Fintree Capital Sdn Bhd v Tetuan Syed Ibrahim & Co (WA-24NCvC-2274-07/2022)

The application before me [Enclosure 17] concerns the right of a court litigant to tax his solicitors’ bill under Section 121(1)(b) of the Legal Profession Act 1976 (“LPA”) on the ground that the fees charged by his solicitors is excessive.

The Defendant solicitors in this case [“Tetuan Syed Ibrahim & Co”] opposed the application on the ground that the Plaintiff their client [“Fintree”] had lost the right to challenge their bill as the deadlines to challenge under Section 126(1) and 128 of the LPA had expired.

One would have thought that these three sections would not pose such difficulties in interpretation. But they do as will be seen when I analyse the decided cases.

I had allowed Fintree’s application on 07-03-2023. Tetuan Syed Ibrahim & Co has filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal. These are my Grounds of Judgment.

The background facts are basically undisputed. S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3

Tetuan Syed Ibrahim & Co is a legal firm and had represented one Liew Chia Soon (“Liew”) and Fintree in a litigation proceeding in Kuala Lumpur High Court Suit No. WA-22NCC-623-12/2020 (“Suit 623”). Liew and Fintree were the 1st and 2nd Defendant respectively.

The representation was for three days from 12-01-2021 to 14-01-2021. (See Enclosure 2 Plaintiff’s Affidavit in Support paragraph 9 and Defendant’s Reply Affidavit dated 22-08-2022 at paragraph 10).

Following Tetuan Syed Ibrahim & Co’s discharge as solicitors on 14- 01-2021, an Invoice dated 15-01-2021 for professional fees of RM 50,000 was raised by them for Liew to pay. They also raised an Invoice No. 538/(01)/2021 dated 15-01-2021 for professional fees of RM 250,000 for Fintree to pay. (“Invoice”). (See Enclosure 2 Plaintiff’s Affidavit in Support, Exhibits A-2 and A- 3, pages 40 and 43 and Defendant’s Reply Affidavit dated 22-08- 2022 at paragraphs 9 and 11).

Both Invoices are for work done by Tetuan Syed Ibrahim & Co for Liew and Fintree in Suit 623.

Liew applied for his Invoice to be taxed on the ground it was way excessive. The High Court reduced the professional fees claimed from RM 50,000 to RM 15,000. (See Enclosure 2 Plaintiff’s Affidavit in Support, Exhibits A-3 and A-4, pages 40 – 48).

Fintree did not pay the Invoice of RM 269,199. S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4

It is Fintree’s pleaded case that after the Invoice was received on or around 15-01-2021 one Datuk Mohd Afrizan was appointed the Interim Judicial Manager of Fintree only 5 days later on 20-01-2021. The appointment of Datuk Mohd Afrizan was challenged and set aside by the Court of Appeal on 21-02-2022. Despite this order, Datuk Mohd Afrizan did not return Fintree’s assets, goods, documents and records. These were only returned after Liew and Fintree obtained an injunction order on 12-04-2022. [See Enclosure 18 Plaintiff’s Supplementary Affidavit paragraphs 8.1 to 8.11]

The Plaintiff also submitted that during the time Datuk Mohd Afrizan was Fintree’s Interim Judicial Manager, he effectively assumed sole and full control of Fintree pursuant to Section 414(2) of the Companies Act 2016. [See Plaintiff’s Written Submissions at paragraph 43]

On 27-06-2022, Tetuan Syed Ibrahim & Co filed a Writ and Statement of Claim against Fintree in Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court Suit No. WA-A52NCVC-458-06/2022 (“Suit 458”) for payment of the Invoice. (See Enclosure 2 Plaintiff’s Affidavit in Support, Exhibit A-1, pages 10 – 37).

The Writ and Statement of Claim for Suit 458 was subsequently served on Fintree on 29-06-2022. S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5

An Originating Summons was filed by Fintree on 28-07-2022 pursuant to Section 121(1)(b) LPA to tax on a solicitor and client basis the Invoice.

Fintree asserts the Invoice was way excessive for only 3 days of work. More so, when the fees from the Invoice rendered to Liew by Tetuan Syed Ibrahim & Co is included.

The Originating Summons was subsequently amended as Amended Originating Summons [Enclosure 17] to add as prayer 1 a prayer for an extension of time to apply to tax the Invoice in the event an extension of time was required.

The Amended Originating Summons prayed for the following reliefs in its original language-

Bahawa satu Lanjutan Masa sehingga 28-07-2022 diberikan kepada Plaintif untuk memohon supaya Invois Defendan iaitu Invois No. 538/(01)/2021 bertarikh 15-01-2021 yang berjumlah RM 269,199.00 ditetapkan / dicukaikan / ditaksirkan (taxed) atas dasar peguam dan anak guam (solicitor and client basis);

Bahawa Invois Defendan iaitu Invois No. 538/(01)/2021 bertarikh 15-01-2021 yang berjumlah RM 269,199.00 ditetapkan / dicukaikan / ditaksirkan (taxed) atas dasar peguam dan anak guam (solicitor and client basis);

Bahawa kos bagi tindakan di sini hendaklah ditanggung oleh Defendan Issues Before This Court [20] There are two issues before me. They are - a) Whether this Court ought to order the Invoice to be taxed pursuant to Section 121(1)(b) of the LPA? b) Whether an extension of time is required by Fintree to apply to tax the Invoice and if so, whether such extension of time ought to be granted? Issue [a] Whether this Court ought to order the Invoice to be taxed pursuant to Section 121(1)(b) of the LPA? [21] This issue requires consideration of Sections 121(1)(b), 126(1), 128(1) and (2) and 132 of the LPA. [22] Section 121(1)(b) of the LPA reads as follows - Where remuneration of advocate and solicitor not subject of agreement S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw 121(1) Where the remuneration of an advocate and solicitor in respect of contentious business done by him is not the subject of an agreement made pursuant to Section 116, the solicitor's bill of costs may at the option of the advocate and solicitor either contain detailed items or be for a gross sum: Provided that –

At any time before service upon him of a writ or other originating process for the recovery of costs included in a gross sum bill and before the expiration of three months from the date of the delivery to him of the bill, the party chargeable therewith may require the advocate and solicitor to deliver to him in lieu of the cost a bill containing detailed items, and the gross sum bill shall thereupon be of no effect;

Where an action is commenced on a gross sum bill, the Court shall, if so requested by the party chargeable therewith before the expiration of one month from the service on that party of the writ or other originating process, order that the bill shall be taxed;

…

Subsection (1) shall not apply to fees paid to an advocate and solicitor who is briefed as a senior counsel. [Emphasis added] S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw [23] Section 126(1) of the LPA reads as follows - 126 An order for taxation of costs to be made within 6 months of delivery of bill of costs

An order for the taxation of a bill of costs delivered by any advocate and solicitor may be obtained by a petition as a matter of course by the party chargeable therewith, or by any person liable to pay the cost either to the party chargeable or to the advocate and solicitor, at any time within six months from the delivery of the bill, or, by the advocate and solicitor after the expiration of one calendar month, and within a year from, the delivery. [Emphasis added] [24] Section 128 of the LPA provides that :- Order for taxation of advocate and solicitor’s bill on notice given 128 (1) After the expiration of six months from the delivery of a bill of costs, or after payment of the bill of costs, no order shall be made for taxation of a solicitor's bill of costs, except upon notice to the advocates and solicitors and under special circumstances to be proved to the satisfaction of the Court. S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw

No such order for taxation shall in any event be made after the expiry of one year from the delivery of the bill of costs. [Emphasis added] [25] Section 132 of the LPA reads as follows-Bill of costs to follow Rules of Court

Bills of costs for taxation as between advocate and solicitor and client shall be drawn in the manner provided by * the Rules of the High Court, and the taxation shall be governed by the Rules. Is section 121(1)(b) subject to sections 126 and/or 128 of the LPA? [26] I begin my analysis of issue (a) by examining whether section 121(1)(b) is subject to Sections 126 and/or 128 of the LPA. [27] This is because the crux of the submissions of Tetuan Syed Ibrahim & Co is that issue (a) should be answered in the negative as Fintree is barred by the timelines in Sections 126 and/or 128 of the LPA from seeking an order for taxation under Section 121(1)(b) of the LPA. [28] In short, Tetuan Syed Ibrahim & Co asserts that Section 121(1)(b) must be read as subject to Sections 126 and/or 128 of the LPA. S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw [29] There is an apparent conflict between on the one hand, Section 121(1)(b) and on the other hand, Section 126 (1) read with 128(1) and

of the LPA. The conflict will arise if Section 121(1)(b) is read as subject to Sections 126 and/or 128 of the LPA. [30] The apparent conflict arises in this way-a) The apparent conflict arises when a solicitor delivers a gross sum bill which was not paid but the action is commenced for non - payment after the expiry of six months from its delivery. b) The client cannot obtain an order for taxation as a matter of course as the six-month period prescribed by Section 126(1) read with Section 128(1) would have expired unless there are special circumstances in his favour. c) But Section 121(1)(b) would appear to entitle him to have the gross sum bill taxed upon application to the High Court if he does so before the expiration of one month from the service of the writ or other originating process for the recovery of the fees even though the six-month period from delivery of the gross sum bill had expired. This is because of the clear wording of Section 121(1)(b) and the fact that Section 121(1)(b) is not stated to be subject to Section 126(1) and/or Section 128(1) LPA. [31] This apparent conflict was considered in two High Court cases. They are Yau Jiok Hua v Sykt Kilang Batu-Bata Chip Siah Sdn Bhd [1999] 1 CLJ 239 Augustine Paul J and John Ang & Jega (suing as S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw a firm) v Kulasingam A/L Sinatamby [2001] 2 MLJ 605 Abdul Malik Ishak J. [32] In Yau Jiok Hua v Sykt Kilang Batu-Bata Chip Siah Sdn Bhd [1999] 1 CLJ 239 Augustine Paul J reconciled the apparent conflict by holding at pages 251 (g) - 252 (b) that-a) Section 126(1) read with 128 of the LPA apply only to a bill of costs that contains detailed items that is ready for taxation within the meaning of Section 132. They do not apply to a gross sum bill. b) A gross sum bill is only subject to the timeline as stated in Section 121(1)(b) of the LPA. c) Section 121(1) b is not subject to Section 126(1) and/or Section 128 LPA. [33] This is what Augustine Paul J said in Yau Jiok Hua v Sykt Kilang Batu-Bata Chip Siah Sdn Bhd [1999] 1 CLJ 239 at pages 251 (g) to 252 (b) – The reference in s. 126(1) to the right of taxation of a bill of costs clearly contemplates a bill of costs that is ready for taxation within the meaning of s. 132 read with O. 59 r. 24. As s. 128(1) refers to the six-month period in s. 126(1) it must also refer to a bill in the same form. Furthermore, the reference to taxation of a gross sum bill under s. 121(1)(b) and (c) with special powers conferred on the taxing officer by that section clearly excludes a gross sum bill from the ambit of ss. 126 and 128. Accordingly, a gross sum bill cannot S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw come within the scope of ss. 126(1) and 128(1) for the plain reason that no order for taxation can be made on it except as authorised by s. 121(1)(b). I therefore hold that the phrase “bill of costs” in ss. 126(1) and 128(1) cannot accommodate a gross sum bill as it is not a bill in taxable form within the meaning of s. 132 read with O. 59 r. 24. To hold otherwise would lead to an absurdity. Thus, the six-month period prescribed by s. 126(1) and the injunction imposed by s. 128(1) do not apply to a gross sum bill. The law applicable to a gross sum bill would therefore be as stated in s. 121. [Emphasis added] [34] Yau Jiok Hua v Sykt Kilang Batu-Bata Chip Siah Sdn Bhd [1999] 1 CLJ 239 Augustine Paul J was followed in Mindvalley Labs Sdn Bhd v Messrs Rao & Kamal (a legal firm in partnership) [2016] 1 LNS 1303 at [20-23] by Hanipah Farikullah J. [35] The second case, besides Yau Jiok Hua v Sykt Kilang Batu-Bata Chip Siah Sdn Bhd [1999] 1 CLJ 239 Augustine Paul J, that considered whether Section 121(1)(b) is or is not subject to Section 126(1) and Section 128 LPA is John Ang & Jega (suing as a firm) v Kulasingam A/L Sinatamby [2001] 2 MLJ 605 HC Abdul Malik Ishak J. [36] Abdul Malik Ishak J disagreed with Augustine Paul J’s view in Yau Jiok Hua v Sykt Kilang Batu-Bata Chip Siah Sdn Bhd [1999] 1 CLJ 239 that Section 121 of the LPA governs gross sum bills whereas S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw Sections 126 and 128 of the LPA govern detailed bills. This is what Abdul Malik Ishak J said at page 635 (e) to (g) - The rules governing taxation of gross sum bills According to Yau Jiok Hua, s 121 of the Act governs gross sum bills whereas ss 126 and 128 of the Act govern detailed bills. With respect, to adopt this kind of interpretation would lead to the unrealistic construction that the whole of Part IX is inapplicable to gross sum bills or gross sum bills in contentious matters. This would certainly lead to an absurd eventuality. It would mean that there are no written rules whatsoever governing taxation of gross sum bills. For instance, s 129 of the Act provides that all petitions by a party chargeable with a ‘bill of costs’ shall contain a submission by the party to pay the amount of the ‘bill of costs’ to the solicitor when taxed. However, when applying Yau Jiok Hua, this provision would lead to detailed bills only. Yet another instance would be s 134 of the Act which sets out the one sixth rule in relation to costs of taxation. And if one follows Yau Jiok Hua, this provision should only apply to detailed bills. [Emphasis added] [37] But on the issue whether Section 121(1)(b) is or is not subject to Section 126(1) and Section 128 LPA, Abdul Malik Ishak J agreed with Yau Jiok Hua v Sykt Kilang Batu-Bata Chip Siah Sdn Bhd [1999] 1 CLJ 239. His rational may be different from Augustine Paul J’s as set out above but on the said issue Abdul Malik Ishak J agreed that S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw Section 121(1)(b) is not subject to Section 126(1) and Section 128 LPA. [38] This is what Abdul Malik Ishak J said at pages 631 (b) to 634 (a) - Yau Jiok Hua v Sykt Kilang Batu-Bata Chip Siah Sdn Bhd Augustine Paul J held in Yau Jiok Hua that when there was an apparent conflict between s 121(1)(b) of the Act on the one hand with that of s 126(1) of the Act and s 128(1) of the Act on the other hand and in order to avoid the conflict, the latter provisions must be construed to refer only to a bill of costs containing the detailed items and not to a gross sum bill. With respect, I beg to disagree and I will advance the reasons in due course… With respect, it is my considered view that there is in fact no conflict whatsoever between the two sets of provisions for the following reasons: The scheme of the Act gave different roles to s 121 and ss 126/128 of the Act. In my considered view, s 121 and ss 126/128 of the Act have totally different roles to play. Section 121 of the Act is comprised in Part VIII of the Act and it is entitled: ‘Remuneration of Advocates and Solicitors’. While ss 126 and 128 of the Act are comprised in Part IX of the Act entitled ‘Recovery and Taxation of Costs’. It must be emphasised that these are the only two Parts governing costs which appear in the Act. S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw … General and specific provisions Sections 126 and 128 of the Act are general in nature, whereas proviso (b) to s 121(1) of the Act is specific. Section 121(1) of the Act by itself is confined to contentious business. Proviso (b) to s 121(1) of the Act applies to gross sum bills only. Now, in applying the rule of construction as found in the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, both the specific rule in s 121(1)(b) of the Act and the general rule in ss 126 and 128 of the Act must be allowed to operate independently and harmoniously. [Emphasis added] [39] Abdul Malik Ishak J went on to give his conclusion that Section 121(1)(b) is not subject to Section 126 or 128 LPA. He said at page 65 B - Using these principles as guidelines, it is my considered view that s 121(1)(b) of the Act comes into play only when certain specific conditions spelt out there in exists and these conditions may be listed as follows:

the business done or undertaken by the solicitor must be confined to contentious business;

(ii) the remuneration of the solicitor must not be the subject of an agreement; S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw

(iii) the bill, which must have been delivered to comply with s 124 of the Act, must be a gross sum bill; and

(iv) an action must have been commenced on the gross sum bill. and only when these conditions exist will the client have one month from the date of the service of the writ to request the court to tax the bill. In this kind of situation, the fact that the six-month period under s 126 of the Act has or has not expired should not be a relevant consideration. [Emphasis added] [40] Fintree also cited the recent Federal Court decision in Lim Kien Seng & Anor v Manoharan Kandasamy [2021] 2 CLJ 307 by Abdul Rahman Sebli FCJ in support of its contention that Section 121(1) b LPA is not subject to the timelines under Section 126 and 128 LPA. [41] With respect, this issue was not directly before the Federal Court and the judgment of the Federal Court does not state clearly the proposition that Fintree contends. This can be seen from the fact that both Yau Jiok Hua v Sykt Kilang Batu-Bata Chip Siah Sdn Bhd [1999] 1 CLJ 239 Augustine Paul J and John Ang & Jega (suing as a firm) v Kulasingam a/l Sinatamby [2001] 2 MLJ 605 HC Abdul Malik Ishak J were not cited and discussed in the judgment. S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw [42] The Federal Court in Lim Kien Seng & Anor v Manoharan Kandasamy [2021] 2 CLJ 307 Abdul Rahman Sebli FCJ was dealing with an application by a solicitor under Section 126(1) of the LPA for an order to tax a detailed bill of costs billed to his client. [43] The Federal Court was not dealing with an application to tax a gross sum bill of costs under Section 121(1)(b) of the LPA. Neither was the Federal Court asked to consider whether Section 121(1)(b) LPA is subject to the timelines under Section 126 and 128 LPA. This is what Abdul Rahman Sebli FCJ said at [13] (iii)] - Where a gross sum bill of costs is delivered, a taxation without the delivery of a detailed bill is only permitted under s. 121(1)(b) of the LPA. In all other cases, where an order for taxation is applied for, then it must be applied for on the basis of a detailed bill of costs that fulfills the requirements of s. 132 of the LPA, such bill of costs having been delivered on the party chargeable.” (Emphasis added) [44] Lim Kien Seng & Anor v Manoharan Kandasamy [2021] 2 CLJ 307 FC on a closer reading can stand for these propositions-a) When a gross sum bill of costs is delivered, an application for taxation is governed by Section 121(1)(b) of the LPA. b) When a detailed bill of costs is delivered, an application for taxation is governed by Section 126 and 128 of the LPA. S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw [45] The upshot is that Lim Kien Seng & Anor v Manoharan Kandasamy [2021] 2 CLJ 307 FC indirectly supports Fintree’s contention that Section 121(1)(b) LPA is not subject to the timelines under Section 126 and 128 LPA. [46] I have reviewed the cases cited by Tetuan Syed Ibrahim & Co as supporting their contention that Section 121(1)(b) LPA is subject to the timelines under Section 126 and 128 LPA. These cases are SP Veloo & Co v Affin Bank Bhd [2017] MLJU 1042 CA, Tetuan Kang & Kang v Kirana Studio Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 CLJ 431 HC, Muhammed Shareef bin Mohamed Sagubar v Tetuan Idris & Associates and another case [2022] 8 MLJ 447 HC, Awan Timur Palm Oil Mill Resources (Perak) Sdn Bhd v Tetuan Shahrizal & Nasir [2021] MLJU 29 HC and Lim Goay Hooi v Tetuan Choy & Associates; Lim Ho Peng (Proposed Intervener) [2021] 1 LNS 2248 HC. [47] With respect, I do not find these cases stating clearly that Section 121(1)(b) LPA is subject to the timelines under Section 126 and 128 LPA. [48] SP Veloo & Co v Affin Bank Bhd [2017] MLJU 1042 CA is an application by a client for taxation of his solicitor’s bill under Sections 130, 132 and 126 of the LPA. [See Grounds para (7) (f)]. It is not an application by a client to tax his solicitors’ bill under Section 121(1)(b) of the LPA on the ground that the fees charged by his solicitors is excessive. S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw [49] Tetuan Kang & Kang v Kirana Studio Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 CLJ 431 HC is also not an application by a client to tax his solicitors’ bill under Section 121(1)(b) of the LPA on the ground that the fees charged by his solicitors is excessive. [See Grounds para (2)]. [50] Muhammed Shareef bin Mohamed Sagubar v Tetuan Idris & Associates and another case [2022] 8 MLJ 447 HC is also not an application by a client to tax his solicitors’ bill under Section 121(1)(b) of the LPA on the ground that the fees charged by his solicitors is excessive. [See Grounds para (24)]. [51] Awan Timur Palm Oil Mill Resources (Perak) Sdn Bhd v Tetuan Shahrizal & Nasir [2021] MLJU 29 HC is also not an application by a client to tax his solicitors’ bill under Section 121(1)(b) of the LPA on the ground that the fees charged by his solicitors is excessive. [See Grounds paragraphs (1 and 7)]. [52] Lim Goay Hooi v Tetuan Choy & Associates; Lim Ho Peng (Proposed Intervener) [2021] 1 LNS 2248 HC is also not an application by a client to tax his solicitors’ bill under Section 121(1)(b) of the LPA on the ground that the fees charged by his solicitors is excessive. [See Grounds paragraph (11)]. [53] To conclude on this point, I accept as good law the principle decided in both Yau Jiok Hua v Sykt Kilang Batu-Bata Chip Siah Sdn Bhd [1999] 1 CLJ 239 Augustine Paul J and John Ang & Jega (suing as a firm) v Kulasingam A/L Sinatamby [2001] 2 MLJ 605 HC Abdul Malik Ishak J that a client can request the court to tax his solicitor’s bill S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw under Section 121(1)(b) LPA if the conditions therein are satisfied. Sections 126 and 128 LPA are not relevant to an application under Section 121(1)(b) LPA. The client need not make the request for taxation within the timelines stated Sections 126 and 128 LPA. Whether Fintree has satisfied the conditions in s 121(1)(b) of the LPA to request the court to tax Tetuan Syed Ibrahim & Co’s Invoice? [54] In the premises, I will now proceed to the next step in my enquiry. Which is whether Fintree has satisfied the conditions in Section 121(1)(b) of the LPA to request the court to tax Tetuan Syed Ibrahim & Co’s Invoice. The law on Section 121(1)(b) of the LPA [55] Section 121(1)(b) of the LPA can only be invoked by a client to tax his solicitor’s bill if - a) The work done by the solicitor is in respect of contentious business; b) The remuneration of the solicitor must not be the subject of a fee agreement under Section 116 LPA; c) The bill must be a gross sum bill; d) The solicitor has commenced an action by writ or other originating process on the unpaid gross sum bill; S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw e) The client had filed an application to the High Court, before the expiration of one month from the service on the client of the writ or other originating process, for an order that the bill be taxed; and f) The fees are not paid to an advocate and solicitor who is briefed as a senior counsel. [See Section 121(2) LPA]. [56] Conditions [a], [b] and [d] are common ground and undisputed. However, Tetuan Syed Ibrahim & Co contends conditions [c], [e] and [f] are not satisfied. Condition [c] - the Invoice is a gross sum bill [57] Fintree contends the Invoice is a gross sum bill. Tetuan Syed Ibrahim & Co disagrees and says the Invoice is a detailed bill of costs. [58] The Invoice can be seen in Enclosure 2 Plaintiff’s Affidavit in Support, Exhibit A-2 page 40. In the Invoice the particulars of the professional fees stated, which are identical to that in the Invoice to Liew, read as follows – Professional Fees: RM 250,000

Urgent perusal of all the cause papers;

(ii) Urgent preparation and filing of Notice of Application and Affidavits; S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw

(iii) Writing and liaising with Kuala Lumpur High Court Registry;

(iv) Legal advices rendered to you; and

Corresponding by letters, emails, texts with the Plaintiffs’ solicitors, Messrs Iza, Ng, Yeoh & Kit. [59] When a bill contains detailed itemization and narration of the work done without any sum being shown against each such item but a final lump sum figure shown to represent the costs of all the items, this is a lump sum bill. [See Harry Lee Wee v Haw Par Brothers International Ltd [1980] 2 MLJ 228 CA Spore at Held [2] Rajah J; and Mindvalley Labs Sdn Bhd v Messrs Rao & Kamal (a legal firm in partnership) [2016] 1 LNS 1303 at [24] Hanipah Farikullah J). [60] By no stretch of the imagination therefore can the Invoice be said to be a detailed bill of costs as contended by Tetuan Syed Ibrahim & Co. It is instead a gross sum bill. Condition [e] - the client had filed an application to the High Court, before the expiration of one month from the service on the client of the writ or other originating process, for an order that the bill be taxed S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw [61] The issue here is the meaning of the words “before the expiration of one month”. One month is not defined in the LPA. However, guidance can be sought from the ROC 2012. [62] Under Order 3 rules 1 of ROC 2012, a month means “a calendar month”. What then is a calendar month? Is it 30 days or 31 days or is “a calendar month is a month which ended on the same date as it commenced on the previous month?” [63] In my view, a calendar month in the LPA means a month which ended on the same date as it commenced on the previous month. [64] The Federal Court in Setali Development Sdn Bhd & Anor v Lim You Keng [1984] 1 MLJ 26 Hashim Yeop A Sani FJ said-The phrase "calendar month" has been judicially considered in many authorities but we need only mention Migotti v Colvill (1879) 4 CPD 233 where it was held that "a calendar month is a month which ended on the same date as it commenced on the previous month." Brett, L.J. in that case puts the principle clearly as follows at pg. 238: — "I am of opinion that the term a calendar month is a legal and technical meaning. The meaning of the phrase is that, in computing time by calendar months, the time must be reckoned by looking at the calendar and not by counting days." S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw See also Marren v Dawson Bentley & Co Ltd [1961] 2 All ER 270. Thus, for example if an act is to be done within one month from January 15, the last date for doing the act is February 15 — see Note 2 Order 3 at page 12 of the English Supreme Court Practice 1979 Vol. 1. Since the order appealed against was made on February 28, 1982 the period of one month under Rule 56 of the Rules of the Federal Court 1980 runs from March 1, 1982. The notice of appeal filed on March 29, 1982 was therefore filed well within time. [65] In Tan Chee Hoe & Anor. v United Malayan Banking Corporation [1996] 2 CLJ 1102 Tee Ah Sing JC held that if a Defence has to be filed within one month from 15 November 1994 the last day for the defendant to file was on 15 December 1994. [66] Therefore, as the Writ and Statement of Claim for Suit 458 was served on Fintree on 29-06-2022 the last day for the Originating Summons to be filed was on 29-07-2022. [67] In the Originating Summons here, it is common ground that the Writ and Statement of Claim for Suit 458 was served on Fintree on 29-06- 2022 and this Originating Summons was filed on 28-07-2022. [68] Therefore, Fintree has satisfied the condition of filing an application to the High Court, before the expiration of one month from the service on them of the writ. S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw Condition [f] – the fees are not paid to an advocate and solicitor who is briefed as a senior counsel. [See Section 121(2) LPA]. [69] In my view, Tetuan Syed Ibrahim & Co has not shown that the fees claimed by them were paid to an advocate and solicitor who is briefed as a senior counsel. No evidence has been shown to prove that an external counsel had been engaged by Tetuan Syed Ibrahim & Co as a senior counsel to lead them in the litigation. The Invoice also does not state so! Conclusion on issue [a] [70] Therefore, I hold that Fintree has satisfied all the conditions in Section 121(1)(b) of the LPA to request the court to tax Tetuan Syed Ibrahim & Co’s Invoice. [71] In view of my decision on issue [a] there is no necessity for me to rule on issue [b] which is “Whether an extension of time is required by Fintree to apply to tax the Invoice and if so, whether such extension of time ought to be granted?” S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw

[72] I allow the Amended Originating Summons [Enclosure 17] with costs for an order that Tetuan Syed Ibrahim & Co‘s Invoice be taxed on a solicitor and client basis. [73] Lastly, I like to express my appreciation to counsel for their diligent submissions that have greatly assisted me in my Judgment. ……(signed)…..……. Leong Wai Hong Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Kuala Lumpur (NCVC 10) Dated: 05th April 2023 COUNSEL: 1) Douglas Yee and Chua Pei Nee for Plaintiff. (Douglas Yee (Petaling Jaya)) 2) Mohamed Izzul Faris and Khavenesh Devanandan for Defendant. (Syed Ibrahim & Co. (Kuala Lumpur)) S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw CASES REFERRED TO: 1) Awan Timur Palm Oil Mill Resources (Perak) Sdn Bhd v Tetuan Shahrizal & Nasir [2021] MLJU 29 HC. 2) Harry Lee Wee v Haw Par Brothers International Ltd [1980] 2 MLJ 228 CA, Singapore. 3) John Ang & Jega (suing as a firm) v Kulasingam A/L Sinatamby [2001] 2 MLJ 605. 4) Lim Goay Hooi v Tetuan Choy & Associates; Lim Ho Peng (Proposed Intervener) [2021] 1 LNS 2248 HC. 5) Lim Kien Seng & Anor v Manoharan Kandasamy [2021] 2 CLJ 307. 6) Marren v Dawson Bentley & Co Ltd [1961] 2 All ER 270. 7) Migotti v Colvill (1879) 4 CPD 233. 8) Mindvalley Labs Sdn Bhd v Messrs Rao & Kamal (a legal firm in partnership) [2016] 1 LNS 1303. 9) Muhammed Shareef bin Mohamed Sagubar v Tetuan Idris & Associates and another case [2022] 8 MLJ 447 HC. 10) Setali Development Sdn Bhd & Anor v Lim You Keng [1984] 1 MLJ

11) SP Veloo & Co v Affin Bank Bhd [2017] MLJU 1042 CA. 12) Tan Chee Hoe & Anor. v United Malayan Banking Corporation [1996] 2 CLJ 1102. 13) Tetuan Kang & Kang v Kirana Studio Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 CLJ 431 HC. 14) Yau Jiok Hua v Sykt Kilang Batu-Bata Chip Siah Sdn Bhd [1999] 1 CLJ 239. S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw LEGISLATION REFERRED TO: 1) Section 116 of the Legal Profession Act 1976. 2) Section 121(1)(b) of the Legal Profession Act 1976. 3) Section 124 [1] of the Legal Profession Act 1976. 4) Section 126 [1] of the Legal Profession Act 1976. 5) Section 128 of the Legal Profession Act 1976. 6) Section 129 of the Legal Profession Act 1976. 7) Section 130 of the Legal Profession Act 1976. 8) Section 132 of the Legal Profession Act 1976. 9) Section 134 of the Legal Profession Act 1976. 10) Section 414(2) of the Companies Act 2016. 11) Order 3 rule 1 of the Rules of Court 2012. 12) Rule 56 of the Rules of the Federal Court 1980. 13) Order 59 rule 24 of the Rules of High Court 1980. BOOK REFERRED TO: 1) Note 2 Order 3 at page 12 of the English Supreme Court Practice 1979 Vol. 1. S/N YQacekyqEeYBPms2wWihw