Farah Fadhlina Binti Mohamed Sazali v Ambiga A/P Pandian (WA-17D-45-10/2024)

The respondent, Ambiga a/p Pandian, had on 12 June 2023 lodged a complaint with the Advocates and Solicitors Disciplinary Board ("DB") against the appellant, who is an advocate and solicitor. The complaint in a nutshell was that the appellant had knowingly permitted an unauthorised person to act as an advocate and solicitor using the appellant's Practising Certificate in a legal firm known as Messrs M.S. Vethanayagam & Associates.

The appellant agreed with the opinion of the DB that the complaint be dealt with summarily under Section 100(4) of the Legal Profession Act 1976 ("LPA") after the advocate and solicitor had furnished her written explanation to the DB upon the latter's request under Section 100(1(b)(ii) of the LPA. The DB dealt with the matter summarily by hearing the appellant, including on the punishment, before imposing the following punishments:

a fine of RM50,000.00 to the Discipline Fund; and

suspension from practice as an advocate and solicitor of the High Court of Malaya for a period of 2 years.

On 23 February 2026, I allowed the appeal in part, by reducing the punishment by half, to a fine of RM25,000.00 and the suspension from practice for 1 year.

The complaint against the appellant was by the respondent, also an advocate and solicitor. In dealing with the legal firm known as Messrs M.S. Vethanayagam & Associates concerning a court case, the respondent discovered that the appellant had allowed an unauthorised person to act in disguise by utilizing the appellant's practising certificate in order to reactivate the legal firm under the name of its former sole proprietor, one M Stanislaus Vethanayagam, since deceased. The undisputed facts are that the deceased's daughter, Natasha Marie Stanislaus ("Natasha"), and wife, Rosemary Stanislaus, agreed with the appellant to continue the operation of the said legal firm using the appellant's practising certificate, wherein Natasha played the role of advocate and solicitor when dealing with clients and other legal firms.

The appellant had commenced legal practise with the said legal firm on 22 April 2022. The complaint was lodged on 12 June 2023, some 13 months later. The appellant was alleged to have breached the following provisions:

Section 36(1) read with Section 37 of the LPA;

Section 82(1)(a) read with Section 82(2)(a) of the LPA;

Rule 12 of the Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) 1978 ("1978 Etiquette Rules") by causing delay in Civil Suit WA-A52NCC-828-03/2023;

Rule 52 of the 1978 Rules by working with an unqualified person for division of costs or profits of the business;

Rule 9 of the Legal Profession (Publicity) Rules 2001 ("2001 Publicity Rules") for failing to display a nameplate on the outside of the premises at which the firm is located; and

Rule 10 of the 2001 Publicity Rules by failing to cause the name and address of her firm to be listed in the directory of the building at which her firm is located.

The DB considered the complaint and the breaches alleged against the appellant, the explanation by the appellant and her counsel for mitigating the punishment, and the written submissions of the respondent and imposed the punishment on the appellant as per the order under section 100 of the LPA. As stated above, the appellant appealed against the severity of the punishment. The Bar Council applied and was allowed to intervene in the instant case.

The sole ground of appeal is that the punishments imposed by the DB were disproportionate and manifestly excessive.

The appellant contended that the punishments are disproportionate, given amongst others, her remorse, her youth and immaturity, her inexperience, pregnancy complications at the material time, and absence of proven financial loss to any person. The appellant was merely a salaried partner paid RM2,500.00 a month and reports to Natasha. It was Natasha who ran the legal firm, including its bank accounts. The appellant argued that these factors ought to have attracted a lesser sanction.

The Bar Council and the respondent opposed the appeal. Collectively, it was submitted that the punishment imposed on the appellant was entirely proportionate to the gravity of the breach of the LPA and both the 1978 and 2001 Rules. The misconduct was properly calibrated in light of the mitigating factors raised, and the punishment that was imposed was proportionate to protect the integrity of the legal profession and the administration of justice. The position on punishment meted out by the DB

The general proposition is that in determining the appropriate punishment, the functions of the DB should, as far as possible be insulated from judicial intervention as the peers of the advocate and solicitor, senior members of the Malaysian Bar would be the appropriate forum to mete out the appropriate punishment under the LPA (Majlis Peguam Malaysia v Hari Krishnan a/l Jeyapalan [2017] 4 CLJ 225). However, the court is permitted to interfere where the punishment meted out where there exist extreme or special circumstances (Majlis Peguam Malaysia v Aniza Abd Aziz [2021] MLRAU 201) or where the punishment of the DB is considered to be manifestly excessive or manifestly wrong in the sense of being illegal (Majlis Peguam Malaysia v Lim Yin Yin [2019] 4 MLRA 39).

In Dinesh Kanavaji Kanawagi & Anor v Ragumaren N Gopal; Majlis Peguam (Intervener) [2018] 2 CLJ 1, the Federal Court stated that the principle of meting out sentences applied to the decision of the DB in the following words: "As to the first appellant, having given due consideration to the first appellant's role in the scheme, the principle of proportionality in meting out sentences applied. The DB and the DC were harsh in their recommendation and order that the first appellant be struck off the Rolls. The DC, in recommending the punishment to be meted out, ought to give brief reasons as to why the DC had recommended the particular punishment meted out, bearing in mind the DC had options available, and the courts must be in a position to examine the same to decide whether the pendulum for punishment had swung too far in favour of striking off the Rolls. Therefore, the order of the DB was to be varied to read that the first appellant be suspended from practice for a period of five years".

I found that there existed exceptional circumstances for the punishment to be reduced, which amounted to an appealable error to interfere with the punishment meted out by the DB.

The error is as follows. The DB took into account the complaint and the various provisions said to have been breached by the appellant, which includes Section 36(1) read with Section 37 of the LPA. I found it inconceivable that the appellant could be said to have breached the said sections.

Section 36(1) from its wording applies to a person known as an unauthorised person. An unauthorised person is a person who practises as an advocate and solicitor or does any act as an advocate and solicitor when his name is: (i) not on the Roll of Advocates and Solicitors of the High Court kept by the Registrar of the High Court; and (ii) he does not have a valid practising certificate issued by the Registrar of the High Court. The appellant certainly does not fall within this section. On the facts, if anyone had acted as an advocate and solicitor without a practising certificate would be Natasha.

Furthermore, Section 37 states that such unauthorised person, if he does the work of an advocate and solicitor as stipulated therein, "shall be guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to both". Thus, a breach of Section 36(1) and 37 is an offence liable to fine and/or imprisonment.

In the circumstances, the DB, by taking into account Sections 36(1) and 37 against the appellant, had added to the severity of the punishment imposed on the appellant. On this ground alone, an appealable error has occurred which justifies appellate intervention to scale the punishment downwards.

In any event, I am of the view that the punishment is not proportionate for failing to take into account the following strong mitigating factors:

the fact of the appellant agreeing for the complaint to be disposed summarily and the admissions she had made in her explanation in reply to the complaint indicate genuine remorse; and

proper weightage was not given to mitigating factors such as the appellant's immaturity, inexperience, where she was a salaried worker receiving RM2,500.00 a month, no proven monetary loss on any person, resulting in the pendulum for punishment swinging too far to excessive punishment.

The appellant had, on the facts, committed a breach of Section 82(1) of allowing an unauthorised person to use the appellant's practising certificate to gain profit and a breach of Section 82(2) of allowing an unauthorized person to operate a bank account in the name of her legal firm. The appellant has also breached Rules 12 and 52 of the 1978 Etiquette Rules, which is in essence an extension of the breach of Section 82(1). There is a doubt whether she has committed a breach of Rules 9 and 10 of the 2001 Publicity Rules, as there is no evidence produced by the respondent in her complaint or written reply, and the appellant has denied breaching these two rules.

For the above reasons, and taking into account all the circumstances, the punishment should be varied by half of what was meted out.Accordingly, the fine was reduced to RM25,000.00, and the suspension reduced to 1 year. DATED:18MAY2026 Amjajat R AMARJEET SINGH SERJIT SINGH JUDGE HIGH COURT KUALA LUMPUR Counsel of the Appellant: Dato' Sri Ramachelvam Manimuthu Nurul Syuhada binti Abdullah Tetuan Rama-Rozi & Associates No.33, Tingkat 1, Jalan Datuk Bahaman 3, 28000 Temerloh, Pahang Darul Makmur. Counsel of the Respondent: Counsel of the Respondent: Sarinah Begum binti Perr Mustafa Tetuan Sarinah Mustafa, Ambiga Pandian & Associates Suite 01-14,1 $ ^{st} $ Floor, TKS Business Center, Menara TKSS, 206 Jalan Segambut, 51200 Kuala Lumpur. Counsel of the Intervener: Louis Liaw Vern Xien Tetuan Louis Liaw Chambers Aras 3, Block C, The Five@KPD, Kompleks Pejabat Damansara, 49, Jalan Dungun, Bukit Damansara, 50490 Kuala Lumpur. 1) Majlis Peguam Malaysia v Hari Krishnan a/l Jeyapalan [2017] 4 CLJ 225. 2) Majlis Peguam Malaysia v Aniza Abd Aziz [2021] MLRAU 201. 3) Majlis Peguam Malaysia v Lim Yin Yin [2019] 4 MLRA 39. 4) Dinesh Kanavaji Kanawagi & Anor v Ragumaren N Gopal; Majlis Peguam (Intervener) [2018] 2 CLJ 1.