In any event, the appeal is conditional on the submission of the BPP. [19] Unperturbed, the appellant liaised with the JKDM to seek clarification, which resulted in the issuance of another letter from JKDM, dated 2.3.2022, to the appellant. The letter states as follows: Untuk makluman puan, tuntutan dalam notis taksiran bagi para 2.1 adalah dibatalkan kerana ianya melebihi tempoh had masa tuntutan, Sekiranya berminat, pihak pengurusan GS Realty adalah dialu-alukan untuk menyertai Program Pengakuan Sukarela (“Voluntary Disclosure”). Manakala tuntutan dalam notis taksiran bagi para 2.2 & 2.3, pihak pengurusan GS Realty Sdn Bhd hanya oleh menyertai Program Pengampunan (Amnesty) selepas bil tuntutan dikeluarkan. [20] The appellant then instructed its solicitors, Messrs Loh Poh Seng & Co, to demand the Deposit of RM2,000,000 being the stakeholder sum from the appellant. Messrs Loh Poh Seng then issued a letter of demand dated 22.4.2022. [21] The respondent’s firm, Messrs PYC, stood its ground that for the appellant to be entitled to its fees as the tax consultant for GS Realty, there should have been a “finality” from the appeal against the decision of the JDKM within four months of the date of the appellant’s Phase 1 Quotation Letter dated 23.11.2021. However, according to Messrs PYC in its letter dated 24.5.2022 to Messrs Loh Poh Seng, as at the date of the appellant’s demand, there was no “finality” on GS Realty’s tax appeal against JKDM. [22] In the circumstances, in the same letter, Messrs PYC afforded the opportunity to the appellant “to produce a final tax assessment as proof of “finality” of the appeal of which must have been issued on or before 22.3.2022”. [23] The failure of Messrs PYC to accede to the said demand was to be the basis of the Complaint against the respondent. Analysis [24] Before me, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the contract between the appellant and GS Realty is tainted with illegality since the appellant was never a tax consultant or agent under the ITA. However, it should be borne in mind that the subject matter of dispute is not under the ITA but under the STA. s 47A allows a third party to transact business on behalf of a taxable person if he could produce a letter of authorisation from the taxable person whom he represents. [25] I do not think that the issue of the illegality of the appointment of the appellant arises. I say this for the following reasons. First, the appointment of the appellant to represent GS Realty is allowed under s 47A of the STA. Secondly, the appointment was recognised by the JDKM in its letter dated 7.10.2021. [26] In any event, the legality of the appellant's appointment is a secondary issue, as the subject matter of dispute in this appeal is whether the respondent breached his stakeholder’s duty by refusing to release the Deposit to the appellant. [27] Let me first reiterate what was said by Lee Swee Seng JC (now JCA) in Poh Chee Seng v Majlis Peguam [2015] 10 MLJ 829: When a lawyer undertakes to do something, it is as if and as good as done. No members of the public dealing with any erstwhile member of the legal profession need to entertain any doubt that a lawyer will do as he says he would do. When he represents to another solicitor that monies had been deposited with him as a stakeholder, there is no need to doubt that it had been so deposited and will so remain there until the happening of the stakeholding event, to be released to the right party. When that trust is misplaced and not honoured, it erodes the very confidence and trust that the public expects of a lawyer. [28] The keywords to my mine are “until the happening of the stakeholding event”. The proposition can also be found in the judgment of the Federal Court in Lai Kee Peng v Tay Hup Lian [2016] 4 CLJ 1 FC, which reiterated what was said by Jeffrey Tan FCJ in Datuk M Kayveas & Anor v Bar Council [2013] 7 CLJ 533 FC that the manner in which the stakeholding money is to be disposed of depends on the terms on which it is held. In short, it does not matter who appointed the solicitor as a stakeholder. Once appointed, the solicitor is under a duty to hold the deposit in medio, pending the outcome of a future event. He does not hold it as an agent for the vendor nor as an agent for the purchaser. He keeps it as trustee for both to await the evidence. [29] It is also equally clear that once it has been established, both as to stakeholding and its breach, the breach of a stakeholder’s duty is itself a misconduct and a serious dereliction of duty; see, e.g., Datuk M Kayveas. [30] Applying the said propositions, once it has been established that a stakeholder’s duty exists, as in this case, it does not matter who is the party who appointed the solicitor. The solicitor is not obligated to follow the instructions of the party who appointed him. As a trustee, as in this case, he has to follow the terms of the trust until the occurrence of the stakeholding event. [31] In the instant case, I do not think that the existence of the stakeholding is in dispute. The only issue to be determined is whether the terms of the stakeholding have been complied with to justify the release of the Deposit. [32] Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the terms of the stakeholding have been complied with. He cited the letter from JKDM dated 2.3.2022 referred to earlier. However, I find difficulty in understanding this line of argument. If indeed the reconfirmation of the JKDM is the final proof that the obligations under the stakeholding have been complied with by the appellant, why did the appellant lodge the Complaint much earlier on 15.2.2022? Is not this putting the cart before the horse? [33] It should be borne in mind that the appeal as to the NA was allowed subject to GS Realty being enrolled in the JKDM’s Voluntary Disclosure Program. In short, although the appeal is allowed, it is contingent upon the appellant causing GS Realty to be enrolled in the said program. The email dated 5.1.2022 from the JKDM went on to state that in the event that GS Realty is not enrolled in the program, the JKDM’s audit exercise will proceed as usual. [34] There is however, no evidence before this Court that the appellant had caused GS Realty to be enrolled in the PKSS program. There was no evidence that the appellant had filled in the Borang Persetujuan Penyertaan (“BPP”) on behalf of GS Realty either. [35] I therefore find merits in learned counsel for the respondent’s argument that there is no finality in the JKDM’s decision to allow the appeal. Since the decision is conditional, GS Realty could be subject to a further audit exercise by the JKDM, and the result could be anybody’s guess. A further audit exercise could reveal the existence of fraud, wilful default or negligence where no statute of limitation applies. [36] In the circumstances, in the absence of any evidence that the conditions precedent have been met, the services rendered by the appellant to GS Realty are inchoate. Findings [37] For the aforesaid reasons, my findings are as follows: