumlah RM2,000,000.00 yang dipegang oleh mereka; 4. Penghakiman terhadap Defendan Pertama untuk jumlah sebanyak RM4,343,450.00; 5. Faedah pada kadar 5% setahun ke atas RM4,343,450.00 dari tarikh perintah Mahkamah Mulia ini sehingga tarikh penyelesaian penuh dibayar oleh Defendan Pertama kepada Plaintif; 6. Perintah bahawa Defendan Kedua dan Defendan Ketiga melepaskan dan membayar jumlah RM2,000,000.00 yang dipegang oleh Defendan Kedua kepada Plaintif dalam tempoh tiga (3) hari dari tarikh perintah. [11] The Defendants appealed. Subsequently, the Defendants filed a stay application to the Order and a conditional stay was granted on 12.3.2024. The terms of the Conditional Stay Order (CSO) are that- (a). D1 shall deposit the sum of RM2,343,450.00 into an interest-bearing account directed by the Court within 30 days thereof; and (b). D2 and D3 shall deposit the sum of RM2,000,000.00 into an interest-bearing account directed by the Court within fourteen (14) days from the Conditional Stay Order. [12] The Plaintiff then filed Enclosure 165 for D3’s non-compliance of the Order and the CSO while D1 filed Enclosure 169 citing D2 and D3s’ non-compliance of the CSO, accordingly. Parties’ Contentions Enclosure 165 [13] The Plaintiff contended that D3, being an advocate and solicitor of the High Court of Malaya and as the sole proprietor of D2, is regarded as an officer of the Court, but D3 has failed to comply with the Order and the CSO. In fact, D3 has attempted to circumvent the Order and the CSO by filing unfounded applications for committal proceedings against the Plaintiff (Enclosure 171) and Enclosure 174. [14] On the other hand, D2 contented that the CSO remains a conditional order, and not mandatory to comply. [15] D2 and D3 argued that the granting of leave to initiate committal proceedings does not, in itself, amount to a finding of contempt. It is merely part of an ex-parte vetting process designed to assess whether there exists a prima facie case of contempt. Therefore, the leave granted ex-parte to the Plaintiff should not be misconstrued as conclusive proof of contempt on the part of D2 and D3. [16] D2 and D3 further contended that in the absence of any provision in the CSO for the return of the deposited sum in the event their appeal is allowed, the CSO is therefore, incomplete and cannot be fully enforced. [17] D2 and D3 also contended that the Plaintiff has entirely failed to satisfy both the legal and evidential burdens required to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that D2 and D3 had committed any act of contempt as there was no intentional or deliberate breach of the CSO. Enclosure 169 [18] D1 contended that this application is premised on D2 and D3 breach of the CSO to deposit the sum of RM2,000,000.00 into an interest-bearing account directed by the Court within fourteen (14) days from the CSO. This CSO is final, regardless of the fact that it is a CSO. [19] Accordingly, D1 has complied with the CSO by depositing the required sum with the Court on 16.04.2024. However, D2 and D3 have failed to comply with the CSO, leaving D1 with no option but to initiate Enclosure 169 as D2 and D3 conduct had clearly impeded and/or prejudiced the administration of justice. [20] On the other hand, D2 and D3 contended that the CSO is incomplete and incapable of full enforcement, as the CSO omitted the provision for the return of the deposited sum, should the Defendants’ appeal succeed at the Court of Appeal. [21] D2 and D3 further contended that D1 has wholly failed to discharge the requisite legal burden and evidential burden placed upon it to establish beyond reasonable doubt that D2 and D3 have committed any contempt of court. Hence, there was no wilful or deliberate disregard of the CSO. [22] D2 and D3 further contended that the CSO was conditional in nature, and not a mandatory injunction. It did not impose any absolute obligation on D2 and D3 unless they chose to invoke the benefit of the stay. D2 and D3 exercised their right not to activate the CSO and accordingly, there was no operative obligation to deposit the judgment sum. Enclosure 174 & Enclosure 176 [23] In support of D2 and D3 applications in Enclosure 174 and Enclosure 176, D2 and D3 contended that the actions of the Plaintiff and D1 amount to an abuse of the Court’s process. [24] D2 and D3 further contended that the Plaintiff and D1 have misled this Court by presenting the CSO as final, whereas D2 and D3 remain subject to the conditions stipulated therein. [25] D2 and D3 also contended that the Plaintiff’s objective is not to seek justice but to coerce and pressure D2 and D3 into making payment. Similarly, D2 and D3 contended that D1’s act of filing the said Leave Application clearly shows that D1’s intention is not to seek justice but to pressure and coerce D2 and D3 into releasing the deposit. [26] D2 and D3 further contended that the Plaintiff and D1 had failed to comply with the mandatory procedure in handling the committal proceedings by failing to endorse the Penal Notice and/or failing to issue a Show Cause Notice to D3 and D2. This omission renders the committal process technically defective and unenforceable, thereby invalidating the Leave Application and the related Statement. [27] In contrast, the Plaintiff contended that D2 and D3 have clearly failed to comply with the Order and CSO. D2 and D3 have also disrupted the Court process since 30.10.2023, including by filing this baseless application in Enclosure 174. [28] The Plaintiff further contended that there is no reasonable justification provided by D2 and D3 for their failure to comply with the Order and the CSO. The Plaintiff also contended that the committal order on 16.06.2025 is appropriate, and the application by D2 and D3 in Enclosure 174 is to be dismissed. [29] In opposing D2 and D3 application in Enclosure 176, D1 submitted that the CSO is clear and unambiguous. Hence, the leave for the committal proceedings was validly granted by this Court, as it was established that there is a breach of the CSO on the part of D2 and D3. [30] D1 contended that the stay order is to ensure that no execution is commenced by the Plaintiff against the Defendants, and the stay is subject to the conditions imposed. Failure to comply with the CSO would attract a committal order. Consequently, it is D2 and D3s’ obligations to comply, despite the fact that the stay order is conditional. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS [31] Article 126 of the Federal Constitution provides the power of this Court to deal with punishment on contempt- 126. “Power to punish for contempt The Federal Court, the Court of Appeal or a High Court shall have power to punish any contempt of itself.”. [32] This provision is further reiterated in section 13 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (Act 91). [33] Accordingly, non-compliance of a court order amounts to contempt of court as deliberated in the Supreme Court case of Wee Choo Keong v MBF Holdings Bhd & Anor and Another Appeal [1993] 2 MLJ 217; [1993] 3 CLJ 210; [1993] 1 MLRA 782; [1993] 2 AMR 1205, which held- “…Obedience to Court Order It is established law that a person against whom an order of Court has been issued is duty bound to obey that order until it is set aside. It is not open for him to decide for himself whether the order was wrongly issued and therefore does not require obedience. His duty is one of obedience until such time as the order may be set aside or varied. Any person who fails to obey an order of Court runs the risk of being held in contempt with all its attendant consequences…” [34] In this regard, Order 45 rule 5(1) and Order 45 rule 5(1)(A) of the Rules of Court 2012 (ROC) provide- “(1) Where- (a) a person required by a judgment or order to do an act within a time specified in the judgment or order refuses or neglects to do it within that time or, as the case may be, within that time as extended or abridged under Order 3, rule 5; or (b) a person disobeys a judgment or order requiring him to abstain from doing an act, then, subject to these Rules, the judgment or order may be enforced by one or more of the following means: (A) with the leave of the Court, an order of committal;” [35] Leave of the Court is a requirement before an order for committal is allowed and it is trite law that the burden of establishing a prima facie case of contempt at the leave stage, is on the Plaintiff and D1 respectively (see Tan Sri Dato' Kam Woon Wah v. Dato' Sri Andrew Kam Tai Yeow, [2024] MLRHU 1144; Mukhriz Mahathir v. Datuk Seri Mohd Najib Tun Haji Abdul Razak & Anor [2019] 2 MLRA 64; [2018] 3 MLJ 715; [2018] 6 CLJ 573, Tan Kang Ho v. Mao Sheng Marketing (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2015] MLRHU 83; [2015] 4 CLJ 113; [2015] 5 AMR 146 and Dewan Perniagaan Melayu Malaysia Negeri Johor v. Menteri Besar Johor & Ors [2016] 2 MLRH 31; [2016] 7 MLJ 1; [2016] 1 CLJ 52). [36] Further, Order 52 of the ROC deals with committal (see CIMB Bank Berhad & Anor v. Tan Hoo Eng & Another Appeal, [2024] 2 MLRA 560; [2024] 3 CLJ 669). [37] In this regard, the legal principle of contempt was further deliberated in the case of Tan Sri Dato’ (Dr) Rozali Ismail & Ors v. Lim Pang Cheong @ George Lim & Ors [2012] 3 MLJ 458, 467-468; [2012] 2 CLJ 849; [2012] 2 AMR 429, [2012] 2 MLRA 717 that- “[20] In dealing with the applications to set aside the leave for committal proceedings, it is necessary for us to consider the law of contempt. A good starting point would be the definition of contempt of court itself. Oswald’s Contempt of Court (3rd Ed), at p 6 gives a general definition of contempt of court as follows: To speak generally, contempt of court may be said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard, or to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigants, or their witnesses during the litigation. [21] The jurisprudence for arming the court with the power to punish a contempt is best expounded by Brown J in Re HE Kingdon v SC Goho [1948] MLJ 17 as follows: But the root principle on which this inherent power to punish for contempt is founded, and the purpose for which it must be exercised, is not to vindicate the dignity of the individual judge or other judicial officer of a court or even of the court itself, but to prevent an undue interference with the administration of justice in the public interest. [22] Hence, the power to punish a contempt is not derived merely from statute nor truly from common law but instead flows from the very concept of a court of law (see Borrie & Lowe’s The Law of Contempt (3rd Ed), at p 465; and Master Jacob (1970) 23 Current Legal Problems 23). [23] Article 126 of the Federal Constitution empowers the Federal Court, the Court of Appeal and the High Court to punish any contempt of itself. This is repeated in s 13 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. However since the RFC has no procedural provision on committal, therefore, by virtue of r 3 of the RFC, the procedure under O 52 of the RHC may be adopted. Thus, an applicant can bring contempt proceedings via O 52 of the RHC without having to go through the Criminal Procedure Code or the Penal Code even if the relief sought is imprisonment. (See Chandra Sri Ram v. Murray Hiebert [1997] 1 MLRH 669; [1997] 3 MLJ 240; Arthur Lee Meng Kwang v. Faber Merlin Malaysia Berhad & Ors [1986] 1 MLRA 159; [1986] 2 MLJ 193 and Chung Onn v. Wee Tian Peng [1996] 4 MLRH 150; [1996] 5 MLJ 521). [24] Contempt of court has traditionally been classified as being either criminal or civil. In England, the general approach has been that a criminal contempt is an act which so threatens the administration of justice that requires punishment whereas by contrast, a civil contempt involves disobedience of a court order. However, O 52 of the RHC is inapplicable for contempt in criminal proceedings where the contempt is in the face of the court or consists of disobedience to an order of the court or a breach of an undertaking to the court (see O 52 r 1(2)(a)(ii) of the RHC). One thing is clear, be it civil or criminal contempt, the standard of proof required in either type is the same, which is beyond reasonable doubt. [26] Contempt has been reclassified either as (1) a specific conduct of contempt for breach of a particular court order; or (2) a more general conduct for interfering with the due administration or the course of justice…” [29] It is settled law that committal proceeding is criminal in nature since it involves the liberty of the alleged contemnor. Premised upon that, the law has provided procedural safeguards in committal proceeding which requires strict compliance…” [38] Accordingly, it was established in Tan Sri Dato’ (Dr) Rozali Ismail (supra) that any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard is an act of contempt. [39] Looking at the present case, this Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff and D1 have been successful to show prima facie contempt of court on the part of D2 and D3 as deliberated. Breach of the Order and the CSO [40] It is trite that where the Court, orders a party to perform an act within a specified time, but the said party fails to do so, that party can be committed for contempt of Court (See Dr Mohd Yussof bin Najar Din & Ors v. Najar Din bin Chatra & Ors [1998] MLJU 125, Hong Kwi Seong v. Ganad Media Sdn Bhd (And Another Appeal) [2013] 2 MLJ 251, 258-259; [2012] 6 AMR 221; [2012] 8 CLJ 667 & BYD Auto Industry Co Ltd v. Amdac (M) Sdn Bhd [2017] 11 MLJ 513; [2017] 5 CLJ 371). [41] In Dr Mohd Yussof (supra), the Court held- “All the 3 defendants had more than a fair opportunity to comply with the orders dated 7/4/97 and 9/6/97 before the committal proceedings were instituted. The orders of Court dated 7/4/97 and 9/6/97 were binding on the defendants unless and until set aside. No stay of execution of the said orders were ever obtained by the defendants. To ignore Court orders and allow defendants to be excused even if they believed that at some future time the orders would be set aside, is a recipe for chaos in the administration of justice. Disobedience to a judgment or order to do an act within a time specified is civil contempt.” [42] Further, in Hong Kwi Seong v. Ganad Media Sdn Bhd [2013] 2 MLJ 251, 258-259; [2012] 6 AMR 221; [2012] 8 CLJ 667, the Court held- “[15] The specific terms of the judgment or order are of overriding importance, as they are to be construed by the court in order to determine the legal effect as to whether the defendant is required to do an act within a time specified therein and whether the defendant has refused or neglected to do so within the prescribed time in the context of O 45 r 1(a). The court will then decide whether or not to grant leave to the plaintiff to pursue an order of committal under O 45 r 1(a)(i). … [19] In the instant appeal, the terms of the order clearly directed the appellant to pay the judgment sum in five instalments on or before the respective dates. In other words, the appellant was directed to do an act within a specified date. Despite that, the appellant had refused or neglected to do. The terms of the order in the instant appeal are peremptory in the sense that the appellant was commanded to make payment. These terms come within the scope of O 45 r 5(1)(a)(i). We are therefore unable to sustain the submission presented for the defendant. We answer the above question in the affirmative.” [43] It is clear and undisputed that D2 and D3 had failed to comply with either the Order or the CSO. Thus, this Court is of the considered view that D3 being the sole proprietor of D2 had committed the act of contempt. [44] Likewise, in BYD Auto Industry Co Ltd v. Amdac (M) Sdn Bhd [2017] 11 MLJ 513; [2017] 5 CLJ 371, the Court held- “[31] This court finds that the present case falls squarely within ratio of the Court of Appeal decision in Hong Kwi Seong v Ganad Media Sdn Bhd, where the terms of the order clearly directed the respondent to pay the sum of RM4.5m within 30 days of the order. The only distinction to be drawn from the facts of this case herein and that of Hong Kwi Seong v Ganad Media Sdn Bhd is, in that case, the said sum in question was a judgment sum. However, the similarity is, the said sum was ordered to be paid within a stipulated time frame and hence could be enforced by way of committal for contempt. It is undisputed, that the respondent failed to adhere to the commandment to make the payment of the said sum stated in the order.” Obstruction of Justice [45] In the case of Malaysian Bar v. Tan Sri Dato' Abdul Hamid Omar, [1989] 2 MLJ 281; [1989] 2 CLJ 373; [1989] 1 MLRA 194, the Supreme Court held- “[9] …what amounts to contempt are acts done calculated to obstruct or interfere with the lawful process of the Court.”. [46] Apparently, the law of contempt is wide enough to cover any breach of a court order and thus, obstructed the administration of justice. This has been the case of D2 and D3 for failure to comply with the CSO as contended by D1. Furthermore, D3 being an Advocate and Solicitor of the High Court of Malaya, would have known the gravity and effect of a Court Order and should abide by the Order and the CSO. Further this Court agrees with D1’s submission that the act of D2 and D2 for not complying with the CSO as an act of interfering with the due administration or the course of justice. [47] This Court agrees with D1’s contention that an order granted by the Court must be obeyed. In this context, D1 cited the case of Ann Joo Steel Berhad v. Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Negeri Pulau Pinang & Anor and another appeal [2019] 9 CLJ 153 (FC) that even a court order that was irregularly obtained could not be treated as a nullity, but must be implicitly obeyed, until by proper application it was discharged. Reference was also made to the case of Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Penyiaran Malaysia & Anor v. Vertex Blue Consulting Sdn Bhd [2025] 2 MLRAU 100; [2025] 5 MLRA 20 (CA) where the Court held- “[20] All court orders must be followed and obeyed. If a court order could be ignored without any consequence or sanction, “this would destroy the authority of judicial orders which is the heart of all judicial system”. In our jurisprudence, court orders must be respected and complied with. Those who choose to ignore them do so at their own peril...” [48] Further, in TO Thomas v. Asia Fishing Industry Pte Ltd [1977] 1 MLJ 151; [1977] 1 MLRA 84, the Federal Court held- “[29] Willfully, disobeying an order of the court constituted contempt. This commonly consists in a party's doing otherwise than he is enjoined to do, or not doing what he is commanded or required to do by the process, order or decree of the court: Miller v Knox. The contempt must be willful. [30] An order of court must have been contumaciously disregarded. It is no good if it is casual, accidental and unintentional: Fairclough & Sons v Manchester Ship Canal Co (No 2)”. [49] Thus, it is clear that D2 and D3 have interfered with the proper administration of justice by wilfully disregard the CSO by failing, refusing, and/or neglecting to comply with the same as contended by D1. This is even more serious when D3 as a senior advocate and solicitor, is deemed to have known and aware of the importance to comply with a court order, and that the order must be treated with respect / require strict obedience. However, D3 had wilfully neglected and disregarded his obligations under the CSO, which warrants a contempt order (see-Golden Star & Ors v. Ling Peek Hoe & Ors [2021] 2 MLJ 259; [2021] 2 MLRA 150; [2021] 3 CLJ 443, FC). [50] Therefore, it is the finding of this Court that D3 and D2 as well, as D3 is the sole proprietor of D2, have not complied with the Order and the CSO. Even if D2 and D3 contended that the CSO is not mandatory but conditional, nevertheless, the fact that D2 and D3 failed to comply with the Order, remains. [51] Thus, the evidence when considered in its totality, established beyond a reasonable doubt, the guilt of D2 and D3, on the charge of the contempt in question. Consequently, this Court finds D2 and D3, guilty of contempt for the breach of the Order and the CSO. Therefore, Enclosure 165 and Enclosure 169 are allowed. Sentencing [52] In the case of Letitia Bosman v. Public Prosecutor and other appeals (No 1) [2020] 5 MLRA 636; [2020] 5 MLJ 277; [2020] 8 CLJ 147; [2020] 6 AMR 801, the Federal Court held- "[125] In passing sentence, the court takes into consideration the mitigating and aggravating factors in order to ensure that the sentence is in accordance with the law. Passing a sentence according to law means the sentence imposed must not only be within the ambit of the sentence period stipulated but also assessed and passed according to established judicial principles (see Jafa bin Daud at p 316 of the judgment of Mohamed Azmi J)." [53] In PP v. Jafa bin Daud [1981] 1 MLJ 315; [1981] CLJU 28; [1981] 1 LNS 28, the Court held that “A sentence according to law" means that the sentence must not only be within the ambit of the punishable section, but it must also be assessed and passed in accordance with established judicial principles.”. [54] Additionally, sentencing is a discretion of the trial court (Loh Hock Seng v Public Prosecutor [1980] 2 MLJ 13 & DA Duncan v PP [1980] 2 MLJ 195; [1980] 1 MLRA 55). [55] In coming to the decision for sentencing, this Court is guided by some of these cases based on the sentencing trend, involving a contemnor for breaching a Court Order, which are as follows-Case Sentencing MBf Holdings Berhad & Anor v Houng Hai Kong & 2 Ors [1994] 4 CLJ 1002 2 years imprisonment Hosland bin Hussin v Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan [2012] 4 MLJ 137 1year imprisonment Tan Sri Datuk Nadraja a/l Ratnam v Murali a/l Subramaniam (Dato Sivakumar a/l Nadraja, intervener) [2017] MLJU 2307 1month imprisonment Lee Lim Huat v Yusuf Khan Bin Ghows Khan & Anor [1997] 2 MLJ 472 1month imprisonment Plastech Industries System Sdn Bhd v N & C Resources Sdn Bhd & Ors [2015] 7 CLJ 252 2 months imprisonment IJM Corporation Bhd v Harta Kumpulan Sdn Bhd (Part 2) [2007] MLJU 822 14 days imprisonment [56] Accordingly, in Lee Lim Huat v. Yusuf Khan Bin Ghows Khan & Anor [1997] 2 MLJ 472; [1997] 3 CLJ 197; [1997] 3 AMR 2401; [1997] 1 MLRA 244, the Court of Appeal held- “[42] We are here not dealing with the case of a layman accused of breaching an injunction. The appellant is a member of the Bar. As such he, more than anyone else, should respect and obey an injunction issued by the Court. The dignity of the judicial arm of Government will surely be eroded if orders of a Court are honoured more in their breach than observance by members of the Bar. The sentence passed should, apart from reflecting the gravity of the particular offence, act as a deterrent to would be violators of injunctions. We therefore reject the argument that this was an earlier offence as being entirely irrelevant. [43] The learned Judge when considering the punishment to be imposed took into account all relevant circumstances. It has not been demonstrated that he erred either in principle or that he had passed a sentence that was manifestly excessive. On the other hand, taking into account all the circumstances of the case, we find the sentence to be extremely lenient. Had we heard the matter at first instance we would have been disposed to passing a longer term of imprisonment.”. (Emphasis Added) [57] Further, in MBf Holdings Berhad & Anor v. Houng Hai Kong & 2 Ors [1994] 4 CLJ 1002, the 1st and 3rd Defendants were found guilty of contempt of court and were sentence to imprisonment. The 3rd Defendant was a member of the bar and was imposed a heavier sentence of 2 years imprisonment for each offence as compared to the 1st Defendant who was sentenced to 2 weeks of imprisonment. The Court held as follows- “[7] The 3rd defendant, however, deserves a more serious punishment. The 3rd defendant is a Member of Parliament and therefore a public officer. In addition he is also a member of the Bar and therefore an officer of the Court. As a member of the Bar the 3rd defendant has an onerous duty to protect the dignity of the Court and to see that justice is upheld. It is also expected of him to show greater respect for an order of Court. The 3rd defendant by obtrusively defying the power of the Court, has clearly shown no respect whatsoever for the Court and has indeed committed contumelious conduct against the order of Court. In view of the above, the 3rd defendant is sentenced to two years imprisonment for each of the offences.” [58] Similarly, in this instant suit, D3 is an advocate and solicitor. Thus, comparatively by applying the ratio of the sentence pronounced in Lee Lim Huat (supra) and the sentence given by this Court against D3, which is ten (10) days of imprisonment and a fine of RM100,000.00, the sentence of this Court is considered justified despite the fact that D3 is an advocate and solicitor. In Lee Lim Huat (supra), the Court of Appeal held that 1month imprisonment is extremely lenient considering that the contemnor is a member of the Bar. CONCLUSION [59] For these reasons, Enclosure 174 and 176 are dismissed and Enclosure 165 and Enclosure 169 are allowed with costs. This Court therefore, passed the sentence as recorded and ordered accordingly. [60] Subsequent to the sentencing orders, learned counsels for D2 and D3 made an oral application under Order 52 R7 of the ROC to stay the imprisonment order. The application was allowed by this Court subject to compliance of the terms referred in paragraph [5] above. Dated: 26 AUGUST 2025 -SGD- (SUZANA BINTI MUHAMAD SAID) Judicial Commissioner of the High Court NCvC 1 Kuala Lumpur COUNSELS For the Plaintiffs : Dato’ Teh Tse Yee, Ho Chong En dan Wong Xiu Tian Tetuan T.Y Teh & Partners For the 1st Defendant : Peter Neik dan Jazz Cheah Tetuan Neik & Partners For the 2nd and 3rd Defendants : Keshwinder Singh Tetuan Patrick Yeoh & Company