G E L v P E L (WA-33-41-01/2020)

This is the Respondent-Husband’s second discovery application (“the Second Discovery Application”) in enclosure 181 pursuant to Order 24 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“Rules of Court”), for discovery of specific documents against the Petitioner-Wife.

In the interest of privacy of the parties concerned and sensitivity of the issues, the Petitioner, Respondent and Co-Respondent have been anonymised respectively as GEL, PEL, and MEL. The factual background [3] The Petitioner, and Respondent (collectively, “the Parties”), both aged 58 and 59 respectively at the time of the hearing of the Second Discovery Application, were married in September 1989. Their union resulted in two adult children.

Over time, the marriage deteriorated, leading to the Respondent leaving the matrimonial home in July 2018. Subsequently, in January 2020, the Petitioner initiated divorce proceedings by filing a divorce petition (“the Divorce Petition”). In June 2020, the Respondent filed his reply and cross-petition.

While the Divorce Petition was pending, the Petitioner filed a discovery application in May 2021 (“the Petitioner’s Discovery Application”), seeking disclosure of 16 categories of documents from the Respondent. 1 January 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________________________________ 3

In July 2021, the Respondent responded by filing his own discovery application (“the Respondent’s First Discovery Application”), seeking disclosure of 18 categories of documents from the Petitioner.

In December 2021, the Court rendered decisions on both discovery applications, partially allowing the Petitioner’s Discovery Application (“the First Decision”) and the Respondent’s First Discovery Application (“the Second Decision”). Dissatisfied with the outcomes, the Petitioner appealed both decisions, the First Decision vide Appeal No W-02(IM)- 96-01/2022 (“Appeal No. 96”) and Second Decision vide Appeal No. W-02(IM)-95-01/2022 (“Appeal No. 95”), while the Respondent appealed only the First Decision vide Appeal No W-02(IM)-94-01/2022 (“Appeal No. 94”).

The Court of Appeal allowed Appeal No. 96, whilst Appeal No. 95 was dismissed. Appeal No. 94 was allowed in part.

In August 2023, the Respondent filed the Second Discovery Application, seeking disclosure of 21 additional categories of documents from the Petitioner. These 21 categories were divided into two groups:

Fourteen categories of documents previously ordered for discovery against the Petitioner in the Second Decision (“Documents Previously Ordered But For Extended Period”), but now sought for an extended period starting from 2010, rather than from 2017 as initially requested and granted, which are as follows: 1 January 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________________________________ 4

The Petitioner’s tax assessments;

(ii) The Petitioner’s EPF statements together with particulars of withdrawals made;

(iii) The Petitioner’s pay slips together with all other relevant documents showing the annual bonuses, director’s fees and dividends received from the following companies where the Petitioner is a director and/or shareholder: • CelesteJG Sdn Bhd (“CelesteJG”); • Hansun Cuili Asset Sdn Bhd (“HCA”); • Sun Cafe Sdn Bhd (“Sun Cafe”); • Sun Pharmaceutical Sdn Bhd (“Sun Pharma”); • Sun Pharmaceutical Sdn Bhd in Brunei (“Sun Pharma Brunei”); and • Sun Pharmaceutical Pte Ltd in Singapore (“Sun Pharma SG”).

(iv) Bank statements from 2010 – present (except for years 2017 –2021) for the following bank accounts which are in the Petitioner’s name and/or in joint names: • HSBC Account No. ********6-108; • HSBC Account No. ********8-028; • HSBC Account No. ********1-108; • HSBC UK Account No.****6840 (International Account No. *********6840), a joint account with Lim Cui Li; 1 January 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________________________________ 5 • HSBC UK Account No. 91171321 (International Account No. **********1321), a joint account with Lim Han Sun; • HSBC Investment Account No. ********1131; • HSBC Fixed Deposit Account No. ********1-131; • OCBC Loan Account No. ***********0000; and • Public Investment Bank Berhad Account No. ******9901;

Bank statements from 2010 – present (except for years 2017– 2021) for HSBC Account No. ********1-108 which is a joint account between the Petitioner and the children;

(vi) Bank statements from 2010 – present (except for years 2017– 2021) for all other bank accounts in Malaysia and overseas, including the Petitioner’s sole HSBC Account, and including any accounts which the Petitioner was / still is a signatory to.

(vii) The Petitioner’s credit card statements from 2010 – present (except for years 2017–2021) for the following: • HSBC Visa Signature No. ************5343; and • HSBC MasterCard Premier No. ************4353.

(viii) The Petitioner’s insurance policies, together with the premium statements, at Great Eastern Life Assurance from 2010 – present (except for years 2017–2021);

(ix) The Petitioner’s Central Depository System (“CDS”) account statements for all CDS Accounts from 2010–present (except for years 2017– 2021); 1 January 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________________________________ 6

List of assets and liabilities, all the financial statements including but not limited to company accounts, tenancy agreements of properties (if any) and statement of rental income for each property, dividend statements, company bank statements, and any other documents showing the value of the following companies in which the Petitioner has a legal and/or beneficial interest from 2010 – present (except for years 2017–2021) in the following: • CelesteJG; • Sino Health Sdn Bhd (“Sino Health”); • Sun Cafe; • Sun Pharma Brunei; and • Sun Pharma SG;

(xi) All relevant documents evidencing the loan repayments made as well as the source of funds for the payments for the Neo Bankside property in London from 2010 – present (except for years 2017–2021);

(xii) All relevant documents evidencing the Petitioner’s top-up / deposits into the HomeSmart Flexi Loan (Overdraft Facility) Account No. ********5101, No. ********5102 and No. ********5103 from 2010 to present (except for years 2017– 2021);

(xiii) All relevant documents evidencing the amount paid by the Petitioner to redeem the six storeys at property known as IOI 1 January 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________________________________ 7 Boulevard Property and her source of funds to pay to unencumber the IOI Boulevard Property, from 2010 to present (except for years 2017–2021);

(xiv) All relevant documents evidencing the sale of an apartment unit at property known as ADRIA by the Petitioner including but not limited to bank statements showing the purchase payment received as well as the documents showing the sum of the redemption or commission and legal fees incurred, from 2010 to present (except for years 2017–2021).

Seven entirely new categories of documents (“New Categories of

The Petitioner’s claims, incentives and any other document of any other sums of monies and/or benefits received, from 2010 to present from the following companies where the Petitioner is a director or shareholder: • CelesteJG; • Sun Café; • Sun Pharma; • Sun Pharma Brunei; and • Sun Pharma SG;

(ii) The Petitioner’s pay slips, bonus, claims, incentives and any other document of any other sums of monies or benefits received from the following companies: 1 January 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________________________________ 8 • Sino Health from 2018 – present; • Sun Li Pharmaceutical Sdn Bhd (“Sun Li”) from 2020 – present; and • Pharma Nord Sdn Bhd (“Pharma Nord”) from 2020 – present;

(iii) The Petitioner’s credit card statements from 2010 – present for any other credit card that the Petitioner has, either as a principal or a supplementary card holder, including any company credit cards;

(iv) The Petitioner’s insurance policies, together with the premium statements for any other insurance that she may have, whether locally or internationally from 2010 – present;

List of assets and liabilities, all the financial statements including but not limited to company accounts, tenancy agreements of properties (if any) and statement of rental income for each property, dividend statements, company bank statements, and any other documents showing the value of the following companies in which the Petitioner has a legal and/or beneficial interest in: • Sun Pharma from 2010 – present; • Sino Health from 2018 – present; • Sun Li from 2020 – present; and • Pharma Nord from 2020 – present; 1 January 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________________________________ 9

(vi) Audited accounts, management accounts, general ledgers, documents relating to the allotment of shares, the share capital as well as any increase of share capital and the source of funds for any increase in share capital, and all directors’ resolutions of the following companies in which the Petitioner has a legal and/or beneficial interest in, from 2010 – present: • CelesteJG; • Sino Health; • Sun Cafe; • Sun Pharma Brunei; • Sun Pharma SG; • Sun Pharma; • Sun Li from 2020 to the present; and • Pharma Nord;

(vii) All relevant documents, including but not limited to correspondence, bank statements, invoices, receipts, share transfer forms, directors’ resolutions and other documents related to the following: • Debt owed by Sun Pharma to CelesteJG in the amount of MYR4.185 million; • Transfer on 28 December 2016 of 405,000 shares in Sun Pharma to HCA; and 1 January 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________________________________ 10 • Transfer on 30 June 2017 of 405,000 shares in Sun Pharma to HCA. The issues [10] At the outset, the Court first turned its attention to the preliminary issue of whether there was undue delay in filing the Second Discovery Application. This necessitated a thorough examination of the timeline of events, including the sequence and outcomes of prior discovery applications, as well as the overall progression of the divorce proceedings. The Court’s analysis focused on assessing whether the Respondent’s actions were reasonable in the circumstances or whether the delay had caused undue prejudice to the Petitioner, thereby impacting the fairness of the proceedings. [11] Beyond the procedural issue of delay, the Court turned to the substantive matters, focusing on (a) whether the documents sought were relevant or necessary to the divorce proceedings, (b) whether the documents sought were too broad, and lacked specificity, (c) whether the decision of the Court of Appeal in allowing the Petitioner’s appeal against the First Decision, justified filing the Second Discovery Application, and (d) whether the Second Discovery Application was an abuse of the process of Court. [12] The Second Discovery Application was dismissed with costs for the following reasons. 1 January 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________________________________ 11 Contentions, evaluation, and findings Whether there was delay in filing Second Discovery Application [13] It was undisputed that the Respondent’s Second Discovery Application was filed more than two years after the First Discovery Application, and more than three years after he had filed his reply to the Divorce Petition. This significant lapse of time raised the question of whether the delay was justified, especially given the progression of the case and the principle that litigation should not be unnecessarily prolonged. [14] At this juncture, it was crucial to highlight that delay is a key factor in considering whether to entertain an application filed by any litigant. Unreasonable delay may undermine the efficiency of legal proceedings, prejudice the opposing party, and go against the overarching objective of ensuring justice is delivered without undue obstruction. [15] In this regard, the observations made by Gopal Sri Ram JCA in Khor Cheng Wah v. Sungai Way Leasing Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 396; [1996] 1 MLJ 223, in the following passages, are particularly relevant. It is a cardinal principle of law, that when a litigant seeks the intervention of the court in a matter that affects his rights, he must do so timeously. The maxim vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, though having its origins in the Court of Chancery, is of universal application. Even in cases where a right is exercisable ex debito justitiae, a court may refuse relief to an indolent litigant. In all cases in which delay in approaching the court is in issue, the burden is upon the litigant who has delayed to render a satisfactory explanation for it. [Emphasis added.] 1 January 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________________________________ 12 [16] The case of Khor Cheng Wah v. Sungai Way Leasing Sdn Bhd underscores the principle that courts must balance the need for thorough adjudication with the imperative of maintaining procedural efficiency. Delay, if unjustified, can lead to the rejection of an application, especially when it disrupts the natural progression of a case or imposes unnecessary burdens on the opposing party. [17] The Court, therefore, needed to consider whether the Respondent’s two-year delay in filing the Second Discovery Application demonstrated a lack of diligence, or if it could be reasonably explained in the context of the ongoing litigation. [18] The Petitioner initiated divorce proceedings by filing the Divorce Petition in January 2020. In response, the Respondent filed his Answer and Cross-Petition in June 2020. By August 2020, the Respondent further filed a Notice of Intention to Proceed with an Application for Ancillary Relief arising from his Answer and Cross-Petition. Pleadings for the Divorce Petition were officially closed in September 2020. [19] Subsequently, in May 2021, the Petitioner’s Discovery Application was filed, which was followed by the Respondent’s First Discovery Application in July 2021. Over two years later, in August 2023, the Respondent filed the Second Discovery Application. [20] The delay in filing the Second Discovery Application was evident, and raised questions about its timing and purpose. It appeared that the primary motivation behind the Second Discovery Application was the Court of Appeal’s decision in the Petitioner’s appeal against the First Decision, which required the Respondent to disclose documents dating 1 January 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________________________________ 13 back to 2010. This decision seemed to prompt the Respondent to file the Second Discovery Application, mirroring the extended time frame for disclosure that had been granted to the Petitioner. [21] The Second Discovery Application was dismissed on the basis of the foundational issue of delay, which was deemed sufficient to justify this outcome. Nevertheless, I went on to consider whether the documents requested in the Second Discovery Application were relevant or necessary. Whether documents sought by Respondent were relevant or necessary [22] The guiding principles for a discovery application have been established in the cases of Yekambaran Marimuthu v Malayawata Steel Berhad [1994] 2 CLJ 581 and ABX Logistics (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v Overseas Bechtel (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2003] 7 CLJ 357. These cases set out the following essential criteria for obtaining an order for discovery: a) The document must exist. Thus, there must be a specific, identifiable document. b) The document must be or have been in the “possession, custody, or power” of the opposing party. c) The document must relate to the matter in question, meaning it must be relevant to the issues in dispute. d) An order for discovery must be necessary to fairly resolve the case or to reduce costs. 1 January 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________________________________ 14 e) The document sought must be clearly identified, as overly broad or vague orders may lead to significant injustice. [23] The element of necessity is also found in Order 24 rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which reads: Order 24 – Discovery and inspection of documents Rule 8 – Discovery to be ordered only if necessary On the hearing of an application for an order under rule 3, 7 or 7A, the Court, if satisfied that discovery is not necessary, or not necessary at that stage of the cause or matter, may dismiss or adjourn the application and shall in any case refuse to make such an order if and so far as it is of the opinion that discovery is not necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs. [Emphasis added.] [24] In the present case, it was clear that the documents sought in the Second Discovery Application were neither relevant nor necessary to the issues at hand. This conclusion was based on several considerations. [25] The first class of documents sought, namely, the Documents Previously Ordered But For Extended Period had already been ordered for discovery against the Petitioner in the First Decision but were from 2017– 2021. However, in the Second Discovery Application, the Respondent sought to extend the period for which these documents were to be disclosed, requesting records dating back to 2010 instead of the original starting point of 2017. The Respondent 1 January 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________________________________ 15 argued that the extended timeline was critical because the Petitioner had allegedly begun siphoning matrimonial funds as early as 2010. [26] The Respondent's claim that documents from 2010 were necessary for the case was unconvincing for several reasons. While the Respondent provided examples to support allegations of the Petitioner’s siphoning and dissipation of matrimonial funds, it was my view that these claims were generalised assertions as they were too broad and lacked sufficient specificity. I was unable to see any connection between the alleged misconduct and the period prior to 2017. The Respondent failed to show why documents from 2010 were crucial to the resolution of the issues in the divorce proceedings. Without compelling evidence linking the earlier records to the central dispute, the request for an extended timeframe was unwarranted. [27] Even if I were to accept the Respondent’s contention regarding the relevance of documents from 2010, it begs the question why these documents were not included in the First Discovery Application. If they were genuinely relevant and necessary, it was implausible that the Respondent would have overlooked the Documents Previously Ordered But For Extended Period in the First Discovery Application. This omission leads to the irresistible inference that Documents Previously Ordered But For Extended Period was not considered necessary at the time, further undermining the Respondent’s argument for their inclusion in the Second Discovery Application. [28] The extensiveness of the list of documents sought by the Respondent in both categories in the Second Discovery Application, namely 1 January 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________________________________ 16 Documents Previously Ordered But For Extended Period and New Categories of Documents fortified my view that they were both not necessary to the divorce proceedings as it was undeniable that if they were, they would have been sought by the Respondent in the First Discovery Application. [29] Furthermore, the Respondent sought to justify the Second Discovery Application by claiming that, during the First Discovery Application, he had not fully understood the scope of the discovery process, particularly the possibility of requesting documents dating back to

This explanation, however, did little to support the necessity of the additional documents. The Court of Appeal’s decision, which reinforced the sufficiency of the documents already disclosed, further undermined the Respondent’s position. In light of this, it remained unclear how the documents sought in the Second Discovery Application could materially contribute to the fair resolution of the Divorce Petition, particularly regarding the determination of the matrimonial assets. [30] Taken together, these factors led to the inescapable conclusion that the documents sought pursuant to the Second Discovery Application were neither relevant nor necessary to the divorce proceedings. Whether reliefs sought were too broad, and lacked specificity [31] My observation regarding the Second Discovery Application was that the reliefs sought were excessively broad, imprecise, and lacked the necessary specificity. For instance, in the section addressing New Categories of Documents, certain phrases related to the requested 1 January 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________________________________ 17 company-related documents outlined in Annexure A of the Second Discovery Application highlighted this issue. The following phrases underscored the overly broad scope and vagueness of the reliefs being sought, which fail to provide clear and specific parameters: …

The Petitioner’s claims, incentives and any other document of any other sums of monies and/or benefits received, from 2010 to present from the following companies where the Petitioner is a director or shareholder:

The Petitioner’s pay slips, bonus, claims, incentives and any other document of any other sums of monies or benefits received from the following companies: …

The Petitioner’s credit card statements from 2010 – present for any other credit card that the Petitioner has, either as a principal or a supplementary card holder, including any company credit cards; …

The Petitioner’s insurance policies, together with the premium statements for any other insurance that she may have, whether locally or internationally from 2010 to present; …

The Petitioner’s insurance policies, together with the premium statements for any other insurance that she may have, whether locally or internationally from 2010 – present;

List of assets and liabilities, all the financial statements including but not limited to company accounts, tenancy agreements of properties (if any) and statement of rental income for each property, dividend statements, company bank statements, and any other documents showing the value of the following companies in which the Petitioner 1 January 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________________________________ 18 has a legal and/or beneficial interest in: Audited accounts, management accounts, general ledgers, documents relating to the allotment of shares, the share capital as well as any increase of share capital and the source of funds for any increase in share capital, and all directors resolutions of the following companies in which the Petitioner has a legal and/or beneficial interest in, from 2010 – present:

All relevant documents, including but not limited to correspondence, bank statements, invoices, receipts, share transfer forms, directors’ resolutions and other documents related to the following: [Emphasis added.] [32] The wording of the above-mentioned reliefs made it evident that the Respondent was pursuing a broad, sweeping, and "catch-all" order against the Petitioner. These reliefs were overly expansive, lacked precision, and were characterised by a troubling vagueness that undermined their clarity and specificity. [33] At this stage, it was crucial to emphasise that documents requested in a discovery application must be clearly and specifically identified to ensure that the process remained fair and did not impose an undue burden on the opposing party. The Court, in Tiow Weng Theong v. Melawangi Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 368, affirmed this principle, stating: [10] Secondly, an essential criterion that the applicant for discovery has to satisfy is that the document has to be identified specifically and its importance to the applicant’s case or defence has to be satisfactorily shown. Otherwise, the discovery exercise would be regarded as a ‘fishing exercise’ to prop up the claim or defence of the applicant that would be unjust or oppressive to the opposing party and accordingly, should not be permitted. This proposition was expressed clearly by the Court of Appeal in Nguang Chan aka Nguang Chan Liquor Trader & Ors v Hai-O Enterprise & Ors 1 January 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________________________________ 19 [2009] 5 MLJ 40 as follows: The court would dismiss a … application for discovery if the plaintiff is merely fishing for evidence to prop up his case and to allow him discovery would be unduly oppressive to the party giving discovery. … [12] In the instant cases, a perusal of the list of documents sought to be discovered would disclose that they have not been sufficiently identified specifically. The documents in question have been described in general terms without reference to particular documents and how they would be important to support the specifically pleaded defences to the claim. In my view, the description of the documents does not satisfy the requirement for the documents sought to be discovered to be identified specifically for the Court to decide whether it would be just and necessary to order the discovery prayed for. It is expressly provided in O 24 r 13 that discovery will only be ordered if it is necessary for the cause or matter to be fairly disposed of. [Emphasis added.] [34] In any case, regarding the New Categories of Documents, the Court, in its First Decision, directed the Petitioner to disclose specific documents from various companies (excluding Sun Pharma, Sun Li, and Pharma Nord). These documents included a list of assets and liabilities; financial statements including but not limited to company accounts, tenancy agreements of properties (if any) and statement of rental income for each property, dividend statements; company bank statements, and any other documents showing the value of the companies; and a complete set of the sale and purchase agreement, facilities agreement and relevant documents evidencing the source of payments for the purchase of the properties registered in the name of the companies. 1 January 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________________________________ 20 [35] Throughout the hearing of the Second Discovery Application, the Respondent relied on broad and unsubstantiated claims, asserting that the additional documents sought were relevant and necessary to ascertain the extent of the matrimonial assets available for division. However, the Respondent failed to provide a clear, detailed, and compelling explanation as to why these specific documents were essential. [36] Notably, the Respondent did not address how the requested materials were necessary given that the Petitioner had already complied with the First Discovery Order by disclosing the required documents. This lack of substantive justification raised serious concerns about the legitimacy of the Second Discovery Application, suggesting that it might have been less about necessity and more about engaging in a fishing expedition. Whether decision of the Court of Appeal justified filing the Second Discovery Application [37] With regard to the Petitioner’s appeal to the Court of Appeal against the First Decision, the Court of Appeal ultimately allowed such appeal. It directed the Respondent to disclose documents dating back to 2010, grounding its decision on the core issues pleaded by the Petitioner in the divorce proceedings. [38] The Respondent sought discovery of documents from the same 2010 timeline, arguing that the Court of Appeal’s decision implicitly supported the relevance and necessity of all documents from 2010 onwards. This argument rested on the premise that the 2010 timeline 1 January 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________________________________ 21 decision of the Court of Appeal, made in favour of the Petitioner’s appeal, established the significance of documents from that period. [39] However, the Respondent’s reliance on the decision of the Court of Appeal was fundamentally flawed for several reasons. [40] The decision of the Court of Appeal to order disclosure of documents from 2010 was specific to the Petitioner’s appeal and directed against the Respondent. This directive did not create a blanket precedent for the disclosure of all documents from 2010 in relation to any other party, including the Petitioner. The decision of the Court of Appeal was narrowly tailored to the facts and claims presented in the Petitioner’s appeal. [41] The Respondent’s attempt to extend the decision of the Court of Appeal to apply against the Petitioner was misconceived and unsupported. The principle underpinning the decision of the Court of Appeal did not logically or legally justify imposing a reciprocal obligation on the Petitioner to disclose documents from 2010. [42] The Respondent’s argument appeared to suggest that the same disclosure obligations imposed on the Respondent should now apply to the Petitioner under the principle of fairness or reciprocity— commonly expressed as "what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander." However, this analogy was inapplicable here, as the decision of the Court of Appeal was specifically grounded in the context of the Petitioner’s appeal and the evidence required to address the claims 1 January 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________________________________ 22 made by Petitioner, and not to create any kind of reciprocal obligations or fairness. [43] The Respondent’s reliance on the decision of the Court of Appeal as a basis for seeking further discovery against the Petitioner was, therefore, untenable. The decision of the Court of Appeal was clearly confined to the facts and issues raised in the Petitioner’s appeal and cannot be misinterpreted or extended to justify additional discovery obligations against the Petitioner. To do so would be to misconstrue the scope and intent of the decision of the Court of Appeal. Whether Second Discovery Application was an abuse of process of court [44] It was my view that the Second Discovery Application was laced with delaying tactics and abuse of the process of court, as it was filed only because the Petitioner’s appeal against the First Decision was allowed by the Court of Appeal. [45] The timing of the filing of the Second Discovery Application was not driven by genuine necessity but rather by a strategic maneuver to reopen and relitigate issues that had already been addressed or could have been raised earlier. [46] I also have to add that the agreed facts and issues to be tried had been filed together with the bundles of documents as early as January 2022. The trial dates had to be rescheduled multiple times due to the numerous interlocutory applications filed by both Parties. Ultimately, the trial dates were rescheduled to August 2025, significantly delaying the disposal of the divorce proceedings. 1 January 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________________________________ 23 [47] The Respondent proceeded with filing the Second Discovery Application despite full knowledge of the rescheduled trial dates and the cumulative delays stemming from prior interlocutory applications. This course of action not only imposed an unnecessary burden on the Court but also increased the risk of adjourning the trial of the Divorce Petition, undermining the efficient administration of justice. [48] The Respondent’s decision to instruct his Counsel to file the Second Discovery Application at such an advanced stage of the proceedings demonstrated a clear disregard for the overarching principles of efficiency and expediency that underpin the trial process. This late-stage filing disrupted the procedural flow of the case, undermining its integrity and creating avoidable delays. [49] Such conduct not only hindered the Court’s ability to manage the proceedings effectively but also placed an undue burden on judicial resources. The time and effort required to address the the Second Discovery Application could have been better allocated to other pressing matters, highlighting the inefficiency introduced by the Respondent’s actions. By prioritising personal litigation strategies over the orderly and timely administration of justice, the Respondent displayed a lack of consideration for the broader implications of his actions, both on the Court’s workload and on the equitable resolution of the case. This approach exemplifies behaviour that Courts must address firmly to uphold the principles of procedural fairness and judicial efficiency. 1 January 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________________________________ 24 [50] Although I disagreed with the Petitioner’s contention that the Respondent had harboured a “craze” and “obsession” for an ever-increasing number of documents, I held the view that there must be a definitive end to the Respondent’s discovery applications. [51] If this Court were to entertain additional discovery applications, it would undermine the principle of finality in pre-trial procedures, especially for documents belonging to the same categories already addressed. Allowing such applications would not only prolong the discovery process indefinitely but would also encourage Parties to submit successive applications for discovery as the trial date approaches. This could lead to requests for trial adjournments on such grounds, creating an unjustifiable delay in the resolution of the case. [52] Furthermore, I must highlight that after the Court rendered its decision on the Second Discovery Application, the Respondent proceeded to file an appeal against that decision, significantly heightening the risk of further delaying the trial. Conclusion [53] After a thorough and careful evaluation of all the evidence presented, including written and oral submissions by Counsel, the Second Discovery Application was dismissed with costs. In fact, I would go further to state that the Second Discovery Application should have never been filed in the first place. Dated: 1 January 2025 1 January 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________________________________ 25 SIGNED …………………………………………. (EVROL MARIETTE PETERS) Judge High Court, Kuala Lumpur Counsel: For the Petitioner-Wife – Siew Choon Jern; Messrs Douglas Yee & Co For the Respondent-Husband – YN Foo and Kiran Dhaliwal; Messrs YN Foo & Co Cases referred to: ➢ ABX Logistics (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v Overseas Bechtel (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2003] 7 CLJ 357 ➢ Khor Cheng Wah v. Sungai Way Leasing Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 396; [1996] 1 MLJ 223 ➢ Tiow Weng Theong v. Melawangi Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 368 ➢ Yekambaran Marimuthu v Malayawata Steel Berhad [1994] 2 CLJ 581 Legislation referred to: ➢ Rules of Court 2012 – Order 24