FELCRA JAYAPUTRA SDN BHD v 1. ) Aw Ching Fu berniaga di bawah perkongsian yang dikenali sebagai Zhe Ming Engineering Works (WA-24C-2-01/2026)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF MALAYSIA (CONSTRUCTION DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO. WA-24C-2-01/2026 In the matter of Adjudication under Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 between Zhe Ming Engineering Works (Registration No.: 200603107190 (JM 0457673-X) and Felcra Jayaputra Sdn Bhd (Company No.: 201301019793 (1045623-U); And In the matter of an Adjudication Decision dated 22.12.2025 decided by Adjudicator Ir. Yeoh Cheong Beng And In the matter of Section 15 of Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012; And In the matter of Section 16 of Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012; And In the matter of Order 7, Rule 2 and Rule 3 and Order 92 Rule 4 of Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN FELCRA JAYAPUTRA SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 201301019793 (1049623-U)) ... PLAINTIFF AND

1. AW CHING FU (NRIC No: 720219-01-6257)

2. LIM SIANG YONG (NRIC No: 790731-01-5038) (Partners carrying on business as Zhe Ming Engineering Works) (No. Syarikat: 200603107190 (JM0457673-X)) ...DEFENDANTS TO BE HEARD WITH IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF MALAYSIA (CONSTRUCTION DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24C-6-01/2026 In the matter of an Adjudication Decision dated 22.12.2025 under the Adjudication Reference No. AIAC/D/ADJ-6129-2025 between Zhe Ming Engineering Works and Felcra Jayaputra Sdn Bhd; And In the matter of Section 28 of the Construction Industry Payment & Adjudication Act 2012; And In the matter of Order 7, Order 28, Order 69A Rule 1 and Order 69A Rule 5 of the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN ZHE MING ENGINEERING WORKS (Company No.:201301019793 (1049623-U)) ...PLAINTIFF AND FELCRA JAYAPUTRA SDN BHD (Company No.: 200603107190 (JM0457673-X)) ...DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT A. INTRODUCTION [1] These grounds concern two Originating Summons heard together before me with the consent of the parties. In OS WA-24C-201/2026, the Plaintiff, Felcra Jayaputra Sdn Bhd ("FJP"), applies under sections 15 and 16 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ("CIPAA") to set aside and stay (the "Setting Aside /Stay Application") an Adjudication Decision dated 22.12.2025 (the "Adjudication Decision") made by learned Adjudicator Ir. Yeoh Cheong Beng ("the Adjudicator") in Adjudication Reference No. AIAC/D/ADJ-6129-2025. [2] In OS WA-24C-6-01/2026, the Defendants' partnership entity i.e. Zhe Ming Engineering Works ("Zhe Ming"), apply under section 28 of CIPAA to enforce the Enforcement Application the same (the "Adjudication Decision".) [3] Having carefully considered the cause papers filed, in particular the Adjudication Decision, as well as the written submissions and replies filed by both parties, I am not satisfied that FJP has met the high threshold required to set aside the Adjudication Decision under Section 15(b) and (d) of CIPAA. Accordingly, the setting aside portion of the Setting Aside /Stay Application is dismissed. After reviewing the affidavits, applicable law, and authorities, the stay portion under the Setting Aside/Stay Application is likewise dismissed. Conversely, Zhe Ming's Enforcement Application is allowed. [4] FJP has since lodged appeals against my decision in respect of the aforesaid 2 OS. These constitute my full reasons for the decision. B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & ADJUDICATION [5] The underlying project was for civil, structural, mechanical and electrical works for a two-storey office building and guardhouse at FJP's palm oil mill in Jerantut, Pahang ("the Project"), carried out by Zhe Ming under a letter of acceptance dated 10.11.2022 incorporating the FIDIC Conditions of Contract for Works of Civil Engineering Construction ("the Contract"). [6] The original contract sum was RM3,240,000.00, with a 9-month completion period from the commencement date of 10.11.2022, giving an original completion date of 9.8.2023. [7] Zhe Ming completed the Project. A Certificate of Practical Completion ("CPC") was issued by FJP's Consultant, AME Consultant Sdn Bhd ("the Consultant"), on 9.5.2024 some 9 months beyond the original completion date. The Defects Liability Period ("DLP") of 365 days under clause 11 of the Contract accordingly expired on 9.5.2025. No notice requiring Zhe Ming to remedy any defects was issued by FJP or the Consultant to Zhe Ming within the DLP. [8] Notwithstanding the expiry of the DLP, FJP declined to release the second moiety of the retention sum. Zhe Ming then commenced adjudication proceedings in or about July 2025 under CIPAA claiming the second moiety amounting to RM239,172.39. [9] In its Adjudication Response, FJP resisted the claim on the basis of three set-off defences: (a) Liquidated Ascertained Damages ("LAD") of RM111,780.00 for alleged delay of 23 days; (b) costs of defective works amounting to RM141,818.00 (reduced from an initial pleading of RM153,818.00); and (c) alleged false and/or overclaim works amounting to RM583,166.00. [10] The aggregate set-off of RM836,764.00, if established, would substantially exceed and extinguish Zhe Ming's claim. The Adjudicator also issued a formal Query List to both parties and received responses before issuing his decision. [11] On 22.12.2025, after considering the evidence, written submissions of both parties, and the responses to his Query List, the learned Adjudicator allowed Zhe Ming's claim in full and ordered FJP to pay: (a) the Adjudicated Sum of RM239,172.39; (b) interest of RM7,437.27 calculated at 5% per annum from 10.5.2025 to 22.12.2025; (c) Adjudication Costs of RM43,102.00; and (d) further costs of RM11,674.99, all to be paid by 5.1.2026. Payment was not made, prompting these proceedings. C. LEGAL FRAMEWORK Overarching Principles Governing Adjudication Under CIPAA [12] Before addressing the specific grounds of challenge, it is necessary to restate the fundamental principles that govern the Court's supervisory role over adjudication decisions under CIPAA, as consistently articulated by the Malaysian courts. [13] "Pay Now, Argue Later" The Provisional Nature of Adjudication Decisions: The primary purpose of CIPAA is to facilitate cash flow in the construction industry by providing a swift and interim mechanism for payment dispute resolution. An adjudication decision is provisional and does not constitute a final determination of the parties' substantive rights. [14] The governing philosophy is "pay now, argue later," enabling the successful party immediate access to funds while preserving both parties' rights to a full re-hearing by way of arbitration or litigation: View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2018] 2 MLJ 22 (Federal Court). This philosophy is the lodestar against which every application to set aside or stay an adjudication decision must be assessed. [15] Limited, Enumerated Grounds for Setting Aside: The Court's power to set aside an adjudication decision is strictly circumscribed by section 15 of CIPAA: (a) improper procurement through fraud or bribery; (b) a denial of natural justice; (c) the adjudicator not acting independently or impartially; or (d) the adjudicator acting in excess of jurisdiction. These are not residual or catch-all categories. [16] The courts have repeatedly and emphatically stated that these circumstances are "rare and exceptional" and that the court must be "restrained" from interfering with the adjudicator's substantive conclusions: ACFM Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v Esstar Vision Sdn Bhd and anor [2016] 1 LNS 1522 (Court of Appeal). In the words of the Court of Appeal in ACFM(supra), section 15 CIPAA does not extend to reviewing the correctness of the adjudicator's decision; factual findings are for the adjudicator alone. [17] The Duty to Consider Material Defences and Its Limits: Both parties rightly drew this Court's attention to the Federal Court's pronouncement in View Esteem(supra) at paragraph [65] that "an adjudicator who wrongly rules out considering a defence presented to him would be in breach of natural justice." This principle is well-established. [18] However, it must be read carefully. The duty is to consider the defence not to accept it, not to provide exhaustive reasons for rejecting it, and not to engage with every sub-argument or document. The principle does not collapse the distinction between an adjudicator who refuses to hear a defence and one who hears it but finds it unpersuasive or insufficiently supported. [19] The Materiality Requirement for Breaches of Natural Justice: Not every procedural irregularity constitutes a breach of natural justice sufficient to impugn an adjudication decision. Three requirements emerge from the authorities: a) First, the breach must be established a mere assertion of procedural unfairness is insufficient. b) Second, the breach must be material, not peripheral. c) Third, and most importantly, the breach must have affected the outcome; the court need only be satisfied that there was a real possibility of a different conclusion, without requiring a full investigation of how the adjudicator would have decided The cumulative effect of this framework is a high threshold appropriately so for judicial intervention. [20] The "Going off on a Frolic" Principle: A related principle is that an adjudicator commits a breach of natural justice if he decides a case on a factual or legal basis that was not argued or put forward by either party without first giving the parties an opportunity to address it. This is sometimes described as an adjudicator "going off on a frolic of his own": Cantillon Ltd v Urvasco Ltd [2008] EWHC 282 (TCC), cited with approval a number of Malaysian authorities, including in one of the recent authorities, Basics Decor Sdn Bhd v Ventura International Sdn Bhd [2025] MLRHU 2274. [21] By contrast, where the adjudicator draws inferences or evaluates evidence in a manner not specifically anticipated by the parties, but from facts placed before him by the parties, no breach arises. The former involves importing an unargued premise; the latter involves the legitimate exercise of evaluative judgment on the material tendered. [22] Presumption of Consideration and Absence of a General Duty of Thoroughness: An adjudicator is deemed to have considered all submissions and evidence placed before him unless the decision expressly states otherwise: Dekinjaya Builder Sdn Bhd v Chong Lek Engineering Works Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 2455. CIPAA does not require an adjudicator to address every argument or authority. [23] The decision need only identify the route by which the conclusion was reached on the central issues. The Court's function under section 15 is limited to examining whether procedural fairness was observed not to review the correctness of the decision, substitute its own view of the evidence, or assess the sufficiency of the adjudicator's reasoning: Ireka Engineering and Construction Sdn Bhd v PWC Corporation Sdn Bhd [2019] MLJU 35. [24] With those principles firmly in mind, I turn to the seven grounds of challenge advanced by FJP. D. THE SETTING ASIDE APPLICATION (WA-24C-2-01/2026, ENCLOSURE 1)

(ii) Alleged Ground 2: The Water Storage Tanks [41] FJP contends that Zhe Ming claimed and received payment of RM24,000.00 for four 500-gallon water storage tanks (as specified in the Contract) which were in fact never supplied, with six 300 gallon tanks having been substituted in their place. FJP's case is that this constitutes a false claim: the item actually supplied did not conform to the contracted item, and payment was received on a false basis. [42] The Adjudicator, FJP argues, failed to address this substance and instead wrongly accepted Zhe Ming's justification for the substitution without giving FJP an adequate opportunity to respond to the basis on which the substitution was accepted. [43] Zhe Ming's position is that FJP itself subsequently instructed the replacement of the four 500-gallon tanks with six 300-gallon tanks (having regard to site constraints and additional piping requirements), and that the claim for RM24,000.00 reflected the fair value of the substituted works including consequential piping. [44] The Adjudicator considered this explanation and assessed whether the price for an almost-equivalent-capacity item could fairly be valued at only RM4,090.00 as contended by FJP. [45] The Adjudicator's finding is an evaluative factual and quantitative determination — precisely the kind of finding that falls within the sole province of the adjudicator and is beyond this Court's remit under section 15. [46] FJP's true complaint is that the Adjudicator wrongly accepted Zhe Ming's explanation and wrongly valued the substituted works. Even if the Adjudicator's valuation is open to challenge, a wrong valuation of a contract item is a merits challenge, not a breach of natural justice. Moreover, FJP's complaint that this amounts to a "false claim" is a serious assertion that it remains open to FJP to advance fully in the civil proceedings. Alleged Ground 2 fails.

(iii) Alleged Ground 3: The Joint Inspection on 13.11.2024 [47] FJP argues that the Adjudicator erred in finding that the joint inspection on 13.11.2024 was attended only by FJP's representatives and the Consultant, when CCTV images tendered before the Adjudicator allegedly showed the presence of the First Defendant and one Mr. Gan at the site on that date. FJP says this finding was not only factually wrong but demonstrates that the Adjudicator acted with bias or failed to properly evaluate FJP's evidence, thereby breaching natural justice. [48] The Adjudicator's finding was expressly based on the totality of evidence before him. The critical evidential gap identified by the Adjudicator was not the presence or absence of individuals at the site on that date which the photographs may have demonstrated but rather the absence of any contemporaneous documentation jointly signed by Zhe Ming or its representatives that would evidence formal participation in, and acceptance of, a defect inspection. The Adjudicator distinguished between physical presence at the site and formal participation in a joint defect inspection, and found the latter unestablished. [49] This is a finding on the weight and sufficiency of evidence. The Court does not sit as a court of first instance on the merits of FJP's evidence. The question under section 15 is not whether the Adjudicator reached the correct conclusion on the photographs and inspection records, but whether FJP was denied a fair opportunity to present its case. It was not. FJP placed the CCTV images and the inspection minutes before the Adjudicator. He evaluated them. That he attributed greater weight to the absence of jointly executed documentation is an evaluative choice, not a manifestation of bias or breach of natural justice. Alleged Ground 3 fails.

(iv) Alleged Ground 4: The Defective Works Set-Off [50] FJP contends that the Adjudicator failed to consider its set-off of RM141,818.00 for defective works. FJP points to the following as evidence of prior notification within the DLP: a meeting on 5.11.2024 at which FJP's concerns were raised; the joint site inspection on 13.11.2024; and a letter from FJP's solicitors dated 5.5.2025 all of which FJP submits constituted sufficient notice of defects within the DLP. [51] The Adjudicator did address this defence. He found that no Engineer's instruction or formal defect notification of the kind required by the FIDIC-based Contract was issued to Zhe Ming within the DLP. He further found that FJP's solicitors' letter of 5.5.2025 did not satisfy the contractual notification requirement, which mandated notice from the Engineer — not from FJP's legal representatives. [52] These are findings on the proper construction and application of the contractual notification framework to the evidence. FJP's complaint is in substance that the Adjudicator misconstrued the contractual requirements a merit dispute going to the correctness of the Adjudicator's legal analysis, not to procedural fairness. [53] As the Court of Appeal observed in ACFM(supra), the Court's function is to examine whether procedural fairness was observed, not to determine whether the adjudicator correctly applied the contractual terms. The Adjudicator addressed the defence; he rejected it. Alleged Ground 4 fails.

(vi) Alleged Ground 6: Failure to Appoint Independent Experts, Convene Oral Hearing or Conduct Site Visit [69] FJP contends that the Adjudicator failed to act independently and impartially by declining to appoint independent experts, convene a physical hearing with oral evidence, or conduct a site visit. Given the technical complexity of the defective works and overclaim allegations, FJP submits that these procedural steps were necessary for a fair and thorough determination. [70] This ground is unsustainable for three reasons. First, CIPAA does not impose any mandatory obligation on an adjudicator to take any of these procedural steps. The Adjudicator's conduct of the proceedings including these matters is entirely within his discretion: Martego Sdn Bhd v Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd [2016] MLJU 1051 (affirmed by the Court of Appeal at [2018] 4 MLJ 496). [71] As Lee Swee Seng J (as he then was) observed in Martego(supra): a party aggrieved by the rejection of a request for an oral hearing cannot elevate that rejection to a breach of natural justice on the assumption that a different procedural approach would have produced a different outcome to do so would be to invite the court to review the sufficiency of the evidence and the weight attached to it, which is not a permissible ground under section 15. [72] Second and critically FJP did not at any point during the adjudication proceedings itself request any of these procedural steps from the Adjudicator. The principle that a party cannot for the first time on a section 15 application complain of a procedural omission that it never raised before the adjudicator is well established. FJP is now estopped from contending that the Adjudicator failed to act independently or impartially by reason of not taking steps that FJP never requested. [73] Third, the absence of an oral hearing or site visit does not, without more, demonstrate a lack of independence or impartiality. These are qualities of the adjudicator's conduct, not of his procedural choices. There is no suggestion that the Adjudicator had any personal interest in the outcome or any prior relationship with either party that could raise an apprehension of bias. Alleged Ground 6 fails.

(vii) Alleged Ground 7: CPC Versus Taking Over Certificate [74] FJP contends that the Adjudicator acknowledged that a CPC had been wrongly issued in place of a Taking Over Certificate under the FIDIC conditions, yet proceeded to order FJP to issue a Certificate of Making Good Defects ("CMGD") and release the retention sum. FJP says this is internally inconsistent: if the wrong certificate was issued, the DLP would not have commenced properly, meaning FJP's rights under the DLP framework remain live. [75] I find no inconsistency in the Adjudicator's reasoning. The observation about the CPC being the wrong form of certificate under the FIDIC conditions was an incidental remark not a finding decisive to his determination. On the Adjudicator's findings, the works were practically completed on 9.5.2024, both parties proceeded on that basis throughout the DLP, and FJP made payment under the Final Account based on that completion date. The DLP ran from 10.5.2024 and expired on 9.5.2025. [76] The Adjudicator's consequential order that FJP issue the CMGD and release the retention sum was a function of two findings: (a) the DLP had expired; and (b) no valid notice of defects had been issued by the Engineer within the DLP. The form of the completion certificate whether a CPC or a Taking Over Certificate did not affect those two findings. The Adjudicator's observation about the certificate's form was obiter and did not undermine the legal basis for the retention sum order. Alleged Ground 7 fails. E. CONCLUSION ON SETTING ASIDE APPLICATION [77] For the foregoing reasons, I dismiss the Setting Aside Application. None of the seven grounds advanced by FJP crosses the threshold from a challenge to the correctness or thoroughness of the Adjudicator's findings into a material breach of natural justice or a demonstrated failure to act independently and impartially. Viewed individually and collectively, FJP's case amounts to dissatisfaction with conclusions the Adjudicator reached on evidence placed before him by both parties following a procedurally proper adjudication. [78] That is precisely the category of challenge that section 15 of CIPAA does not permit, as the Court of Appeal has unequivocally stated in ACFM(supra): "This was simply a case where the losing party was not happy that it had obtained an unfavourable decision and tried its chance in the judicial system. The law as it exists now correctly limits the Court's functions which expressly do not include to review the correctness of the adjudicator's decision". F. THE STAY APPLICATION (WA-24C-2-01/2026, ENCLOSURE 7) [79] FJP also applies to stay the Adjudication Decision pending the final determination of KLHC Suit. Two issues arise: first, whether the preconditions under section 16(1) CIPAA are satisfied; and second, if so, whether a stay should be granted in the exercise of the Court's discretion. Preconditions [80] Section 16(1) of CIPAA provides two gateways for a stay application: (a) a pending setting aside application under section 15 (section 16(1)(a)); and (b) the subject matter of the adjudication decision being pending final determination by arbitration or by the court (section 16(1)(b)). [81] I accept that the preconditions are technically satisfied: the setting aside application was made (even if it fails on its merits), and KLHC Suit is pending in the High Court in respect of the same project. FJP has confirmed that earlier consolidated civil proceedings involving this and other projects were discontinued on the court's direction and refiled separately, and KLHC Suit is currently at case management stage with a case management date in April 2026. Principles Governing the Exercise of Discretion [82] Satisfaction of the preconditions is necessary but not sufficient for a stay. The grant of a stay is a matter of discretion to be exercised consistently with the overarching purpose of CIPAA. The leading authorities on this discretion which are binding or highly persuasive may be synthesised as follows: a) A stay will only be granted in exceptional circumstances: Subang Skypark Sdn Bhd v Acradius Sdn Bhd [2015] 11 MLJ 818. The merits of the underlying dispute, and the prospects of success in the setting aside application, are not relevant considerations. b) Where a stay is sought pending civil proceedings, the mere pendency of such proceedings is insufficient. To hold otherwise would permit section 16(1)(b) to be routinely weaponised to defeat the "pay now, argue later" purpose of CIPAA anyone wishing to avoid payment need only file a writ. Such a result is plainly contrary to legislative intent: Bumimetro Construction Sdn Bhd v Mayland Universal Sdn Bhd [2017] MLJU 1993; Ireka Engineering and Construction Sdn Bhd v PWC Corporation Sdn Bhd [2019] MLJU 35 (Court of Appeal). c) A stay may be justified where the adjudication decision contains clear and unequivocal errors such that a stay is warranted in the interests of justice: View Esteem(supra); Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd v ASM Development (KL) Sdn Bhd [2024] 5 CLJ 16 (Federal Court). The relevant question is whether Section 16 functions as a safeguard against a clearly wrongful decision. d) The financial position of the claimant including the risk of non-recovery if the adjudicated sum is paid and the decision is subsequently set aside is a relevant exceptional circumstance. However, the risk must be real and supported by evidence, not speculative: Woolley Development Sdn Bhd v Integer Construction Sdn Bhd [2022] MLJU 1818; Application [83] I turn to apply these principles to FJP's grounds for a stay. [84] No clear error in the Adjudication Decision: For the same reasons that the setting aside application fails, I find no clear and unequivocal error in the Adjudication Decision. The Adjudicator conducted the proceedings properly. He issued a formal Query List to both parties on the disputed issues. He received and considered the responses. He made findings that are grounded in the evidence and submissions before him. The grounds advanced by FJP are, in substance, a dissatisfaction with factual and evaluative conclusions he reached. There is no clear and unequivocal error that pricks the judicial conscience or that would justify a stay as a safeguard against a wrongful decision. [85] The stay grounds mirror the dismissed setting aside grounds: FJP's grounds for seeking a stay essentially replicate the grounds on which it sought to set aside the Adjudication Decision. Since those grounds have been dismissed, they cannot find a stay either. [86] Risk of non-recovery - Partnership status: FJP argues that because Zhe Ming operates as a partnership (rather than a Sdn Bhd), there is a material risk that the adjudicated sum cannot be recovered if the Adjudication Decision is subsequently set aside. FJP points to the structural vulnerability of a partnership under the Partnership Act 1961 in particular, the rule that a partnership may dissolve automatically upon the death or bankruptcy of a partner (absent a contrary written agreement) and contends that Zhe Ming's tax returns, while showing business income, do not demonstrate sufficient financial liquidity to repay the adjudicated sum. [87] I do not accept that this risk justifies a stay for three reasons. First, FJP has been fully aware since at least 2015 that Zhe Ming operates as a partnership and has throughout that period awarded contracts to it and made payments to it. The partnership structure of Zhe Ming is not new information and cannot now be a reason to deny it the fruits of a successful adjudication. Second, Zhe Ming has produced tax declarations evidencing consistent and continuing business income. While FJP correctly observes that tax declarations do not reveal the full financial picture, they are not without probative value. The risk of non-recovery remains in the realm of speculation. [88] The burden of establishing a real, and not merely speculative, risk of non-recovery lies squarely on FJP. A bare assertion that tax declarations do not present a complete financial picture unaccompanied by any positive evidence of insolvency, dissipation of assets, or demonstrable financial instability does not discharge that burden. The applicable threshold is not theoretical irrecoverability; it is a demonstrated and concrete risk that the specific adjudicated sum cannot, as a practical matter, be recovered. No such evidence has been placed before this Court. [89] Third, the dissolution of a partnership does not extinguish the partners' joint and several personal liability for partnership debts. As the High Court affirmed in TPJ Engineering Sdn Bhd v Cergas Jaya Logistics & Supply [2025] MLJU 2201 a case involving recovery of a judgment debt against a former partnership legal proceedings can be maintained against the partners personally for liabilities incurred during the partnership's operation, and partners remain jointly and severally liable for all debts of the partnership under section 11 of the Partnership Act 1961. A comparable risk of financial difficulty, it should be observed, attaches to any Sdn Bhd company that may at any time face insolvency or winding up. [90] The civil proceedings do not warrant a stay: The pendency of KLHC Suit satisfies the precondition in section 16(1)(b) but, for the reasons already stated, does not by itself justify a stay. To hold otherwise would render the CIPAA regime otiose. FJP has had its day in adjudication. Zhe Ming has obtained a decision in its favour. The "pay now, argue later" principle requires FJP to pay now and argue the merits of its counterclaims in the civil suit. [91] The alternative proposal deposit as stakeholder: FJP advanced an alternative proposal that the adjudicated sum be deposited with a neutral stakeholder (its solicitors' client account) under section 16(2) of CIPAA, pending the determination of KLHC Suit. Section 16(2) does give the Court flexibility to order the adjudicated amount or part of it to be deposited with the Director of the KLRCA or to make any other order as it thinks fit. In an appropriate case, this is a useful middle-ground order that preserves the claimant's interest while protecting against genuine non-recovery risk. [92] However, in the exercise of my discretion, I decline to make such an order in this case. The court's discretion under section 16(2) should not be exercised in a manner that effectively grants a stay through the back door where no clear error has been found and the risk of non-recovery is speculative. [93] FJP characterises its stakeholder proposal as a "balanced and protective measure" that demonstrates a genuine intention to pay rather than an attempt to evade the obligations imposed by CIPAA. The characterisation does not alter the analysis. What matters is not the label applied to an order but its practical effect. Where KLHC Suit remains at case management stage with no trial date fixed, directing that the adjudicated sum be held in FJP's own solicitors' client account as stakeholder would deprive Zhe Ming of access to those funds for an indeterminate period — potentially several years. [94] That is, in substance and effect, a stay of the Adjudication Decision, regardless of the form in which it is dressed. To deposit the funds with FJP's own solicitors pending a civil suit that may take years to determine would, in substance, deprive Zhe Ming of the practical benefit of the Adjudication Decision entirely contrary to the legislative purpose. The Stay Application is dismissed. G. THE ENFORCEMENT APPLICATION (WA-24C-6-01/2026) [95] Zhe Ming applies under section 28 of CIPAA for leave to enforce the Adjudication Decision as a judgment of the High Court. FJP resists enforcement on the basis that the setting aside and stay applications are pending and that it would be premature to enforce a decision the validity of which is seriously contested. FJP relies on Mudajaya Corporation Bhd v Leighton Contractors (M) Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 2038 for the proposition that the court retains discretion to consider enforcement alongside the setting aside challenge. [96] Under section 28 of CIPAA and the approach established in Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd v Puteri Nusantara Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 MLJ 362, the Court shall give leave to enforce an adjudication decision upon the satisfaction of three conditions: (a) there is an adjudication decision rendered in the applicant's favour; (b) the adjudicated sum has not been paid by the date specified; and (c) there is no prohibition on enforcement. The discretion under section 28 is narrow and does not extend to requiring the applicant to demonstrate the absence of any tenable setting aside ground. [97] All three conditions are satisfied in this case. First, there is an Adjudication Decision dated 22.12.2025 in Zhe Ming's favour. Second, FJP has not paid the Adjudicated Sum or any part thereof by the stipulated date of 5.1.2026, or at all. Third, the setting aside application has been dismissed and the stay application likewise dismissed there is accordingly no prohibition on enforcement. [98] FJP's argument that enforcement should await the outcome of the setting aside challenge might have had force had the setting aside application succeeded or revealed a clearly arguable ground. It does not. The logical corollary of the Court dismissing both the setting aside and stay applications is that enforcement must follow. To delay enforcement at this juncture would, in effect, grant FJP the stay by administrative inaction. The Enforcement Application is allowed. H. ORDERS [99] For the foregoing reasons, I make the following orders: [a] The Setting Aside Application in OS WA-24C-2-01/2026 (Encl. 1) is dismissed. [b] The Stay Application in OS WA-24C-2-01/2026 (Encl. 7) is dismissed. [c] Leave is granted to enforce the Adjudication Decision dated 22 December 2025 in OS WA-24C-6-01/2026 as a judgment of the High Court. FJP shall pay Zhe Ming the Adjudicated Sum of RM239,172.39 together with interest of RM7,437.27, adjudication costs of RM43,102.00 and RM11,674.99, and continuing interest at the statutory rate from the date of this order until full payment together with costs of RM5,000.00 subject to allocatur. [d] FJP shall pay the costs of RM8,000.00 subject to allocatur for OS WA-24C-2-01/2026 and RM5,000.00 subject to allocatur for OS WA-24C-6-01/2026 to Zhe Ming. Dated 30th March 2026 RAJES RAGHAVJI JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH COURT CONSTRUCTION COURT1 KUALA LUMPUR COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF (OS 2)/RESPONDENT (OS 6): Nurul Azua binti Abu Yazid (Messrs Salleh & Khan (Petaling Jaya) COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANTS (OS 2)/PLAINTIFF (OS 6): Michelle Toh Xin Ran (Messrs Vin Cheng & Co. (Kuala Lumpur) Case(s) referred to: View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2018] 2 MLJ 22 (Federal Court) ACFM Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v Esstar Vision Sdn Bhd and anor [2016] 1 LNS 1522 Cantillon Ltd v Urvasco Ltd [2008] EWHC 282 (TCC) Basics Decor Sdn Bhd v Ventura International Sdn Bhd [2025] MLRHU 2274 Dekinjaya Builder Sdn Bhd v Chong Lek Engineering Works Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 2455 Ireka Engineering and Construction Sdn Bhd v PWC Corporation Sdn Bhd [2019] MLJU 35 Sarakoppes Sdn Bhd v Redha Services Sdn Bhd [2019] 1 LNS 630 MRCB Builders Sdn Bhd v Wazam Ventures Sdn Bhd [2020] 5 MLRH 138 Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd v ASM Development (KL) Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 1146; Martego Sdn Bhd v Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd [2016] MLJU 1051 (affirmed by the Court of Appeal at [2018] 4 MLJ 496) Subang Skypark Sdn Bhd v Acradius Sdn Bhd [2015] 11 MLJ 818. Bumimetro Construction Sdn Bhd v Mayland Universal Sdn Bhd [2017] MLJU 1993 Ireka Engineering and Construction Sdn Bhd v PWC Corporation Sdn Bhd [2019] MLJU 35 Mudajaya Corporation Bhd v Leighton Contractors (M) Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 2038 Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd v Puteri Nusantara Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 MLJ 362 TPJ Engineering Sdn Bhd v Cergas Jaya Logistics & Supply [2025] MLJU 2201 Legislation(s) referred to: Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ("CIPAA") Rules of Court 2012