(ii) the application seeking leave is an abuse of process. [16] Learned counsel for the applicant cited the case of William John a/l P Sandansamy v Public Prosecutor [Criminal Appeal No: WA-42S-9- 09/2020] where the High Court judge allowed the appeal from the Sessions Court. In that appeal, the accused had lodged a police report 1 month after he was arrested. However, the trial judge did not consider the police report as part of the accused’s defence. On appeal, the High Court judge found the police report lodged by the accused supported his defence. [17] In the application before this court, the facts reveal that the applicant’s wife had filed a police report to state that the applicant had been set up or framed. The Public Prosecutor proceeded to charge the applicant despite this police report filed by the applicant’s wife. It was argued by learned counsel for the applicant there was no investigation into the police report filed by the applicant’s wife. A letter of representation was sent to the public prosecutor to no avail. [18] In the reply the learned Senior Federal Counsel argued that the case of William John (supra) could be distinguished from this case. In the case of William John (supra), the police report was tendered during the course of the trial. [19] William John (supra) the decision of the Sessions Court’s judge after full trial of a criminal case. The police report was tendered during criminal proceedings to support the accused’s defense. The trial judge had evaluated the content and the weight of the police report after the prosecution’s case and the defense’s case being heard. [20] In this respect, this court agrees with the submission by learned Senior Federal Counsel that the case of William John (supra) can be distinguished from the current application before this court. The police report in William John’s case (supra) case was adduced during a trial to support the accused’s defence. This is not the position in this application. By merely lodging a police report does not render the police report to be the truth. The veracity of the contents of the said police report is required to be established. This can be done during the criminal proceedings. [21] At the risk of repetition, the veracity of the content of the police report lodge by the accused’s wife and weightage to be attached to the police report can only be determined in the criminal trial. The police report does not singularly lead to the applicant’s innocence of the charged proffered against him. [22] Hence, this court is of the considered view that whether or not the applicant had committed the crime as per charges ought to be tested in criminal proceedings in criminal proceedings. It is a question of fact and would require consideration of all the evidence relating to and in support of the criminal charges. [23] Furthermore, this court made reference to Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution which provides as reproduced below: “The Attorney General shall have power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for an offence, other than proceedings before a Syariah court, a native court or a court martial.” [24] A perusal of Article 145 (3) of the Federal Constitution confers the prosecutorial powers to the Attorney General. [25] The meaning and effect of this constitutional clause have been examined in a long line of decisions and the apex Courts have consistently held that the decision of the Attorney General to institute, to conduct or to discontinue criminal proceedings is not amenable to judicial review. [See: Long Bin Samat & Ors v. Public Prosecutor [1974] 2 MLJ 152 (FC); Teh Cheng Poh v. Public Prosecutor [1979] 1 MLJ 50 (PC); and Karpal Singh & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1991] 2 MLJ 544] [26] However, in Sundra Rajoo a/l Nadarajah v. Menteri Luar Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2021] 6 CLJ 199 the Federal Court observed that the courts must be cautious not to run awry of the fine dividing line of the doctrine of separation of powers. In this regard, while the Attorney General/Public Prosecutor’s powers are reviewable, the Attorney General/Public Prosecutor’s discretion under Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution, as a matter of policy, remains subject to a higher threshold of scrutiny. [27] The Federal Court went on to state that the decisions of the Attorney General exercising the power under Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution are cloaked with the presumption of legality. The onerous burden lies on the challenging party to overcome the strong presumption of legality with compelling prima facie evidence of grounds to review the Attorney General/Public Prosecutor’s decision within the recognised reasons for judicial review. [28] The Federal Court in Sundra Rajoo (supra) held that the Attorney General does not have absolute or unfettered discretion under Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution and that it is appropriate, rare and exceptional cases, such discretion is amenable to judicial review. [29] The Federal Court stated that any challenge to the poser of the Attorney General/Public Prosecutor must pass a two-step threshold which must be satisfied at the leave stage of any application for judicial review. The applicant is first required to show that he has a legal basis to challenge the decision of the Attorney General/Public Prosecutor such as illegality; procedural impropriety; irrationality and mala fide. The applicant will then have to adduce compelling prima facie proof that he decision or omission of the Attorney General/Public Prosecutor falls within those grounds or any one of them. [30] In this instant case, the applicant challenged the decision of the Public Prosecutor to charge the applicant on the grounds that: