Foo Tseh Wei v Jb Advance Plastic Sdn. Bhd. (dalam Penggulungan) (JA-28PW-32-04/2024)

Pemohon tidak boleh membuat Permohonan Kebenaran bagi pihak Responden disebabkan syarikat itu telah digulung. Sebaliknya, permohonan ini sepatutnya dipohon oleh JIM selaku pegawai penerima Responden;

Permohonan Kebenaran jika dibenarkan memberi kesan kebelakang (retrospective effect); dan

tiada alasan munasabah mengapa Permohonan Kebenaran yang memberi kesan kebelakang dibenarkan. Sama ada Toyota wajar dibenarkan menjadi pencelah [16] Semasa pendengaran Permohonan Kebenaran, Pemohon telah membangkitkan bantahan awal terhadap permohonan Toyota untuk menjadi pencelah atas alasan Toyota bukanlah penyelesai (liquidator) kepada Responden. Sebaliknya, Toyota hanyalah pemiutang tidak bercagar (unsecured creditor) dan tidak mempunyai kepentingan. [17] Dalam hal ini, undang-undang berkaitan dengan pencelah ada diperuntukkan dalam A. 15 k. 16(2) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (“KKM”) yang menyebut —

Subject to this rule, at any stage of the proceedings in any cause or matter, the Court may on such terms as it thinks just and either of its own motion or on application —

order any person who has been improperly or unnecessarily made a party or who has for any reason ceased to be a proper or necessary party, to cease to be a party;

order any of the following persons to be added as a party, namely —

any person who ought to have been joined as a party or whose presence before the Court is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute in the cause or matter may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon; or

(ii) any person between whom and any party to the cause or matter there may exist a question or issue arising out of or relating to or connected with any relief or remedy claimed in the cause or matter which, in the opinion of the Court, would be just and convenient to determine as between him and that party as well as between the parties to the cause or matter. [18] Abdull Hamid Embong HMR (pada masa itu) dalam kes Sri Permata Sdn Bhd v. PPH Realty Sdn Bhd; Lingkaran Cemerlang Sdn Bhd (Interveners) [2001] 7 CLJ 633 memutuskan bahawa pihak yang memohon untuk menjadi pencelah hendaklah membuktikan bahawa kepentingannya terkesan secara langsung dengan apa-apa perintah yang bakal dibuat oleh mahkamah melalui “ujian hak terhadap atau tanggungan” tertentu. Beliau menghuraikan sebagaimana berikut: Looking at these authorities, both domestic and foreign, including the recent Court of Appeal decision of Soo Hong & Leong Kew Hoi & Ors v. United Malayan Banking Corp Bhd & Anor [1997] 2 CLJ 548; [1997] 1 MLJ 690, which confirmed the Pegang Mining test, one factor that came out in consonance to qualify the 'rights against or liabilities to' test is that the intervening party must have been 'directly affected' by any order made by the court on the subject matter. [19] Begitu juga dalam kes Majlis Agama Islam Selangor v. Bong Boon Chuen & Ors [2009] 6 CLJ 405 FC; [2009] 6 MLJ 307; [2009] 2 MLRA 453, Zulkefli Makinudin HMP menyatakan: "[19] Under O. 15 r. 6(2)(b) of the RHC, the proposed intervener must establish under limb (i) that he ought to have been joined as a party or his presence before the court is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon. Whilst under limb (ii) the proposed intervener has to establish that he has an interest in the subject matter of the action and the court considers just and convenient to determine the issue as between him and any party to the action as well as between the parties to the action within the same proceedings.". [20] Dalam kes di hadapan saya, saya mendapati Toyota mempunyai kepentingan secara langsung dalam Permohonan Kebenaran disebabkan–

Toyota merupakan pemiutang penghakiman (judgment creditor) terhadap Responden ekoran keputusan yang dibuat oleh Mahkamah dalam Guaman No. 216;

Toyota adalah responden dalam Rayuan No. 2416; dan

kepentingan Toyota akan terkesan secara langsung dengan keputusan berkaitan dengan Permohonan Kebenaran ini. [21] Berdasarkan kepada alasan tersebut, saya membenarkan Toyota untuk menjadi pencelah dalam Permohonan Kebenaran. Sama ada Pemohon layak untuk membuat Permohonan Kebenaran [22] Pemohon dalam Permohonan Kebenaran menyatakan bahawa beliau layak untuk membuat permohonan ini disebabkan beliau adalah penyumbang kepada Responden. Selain itu, Pemohon juga telah memaklumkan kepada JIM mengenai Permohonan Kebenaran dan tiada bantahan daripada jabatan tersebut. [23] Dalam hal ini, Responden sebagai syarikat yang telah digulung, semua tindakan yang berkaitan hendaklah dijalankan oleh penyelesai. Dalam kes Lai King Lung (practising as advocate and solicitor under the name and style of Messrs Chris Lai, Yap & Partners, advocates and solicitors) & Anor v. Merais Sdn Bhd [2020] 9 CLJ 449; [2020] 5 MLJ 614 Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan – [21] At the outset, it is important to appreciate that there are two different and distinct fact situations under which leave of the court or sanction of the liquidator is required. The first is in respect of action or proceedings against a wound up company. This situation is governed by s. 226(3) of the 1965 Act / s. 471(1) of the 2016 Act which provides that leave of court is necessary in order for any action or proceeding proceeded with or commenced against a wound-up company. The second scenario is where action or proceeding is taken by a wound-up company: s. 236(2)(a) and (3) of the 1965 Act / s. 486 of the 2016 Act read together with Part 1 of the Twelfth Schedule which requires the sanction of the liquidator to be obtained. [24] Prinsip ini diulangi dalam kes Small Medium Enterprise Development Bank Malaysia Bhd v. Blackrock Corporation Sdn Bhd & Ors [2017] 9 CLJ 45, di mana Zabariah Mohd Yusof HMR (pada masa itu) ketika menyampaikan keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan menyebut – [30] The statement of claim clearly averred that the second to fourth plaintiffs instituted the action in their capacity as directors of the first plaintiff. However, as the first plaintiff had been wound up, the second to fourth plaintiffs being directors have limited residual powers. The powers to conduct the affairs of the wound up company, including the power to institute legal proceedings is vested in the liquidator. Zaitun Marketing Sdn Bhd v. Boustead Eldred Sdn Bhd (supra ) clearly outlined the fundamental principle that once a company is in liquidation, its assets and liabilities vest in the liquidator. It is left to the liquidator as to how to proceed with any legal proceedings. [25] Bagaimanapun dalam kes di hadapan saya ini, Rayuan No. 2416 tidak difailkan oleh JIM sebagai pegawai penerima. Sebaliknya ia dibuat oleh Responden sendiri walaupun pada masa itu Responden telah 2 tahun digulung. Perlu dinyatakan bahawa apabila Responden telah digulung, hanya JIM yang mempunyai budibicara mutlak sama ada untuk memfailkan rayuan atau sebaliknya. Bagaimanapun, kuasa ini telah diambil alih oleh Responden secara sedar dan secara tidak sah dengan memfailkan Rayuan No. 2416. [25] Mengenai alasan Pemohon bahawa beliau sebagai penyumbang layak untuk memfailkan Permohonan Kebenaran, saya mendapati undang-undang jelas hanya membenarkan penyumbang memohon kebenaran untuk mendakwa atau membela syarikat yang telah digulung sekiranya penyelesai enggan memberikan kebenaran. Dalam kes Zaitun Marketing Sdn Bhd v. Boustead Eldred Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Bousted Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd[2010] 3 CLJ 785, Gopal Sri Ram HMP menyatakan – Of course, resort to the court's power to authorise someone other than the liquidator to institute, continue or defend proceedings only arises where the liquidator refuses to do so and declines authority. But where, as here, the liquidator grants authorisation, there is no necessity to move the court. Once authority is given either by the liquidator or by the court, the person authorised may appoint counsel of his or her choice to prosecute the proceedings in question [26] Bagaimanapun, saya mendapati tiada satu keterangan pun dikemukakan oleh Pemohon bahawa beliau telah memohon kebenaran untuk memfailkan rayuan kepada JIM namun ditolak. Ini pada pandangan saya tidak memenuhi syarat sebagaimana dinyatakan dalam kes Zaitun Marketing Sdn Bhd (supra). [27] Sehubungan itu, saya mendapati Pemohon tidak memenuhi syarat untuk memfailkan Permohonan Kebenaran ini. Sama ada Permohonan Kebenaran yang memberi kesan kebelakang ini boleh dibenarkan [28] Pemohon dalam Permohonan Kebenaran mendakwa bahawa permohonan ini boleh dibenarkan walaupun ia memberi kesan secara kebelakang berdasarkan kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Lai King Lung (supra). [29] Bagaimanapun, saya mendapati kes Lai King Lung (supra) yang dirujuk oleh Pemohon tidak membincangkan isu kesan kebelakang ini. Dalam perenggan 30 kes tersebut dinyatakan – [30] In the appeal before us, the fact that no formal application was made by the plaintiff in the Court of Appeal for leave nunc pro tunc is undeniable on the appeal record. What transpired in the Court of Appeal was the hearing of the defendants' application to strike out the plaintiff's appeal. Whether leave nunc pro tunc to ratify the retrospective sanction given by the liquidator was never in issue as there was no such application before the Court of Appeal. At the hearing in the Court of Appeal, the defendants acknowledged that in appropriate circumstances, the court may grant retrospective leave nunc pro tunc; but that this would require a formal application by the plaintiff. However, given that there was no formal application, supported by a properly deposed affidavit, the defendants argued that there was therefore no material before the Court of Appeal to consider or justly grant any nunc pro tunc leave. It was in this context that the Court of Appeal opined that there may be retrospective leave or sanction, or leave nunc pro tunc granted in appropriate cases; or even the application of the principle of ratification. The Court of Appeal went on to say that that call does not arise in this case as the sanction has already been granted by the liquidator; and that in the event that there is such a need, the circumstances are in fact ripe for a grant of retrospective leave or for a nunc pro tunc leave (see para. [36] of the Court of Appeal's written judgment). And at para. [67] of its written judgment, the Court of Appeal stated categorically that "had there been an application for retrospective leave or leave nunc pro tunc sought by the appellant before us, we would have granted it unhesitatingly." The defendant's application was dismissed on the ground that there was no merit as the liquidator had already granted the necessary retrospective sanction. The Court of Appeal cited Reebok (supra), another decision of the Court of Appeal with approval. [30] Oleh yang demikian, kes tersebut tidak wajar dijadikan sandaran bagi membolehkan kebenaran diberikan kepada Responden yang kesannya adalah kebelakang. [31] Saya suka menekankan di sini bahawa tiada peruntukan dalam s. 486 Akta Syarikat yang menyatakan bahawa kebenaran meneruskan prosiding mahkamah boleh diberikan secara kebelakang. Justeru, dengan ketiadaan peruntukan yang sedemikian, maka ia bermakna kebenaran hanya boleh diberikan secara prospektif (prospectively). [32] Keputusan dalam kes Mak Siew Wei v. Yeoh Eng Kong & Other appeals [2019] 7 CLJ 470 boleh dijadikan panduan di mana dalam kes tersebut isu yang dibangkitkan ialah sama ada s. 347(3) Akta Syarikat mengenai hak mana-mana orang untuk membawa, mencelah dalam, membela atau memberhentikan apa-apa prosiding bagi pihak sesuatu syarikat mengikut common law mempunyai pemakaian secara kebelakang. Nallini Pathmanathan HMR (pada masa itu) semasa memberikan keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan, menyatakan bahawa pemakaian peruntukan dalam Akta Syarikat adalah secara prospektif sebagaimana berikut: [22] In brief, the learned High Court Judge held that s. 620(4) of the 2016 Act, as the savings provision, preserves any rights acquired before the enactment of the 2016 Act. Her Ladyship therefore held that no interpretative exercise is needed to determine whether the 2016 Act is retrospective or prospective, as such an exercise is only necessary where a statute is unclear. We concur with her view that the intention of Parliament is unambiguous that the 2016 Act is to be applied prospectively, and that any rights accrued before its enactment will survive. Under the old Companies Act 1965, the plaintiff has the right to bring a common law derivative action. This right has been preserved by s. 620(4) of the 2016 Act. [33] Sebagaimana yang saya nyatakan sebelum ini, Permohonan Kebenaran hanya dipohon oleh Pemohon 2 tahun selepas Rayuan No. 2416 difailkan. Itupun setelah isu mengenai ketiadaan kebenaran diperolehi oleh Responden bagi memfailkan rayuan dibangkitkan oleh Toyota semasa pengurusan kes di Mahkamah Rayuan. Tiada sebarang alasan diberikan mengapa Responden telah memfailkan rayuan tanpa kuasa yang sah. Selain itu, tiada sebarang penjelasan diberikan oleh Pemohon mengapa setelah sekian lama barulah beliau membuat Permohonan Kebenaran. [34] Pada pandangan saya tindakan Responden yang memfailkan Rayuan No. 2416 tanpa kebenaran sedangkan syarikat itu telah digulung menunjukkan syarikat itu memandang ringan akan keperluan pematuhan undang-undang. Pemfailan Permohonan Kebenaran ini adalah tidak lebih daripada mengesahkan (validate) tindakan Responden yang secara sedar tidak mematuhi kehendak perundangan sebelum ini. [35] Adalah menjadi prinsip yang mantap bahawa mahkamah tidak boleh memberikan bantuan kepada pihak yang secara terang-terangan melanggar undang-undang. Kesimpulan [36] Berdasarkan kepada alasan di atas, saya menolak Permohonan Kebenaran oleh Pemohon dalam Lampiran 1 dengan kos. Tarikh: 19.1.2025 - t.t - (SHAMSULBAHRI BIN HAJI IBRAHIM) Hakim, Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya, Johor Bahru Peguamcara: Bagi pihak Pemohon - Lim Kon Keen (Yong Hui Ying bersamanya); Tetuan JW Wong & Partner Bagi pihak Pegawai Penerima - Nor Deana Aqilah binti Aliman, Peguam Persekutuan Bagi pihak Pencelah - Lee Shih (Sarah Chin Yuan Ching bersamanya); Tetuan Lim Chee Wee Partnership Kes yang dirujuk:  Lai King Lung (practising as advocate and solicitor under the name and style of Messrs Chris Lai, Yap & Partners, advocates and solicitors) & Anor v. Merais Sdn Bhd [2020] 9 CLJ 449; [2020] 5 MLJ 614  Majlis Agama Islam Selangor v. Bong Boon Chuen & Ors [2009] 6 CLJ 405 FC; [2009] 6 MLJ 307; [2009] 2 MLRA 453,  Mak Siew Wei v. Yeoh Eng Kong & Other appeals [2019] 7 CLJ 470  Small Medium Enterprise Development Bank Malaysia Bhd v. Blackrock Corporation Sdn Bhd & Ors [2017] 9 CLJ 45,  Sri Permata Sdn Bhd v. PPH Realty Sdn Bhd; Lingkaran Cemerlang Sdn Bhd (Interveners) [2001] 7 CLJ 633  Zaitun Marketing Sdn Bhd v. Boustead Eldred Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Bousted Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd[2010] 3 CLJ 785 Perundangan yang dirujuk:  Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 - A. 15 k. 16(2)