EUM Realty Sdn Bhd v Inter Formula (M) Sdn Bhd (BA-12ANCvC-77-12/2024)

Sierra Dynamic Sdn Bhd [No. Syarikat: 388899-W] 03/06/2025 08:25:11

Eddie Hew

EUM Realty Sdn Bhd [No. Syarikat: 1194403-K] …Defendan-Defendan] JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This is an appeal by EUM Realty Sdn Bhd, the Third Defendant in the Sessions Court, pursuant to Order 55 rule 5 of the Rules of Court 2012, against the decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge in dismissing its application in Enclosure 19 with costs in the cause. [2] Enclosure 19 at the Sessions Court was premised on Order 33 rule 2 and/or Order 15 rule 6 and/or Order 18 rule 19(1) of the Rules of Court 2012. The Appellant had sought the following in its application in Enclosure 19: • Bahawa soalan dan/atau isu yang tertimbul daripada tindakan Plaintif didengar atau dilupuskan dan/atau dibicarakan terlebih dahulu sebagai isu preliminary sebelum pendengaran isu-isu dan/atau soalan-soalan lain tindakan Plaintif menurut Aturan 33 Kaedah 2 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012; dan • Mahkamah memberikan perintah yang sesuai berkenaan dengan keputusan yang didapati daripada pendengaran isu di permohonan ini; • Bahawa D3 dikeluarkan sebagai salah satu Defendan-Defendan dan/atau diberikan kebenaran untuk menarik diri daripada tindakan ini berdasarkan antara lain Aturan 15 Kaedah 6 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012; dan • Bahawa Writ Saman dan Pernyataan Tuntutan bertarikh 08 December 2023 dibatalkan terhadap D3. The Issue in this Appeal [3] The primary issue in this appeal is whether the Sessions Court had erred in law and/or in fact in dismissing the Appellant’s Notice of Application in Enclosure 19. The Pertinent Background Facts [4] The relevant background facts have been outlined by the learned Sessions Court Judge in paragraphs [5] to [10] of her grounds of judgment. [5] For the sake of completeness and to provide the full factual and procedural background, the relevant portion of the learned Sessions Court’s grounds is reproduced below. [5] Defendan Pertama merupakan tuanpunya tanah di kawasan perindustrian Sime UEP Industrial Park, Shah Alam (“Tanah itu”). Defendan Ke-2-pula adalah ejen hartanah yang dilantik oleh Defendan Pertama untuk menyewa Tanah itu kepada Plaintif. [6] Dalam tuntutan ini, Plaintif mendakwa, inter alia, bahawa Defendan Ke-2 telah melakukan frod terhadap Plaintif dan menukar terma-terma perjanjian penyewaan yang dipersetujui oleh pihak-pihak kepada terma terma yang lain ketika mendapatkan tandatangan Plaintif ke atas perjanjian penyewaan di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama. [7] Selain itu, Plaintif mengatakan bahawa representasi-representasi telah diberikan oleh Defendan Ke-2 kepada Plaintif berkenaan terma-terma penyewaan tersebut dan berkenaan kerja-kerja yang akan dilakukan oleh Defendan Pertama sebelum Plaintif mengambil milikan kosong Tanah itu. Plaintif mendakwa bahawa representasi-representasi yang dibuat oleh Defendan Ke-2 itu tidak dipenuhi oleh Defendan Pertama. [8] Maka perbicaraan tindakan ini akan merangkumi isu berkenaan pengingkaran terma-terma penyewaan oleh Defendan Pertama dan juga berkenaan representasi-representasi yang dibuat oleh Defendan Ke-2 dan frod yang dilakukan oleh Defendan Ke-2 terhadap Plaintif. Selain itu, terdapat isu liabiliti Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Ke-3 bagi frod yang dilakukan oleh Defendan 2 terhadap Plaintif. [9] Plaintif telah dalam tuntutannya memplidkan bahawa Defendan Ke-2 adalah pekerja Defendan Ke-3. Plaintif juga memplidkan bahawa Defendan Ke-3 berliabiliti terhadap Plaintif:

9.1 secara vikarius bagi salah laku Defendan Ke-2 terhadap

9.2 di bawah undang-undang am dan statut berkenaan liabiliti ejen hartanah;

9.3 di bawah doktrin estoppel kerana Defendan Ke-3 telah membenarkan atau mengetahui mengenai representasi-representasi oleh Defendan Ke-2 kepada orang awam termasuk Plaintif bahawa Defendan Ke-2 adalah sebahagian daripada organisasi Defendan Ke-3 dan adalah ejen atau pekerjanya; dan

9.4 Defendan Ke-3 mempunyai obligasi terhadap Plaintif yang tidak boleh didelegasikan kepada Defendan Ke-2 dan oleh itu berliabiliti untuk salah laku Defendan Ke-2 terhadap Plaintif. [10] Defendan Ke-3 menafikan bahawa Defendan Ke-2 adalah pekerjanya dan menyatakan bahawa Defendan Ke-2 adalah kontraktor bebas yang dilantik oleh Defendan Ke-3 dan bukan pekerjanya dan oleh itu Defendan Ke-3 tidak berliabiliti bagi salah laku Defendan Ke-2 terhadap Plaintif. [6] In essence, the background facts of the case before the court below concern a tenancy dispute, wherein the Respondent (as Plaintiff) was the tenant and the First Defendant the landlord. The Second Defendant acted as the landlord’s agent and had, at the material time also entered into a contract of or for service with the Appellant, a real estate agency (named as the Third Defendant). The Respondent's claim includes, inter alia, allegations of fraud and breach of contract arising from the tenancy. It is alleged that the Second Defendant was the principal wrongdoer, and the Respondent contended, in its Statement of Claim, that the Appellant was vicariously liable for the said misconduct by virtue of being the Second Defendant’s employer. Proceedings at and the Decision of the Sessions Court [7] The grounds by the Appellant at the Court below, in support of Enclosure 19, as outlined by the learned Sessions Court Judge, were as follows:

Plaintif telah memplidkan hanya satu kausa tindakan terhadap D3 iaitu di perenggan 5 PT seperti berikut: “5. D3 adalah sebuah syarikat yang diperbadankan di bawah undangundang Malaysia dan pada waktu yang berkenaan Defendan Kedua adalah pekerja D3. D3 adalah bertanggungjawab secara vikarius terhadap kesalahan Defendan Kedua seperti yang dinyatakan di sini.” D3 hanya akan mempunyai liabiliti untuk tindakan Defendan ke-2 sekiranya Defendan ke-2 adalah pekerja D3.

D3 tidak pernah terlibat dalam sebarang transaksi, peristiwa dan/atau fakta seperti yang diplidkan dalam PT; dan

Defendan ke-2 tidak mempunyai hubungan pekerjaan dengan D3. Defendan ke-2 hanyalah kontraktor bebas menurut kontrak bertarikh 12.09.2022 dan kontrak ini adalah kontrak for service bukan kontrak of service. [8] In rejecting the Appellant’s prayer for the Sessions Court to invoke Order 33 rule 2 of the Rules of Court 2012 and for the Appellant to be removed as one of the Defendants pursuant to Order 15 rule 6 of the RC 2012, the learned Sessions Court Judge explained as follows: [14] Plaintif memplidkan perkara-perkara berikut terhadap D3: a) D3 berliabiliti terhadap Plaintif secara vikarius bagi salah laku Defendan Ke-2 terhadap Plaintif (Penyata Tuntutan, perenggan 5); b) D3 berliabiliti terhadap Plaintif di bawah undang-undang am dan statut berkenaan liabiliti ejen hartanah; c) D3 berliabiliti terhadap Plaintif di bawah doktrin estoppel kerana D3 telah membenarkan atau mengetahui mengenai representasirepresentasi oleh Defendan Ke-2 kepada orang awam termasuk Plaintif bahawa Defendan Ke-2 adalah sebahagian daripada organisasi D3 dan adalah ejen atau pekerjanya; dan d) Defendan Ke-3 mempunyai obligasi terhadap Plaintif yang tidak boleh didelegasikan kepada Defendan Ke-2 dan oleh itu berliabiliti untuk salah laku Defendan Ke-2 terhadap Plaintif. (b – d terkandung dalam Jawapan Kepada Pembelaan Defendan Ke3, di Lampiran 17, perenggan 3.1 – 3.3) [15] Isu utama yang perlu mahkamah putuskan bagi membuat keputusan sama ada menolak atau membenarkan permohonan D3 adalah isu penentuan liabiliti D3 secara vikarius terhadap Defendan Ke-

[16] Alasan utama yang disandari oleh Defendan Ke-3 untuk membuat permohonan ini adalah bahawa Defendan Ke-2 adalah seorang ejen hartanah yang dilantik oleh D3 melalui satu kontrak untuk perkhidmatan (contract for service) bekerja untuknya sebagai kontraktor yang bebas dan bukannya sebagai pekerja D3. D3 merujuk kepada perjajian antara Defendan ke-2 dan D3 bertarikh 12.09.2022 (Ekshibit A – Lampiran 20). [17] Mahkamah perlu memutuskan sama ada D3 bertanggungan ataupun tidak secara vikarius terhadap tindakan Defendan 2 seperti yang diplidkan oleh Plaintif dalam tindakan ini. Persoalan penting yang perlu dijawab, bolehkah mahkamah membuat keputusan hanya semata-mata bergantung kepada perjanjian bertarikh 12.09.2022 tersebut tanpa perlu mendengar merit tuntutan Plaintif melalui perbicaraan penuh? [18] Bagi menjawab soalan di atas, mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan Plaintif bahawa kontrak di antara Defendan Ke-2 dan D3 itu bukanlah satu-satunya keterangan yang akan dipertimbangkan dan diambil oleh Mahkamah ini untuk memutuskan isu liabiliti D3 terhadap Plaintif. [9] The Sessions Court relied on the Court of Appeal decision in Vincent Manickam s/o David v Dr S Hari Rajah & Anor [2017] AMEJ 1985; [2017] 8 CLJ 27; [2018] 2 MLJ 497; [2017] 5 MLRA 244 (“Vincent Manickam”) and held that “perjanjian antara D3 dan Defendan ke-2 bukanlah faktor tunggal untuk pertimbangan mahkamah dalam menentukan kewujudan liabiliti vikarius di pihak D3”. [10] The learned Sessions Court Judge thus concluded as follows: [22] Penentuan mengenai kewujudan tanggungjawab vikarius hanya boleh dicapai melalui penelitian terhadap dokumen-dokumen yang dizahirkan semasa perbicaraan penuh kes ini dan melalui viva voce saksi-saksi. [23] Mahkamah juga bersetuju dengan hujahan pihak Plaintif bahawa tiada faedah untuk mahkamah mendahulukan perbicaraan isu ini sedangkan mahkamah boleh mendengar bersekali atau sekaligus pada perbicaraan penuh untuk menentukan merit tuntutan Plaintif yang mana ia lebih menjimatkan masa semua pihak. [24] Atas alasan di atas, mahkamah memutuskan untuk menolak permohonan D3 di Lampiran 19. The Respective Contentions in this Appeal [11] In this appeal, the Appellant reiterated the purpose of filing Enclosure 19, namely, to invite the learned Sessions Court Judge to, inter alia: a. Determine a preliminary issue pursuant to Order 33 rule 2 of the Rules of Court 2012; b. Order the removal of the Appellant as a party to the Sessions Court proceedings; and c. Strike out the Respondent’s claim dated 08.12.2023, insofar as they pertain to the Appellant. [12] The Appellant contended that the appeal ought to be allowed on the following grounds: i. The legal basis underlying Enclosure 19; ii. The contractual arrangement between the Second Defendant and the Appellant clearly indicates that the Second Defendant is not an employee of the Appellant; iii. The Respondent is bound by the position pleaded in the Statement of Claim and is not entitled to supplement or improve its case through affidavits or the Statement in Reply. [13] Reference was made to the case of Fauziah Ismail & Ors v Lazim Kanan & Orang-Orang Yang Tidak Diketahui [2013] 7 CLJ 37; [2013] 5 MLJ 423; [2013] 4 MLRA 445 (“Fauziah Ismail”). [14] It was averred by the Appellant that the contract between the Second Defendant (in the Sessions Court) and the Appellant “shows that D2 is not an employee”. [15] In support of the above contention, the Appellant made references to the terms in the said contract between the parties and relied on cases such as Woon Kim Choy v Acexide Technology Sdn Bhd & Anor and Another Appeal [2025] 2 CLJ 57; [2024] MLJU 3109; [2025] 1 MLRA 495, Sze Tho Kong v Bedford Damansara Heights Development Sdn Bhd & Ors Industrial Court of Malaysia Case No: 3(19)/4-1566/07, Ng Hee Thoong & Anor v Public Bank Berhad [1995] 1 AMR 622; [19950 1 CLJ 609; [1995] 1 MLJ 281; [1995] 1 MLRA 48, MTD Prime Sdn Bhd v See Hwee Keong & Ors and Another Appeal [2016] AMEJ 1614; [2016] 8 CLJ 623; [2016] 4 MLJ 695; [2017] 4 MLRA 130 and Wu Siew Ying v Gunung Tunggal Quarry & Construction Sdn Bhd & Anor [2011] 2 MLJ 1; [2010] 3 MLRA 78. [16] The next argument advanced by the Appellant was that “the Respondent/Plaintiff is limited to the position pleaded in the statement of claim and is not permitted to improve or supplement the case through affidavits or the statement in reply”. [17] On this contention, the Appellant referred this Court to the following cases, namely, Tan Sri Norian & Anor v Suzana Md Aris [2011] CLJU 1912; [2012] 6 MLRA 507, Ter Thian Tin v Ter Wei Hong & Ors [2021] AMEJ 0104; [2021] CLJU 172; [2021] MLJU 122; [2021] MLRHU 2572 and Itramas Technology Sdn Bhd v Maju Holdings Sdn Bhd & Ors (Encl 65) [2021] AMEJ 0983; [2021] CLJU 1002] [2022] 10 MLJ 656; [2021] MLRHU 559. [18] The Respondent’s primary contention was that the question of whether the Second Defendant is truly an independent contractor or the Appellant is vicariously liable for the Second Defendant’s wrongs is a mixed question of fact and law which requires a full trial. [19] In this regard, the Respondent argued that the Sessions Court correctly relied on Vincent Manickam and was right in concluding that there is no benefit in having a split trial where the trial between the Respondent and the Appellant is held first before the trial of the Respondent’s claim against the First and the Second Defendants The Decision of this Court [20] A scrutiny of the Appellant’s Notice of Application in Enclosure 19 filed in the Sessions Court reveals that the Appellant sought two broad categories of relief: first, an order that the issue of the Appellant’s liability to the Respondent be tried in advance of the liability of the other Defendants, pursuant to Order 33 rule 2 of the Rules of Court 2012; and second, consequential relief in the form of an order that the Respondent’s claim against the Appellant be struck out and the Appellant removed as a party to the proceedings, pursuant to Order 18 rule 19(1) and Order 15 rule 6 of the Rules of Court 2012 respectively. [21] Given that the Sessions Court refused the first relief sought, this Court will first address that aspect of the decision. [22] Order 33 rule 2 provides as follows: Time of trial of questions or issues (O. 33, r. 2) The Court may order any question or issue arising in a cause or matter, whether of fact or law or partly of fact and partly of law, and whether raised by the pleadings or otherwise, to be tried before, at or after the trial of the cause or matter, and may give directions as to the manner in which the question or issue shall be stated.” [23] In Fauziah Ismail, the Court of Appeal articulated the rationale for Order 33 rule 2 as follows: [14] Alternatively, the same application can also be made under O 33 r 2 of the Rules of Court 2012. Under the said rule, the court may order any question or issue arising in any cause or matter, whether of fact or law or partly of fact and partly of law, and whether raised by the pleadings or otherwise, to be tried before, at or after the trial of the cause or matters and the court may give directions as to the manner in which the question or issue shall be stated. As a general rule, the court will exercise its power under this rule if the trial of the question or issue will result in a substantial saving of time and expenditure which otherwise would have to be expended should the action go to trial. As a whole the outcome of the application will depend very much on the facts of each case. Under O 33 r 5, the court may give judgment and allow the plaintiff’s claim; or dismiss the cause. [24] It bears noting that Order 33 concerns the Mode of Trial. [25] This Court is cognizant of the point made by the Respondent that when the Appellant invoked Order 33 rule 2 in the court below, the Appellant was seeking “for an order that the issue of its liability to the Respondent be tried first before the issue of the liability of the other Defendants” and not for the court below to “determine a preliminary issue under Order 33 rule 2, Rules of Court 2012”. [26] This Court finds the distinction drawn by the Respondent to be immaterial. The power conferred under Order 33 rule 2 must be read in conjunction with Order 33 rule 5, which provides the Court with the discretion to summarily dispose of a matter if the separate trial of a question or issue renders the trial of the cause or matter unnecessary: Dismissal of action after decision of preliminary issue (O. 33, r. 5) If it appears to the Court that the decision of any question or issue arising in a cause or matter and tried separately from the cause or matter substantially disposes of the cause or matter or renders the trial of the cause or matter unnecessary, it may dismiss the cause or matter or make such other order or give such judgment therein as may be just. [27] Nevertheless, this Court is of the considered view that the learned Sessions Court Judge did not err in law or in fact in declining to invoke Order 33 rule 2. [28] In Vincent Manickam, the Court of Appeal observed: [50] From the line of authorities, we are of the view that this considerable question of whether a private hospital is vicariously liable for the negligence of its doctors, consultants or nurses, that is, the tortfeasor, is to be determined by investigating and evaluating whether such persons are truly independent contractors or they are, for all intents and purposes, still employees or in special relationships with the hospital. This evaluation involves mixed questions of fact and law for which we find that the multiple test or common sense approach as the most appropriate test. This test of various indicia (see Lee Ting Sang v Chung Chi-Keung and another at p 383) acknowledges the relevance of other factors such as the way business arrangements are drawn-up especially in the running of hospitals and the provision of healthcare and health services. The modern day economic reality in the provision of healthcare has seen the role no longer the single responsibility or domain of public hospitals run and supported by public funds. Healthcare is now hugely augmented by the presence of private hospitals such as the second respondent, who are in the position to offer supposedly better and perhaps wider range of healthcare and healthcare services. Other than the obvious difference in physical conditions of the hospitals, private hospitals are, to a large extent still staffed by the same and usual range of doctors and nurses, of different levels of expertise and types of specialisation. While the contractual arrangements of the doctors and nurses in public hospitals are generally governed by terms and conditions prescribed under the general orders, the same cannot be said of the private hospitals. Private hospitals enjoy greater flexibility and have arguably wider options often dictated by business and profit oriented considerations when it comes to how the organisational structure is to be established. Such considerations are not unlike those discussed by Henry LJ in Paul William Lane’s case. [29] Although the focal point in Vincent Manickam concerned vicarious liability in the context of private healthcare, the reasoning remains instructive. The question raised in the present case similarly involves mixed questions of fact and law. The Sessions Court was therefore justified in declining to determine the issue separately under Order 33 rule 2. [30] Consequently, the Appellant’s further prayers to be removed as a party and to strike out the Respondent’s claim under Order 15 rule 6 and Order 18 rule 19(1) must necessarily fail. These forms of relief are contingent upon a favourable determination under Order 33 rule 2, one that, in the present instance, was neither granted nor warranted. [31] This appeal is dismissed with costs. [32] The Appellant to pay costs of RM10,000.00 to the Respondent. Dated: 25 May, 2025 sgd [CHOONG YEOW CHOY] Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Shah Alam Counsel: Tee Xue Ying for the Appellant (Messrs. K Y Lim & Patners) Khabir Saroop Singh Dhillon for the Respondent (Messrs. Khabir Dhillon)