Feng Shilin v Pendakwa Raya (Q-05(SH)-257-07/2023)

This is an appeal by the Appellant, Feng Shilin, against the decision of the High Court of Sabah and Sarawak at Bintulu in Criminal Case No.: BTU-45B-3/7-2022. The Appellant was charged with the offence of murder under Section 302 of the Penal Code for intentionally causing the death of one Wang Yingjin (male).

The charge against the Appellant reads as follows: “That you, FENG SHILIN (Passport No. E30808612) on 17 May 2021, at about 7.30pm, at Bilik 211, Kuarters Pekerja Kontraktor 7MCC, Fasa 3, Press Metal Bintulu Sdn Bhd, 97000 Bintulu, in the district of Bintulu, in the state of Sarawak did commit murder by causing the death of WANG YINGJIN (No. Passport: EH3532168), and you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Penal Code.”

The Appellant claimed trial to the charge, and the prosecution called a total of 20 witnesses to establish its case. At the conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Judge after evaluated the evidence in its entirety, found the Appellant guilty as charged, and sentenced him to the punishment prescribed by law.

Having heard the oral and written submissions from both the learned counsel for the Appellant and the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor for the Respondent, and having meticulously examined the record of appeal, we found no appealable error that would warrant appellate intervention. Consequently, we unanimously dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction and sentence passed by the High Court.

We now provide the full grounds for our decision. B. FACTS OF THE CASE Case for the Prosecution 6. The narrative of the prosecution’s case was unraveled chronologically through its key witnesses. On 25 May 2021, at approximately 1630 hours, the complainant, Ling Lee Chuen (PW4), an Auxiliary Police officer at Press Metal Bintulu Sdn. Bhd., received a telephone call from Deputy Manager Mr. Low Kwong Fei (PW14). PW14 informed her that a worker under the contractor 7MCC had passed away at Hospital Miri and directed her to investigate the matter further with Qu Baihui (PW10), the Head of 7MCC.

Upon inquiry, PW10 disclosed that the Deceased, Wang Yingjin, had been involved in a physical altercation with the Appellant within the 7MCC contractor quarters, during which the Appellant stabbed the Deceased in the back of his neck. Following the Deceased’s death, PW4 lodged a formal police report (Bintulu Report No. 3793/21, marked as Exhibit P20).

Acting on this report, the police arrested the Appellant on 25 May 2021 at Room 917, 9th Floor, Everly Hotel, Jalan Tanjung Batu, Bintulu, Sarawak.

Investigations conducted by the Investigating Officer, Inspector Nurikman Bin Hadi (PW20), revealed a history of multi-stage confrontations on the night of 17 May 2021 at Room 211 of the 7MCC quarters. According to the direct eyewitness testimonies of the Deceased’s roommates, Luo Shi Min (PW8) and Liu Zeng Xiang (PW9), the altercation progressed in four distinct stages:

First Confrontation: The Appellant entered Room 211 and initiated an argument with the Deceased regarding work-related matters. As the argument grew heated, PW8 and PW9 intervened to defuse the situation, causing the Appellant to leave the room.

(ii) Second Confrontation: Shortly thereafter, the Appellant returned to Room 211, confronting the Deceased again on the same issue. A physical fight broke out, which was once again stopped by PW8 and PW9, forcing the Appellant to leave a second time.

(iii) Third Confrontation: The Appellant returned for a third time, and the confrontation escalated in aggression. During this clash, the Deceased struck the Appellant by punching him in the face. PW8 and PW9 separated them again, and the Appellant exited the room.

(iv) Fourth Confrontation (The Stabbing): Not long after the third encounter, the Appellant returned for a fourth time, now armed with a knife. He walked straight toward the Deceased, who was sitting passively on his bed, and plunged the knife into the back of the Deceased’s neck.

Immediately after the stabbing, PW8 and PW9 wrestled the Appellant and pinned him onto PW8’s bed. Attracted by the commotion, PW10 entered the room, assisted in restraining the Appellant, and successfully disarmed him to prevent further harm. PW10 and another colleague then carried the bleeding Deceased down to Room 108.

While PW8 and PW9 attempted to hold the Appellant in Room 211, he broke free from their restraint, located a wooden stick, and forcefully burst into Room 108, where he proceeded to hit the injured Deceased again. In the ensuing struggle inside Room 108, PW10 kicked the Appellant to restrain him, causing the weaponized knife (which PW10 had carried down) to slide onto the floor. Observing this danger, Sun Pengli (PW13) entered the room, picked up the knife, snapped the blade by stepping on it, and threw the broken parts into a pile of steel to permanently eliminate the risk of further violence.

The medical timeline shows that the Deceased was initially treated at the Press Metal medic station, where a nurse (PW12) applied compression to stem the heavy bleeding from the neck wound. He was moved to Bintulu Medical Centre and subsequently to Hospital Bintulu, where he was attended to by Dr. Muhammad Haziq Bin Hashim (PW11). Once stabilized, the Deceased was transferred to Hospital Miri on 18 May 2021 for advanced care. Although Dr. Maimuna Zahra (PW7) noted that the Deceased initially appeared stable at Hospital Miri, his condition deteriorated rapidly, and he passed away on 25 May 2021 at 1530 hours.

Dr. Kunasilan A/L Subramaniam (PW3), a Medical Forensic Specialist, performed the autopsy on 31 May 2021. He certified the cause of death as a “stab wound to the neck due to complication” (Exhibit P14). PW3’s external and internal examinations revealed a stab wound measuring 2 x 0.3 cm located 7 cm from the vertex of the head, with a deep track length of approximately 11 cm. The track sliced through the skin, subcutaneous layer, neck muscles, right lamina of the fifth cervical vertebra, meninges, and directly into the spinal cord. This traumatic injury caused severe damage and haemorrhage to the spinal cord, paralyzing the Deceased’s consciousness, respiratory functions, and gag reflex. Consequently, the Deceased suffered from the aspiration of gastric stomach contents into his airway and lungs, which induced a massive lung infection (pneumonia) that ultimately terminated his life. PW3 firmly testified that this stab wound was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

At the close of the prosecution’s case, the learned trial Judge found that a prima facie case had been established and called upon the Appellant to enter his defence. The Appellant chose to testify on oath. Case for the Defence 15. The core of the defence rested on a denial of the requisite intention to murder under Section 300 of the Penal Code. The Appellant contended that he did not intend to kill or cause any fatal injury to the Deceased. He asserted that the physical confrontations were mutually aggressive and that he had been severely provoked when the Deceased punched him in the face during the third confrontation.

Additionally, the defence argued that the chain of causation was fundamentally broken. The Appellant claimed that the Deceased’s actual death resulted from an independent intervening cause (novus actus interveniens) — specifically, hospital-acquired lung infections or potential medical mismanagement over the 8 days of hospitalization, rather than the initial neck injury inflicted by the Appellant.

At the end of the defence’s case, the learned trial Judge found was satisfied that the prosecution has proven all the elements of the charge preferred against the Accused beyond all reasonable doubt, and that the defence has failed to prove on a balance of probabilities the existence of circumstances which can bring his case within one or more of the special exceptions to Section 300 of the Penal Code. His Lordship was also satisfied that his evidence has not raised any reasonable doubt as to the truth of the prosecution’s case. Hence, the learned trial Judge therefore find the Accused guilty as charged and convict him accordingly. Hence, this appeal. C.

Before this Court, the learned counsel for the Appellant raised three primary grounds of appeal challenging the conviction:

The Issue of Causation (Novus Actus Interveniens): That the learned trial Judge erred in finding that the Appellant caused the death of the Deceased, failing to appreciate that the immediate cause of death was a lung infection contracted days after the incident, which severed the legal chain of causation.

(ii) The Issue of Defences/ Mitigating Exceptions: That the learned trial Judge failed to properly consider and apply Exception 1 (sudden and grave provocation) or Exception 4 (sudden fight) under Section 300 of the Penal Code, given that the Deceased had initially punched the Appellant in the face.

(iii) The Issue of Mens Rea: That the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Appellant possessed the threshold intention to cause death or to cause a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death under Section 300(c) of the Penal Code.

The elements of the offence of murder are found in Section 299 and Section 300 of the Penal Code. Section 299 defines culpable homicide as follows: “Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death commits the offence of culpable homicide.” Section 300 of the Penal Code read as follows: “Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder -

If the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death;

If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused;

If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person, and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or

If the person committing the act knows that it is imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death, or such injury as aforesaid". D. SUBMISSION BY THE RESPONDENT

In response, the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor (Respondent) vigorously defended the trial Court’s findings:

On Causation: The Respondent submitted that the chain of causation remained completely intact and unbroken. The lung infection was not an independent, isolated occurrence but a direct, predictable physiological complication flowing directly from the 11 cm deep stab wound that destroyed the spinal cord and neutralized the Deceased’s natural gag reflex.

(ii) On Exceptions 1 and 4: The Respondent argued that neither sudden provocation nor sudden fight could apply in this present case. The Appellant left the room after being punched, sought out a lethal weapon, and returned for the fourth time to launch a targeted attack on a resting, un-alert victim. This structural gap established a clear cooling-off period that neutralizes “suddenness”, transforming the act into one of deliberate revenge. His subsequent behaviour in breaking into Room 108 with a wooden stick further illustrated an ongoing, un-cooled malice.

(iii) On Mens Rea: The Respondent asserted that the physical act of introducing a blade into the back of a victim’s neck to a depth of 11 cm satisfies the criteria of Section 300(c) of the Penal Code. The expert medical testimony of PW3 explicitly confirmed that the physical injury inflicted was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. E. COURT OF APPEAL; DECISION AND ANALYSIS

(i)

The Appellant argued that because the Deceased survived for eight days and ultimately died from a lung infection, the infection constituted a novus actus interveniens (an independent intervening act) that absolved him of criminal liability for murder. We found this argument legally untenable and completely contradicted by established medical jurisprudence.

The law on causation in criminal homicide dictates that an assailant is held responsible for the death of a victim if the injury inflicted remains the operating and substantial cause of death. A subsequent medical complication or infection does not break the chain of causation if it flows naturally, directly, and physiologically from the original wound. This legal principle is anchored in the classic common law authority of R v Smith [1959] 2 QB 35, where Lord Parker CJ stated at pages 42–43: “If at the time of death the original wound is still an operating cause and a substantial cause, then the death can properly be said to be the result of the wound, albeit that some other cause of death is also operating. Only if the second cause is so overwhelming as to make the original wound merely part of the history can it be said that the death does not flow from the wound.”

Further, this principle has been seamlessly adopted into Malaysian criminal jurisprudence. In Yeap Boon Hai v Public Prosecutor [2010] 2 CLJ 337, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed that where an injury inflicted by an accused person sets in motion a chain of physiological events or medical complications that ultimately result in death, the legal cause of death remains the act of the accused. The chain of causation is broken only if the subsequent intervention is so abnormal, disconnected, or grossly negligent that it reduces the original wound to mere background history.

In the present case, the forensic expert evidence of the specialist, PW3, provided an airtight link between the Appellant’s physical act and the ultimate demise of the Deceased. The 11 cm deep track penetrated the fifth cervical vertebra and directly compromised the spinal cord. This trauma physically paralyzed the Deceased’s neurological controls, destroying his conscious capacity and his airway's protective gag reflex. Deprived of a gag reflex, the Deceased involuntarily aspirated his own stomach contents into his lungs, creating the precise internal environment that caused the fatal bacterial lung infection.

Applying the principle ini R v Smith (supra), the lung infection suffered by the Deceased was not an independent intervention but a direct, un-severed physiological symptom and consequence of the spinal cord paralysis caused by the stab wound. The stabbing remained the primary “operating and substantial cause” of death throughout the Deceased’s stay in the hospital. The medical treatment provided at Hospital Bintulu and Hospital Miri was designed to stabilize these escalating trauma complications. There was absolutely no evidence of abnormal or grossly negligent medical treatment that could break the chain of causation.

For the abovesaid reasons, we therefore agreed with the learned trial Judge that the prosecution had succeed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Appellant’s act had caused the death of the Deceased.

(ii) Ground 2: Exception 1 (sudden and grave provocation) and Exception 4 (sudden fight)

The Appellant next sought refuge under Exceptions 1 and 4 to Section 300 of the Penal Code to reduce the charge of murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. We examined both defences against the factual matrix and found that the trial Judge was entirely justified in rejecting them.

For Exception 1 (sudden and grave provocation) to succeed, the provocation must satisfy the stringent criteria outlined in the landmark decision of Mat Sawi bin Bahodin v Public Prosecutor [1958] 1 MLJ 189. The court in Mat Sawi (supra) clarified that the defence requires a dual test: first, whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to deprive a reasonable person of the power of self-control (the objective standard); and second, whether the accused was in fact deprived of his self-control at the time of committing the offense (the subjective standard). Crucially, the retaliation must happen immediately in the heat of passion, before there has been time for the passion to cool down.

The facts of the present case here explicitly defeat the elements of “suddenness” and loss of self-control. While the Deceased did punch the Appellant during the third confrontation, the physical altercation did not happen then. Following that punch, the Appellant exited the room. Instead of reacting instinctively in the heat of passion, the Appellant used this interval to locate a weapon — a single-edged knife. He then returned for a fourth time, walked straight to the Deceased who was sitting defencelessly on his bed, and stabbed him in a highly vulnerable location.

The act of leaving the scene, seeking out a deadly weapon, and returning to execute a targeted attack establishes a clear “cooling-off period”. Reason had time to resume, and the weaponization indicates premeditated vengeance rather than an uncontrolled, sudden impulse. Furthermore, introducing a lethal knife to stab a sitting man’s neck is grossly disproportionate to a singular fist punch to the face. The Appellant's subsequent behaviour — breaking into Room 108 with a wooden stick to continue beating the bleeding Deceased — completely destroys any suggestion of an isolated, sudden loss of self-control. It points instead to sustained, calculated malice.

Similarly, Exception 4 (sudden fight) also cannot assist the Appellant. Exception 4 requires that the homicide be committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, and crucially, “without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.” By leaving a broken-up quarrel to arm himself with a concealed knife and returning to stab an unarmed, seated target, the Appellant took immense, undue advantage and acted with extreme cruelty. Exception 4 is entirely inapplicable under these circumstances.

(iii) Ground 3: Intention and the Application of Section 300(c) of the Penal Code

The Appellant argued that he lacked the subjective intention to murder the Deceased. In analysing this ground, we reviewed the strict statutory test laid down in the seminal case of Virsa Singh v State of Punjab [1958] AIR SC 465, which is universally applicable in Malaysia via Balan v Public Prosecutor [1984] 2 MLJ 151.

In Virsa Singh (supra), Vivian Bose J explained the precise mental and physical components required under the third clause of Section 300 (Section 300(c) of our Penal Code). The prosecution must satisfy a four-step test: “First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.”

The Supreme Court in Virsa Singh (supra) further elaborated that it is completely unnecessary to inquire whether the accused intended to cause death, or whether he knew that the injury would be sufficient to cause death. The court observed as follows: “In considering whether the intention was to inflict the injury found to have been inflicted, the enquiry necessarily proceeds on broad lines as, for example, whether there was an intention to strike at a vital or a dangerous spot, and whether with sufficient force to cause the kind of injury found to have been inflicted... It is, of course, not necessary to enquire into every last detail as, for instance, whether the prisoner intended to have the bowels fall out, or whether he intended to penetrate the liver or the kidneys or the heart. Otherwise, a man who has no knowledge of anatomy could never be convicted...”

Applying these steps to the present appeal before us, the first and second elements are fully satisfied by the medical testimony of PW3, who detailed the 2 x 0.3 cm external wound and the 11 cm internal track injury piercing the deep spinal cord.

Regarding the third element, the injury was clearly not accidental or misdirected. The eyewitness accounts of PW8 and PW9 confirmed that the Appellant marched directly to the Deceased and delivered a calculated thrust into the back of his neck. A person is judicially presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of their deliberate actions. Stabbing an individual in a highly delicate, vital anatomical location like the neck with substantial force cannot be interpreted as anything other than an intentional infliction of that specific injury.

As for the fourth element, we satisfied that the prosecution successfully established it through the undisputed expert evaluation of PW3, who explicitly testified that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Once a specific injury is intentionally inflicted, and that injury is objectively determined by a medical expert to be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, the full threshold of Section 300(c) of the Penal Code is met, irrespective of whether the accused subjectively intended to cause death itself. F.

For the abovesaid reasons, we found that the learned trial Judge conducted a comprehensive evaluation of all testimonies and exhibits at the close of the prosecution case, fully adhering to the standard of “maximum evaluation” mandated by the Federal Court in Public Prosecutor v Mohd Radzi bin Abu Bakar [2005] 6 MLJ 393. At that stage, the prosecution had successfully adduced credible evidence proving each ingredient of the offense which, if unrebutted, warranted a conviction.

The defences subsequently raised by the Appellant were properly evaluated and rightfully rejected as an afterthought designed to escape full liability. As such, we find that the conviction of the Appellant under Section 302 of the Penal Code is safe. The appeal is devoid of any merits. We therefore dismissed the appeal, affirmed the decision of the High Court, and uphold the conviction and sentence passed against the Appellant. Dated the 8th July 2026 -sgd-AZMAN BIN ABDULLAH Judge Court of Appeal, Malaysia Counsel For the Appellant : Tetuan Hani Iryani Ling & Lateng Advocates (Sibu) For the Respondent : TPR Tuan Mohamad Arif Aizuddin bin Masrom [Attorney General's Chambers]