RM12,400.00 on 8.3.2023 as part of the instalment payment for stage 2(a) in the Third Schedule of the SPA. [9] The Plaintiff further highlighted that in order to finance the purchase of the said Property, the Defendant has also obtained financing from Public Bank Berhad (“the Defendant’s Financier”) on 4 April, 2022. A pertinent fact relates to a Letter of Undertaking which the Plaintiff received from the Defendant’s Financier. This Letter of Undertaking, dated 17 May, S/N Lh4qRsaR0yilbtlgb0IxA 2023 is the Defendant’s Financier undertaking to release the Defendant’s loan in the sum of RM805,800.00 to the Plaintiff. [10] It was averred by the Plaintiff that it acted in accordance with Clauses 5(1), 5(2) and the Third Schedule of the SPA when it sent a notice to request payment from the Defendant and/or the Defendant’s Financier by attaching a certificate signed by the Plaintiff’s architect to prove that the work stage stated in the Third Schedule of the SPA has been executed. Despite obtaining financing from the Defendant’s Financier, the Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant has not settled the outstanding amount of RM545,100.00. [11] Therefore, vide the Plaintiff’s Notice of Intention to terminate the SPA dated 25 April, 2024, the Plaintiff has claimed for the Outstanding Amount of RM545,100.00 and late payment charges / interest accrued in the sum of RM27,323.17 (as at 4 April, 2024) from the Defendant. The Plaintiff also informed the Defendant that if the Defendant fails to make payment within 30 days from the date of the Notice of Intention, the SPA shall be treated as repudiated by the Defendant and be deemed as annulled and terminated whereby the Plaintiff has the right to dispose the said Property. The Plaintiff further submitted that after the expiration of 30 days from the date of the Plaintiff's Notice of Intention to terminate the SPA, there was still no reply from the Defendant. [12] According to the Plaintiff, following the non-compliance of the terms of the SPA, the Plaintiff issued another letter dated 27 May, 2024 to inform the Defendant that: (i) the SPA is deemed terminated; (ii) the Plaintiff shall deal with or dispose the said Property in such manner as they shall see fit as if the SPA has not been entered into; (iii) the instalments previously S/N Lh4qRsaR0yilbtlgb0IxA paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff shall be dealt with and disposed of in accordance with Clause 11(1) of the SPA; and (iv) all outstanding sums under Clause 11(1) shall remain as a debt due from the Defendant to the Plaintiff. [13] In its submissions, the Plaintiff underscored the fact that the Defendant never disputed to the termination of the SPA by the Plaintiff. [14] Another pertinent fact is the discovery by the Plaintiff that bankruptcy proceedings had been initiated by AmBank (M) Berhad (at the Shah Alam High Court in Civil Suit No.: BA-29NCC-347-02/2024) against the Defendant and this was admitted by the Defendant. [15] In support of its case, the Plaintiff relied on a number of cases. The first is Ching Yik Development Sdn Bhd v Setapak Heights Development Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 AMR 89; [1997] 1 CLJ 287; [1996] 3 MLJ 675; [1996] 2 MLRA 69 (“Ching Yik Development”) for the proposition that an obligation to pay the purchase price is a fundamental term. This was a decision of the Court of Appeal. [16] The next authority relied by the Plaintiff is Koperasi Mahadaya Bhd v Koperasi Polis Diraja Malaysia Bhd & Anor and another appeal [2012] 1 CLJ 724; [2012] 2 MLJ 569; [2012] 1 MLRA 427 (“Koperasi Mahadaya”), also a decision of the Court of Appeal. The principle from this case being when a breach of the fundamental term has occurred, the innocent party is entitled to terminate the contract. [17] Other cases cited include Yeng Chong Realty Bhd v Tenaga Nasional Berhad & Ors [2015] 1 LNS 1339 and Dream Property Sdn Bhd S/N Lh4qRsaR0yilbtlgb0IxA v Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd [2013] 2 AMCR 814; [2013] 7 CLJ 969; [2013] 6 MLJ 836; [2013] 6 MLRA 650. [18] In view of the bankruptcy action by AmBank (M) Berhad against the Defendant, the Plaintiff moved this Court for (i) the Defendant’s ownership in the title deed of the said Property to be cancelled and removed by the relevant District and Land Office; (ii) to re-register the Proprietor as the registered owner in the land title; and (iii) that the charge created by Public Bank Berhad in the said Property to be cancelled and removed from the title deed of the said Property by the relevant District and Land Office. [19] The Intitulement in the Originating Summons also made references to sections 56(1), 74(1), 75 and 76 of the Contracts Act 1950. The Defendant’s Assertation [20] The Defendant’s case is premised primarily on the ground that since Public Bank Berhad was the one that had issued the Letter of Undertaking, the Plaintiff ought to have pursued the matter with Public Bank Berhad and not the Defendant. [21] It was asserted by the Defendant that since the Undertaking given by Public Bank Berhad is still effective, “so do the registration of the dealings in the Land Registry affecting the property”. According to the Defendant’s line of argument, the Plaintiff “cannot simply ignore the Undertaking given and also the registration of the dealings and turn around to demand from the Defendant to pay the balance purchase price when the property purchased has been encumbered by registration at the Land Office”. S/N Lh4qRsaR0yilbtlgb0IxA [22] On the case of Ching Yik Development, the Defendant argued that it could be distinguished as unlike that case, the obligation to pay the balance purchase price was on the Defendant's financier following the registration of the instrument of Transfer and Charge at the Land Office. [23] To rebut Koperasi Mahadaya as cited by the Plaintiff, the Defendant again distinguished that case from the present case, pointing out that in that case, the court had decided that the transfer was fraudulent as the balance purchase price was not paid. However, in the present case, it was the Defendant’s contention that there was no fraudulent transfer occasioned by the Defendant but the Transfer and Charge was done by the Plaintiff and the Financier's Solicitors. [24] The Defendant also asserted that “the act to register the two dealings”, that is, the Transfer and the Charge, “cannot be labelled as unfortunate” and it was attributed to the “negligence on the part of the Plaintiff and Public Bank Berhad for which they should be fully responsible”. [25] ln regard to the termination of the SPA by the Plaintiff, the Defendant took the position that it was unlawful in view of the fact that the failure to pay the balance purchase price is by Public Bank Berhad and not by the Defendant. The Defendant went on to argue that while there was a contract by way of an existing loan between the Bank and the Defendant, which was duty executed, stamped and registered, nevertheless the Plaintiff “cannot simply ignore this fact and still seek payment from the Defendant”. S/N Lh4qRsaR0yilbtlgb0IxA [26] On the provisions of the Contracts Act 1950, the Defendant submitted that he was not in breach section 56(1) of the Contracts Act 1950 since the failure to pay as and when required under the terms of the SPA had shifted to Public Bank Berhad by virtue of the Letter of Undertaking and the loan documentation being perfected. [27] In addition, the Defendant alluded to section 74 of the Contracts Act 1950 and argued that that section allows an innocent party to claim damages from the party in breach in respect of all breaches of contract and based on the facts of this case there was no breach of any of the terms of the SPA by the Defendant. [28] The Defendant also argued that sections 75 and 76 of the Contracts Act 1950 cannot be invoked against him in the present case as first, the Defendant did not breach the compensation clause in the SPA and second, it is Public Bank Berhad that has taken over the responsibility to pay the balance purchase price to the Plaintiff. [29] The Defendant also raised the point pertaining to the failure by the Plaintiff to name the Land Office/Land Administrator, in addition to Public Bank Berhad, as Defendants. The Relevant Provisions of the Contracts Act 1950 [30] For convenience, the provisions of the Contracts Act 1950 as invoked in this suit are reproduced. The relevant provisions in sections 56(1), 74(1), 75 and 76 provide as follows: S/N Lh4qRsaR0yilbtlgb0IxA Effect of failure to perform at fixed time, in contract in which time is essential