Felcra Properties Sdn Bhd v Tetuan Hasshahari & Partners (WA-24NCC-499-08/2025)

This is the Plaintiff’s Originating Summons dated 29.08.2025 (Enclosure 1), whereby the Plaintiff essentially seeks: i) an extension of time under sections 126 and 128 of the Legal Profession Act 1976 (“LPA 1976”) to file and/or commence the present application for taxation of the Defendant’s bills of costs; ii) for the Defendant’s fifty-nine (59) bills of costs to be referred to this Court for taxation; and iii) that the Plaintiff shall pay the Defendant any amount this Court determines after the said bills have been taxed. (“this Originating Summons” or “the present application”)

This Originating Summons was determined on the first issue, namely whether the Plaintiff should be granted an extension of time under sections 126 and 128 of the LPA 1976 to file and/or Page 3 of 19 commence an application for taxation of the Defendant’s bills of costs. Having considered the affidavits and submissions of the parties, I am not satisfied that the Plaintiff has established sufficient grounds to warrant such extension of time, and the present application is accordingly dismissed. These are my grounds. A]

The Defendant is a firm of advocates and solicitors which had rendered legal services to the Plaintiff pursuant to a Letter of Appointment dated 15.8.2017.

The Defendant issued fifty-nine (59) bills of costs to the Plaintiff for the said legal services, all of which are dated 17.6.2019, and which were furnished to the Plaintiff (paragraph 11 of the Plaintiff’s Affidavit In Support (Enclosure 2)). The Defendant subsequently issued emails to the Plaintiff dated 25.10.2023 and 18.12.2023 asserting that the Plaintiff was required to make payment under the said bills, including interest thereon (paragraph 12, Enclosure 2).

On 12.7.2024, the Plaintiff issued a letter stating that the amount due and owing to the Defendant was RM833,626.00.

The Defendant commenced proceedings against the Plaintiff in the Sessions Court at Kuala Lumpur vide Suit No. WA- Page 4 of 19 B52NCvC-203-05/2025 on 16.5.2025 to recover sums allegedly due for legal fees arising from the Defendant’s bills of costs, including a claim for RM907,031.54 and RM50,945.00 (“Sessions Court Suit”).

It is apparent from the material before this Court that the Defendant’s claim in the Sessions Court Suit is founded on its bills of costs, and that this Originating Summons was commenced by the Plaintiff to seek taxation of those bills. In that sense, this Originating Summons is closely connected to, and arises in response to, the Sessions Court proceedings.

This Originating Summons was only filed on 29.8.2025, seeking, inter alia, an extension of time under sections 126 and 128 of the LPA 1976 to file and/or commence the present application for taxation of the Defendant’s bills of costs and for the Defendant’s said bills to be referred to this Court for taxation. B]

The Plaintiff submits that this Court ought to grant an extension of time under sections 126 and 128 of the Legal Profession Act 1976 to enable the taxation of the Defendant’s bills of costs.

The Plaintiff contends that the present application may properly combine both: Page 5 of 19 i) an application for extension of time; and ii) a substantive application for taxation of the said bills.

The Plaintiff further argues that: i) the amounts claimed by the Defendant under the bills of costs are excessive, unreasonable, and contrary to the applicable statutory framework and the terms of the Letter of Appointment; and ii) the Defendant has failed to properly advise or account for the sums allegedly due.

The Plaintiff also takes the position that the Defendant’s claim in the Sessions Court Suit is time-barred, on the basis that the relevant works were carried out and/or completed in or around 2017–2018.

In response to the issue of delay, the Plaintiff’s position (as reflected in its affidavits and submissions) is that it only realised the need to challenge the bills of costs after the commencement of the Sessions Court Suit, and it now seeks to invoke the taxation mechanism by way of the present application. Page 6 of 19

The Plaintiff further disputes the Defendant’s reliance on the letter dated 12.7.2024, contending that the said letter does not constitute any binding agreement or acknowledgment of debt, but was issued for clarification and/or audit purposes. C]

The Defendant opposes the application and submits that the Plaintiff has failed to comply with the statutory requirements under sections 126 and 128 of the Legal Profession Act 1976, particularly in light of the delay in bringing the present application.

The Defendant contends that: i) the application is filed well outside the prescribed timelines under LPA 1976; ii) no satisfactory or valid explanation has been provided for the delay; and iii) the Plaintiff had ample opportunity to dispute or challenge the bills earlier but failed to do so.

The Defendant further submits that the Plaintiff had not raised any objection to the bills of costs from the time they were first issued, and that such conduct amounts to acceptance of the sums claimed. Page 7 of 19

In addition, the Defendant relies on the Plaintiff’s letter dated 12.7.2024, which it characterises as: i) an acknowledgment and/or confirmation of the amount allegedly due; and ii) giving rise to a cause of action or forming the basis of the Sessions Court claim.

The Defendant also disputes the Plaintiff’s contention that the Sessions Court Suit is time-barred, and maintains that the claim is valid and properly brought in law.

Finally, the Defendant submits that the Plaintiff’s application is procedurally defective and ought to be dismissed without the Court entering into the merits of the bills of costs. D]

This Originating Summons gives rise to two separate and distinct issues to be determined: i) Issue 1: Whether the Plaintiff should be granted an extension of time under sections 126 and 128 of the LPA 1976 to file and/or commence an application for taxation of the Defendant’s bills of costs; and Page 8 of 19 ii) Issue 2: If the extension of time is granted, then the considerations and applicable law will apply to the taxation of the Defendant’s bills of costs.

The first issue is a threshold issue which must be determined before the Court can proceed to consider the taxation of the said bills.

Accordingly, the Court will first determine Issue

Only in the event that the Plaintiff succeeds in obtaining an extension of time will it be necessary for the Court to proceed to consider Issue 2 relating to the taxation of the Defendant’s bills of costs. E] APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING AN APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME – LPA 1976

The applicable law in respect of taxation of solicitor-client costs is governed by sections 126 and 128 of the LPA 1976.

Section 128 of the LPA 1976 circumscribes the Court’s power to order taxation outside the time prescribed under section

Section 126 provides as follows: “(1) An order for the taxation of a bill of costs delivered by any advocate and solicitor or limited liability law partnership may be obtained by a petition as a matter of course by the party chargeable therewith, or by any person liable to pay the cost either to the Page 9 of 19 party chargeable, or to the advocate and solicitor or the limited liability law partnership, at any time within six months from the delivery of the bill, or, by the advocate and solicitor or the limited liability law partnership after the expiration of one calendar month, and within a year from, the delivery.” (emphasis added)

Section 128 of the LPA 1976 circumscribes the Court’s power to order taxation outside the stipulated period. Section 128 provides as follows: “(1) After the expiration of six months from the delivery of a bill of costs, or after payment of the bill of costs, no order shall be made for taxation of a bill of costs, except upon notice to the advocates and solicitors or the limited liability law partnerships and under special circumstances to be proved to the satisfaction of the Court.

Notwithstanding the wording of section 128(2) of the LPA 1976, which provides that no order for taxation shall be made Page 10 of 19 after the expiry of one year from the delivery of the bill of costs, the authorities have recognised that the Court retains jurisdiction, in appropriate circumstances, to permit taxation beyond that period (see Tan Tek Sin & Anor v. Tetuan Nora Hayati & Associates [2015] 1 CLJ 89 (CA); Lim Kien Seng & Anor v. Manoharan Kandasamy [2021] 2 CLJ 307 (FC)).

The Court has inherent jurisdiction to extend time beyond one year under section 128 of the LPA 1976 and the issue here is whether the requirements for the grant of an extension of time have been satisfied (see Tetuan Azim, Tunku Farik & Wong v. Tetuan Ong Partnership [2021] 10 CLJ 258 (CA)). Accordingly, I will determine the present application on that basis. F] WHETHER SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED i) Inordinate Delay

It is not disputed that the Plaintiff’s present application for an extension of time is made several years after the delivery of the Defendant’s bills of costs. On the Plaintiff’s own case, the bills are dated 17.6.2019 and were furnished to the Plaintiff (paragraph 11, Enclosure 2), whereas this Originating Summons was only filed on 29.8.2025. The delay of Page 11 of 19 approximately six (6) years is therefore inordinate and requires a cogent and satisfactory explanation.

In the circumstances, the Plaintiff must demonstrate “special circumstances to the satisfaction of the Court” within the meaning of section 128(1) of the LPA 1976 to justify the grant of an extension of time.

While “special circumstances” is not defined in the statute, the Court of Appeal in Tetuan Azim (supra) emphasised that “an extraordinarily good reason must be furnished to the court to extend time”.

The Plaintiff’s explanation for the delay, as reflected in its affidavits, is that it accepted and relied on the Defendant’s representations in the bills of costs, and only realised the need to challenge the same after the Defendant commenced proceedings in the Sessions Court to recover the sums claimed.

In substance, the Plaintiff’s position is that it only appreciated the alleged implications of the bills after proceedings were commenced against it in the Sessions Court. ii) Ignorance of the Law

In my respectful view, this explanation is not sufficient. A failure to appreciate one’s legal rights or the availability of a remedy Page 12 of 19 does not, without more, constitute a valid or acceptable basis for an extension of time. It is trite that ignorance of the law is no excuse.

The chronology of events is also telling. There is no evidence that the bills were challenged until after proceedings were commenced against it in the Sessions Court. In these circumstances, the present application appears to be a reactive response to the Sessions Court proceedings rather than a bona fide invocation of the statutory mechanism within a reasonable time. iii) Plaintiff’s Inaction

Further, the material before this Court shows that the Plaintiff had knowledge of the Defendant’s bills of costs long before the commencement of the Sessions Court Suit. Notwithstanding such knowledge, the Plaintiff did not take any steps to dispute, query or seek taxation of the bills for approximately six (6) years.

There is also no evidence that the Plaintiff raised any contemporaneous objection to the bills when they were furnished, or at any time thereafter. On the contrary, the material before this Court shows that the Defendant issued reminders to the Plaintiff between 2019 and 2020, followed by further emails dated 25.10.2023 and 18.12.2023 asserting that Page 13 of 19 payment was due under the said bills. Notwithstanding these communications, the Plaintiff remained silent and did not raise any objection to the said bills.

Further, the Plaintiff itself wrote to the Defendant on 12.7.2024 following an audit, yet did not raise any challenge to the validity of the bills at that stage. The Plaintiff’s complete inaction, despite repeated opportunities to do so, undermines the present attempt to seek an extension of time at this late stage.

I also take into account that the Plaintiff is a corporate entity which had the means and opportunity to obtain legal advice and take appropriate steps in respect of the Defendant’s bills of costs. Notwithstanding this, the Plaintiff did not take any steps to challenge the said bills within a reasonable time. This further weighs against the exercise of this Court’s discretion to grant an extension of time.

In the circumstances, having considered the length of the delay, the Plaintiff’s explanation and its conduct throughout the relevant period, I am not satisfied that the Plaintiff has demonstrated any special circumstances, let alone an extraordinarily good reason, to justify the grant of an extension of time under section 128(1) of the LPA 1976. I now turn to consider the availability of other remedies. Page 14 of 19 iv) Availability of Other Remedies

I further take into account that the Plaintiff is not without remedy. The Defendant has commenced the Sessions Court Suit against the Plaintiff in to recover the sums allegedly due under the bills of costs.

In those proceedings, the Plaintiff remains at liberty to raise any defences available to it in law, including any challenge to the validity, reasonableness or enforceability of the Defendant’s claim arising from their bills of costs.

In that regard, the Plaintiff is not prejudiced by the refusal of an extension of time in the present application. The Plaintiff will still have the opportunity to ventilate its position in the Sessions Court Suit.

Therefore, the availability of an alternative forum in which the Plaintiff may raise its complaints further militates against the exercise of this Court’s discretion to grant an extension of time. v) Multiplicity of Proceedings

Further, to allow the present application would give rise to a multiplicity of proceedings, in that both this Court and the Sessions Court would be required, in substance, to determine the same underlying issue, namely: Page 15 of 19 i) whether the Defendant is entitled to payment under its bills of costs; and ii) the validity, reasonableness or enforceability of those bills.

In this regard, the Court of Appeal in Orange Business Services (Network) Sdn Bhd v. Dealtel (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2019] MLJU 477 observed as follows: “[17] The objection to multiplicity of proceedings is well-grounded and underscored by the public interest to avoid conflicting decisions by two different courts on the same issue between parties (see Lesco Development Corp Sdn Bhd v Malaysia Building Society Bhd [1987] CLJ (Rep) 160 and Taunton Collins v Cromie and Anor [1964] 2 All ER 332). Conflicting decisions on the same issue not only brings embarrassment to the court or tribunal but may also undermine public confidence in the administration of justice. [18] Authorities on the point also suggest that having multiple actions on the same issues is an abuse of process giving power to the court to act accordingly by striking out any such action or actions (see Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd & Anor v Monatec (M) Sdn Bhd [1999] 4 MLJ 637; Damayanti Kantilal Doshi & Ors v Jigarlal Kantilal Doshi & Ors [2001] 6 MLJ 417; Penang Port Commission v Page 16 of 19 Kanawagi s/o Seperumaniam [2008] 6 MLJ 686 and Lai Kim Loi v Dato’ Lai Fook Kim & Anor [1989] 2 MLJ 290).” (emphasis added)

Therefore, permitting the Plaintiff to proceed with this Originating Summons would result in parallel proceedings involving substantially the same issues, thereby creating a real risk of inconsistent findings and unnecessary duplication of judicial effort. This is a further factor which weighs against the exercise of this Court’s discretion to grant an extension of time. G]

In conclusion, I find that the Plaintiff has failed to establish any special circumstances, much less an exceptionally compelling reason, to justify the grant of an extension of time under section 128(1) of the LPA 1976. The Plaintiff’s excessive delay, inadequate explanation, and persistent inaction, coupled with the availability of alternative remedies and the risk of a multiplicity of proceedings, all weigh against the exercise of this Court’s discretion.

For completeness, I emphasise that in determining this Originating Summons, I have confined my consideration to the threshold issue of whether an extension of time ought to be Page 17 of 19 granted. In light of my finding that no such extension is warranted, I have not made any findings on the merits, validity or reasonableness of the Defendant’s bills of costs, which would only arise for determination upon the grant of such extension. Those matters would properly fall within the purview of the Sessions Court Suit.

For the reasons stated above, this Originating Summons in Enclosure 1 is dismissed with costs. Dated this 30th day of April, 2026 -SGD- (WAN MUHAMMAD AMIN BIN WAN YAHYA) JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA, (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) HIGH COURT OF KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA Page 18 of 19 COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF : Tengku Nazmi bin Tengku Anuar (Mohamed Hamzah Khatri bin Mohamed Haniff together with him) Messrs Azmi & Associates Suite 6.03, Tingkat 6, Menara Keck Seng, 203 Jalan Bukit Bintang, 55100 Kuala Lumpur Tel: 03-2118 5000 Email: general@azmilaw.com COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT : Hasshahari bin Johari Mawi (Shah Nurul Afzan binti Abdullah together with him) Messrs Hasshahari & Partners Space U8, Level 1, Unit No. 2-11-1, Persiaran Pasak Bumi, Bukit Jelutong, Seksyen U8, 40150 Shah Alam, Selangor Tel: 03-5038 2440 Email: hpartnersa@gmail.com LEGISLATION CITED Legal Profession Act 1976 ▪ Section 126 ▪ Section 128

Lim Kien Seng & Anor v. Manoharan Kandasamy [2021] 2 CLJ 307 Page 19 of 19

Orange Business Services (Network) Sdn Bhd v. Dealtel (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2019] MLJU 477

Tan Tek Sin & Anor v. Tetuan Nora Hayati & Associates [2015] 1 CLJ 89;

Tetuan Azim, Tunku Farik & Wong v. Tetuan Ong Partnership [2021] 10 CLJ 258