Express Solutions Sdn Bhd v Abazareeza Binti Mohd Abbas (KA-A52NCC-33-06/2024)

Tindakan Plaintif adalah “res judicata” dan/atau “duplicity of action” kerana Tindakan Plaintif adalah sama dengan tindakan yang dibangkitkan oleh MBSB melalui Guaman Sivil No.: 22A-234-03/2012;

(ii) Tindakan Plaintif adalah dihalang oleh Akta Had Masa 1953; dan

(iii) Tindakan Plaintif adalah mengaibkan, remeh atau menyusahkan dan adalah suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah. [ 3 ] Kertas-kertas kausa yang telah difailkan adalah seperti yang berikut:

Writ Saman bertarikh 21.06.2024 (“Writ”);

(ii) Pernyataan Tuntutan bertarikh 21.06.2024 (“Pernyataan Tuntutan”)

(iii) Permohonan Pembatalan;

(iv) Afidavit Sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh Abazareeza Binti Mohd Abbas 35 pada 20.08.2024 (“Afidavit Defendan (1)”);

Afidavit Jawapan yang diikrarkan oleh Tan Kai Tak pada 06.09.2024 (“Afidavit Plaintif”); dan

(vi) Afidavit Balasan yang diikrarkan oleh Abazareeza Binti Mohd Abbas pada 18.09.2024 (“Afidavit Defendan (2)”). 40 FAKTA RINGKAS [ 4 ] Pada 15.01.2018, Plaintif dan MBSB telah memasuki suatu perjanjian yang disebut sebagai NPF Debt Sale Agreement di mana MBSB telah bersetuju untuk menjual dan Plaintif telah bersetuju untuk membeli akaun hutang-hutang lapuk tidak 45 berbayar bagi produk pembiayaan peribadi (personal financing atau “PFI”) dan pembiayaan gadai janji (mortgage financing atau “Mortgage”) seperti yang terkandung dalam Jadual B NPF Debt Sale Agreement yang dikenali sebagai NPF Debt Schedule (selepas ini dirujuk secara kolektif sebagai “NPF Debt”) atas terma-terma dan syarat-syarat yang termaktub di dalam NPF Debt Sale Agreement. 50 [ 5 ] Pada 26.07.2019, Plaintif dan MBSB telah memfailkan suatu permohonan bersama melalui Saman Pemula No.: WA-24NCC-404- 07/2019 di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur bagi satu Perintah Letakhak untuk memberi kesan kepada pemindahan dan peletakanhak oleh MBSB kepada Plaintif berkenaan akaun-akaun di bawah NPF 55 Debt (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Permohonan Perintah Letakhak tersebut”). [ 6 ] Pada 14.08.2019, Permohonan Perintah Letakhak tersebut telah dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur yang mana NPF Debt yang merangkumi sebahagian daripada perniagaan MBSB, bersama dengan semua hak-hak, faedah, 60 kausa dan kepentingan sedia ada MBSB di bawah NPF Debt termasuklah hutang milik Defendan dipindahmilik dan diletakhak kepada Plaintif mengikuti terma-termanya tidak kira sama ada mengikut mana-mana undang-undang atau peraturan perundangan yang terpakai (“Perintah Letakhak”). 65 [ 7 ] Berdasarkan Perintah Letakhak tersebut serta rekod yang diperolehi Plaintif susulan NPF Debt Sale Agreement, Defendan mempunyai suatu akaun pinjaman Pfi yang mempunyai nombor akaun 45018008337200000 (“Pinjaman”). Defendan masih berhutang sejumlah RM315,695.02 (“Hutang Tertunggak”) kepada Plaintif sejak Plaintif mengambil alih hutang Defendan melalui Perintah Letakhak tersebut. 70 [ 8 ] Oleh kerana kegagalan Defendan dalam melunaskan Hutang Tertunggak kepada Plaintif walaupun telah melalui beberapa siri komunikasi dengan Plaintif, Plaintif dengan ini memfailkan Writ dan Penyataan Tuntutan ini pada 21.06.2024 bagi menuntut bayaran Hutang Tertunggak tersebut (“Tindakan Plaintif”). 75 [ 9 ] Selepas Defendan memfailkan Pembelaan bertarikh 06.08.2024, Defendan telah memfailkan Notis Permohonan bagi membatalkan writ saman dan pernyataan tuntutan Plaintif. 80 [ 10 ] Defendan memohon Writ dan Pernyataan Tuntutan dibatalkan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19(1)(b) dan (d) iaitu:

“Pembatalan pliding dan pengendorsan (A. 18, k. 19)

Mahkamah boleh pada mana-mana peringkat prosiding memerintahkan 85 supaya dibatalkan atau dipinda mana-mana pliding atau pengendorsan, apa-apa writ dalam tindakan itu, atau apa-apa jua dalam mana-mana pliding atau dalam pengendorsan, atas alasan bahawa –

ia tidak mendedahkan kausa tindakan yang munasabah;

ia mengaibkan, remeh atau menyusahkan;

ia boleh menjejaskan, menghalang atau melengahkan perbicaraan tindakan tersebut dengan adil;

ia selainnya adalah suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah, dan boleh memerintahkan tindakan itu digantung atau ditolak atau 95 penghakiman dicatatkan dengan sewajarnya, mengikut mana-mana yang berkenaan.” OTORITI-OTORITI [ 11 ] Defendan membuat permohonan ini di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19(1)(b) dan 100

Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 yang memperuntukkan seperti berikut: Striking out pleadings and endorsements (O. 18, r. 19) “19.

The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the endorsement, of any writ in the action, or 105 anything in any pleading or in the endorsement, on the ground that –

it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be;

it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious;

it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or 110

it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court, and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be.” 115 [ 12 ] Manakala Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 pula memperuntukkan bahawa: Inherent powers of the Court (O. 92, r. 4) “4. For the removal of doubt it is hereby declared that nothing in these Rules 120 shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the Court to make any order as may be necessary to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court.” [ 13 ] Beberapa kes Mahkamah telah menjelaskan mengenai pemakaian Aturan 18 125 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012. [ 14 ] Di dalam kes Bandar Builder Sdn. Bhd. & Ors. v. United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd. [1993] 3 MLJ 36 di muka surat 43, Mahkamah Agung telah memutuskan seperti berikut: 130 “The principles upon which the court acts in exercising its power under any of the four limbs of O 18 r 19(1) of the RHC are well settled. It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule (per Lindley MR in Hubbuck & Sons Ltd v Wilkinson, Heywood & Clark Ltd), and this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly 135 seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it ‘obviously unsustainable’ (see AG of Duchy of Lancaster v L & NW Rly Co 8). It cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case, in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence (see Wenlock v Moloney & Ors 9). The authorities further show that if there is a point of law which requires 140 serious discussion, an objection should be taken on the pleadings and the point set down for argument under O 33 r 3 (which is in parimateria with our O 33 r 2 of the RHC) (see Hubbuck & Sons Ltd v Wilkinson, Heywood & Clark Ltd 7). The court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious or that the defences raised are not 145 arguable.” [ 15 ] Manakala di dalam kes Pengiran Othman Shah Bin Pengiran Mohd Yusoff v. Karambunai Resorts Sdn. Bhd. (Siti Norma Yaakob JCA) [1996] 1 MLJ 309, di muka surat 321 Mahkamah Rayuan telah memutuskan seperti berikut: 150 “The discretionary power to dismiss an action summarily under O 18 r 19 and under the inherent jurisdiction of the court is a drastic power which should only be exercised in plain and obvious cases, as the effect of the exercise of such a power is to shut out the plaintiff altogether from pursuing his claim. (See Tractors 155

(M) Bhd. v Tio Chee Hing [1975] 2 MLJ 1.) Whether a case is plain or obvious does not depend upon the length of time it takes to argue the case, but that when the case is argued on the affidavit evidence available, it becomes plain and obvious that the case has no chance of success. …” 160 “When a question of law becomes an issue, this in itself will not prevent the court from granting the application, for as long as the court is satisfied that the issue of law is unarguable and unsustainable, it may proceed to determine that question. (See Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail & Ors. [1992] 1 MLJ 400.) Likewise, where the affidavit evidence discloses a 165 dispute of facts, such facts must be analyzed and if they are found to be inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or inherently improbable in themselves, the court is entitled to reject those facts and proceed upon the undisputed contemporaneous documentary evidence.” 170 [ 16 ] Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Indah Desa Saujana Corp Sdn. Bhd. v. James Foong Cheng Yuen, Judge, High Court Malaya & Anor [2008] 2 MLJ 11, Low Hop Bing JCA telah memutuskan bahawa: “Order 18 r 19(1)(a), (b) or (d) empowers the Court at any stage of the 175 proceedings to strike out the pleadings eg. the plaintiffs' statement of claim herein on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action; or it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; or is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court, respectively. There is a plethora of weighty authorities setting out trite principles governing an application under O. 18 r. 19(1). It has been consistently stated 180 by our courts that any pleading may be struck out if it is obviously unsustainable. … ... In the context of O 18 r 19(1)(b), 'scandalous' is taken to mean wholly unnecessary and irrelevant and not just unpleasant allegations: see eg 185 Boey Oi Leng (Trading as Indah Reka Construction and Trading) v Trans Resources Corporation Sdn Bhd [2001] 4 AMR 4807 (HC). 'Frivolous' or 'vexatious' means that the pleadings are obviously unsustainable. … The court has an inherent jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of its process: 190 Raja Zainal Abidin bin Raja Haji Tachik & Ors. v British-American Life & General Insurance Bhd. [1993] MLJ 16 (SC). ... The categories of abuse of process of the court are never closed and will certainly proliferate pursuant to the myriad of circumstances available from the factual matrix found in each particular case. In Gabriel Peter & Partners (suing as a firm) v Wee Chong Jin [1988] 1 SLR 374 195 384, the Singapore Court of Appeal explained the scope of 'an abuse of the process of the court' under O 18 r.19(1)(d) which is in parimateria with ours. The term has been given a wide interpretation by the courts and includes considerations of public policy and the interests of justice. It signifies that the process of the court must be used bona fide and properly and must not 200 be abused.” [ 17 ] Seterusnya di dalam kes Middy Industries Sdn. Bhd. & Ors v. Arensi-Marley (M) Sdn. Bhd. [2012] 1 LNS 830, di muka surat 5-7 dan 14 yang mana Mahkamah Rayuan Putrajaya di dalam memutuskan prinsip undang-undang di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 9 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 telah menyatakan seperti 205 berikut: “[7] Sub-paragraph (1)(b) of r. 19, deals with pleading which is “scandalous, frivolous or vexatious”; while sub-para. (1)(d) of the same rule deals with “an abuse of the process of the court”. In Murray v. Epson 210 Local Board [1897] 1 Ch 35 it was held by the court that, “scandalous” generally refers to matters which improperly cause derogatory light on someone, usually a party to an action, with respect to moral character or uses repulsive language (see also: Boey Oi Leng v. Trans Resources Corporation Sdn. Bhd. [2002] 1 CLJ 405; [2001] 4 AMR 4807; and Indah Desa Saujana Corporation Sdn. Bhd. & Ors 215 v. James Foong Cheng Yuen & Anor [2008] 1 CLJ 651; [2008] 2 MLJ 11). The words “frivolous or vexatious” generally refer to a groundless action or statement with no prospect of success, often raised to embarrass or annoy the other party to the action. In considering whether any proceedings were vexatious or frivolous, one is entitled to and ought to look at the whole history of the 220 matter and it is not to be determined by whether the pleading discloses a cause of action or not (see: Attorney General of Duchy of Lancaster v. London & North Western Railway Co. [1892] 3 Ch 274; and Re Vernazza [1959] 2 All ER 200). It was decided in the above cases that “frivolous or vexatious actions mean cases which are obviously frivolous or vexatious or obviously unsustainable.”” 225 “[9] Sub-paragraph (d) of the rule deals with pleading which is “an abuse of the process of the court”. In Castro v. Murray [1875] 10 Ex 213, the phrase “abuse of the process of the court” had been described generally to refer to situation where the court’s process is used for unlawful object and not for the 230 actual purpose intended to achieve justice. It involves a process which is contrary to good order established by usage. In dealing with thus sub-para. (1)(d), the judge is entitled to look at the affidavit evidence, on the same principle applicable to sub-para. (1)(b). ……….” 235 “[10] In short, the words “frivolous or vexatious” under r. 19(1)(b) refer to cases which are obviously unsustainable or wrong. The words connote purposelessness in relation to the process or a lack of seriousness or truth and a lack of bona fide; they also include proceedings where a party is not acting bona fide and merely wishes to annoy or embarrass his opponent, or when it is 240 not calculated to lead to any practical result (see: Goh Koon Suan v. Heng Gek Kiau [1990] 2 SLR (R) 705; Afro-Asia Shipping Co (Pte) Ltd v. Haridass Ho & Partners [2003] 2 SLR (R) 491; and Riduan Yusof v. Khng Thian Huat & Anor [2005] 2 SLR (R) 188).” 245 “[11] The phrase “abuse of process” under r. 19(1)(d) signifies that the process of the court must be used bona fide and properly and must not be abused. It includes consideration of public policy and interest of justice. The court will prevent any improper use of its machinery. It will prevent the judicial process from being used as a means of vexation and oppression in the 250 process of litigation. The categories of conduct rendering a claim frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process are not closed and will depend on all the relevant circumstances of the case. If an action was not brought bona fide for the purpose of obtaining relief but for some other ulterior or collateral purpose, it might be struck out as an abuse of the process of the court. (See: Gabriel Peter 255 & Partners v. Wee Chong Jin [1997] 3 SLR (R) 649 and Lonrho plc v. Fayed (No. 5) [1993] 1 WLR 1489).” ……………………… “[30] The learned High Court Judge was correct in exercising his discretion in striking out the appellants’ notice of appointment for the hearing of assessment 260 of damages in the present case before us. He had applied the correct principles of law governing the subject matter. We find no reason to interfere with his decision.” [ 18 ] Mahkamah ini turut merujuk kes Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Seruan 265 Gemilang Makmur Sdn. Bhd. v Kerajaan Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur & Anor [2016] 3 MLJ 1 yang menegaskan prinsip dalam kes Bandar Builder dalam perenggan 28 hingga 29 seperti berikut: “The basic test for striking out as laid down by the Supreme Court in Bandar 270 Builder is that the claim on the face of it must be ‘obviously unsustainable’. The stress is not only on the word ‘unsustainable’ but also on the word ‘obviously’, i.e. the degree of unsustainability must appear on the face of the claim without having to go into lengthy and mature consideration in detail. If one has to go into lengthy and mature consideration in detail of the issues of law and/or 275 fact, then the matter is not appropriate to be struck out summarily. It must be determined at trial. The established rule on this point is that the court should not examine the evidence in this summary proceedings in such a way as to amount to conducting 280 a trial on the conflicting affidavit evidence. As rightly said by Lord Diplock in the House of Lords in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] 1 All ER 504 at p 509; [1975] AC 396 at p 407: … The court no doubt must be satisfied that the claim is not frivolous or 285 vexatious; in other words, that there is a serious question to be tried. It is no part of the court’s function at this stage of the litigation to try to resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavit as to facts on which the claims of either party may ultimately depend nor to decide difficult 290 questions of law which call for detailed argument and mature considerations. These are matters to be dealt with at the trial … (Emphasis added.)” [ 19 ] Selanjutnya di dalam kes Lee Phak Kong v. Bestway Fortune Sdn. Bhd. 295 & Anor [2023] 1 LNS 586, Mahkamah Tinggi Ipoh di dalam isu berkenaan dengan pembatalan (“striking out”) di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dan/atau Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 telah memutuskan prinsip undang-undang berkenaan seperti berikut: 300 “Law on striking out” “[22] As the striking out applications are grounded on Order 18 rule 19 (1)

(a), (b), (d) as well as Order 92 rule 4 of the ROC, I set them out below. “Striking out pleadings and endorsement (O. 18 r. 19)

The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the endorsement, of any writ in the action, or anything in any pleading or in the endorsement, on the ground that–

it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case 310 may be;

it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious;

it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or

it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court, 315 and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be.” “Inherent powers of the Court (O. 92 r. 4) “[23] The law on a striking out application is settled, the principle being 320 that although the Plaintiff may have a weak case and is unlikely to succeed at trial it is not a ground for the claim to be struck out, see Bandar Builder Sdn. Bhd. & Ors. v. United Malayan Banking Corporation [1993] 4 CLJ 7 [1993] 3 MLJ 36 (SC); Loh Holdings Sdn. Bhd. v. Peglin Development Sdn. Bh.d & Anor [1984] 1 CLJ 325 Rep 211; [1984] 2 MLJ 105 (FC), and if the action can be saved by a suitable amendment to the pleadings, it ought not to be struck out but the Plaintiff is to be given liberty to amend, see Solai Realty SdnB hd v. Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Berhad [2013] 1 LNS 384; [2013] 4 MLJ 545 (CA). …..” 330 “[55] And, the defendants in this case had in fact relied upon the grounds of the action being frivolous, scandalous or vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court and had supported their applications with affidavit evidence. Wherefore, is 335 deciding the four appeals on the four striking out applications, this Court is at liberty to and had perused the affidavits filed.” “Conclusion” “[57] In the circumstances, in my considered view, it is plain and 340 obvious that the plaintiffs’ claims against the defendants are obviously unsustainable, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or is otherwise an abuse of process of the Court and the action against the defendants is struck out pursuant to Order 18 r.

(b) and (d) ROC.” 345 [ 20 ] Manakala di dalam kes Gasing Heights Sdn. Bhd. v. Aloyah Bte Abd Rahman & Ors. [1996] 3 MLJ 259, di muka surat 268 Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam telah memutuskan bahawa: 350 “……. Meanwhile, after the defendants were served with the writ and statement of claim, six of the defendants jointly filed a summons in chambers to strike out the statement of claim based on all the limbs of O 18 r 19(1)(a), (b), (c) and (d). A similar application was filed separately by the fifth defendant. In the circumstances, the court was not confined to a mere perusal of the 355 averments in the statement of claim, but could also look to the evidence (where relevant), in the numerous affidavits filed for and in support of the applications.” [ 21 ] Oleh demikian, berdasarkan prinsip-prinsip atas Mahkamah akan bertindak 360 apabila menggunakan kuasanya di bawah mana-mana satu perenggan Aturan 18 kaedah 19(1) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 adalah jelas. [ 22 ] Proses terus di bawah kaedah ini patut digunakan di dalam kes-kes yang terang dan nyata sahaja dan prosedur terus ini hanya boleh digunakan apabila jelas 365 bahawa sesuatu tuntutan atau jawapan adalah pada wajahnya 'obviously unsustainable'. Ia tidak boleh digunakan dengan pemeriksaan rapi dokumen-dokumen dan fakta-fakta kes itu untuk melihat sama ada pihak yang berkenaan mempunyai suatu kausa tindakan atau pembelaan. 370 [ 23 ] Sehubungan itu, kuasa Mahkamah di bawah Aturan 18 kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 untuk membatalkan pliding adalah budi bicara Mahkamah dan hanya boleh dilaksanakan bagi suatu kes yang jelas tiada asasnya (plain and obvious case). 375 PERTIMBANGAN MAHKAMAH [ 24 ] Asas kepada permohonan Defendan ini adalah bahawa:

Tindakan Plaintif adalah “res judicata” dan/atau “duplicity of action” kerana Tindakan Plaintif adalah sama dengan tindakan yang dibangkitkan oleh MBSB melalui Guaman Sivil No.: 22A-234-03/2012;

(ii) Tindakan Plaintif adalah dihalang oleh Akta Had Masa 1953;

(iii) Tindakan Plaintif adalah mengaibkan, remeh atau menyusahkan dan adalah suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah.

Tindakan Plaintif adalah “res judicata” dan/atau “duplicity of action” 385 kerana Tindakan Plaintif adalah sama dengan tindakan yang dibangkitkan oleh Malaysia Building Society Berhad (MBSB) melalui Guaman Sivil No.: 22A-234- 03/2012 [ 24 ] Defendan berhujah bahawa tuntutan Plaintif berasaskan kemungkiran 390 membayar balik pinjaman yang sama seperti mana sebelum ini telah dituntut oleh MBSB di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur di bawah kes No. 22A-234-02/2012. Defendan menyatakan bahawa isu tuntutan ini adalah isu yang sama yang telah diputuskan di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur tersebut. 395 [ 25 ] Manakala Plaintif berhujah bahawa penghakiman yang dimasukkan oleh MBSB adalah suatu penghakiman ingkar kehadiran iaitu suatu penghakiman yang dimasukkan kerana kegagalan Defendan untuk memfailkan Memorandum Kehadiran. Oleh itu, isu-isu mengenai undang-undang dan/atau fakta-fakta tidak pernah didengar dan/atau diputuskan oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia. Dalam hal ini, penghakiman ingkar 400 yang telah diperolehi bukanlah suatu “finality in litigation”. [ 26 ] Mahkamah mendapati bahawa bahawa penghakiman yang diberikan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur untuk tindakan MBSB adalah penghakiman ingkar kehadiran yang mana Defendan gagal memasukkan Memorandum Kehadiran dalam 405 tempoh yang telah ditetapkan. [ 27 ] Ini bermaksud ia merupakan suatu penghakiman yang diberikan tanpa perbicaraan penuh dan belum muktamad keseluruhannya. Ini bermakna isu-isu mengenai fakta dan/atau undang-undang di dalam tindakan MBSB tidak pernah 410 diputuskan oleh Mahkamah lagi. [ 28 ] Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah ini tidak sependapat dengan dakwaan Defendan bahawa wujud isu res judicata dan/atau “duplicity of action” kerana tindakan Plaintif adalah sama dengan tindakan yang dibangkitkan oleh Malaysia Building 415 Society Berhad (MBSB) melalui Guaman Sivil No.: 22A-234-03/2012 adalah tidak benar.

(ii) Tindakan Plaintif adalah dihalang oleh Akta Had Masa 1953 420 [ 29 ] Defendan berhujah bahawa tindakan Plaintif ini adalah dihalang oleh Akta Had Masa 1953 kerana telah melebihi tempoh enam (60 tahun dari tarikh kausa tindakan ini bermula. Ini adalah kerana MBSB telah memulakan tindakan sekitar tahun 2012 dan besar kemungkinan pelanggaran perjanjian atau bayaran terakhir yang diterima oleh MBSB telahpun berlaku pada tahun 2011/2012 lagi. 425 [ 30 ] Oleh yang demikian, tuntutan di dalam Mahkamah ini hanya dibuat selepas hampir 13 tahun dan secara jelas telah melebihi tempoh enam (6) tahun dari tempoh yang dibenarkan oleh undang-undang. 430 [ 31 ] Plaintif berhujah bahawa hubungan antara Plaintif dan Defendan mengenai hutang yang tertunggak oleh Defendan hanya timbul selepas Perintah Letakhak bertarikh 14.08.2019 antara Plaintif dan MBSB dianugerahkan kuasa. [ 32 ] Manakala tindakan Plaintif telah difailkan pada 21.06.2024. Oleh yang 435 demikian, Perintah Letakhak bertarikh 14.08.2019 masih berkuat kuasa dan Plaintif mempunyai hak untuk menuntut kerana ia hanya akan luput pada 14.08.2025. [ 33 ] Selanjutnya, Plaintif menyatakan bahawa secara alternatif, had masa juga sewajarnya bermula setelah Defendan dilepaskan daripada status kebankrapan iaitu 440 pada 22.11.2019 apabila wujud Laporan Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi bertarikh 05.11.2019 yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan dalam Afidavit Sokongannya. [ 34 ] Seterusnya Ini menjadi bukti bahawa hutang berkenaan MBSB (kini milik Plaintif) belum dilunaskan kerana hanya Hutang Bank Rakyat (M) Bhd. dan LHDN 445 sahaja yang telah dijelaskan. Oleh yang demikian, Plaintif mempunyai segala hak untuk menuntut jumlah hutang yang tertunggak tersebut. [ 35 ] Mengenai isu had masa, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa hubungan antara Plaintif dan Defendan mengenai hutang yang tertunggak oleh Defendan hanya timbul 450 selepas Perintah Letakhak bertarikh 14.08.2019 antara Plaintif dan MBSB telah berlaku yang mewajarkan permulaan hubungan di antara Plaintif dan Defendan terbentuk dan bukan sebelumnya. [ 36 ] Malahan Permohonan Perintah Letakhak tersebut telahpun dibenarkan oleh 455 Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur pada 14.08.2019, yang mana NPF Debt yang merangkumi sebahagian daripada perniagaan MBSB, bersama dengan semua hak-hak, faedah, kausa dan kepentingan sedia ada MBSB di bawah NPF Debt termasuklah hutang milik Defendan dipindahmilik dan diletakhak kepada Plaintif. 460 [ 37 ] Sehubungan dengan itu, Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa tuntutan Plaintif yang difailkan pada 21.06.2024 adalah tidak dihalang oleh Akta Had Masa 1953 sebagaimana dakwaan oleh Defendan.

(iii) Tindakan Plaintif adalah mengaibkan, remeh atau menyusahkan dan 465 adalah suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah [ 38 ] Defendan berhujah bahawa tindakan Plaintif adalah mengaibkan, remeh atau menyusahkan dan adalah suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah. Asas dakwaan Defendan ini adalah berdasarkan bahawa tindakan Plaintif adalah “res judicata” 470 dan/atau “duplicity of action” dan tindakan Plaintif adalah dihalang oleh Akta Had Masa 1953. [ 39 ] Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes Middy Industries Sdn. Bhd. & Ors v. Arensi-Marley (M) Sdn. Bhd. [2012] 1 LNS 830, yang mana Mahkamah Rayuan di 475 dalam memutuskan prinsip undang-undang di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 9 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 telah menyatakan seperti berikut: “[7] Sub-paragraph (1)(b) of r. 19, deals with pleading which is “scandalous, frivolous or vexatious”; while sub-para. (1)(d) of the same 480 rule deals with “an abuse of the process of the court”. In Murray v. Epson Local Board [1897] 1 Ch 35 it was held by the court that, “scandalous” generally refers to matters which improperly cause derogatory light on someone, usually a party to an action, with respect to moral character or uses repulsive language (see also: Boey Oi Leng v. Trans Resources Corporation Sdn. Bhd. [2002] 1 CLJ 485 405; [2001] 4 AMR 4807; and Indah Desa Saujana Corporation Sdn. Bhd. & Ors v. James Foong Cheng Yuen & Anor [2008] 1 CLJ 651; [2008] 2 MLJ 11). The words “frivolous or vexatious” generally refer to a groundless action or statement with no prospect of success, often raised to embarrass or annoy the other party to the action. In considering whether any proceedings were vexatious or 490 frivolous, one is entitled to and ought to look at the whole history of the matter and it is not to be determined by whether the pleading discloses a cause of action or not (see: Attorney General of Duchy of Lancaster v. London & North Western Railway Co. [1892] 3 Ch 274; and Re Vernazza [1959] 2 All ER 200). It was decided in the above cases that “frivolous or vexatious actions mean 495 cases which are obviously frivolous or vexatious or obviously unsustainable.”” “[9] Sub-paragraph (d) of the rule deals with pleading which is “an abuse of the process of the court”. In Castro v. Murray [1875] 10 Ex 213, the phrase “abuse of the process of the court” had been described generally to refer 500 to situation where the court’s process is used for unlawful object and not for the actual purpose intended to achieve justice. It involves a process which is contrary to good order established by usage. In dealing with thus sub-para. (1)(d), the judge is entitled to look at the affidavit evidence, on the same principle applicable to sub-para. (1)(b). ……….” 505 “[10] In short, the words “frivolous or vexatious” under r. 19(1)(b) refer to cases which are obviously unsustainable or wrong. The words connote purposelessness in relation to the process or a lack of seriousness or truth and a lack of bona fide; they also include proceedings where a party is not acting 510 bona fide and merely wishes to annoy or embarrass his opponent, or when it is not calculated to lead to any practical result (see: Goh Koon Suan v. Heng Gek Kiau [1990] 2 SLR (R) 705; Afro-Asia Shipping Co (Pte) Ltd v. Haridass Ho & Partners [2003] 2 SLR (R) 491; and Riduan Yusof v. Khng Thian Huat & Anor [2005] 2 SLR (R) 188).” 515 “[11] The phrase “abuse of process” under r. 19(1)(d) signifies that the process of the court must be used bona fide and properly and must not be abused. It includes consideration of public policy and interest of justice. The court will prevent any improper use of its machinery. It will prevent the 520 judicial process from being used as a means of vexation and oppression in the process of litigation. The categories of conduct rendering a claim frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process are not closed and will depend on all the relevant circumstances of the case. If an action was not brought bona fide for the purpose of obtaining relief but for some other ulterior or collateral purpose, it 525 might be struck out as an abuse of the process of the court. (See: Gabriel Peter & Partners v. Wee Chong Jin [1997] 3 SLR (R) 649 and Lonrho plc v. Fayed (No. 5) [1993] 1 WLR 1489).” ……………………… “[30] The learned High Court Judge was correct in exercising his discretion in 530 striking out the appellants’ notice of appointment for the hearing of assessment of damages in the present case before us. He had applied the correct principles of law governing the subject matter. We find no reason to interfere with his decision.” 535 [ 40 ] Mahkamah mendapati bahawa hak Plaintif menuntut hutang yang tertunggak oleh Defendan wujud selepas Perintah Letakhak bertarikh 14.08.2019 antara Plaintif dan MBSB. [ 41 ] Plaintif telah memfailkan tuntutan terhadap Defendan pada 21.06.2024 dan 540 hanya akan luput pada 14.08.2025. Tiada keterangan menunjukkan bahawa Defendan telah melunaskan semua hutangnya semasa di bawah MBSB ataupun selepas Perintah Letakhak bertarikh 14.08.2019 antara Plaintif dan MBSB. Ini adalah kerana hanya Hutang Bank Rakyat (M) Bhd. dan LHDN sahaja yang telah dijelaskan. 545 [ 42 ] Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa Plaintif mempunyai kausa tindakan terhadap Defendan dan tuntutan Plaintif ini adalah berasas. KESIMPULAN [ 43 ] Mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa tuntutan Plaintif mempunyai merit dan terdapat isu-isu yang perlu dibicarakan dengan memanggil saksi saksi memberi 550 keterangan. [ 44 ] Sehubungan itu, Mahkamah berpandangan bahawa Defendan gagal membuktikan mana-mana elemen di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19(1)(b) dan/atau (d) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 bahawa tindakan Plaintif adalah mengaibkan, 555 remeh atau menyusahkan dan adalah suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah. [ 45 ] Oleh yang demikian, atas imbangan kebarangkalian Mahkamah menolak Notis Permohonan Defendan Lampiran 10 bagi membatalkan Writ Saman dan Pernyataan Tuntutan Plaintif. 560 [ 46 ] Kos adalah mengikut kausa. Bertarikh 13 Februari 2025 565 t.t. (DARMAFIKRI BIN ABU ADAM) HAKIM MAHKAMAH SESYEN (1) ALOR SETAR, KEDAH 570 Peguam Cara Plaintif: Tetuan K K Lim, Peguamcara Plaintif yang mempunyai alamat penyampaian di 575 Chambers Twelve, 12B-1-1, Cempenai Parc, No. 12, Jalan Chempenai, Bukit Damansara, 50490, Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur. Peguam Cara Defendan: Tetuan Razif Jamil & Partners, Peguamcara Defendan yang mempunyai alamat 580 penyampaian di Wisma Razif Jamil, B 56 & 57, Jalan Sejati 3/2, Taman Sejati Indah, 08000, Sungai Petani, Kedah. 585 590