Gainhill Marketing Sdn. Bhd. v Pdc Auto (Kuantan) Sdn. Bhd. (CA-22NCvC-23-06/2023)

of the Rules of Courts 2012 (“ROC 2012”). [2] Below are my grounds in coming to such decision. 19/04/2024 16:37:27 CA-22NCvC-23-06/2023 Kand. 30 BACKGROUND SPA 16/4/2012 [3] Vide an agreement dated 4/8/2003 between the Plaintiff and the Perbadanan Setiausaha Kerajaan Negeri Pahang, the Plaintiff purchased a land HS(D) 39691, PT 106948, Mukim Kuala Kuantan, Kuantan, Pahang measuring 19,790 square meters (“The Land”) for a sum of RM2,250,000.00. [4] On 16/4/2012, the Plaintiff sold The Land to the Defendant for a sum of RM7,800,000.00 vide an agreement dated 16/4/2012 (“SPA 16/4/2012”). [5] After all the prerequisite conditions of the SPA 16/4/2012 having been fulfilled, including having obtained the consent from the State Authority, The Land was transferred to the Defendant on 4/10/2012 and registered in the Defendant’s name on 29/11/2012. Suit No. 22NCVC-60-12/2015 [6] When the agreed sums of the deposit and purchase price of The Land amounting to RM7,800,000.00 remained unpaid by the Defendant, the Plaintiff filed Suit No. 22NCVC-60-12/2015 (“Suit 2015”) against the Defendant. However, this Suit was withdrawn by the Plaintiff. Suit CA-22NCVC-68-12/2017 [7] Two years after withdrawing Suit 2015, the Plaintiff filed Suit CA- 22NCVC-68-12/2017 (“Suit 2017”) against the Defendant on a similar claim as Suit 2015, praying for an order that the Defendant to pay Plaintiff the said sum of RM7,800,000.00 and the accrued interests. [8] Vide an Order dated 28/8/2018, the Plaintiff obtained a Summary Judgment against the Defendant under O.14 of the Rules. The Order was overturned by the Court of Appeal on 16/11/2021 and the matter was remitted back to this Court. [9] Almost immediately after the Court of Appeal ruling until around mid 2023, both parties were involved in garnishee proceedings taken by certain financial institutions against the Defendant. At the same time, both parties were preparing for the full trial. [10] On 5/9/2023 both parties entered into a Consent Judgment with terms including:

RM7,000,000.00 as a full and final settlement sum to be paid in the following manner:

RM4,000,000.00 to be paid before 5/9/2023;

Balance of RM3,000,000.00 to be paid in 3 instalments on/before 5/9/2024, 5/9/2025, 5/9/2026 respectively;

(ii) The payable sums shall be made by way of post-dated cheques to the Plaintiff’s solicitor;

(iii) In the event that the Defendant failed to pay the agreed sum of RM7,000,000.00 within the agreed timeline or the extension thereof, the Defendant shall pay the said sum in full together with a penalty in the amount of RM1,000,000.00. Current Suit [11] 6 years after the filing of Suit 2017, and 3 months prior to the entering of the Consent Judgment between the parties, the Plaintiff filed this current Suit, for the exact same piece of The Land, but with a different twist. [12] In its Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff now claims that –

The Defendant was planning to open a Toyota 3S Centre in Kuantan, Pahang, and required a land for that purpose;

(ii) Dato’ Ahmad Tasnim, a shareholder and director of the Plaintiff, who is also a shareholder and a director of the Defendant proposed that a portion of The Land to be sold to the Defendant to enable the Defendant to carry out its plan;

(iii) Consequent to the proposal, the Plaintiff engaged a valuer who came out with a valuation in the amount of RM8,500,000.00;

(iv) The Plaintiff claimed that this amount was only for a portion of The Land – 12,141 square meters (around 3 acres) - and not for the entire 19,790 square meters (5 acres);

Following a series of discussion between Dato’ Ahmad Tasnim representing the Plaintiff, and Lee Chiew Shan and Chua Sook Hwa representing the Defendants, the Plaintiff agreed to enter into the SPA 16/4/2012 with the Defendant based on the representation of the Defendant’s representatives that the SPA 16/4/2012 depicting the entirety of The Land merely to enable the Defendant to obtain approval for financing of the Toyota 3S Centre development. Once the financing is approved and the development of the Centre takes off, the Defendant will take the necessary actions to divide The Land. This division will result in the Defendant’s ownership to be altered and confined only to the agreed portion of The Land – 12,141 square meters (3 acres). The other 7,649 square meters (2 acres) of The Land will be returned to the Plaintiff (“3-2 Division of The Land”);

(vi) The Plaintiff did not deny that the SPA 16/4/2012 was for the entire portion of The Land measuring 19,790 square meters (5 acres) and not for the 3 acres portion only. The Plaintiff claimed this was so as the 3-2 Division of The Land cannot be carried out within the short span of time as the Defendant required The Land urgently to be used as security to finance the Toyota 3S Centre development;

(vii) Thus, although the Plaintiff did not deny that it had signed the Borang 14A which clearly stated that it had agreed to transfer the entirety of The Land to the Defendant, it was understood between the parties that the intent between them was that only 3 acres of The Land was meant to be transferred to the Defendant and not the entirety of The Land; and

(viii) Apart from the above, the Plaintiff had also agreed to execute the transfer despite the Defendant had not made the full payment of the purchase price. The Plaintiff claimed that this was done due to some special arrangements between the parties. [13] The Defendant’s answers to the Plaintiff’s claims which formed the Defendant’s grounds to support its application to strike out the Plaintiff’s actions were as follows:

The Plaintiff failed to disclose any reasonable cause of action as its action was based on purported representation of the Defendant’s representatives, the existence of which was vehemently denied by the Defendant;

(ii) The SPA 16/4/2012 had long been concluded and the Plaintiff’s attempt to “rewrite” the said SPA on the 3-2 Division of The Land cannot be allowed;

(iii) The Plaintiff failed to plead any facts to support its application to set aside the transfer of The Land to the Defendant which had been perfected in 2012;

(iv) The Plaintiff’s claims in the current Suit is a duplicity in proceedings with the Plaintiff’s Suit 2017;

The Plaintiff did not plead a cause of action for recovery of land. Thus, he cannot now raise at submission stage that its action is not statute-barred as its claim is allowed under s.9 of the Limitation Act 1953 for recovery of land; and

(vi) Despite the Defendant’s reply to the Plaintiff’s Notice of Demand dated 10/6/2022 where the Defendant had raised the issue of duplicity of proceeding, the Plaintiff proceeded to file the current action, which is an abuse of the process of the Court. FINDINGS [14] It is trite that in determining an O. 18 r. 19 application, this Court shall refrain from making a finding on the substantive action and avoid resolving contradicting evidence before it: Meeriam Rosaline a/p Edward Paul v William Singam a/l Raja Singam (suing as Public Officer of Pertubuhan Persaudaraan Kristian Thaveethin Kudaram, Ipoh, Perak) [2010] 3 MLJ 541; Noor Jahan bte Abdul Wahab v Md Yusoff bin Amanshah [1994] 1 MLJ 156. If, having perused the pleadings and affidavit evidence, this Court found that the Plaintiff’s cause of actions are obviously unsustainable, then this Court shall make an appropriate order to allow the Defendant’s application: Sarjit Singh Khaira v. Government of The State of Sarawak & Anor. [1990] 2 CLJ 95, 97; [1990] 3 CLJ (Rep) 59; Bandar Builder Sdn. Bhd. & 2 Ors. v. United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd. [1993] 4 CLJ 7. [15] To determine whether the Plaintiff’s claim is obviously sustainable, this Court is entitled to examine the history of the case that had arisen between the parties as expounded in their respective pleadings. This is in consonant with the decision of Haidar Mohd Noor J. (as His Lordship then was) in Jamir Hassan v Kang Min [1992] 2 MLJ 46: “If I am wrong in my construction of the law I then need to examine the pleadings and the affidavit evidence to see whether there is a cause of action disclosed on adverse possession. ... There does not seem to be evidence shown by the plaintiff in the pleadings that he is either in physical possession of the land or exercising dominion over the property. In the circumstances he failed to show evidence of adverse possession and O. 18 r. 19 of RHC can rightly be invoked. Further, the Court is entitled to look at the history of this case to determine whether the pleadings disclose a form of action. This is what Lord Parker CJ said in Re Vernazza [1959] 2 All ER at p. 202: In considering whether any proceedings are vexatious one is entitled to and must look at the whole history of the matter and it is not determined by whether the pleading discloses a form of action. Indeed that is the principle applied under the rules of Court when application is made to strike out a pleading. Though the pleading may be in order, the Court in its inherent jurisdiction is entitled to look at affidavits as to the history of the matter, and if in the light of the history the action is vexatious, the matter can be struck out and the action dismissed.” Preliminary Issue 1: Is the Plaintiff’s action time-barred? [16] The indefeasibility of the Defendant’s title over The Land is statutorily guaranteed pursuant to s. 340(1) of the National Land Code. The only instances where the Plaintiff can challenge the Defendant’s indefeasible title over The Land are those provided under subsection 340(2) of the NLC, viz:

in any case of fraud or misrepresentation to which the person or body, or any agent of the person or body, was a party or privy; or

where registration was obtained by forgery, or by means of an insufficient or void instrument; or

where the title or interest was unlawfully acquired by the person or body in the purported exercise of any power or authority conferred by any written law. [17] Subsection 340(3) provides further that if any of those circumstances are proven by the Plaintiff, then the Defendant’s title over The Land can be set aside. [18] However, for the Plaintiff to be able to set aside the Defendant’s title over The Land and to recover The Land, the Plaintiff shall bring its action against the Defendant within 12 years from the date on which the right of action accrued to him. This is provided under subsection 9(1) of the Limitation Act 1953. The Plaintiff’s right of action accrued on 16/4/2012, the date of signing of the SPA 16/4/2012. The 12 years’ time period expired on 16/4/2024. This current action was brought on 1/6/2023, well within the time period. [19] The Defendant argued notwithstanding that the Plaintiff’s action was filed within the 12 years’ time period, the action cannot be sustained as the Plaintiff failed to specifically pleaded subsection 9(1) of the Limitation Act. Due to such failure, the Plaintiff’s action fell squarely under s. 6 of the Limitation Act which provides the general limitation period of 6 years for a civil action. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s action is time-barred and must be set aside as it is a frivolous, scandalous and vexatious action under O.18 r.19(1)(b) and an abuse of the Court process under O.18 r.19(1)(d) : Tan Sri Dato’ Eric Chia Eng Hock v NKK Corp (Japan) [2005] AMR 343. [20] This Court disagreed with the Defendant on this argument. The Plaintiff’s cause of action here is for recovery of The Land. His pleadings and claims on this matter are explicit and clear. It is trite law that only material facts and not law affecting the case may be pleaded. What the Plaintiff pleaded was in compliance with the rule governing pleadings as set out in O.18 rr. 7 and 11. See also Lo Su Tsoon Timber Depot v Southern Estate Sdn Bhd [1971] 2 MLJ 161. [21] It is my finding that the Defendant’s reliance on Amakannu a/p Veerapan & Ors v Mayland Development Sdn Bhd [2011] 8 MLJ 682 was misplaced. There the Court held that when the plaintiff’s cause of action was solely on breach of contract, the plaintiff cannot seek reliefs against the defendant for recovery of land, which the plaintiff failed to plead. [22] Relying on the provisions of the law and the authorities that I had cited above, it is my ruling that the Plaintiff’s action in the current action is for recovery of The Land and he had filed this action within the time period as provided under s.9(1) of the Limitation Act. Preliminary Issue 2: Is the Defendant’s striking out application defective? [23] The Plaintiff raised a preliminary issue that the Defendant’s filing of its O.18 application was defective. This is because the Defendant made the application under O. 18 r. 19(1)(a), (b) and (d) of the Rules. [24] The Plaintiff argued that an application made under O.18 r.19 (1)(a), which disallows affidavit evidence, cannot be lumped together with an application under O.18 r.19(1)(b), (c) and (d). [25] This argument is totally flawed. The law has long been settled by the oft-cited decision in See Thong & Anor v Saw Beng Chong [2012] CLJU 817, [2013] 3 AMR 385, [2013] 3 MLJ 235, where the Court of Appeal held that an application for striking out under O. 18 r. 19 can be premised on any one or more than one of the grounds in paragraphs (a)-

(d). If an application is based on more than one of the grounds and affidavits are filed by parties, then the Courts must ignore the affidavits when considering paragraph (1)(a), which must be dealt first, before considering the affidavit evidence under the other grounds. 3-2 Division of The Land based on representation made by Defendant’s representatives to the Plaintiff’s representative [26] As set out in the earlier paragraphs, the Plaintiff argued that this Court cannot allow the striking out of its case as the Plaintiff had raised triable issues. The most significant triable issue cited by the Plaintiff was its allegation that the 3-2 Division of The Land had been agreed through a representation made by the Defendant’s representatives. [27] The Plaintiff relied on the High Court decision in Tumasek Beckmann Cutlery Sdn Bhd v Bromma (M) Sdn Bhd [2008] 5 MLJ 526 to substantiate its argument that this Court must allow the Plaintiff to prove its case at a trial and not to determine the matters by way of summary procedure. The Plaintiff’s case shows strong prima facie case for interrogatories, discovery and cross-examination which will be available only if the case goes to trial. The Plaintiff also cited another High Court decision in Dataran Khas Sdn Bhd v Arkitek Se [2002] 4 MLRH 794 where it was held that factual matters normally would not be easily finally determined based on affidavit evidence. It should be more appropriately decided after a full hearing involving witnesses. [28] Having considered the Plaintiff’s arguments as set out above, this Court is more inclined to agree with the decision of the case cited by the Defendant in Amazing Place Sdn Bhd v Couture Homes Sdn Bhd & Anor [2010] CLJU 823. In this case, Zabariah JC (now FCJ) had the opportunity of dealing with the issues almost identical with the situation before this Court and Her Ladyship held that despite the purported defendant’s oral representation argued by the plaintiff in that case, which was vehemently denied by the defendant, the terms in the agreement signed between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant negates any oral representation by the defendant. Her Ladyship held further: “Now what does the SPA and the Deed of Mutual Covenant which was entered between the plaintiff and the defendant states? Clause 25, 32.5 and 32.6 of the deed of Mutual Covenant are clear and unambigous. The plaintiff had signed the SPA and the Deed of Mutual Covenant and thus is bound by its terms. The clauses in the Deed of Mutual Covenants are very clear in that the plaintiff is wholly aware that it had entered into the SPA and the Deed of Mutual Covenant not in reliance of any representation or statement made by the Vendor (1st defendant) before the signing of the SPA and the Deed of Mutual Covenant.” [29] The principle distilled from the above paragraphs of Her Ladyship decision is simply that when there exist no evidence stating that a contract that had been entered between parties shall be subjected to or to be read with certain other understanding, there is nothing that can be done by the Court other than looking at the terms of the contract. [30] This proposition was laid down in Koh Siak Poo v. Perkayuan OKS Sdn Bhd & Ors [1989] 2 CLJ 1 (Rep); [1989] 1 CLJ 30; [1989] 3 MLJ 164 where the Supreme Court held that where the written contracts are clear and unambiguous the courts should not go behind the written terms of the contract to introduce or add new terms to it as the duty of the court is confined to the construction of the written documents and extrinsic evidence is not admissible by virtue of sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act. See also Macronet Sdn Bhd v. RHB Bank Bhd, Master Strike Sdn Bhd v. Sterling Heights [2005] 2 CLJ 596; [2005] 3 MLJ 585, Tindok Besar Estate Sdn Bhd v. Tinjar Co [1979] CLJU 119; [1979] 1 LNS 119; [1979] 2 MLJ 229. [31] Applying the principles set out in the authorities cited above, this Court ruled that the alleged representation of the Defendant’s representatives cannot form the basis of the Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendant as the Plaintiff failed to show any credible evidence to support its claim on the existence of such representation. This Court further ruled that the understanding between the parties over The Land had been conclusively and comprehensively set out in the SPA 16/4/2012. The terms of the said SPA had been executed through the transfer of the title over The Land to the Defendant. There exists no further triable issue. [32] Apart from the above, this Court further agrees with the Defendant that the Plaintiff’s failure to plead the specific particulars as to when the alleged representation on the 3-2 Division of The Land was made by the Defendant’s representatives was fatal to the Plaintiff’s case and liable to be struck out. This was the principle laid down in Tan Poh Yee v Tan Boon Thien & Other Appeals [2017] 3 CLJ 569 where the Court of Appeal held: “[22] It ought to be emphasised that the date for the conclusion of a valid contract, especially an oral one as in this instant appeal, is pertinent and must be specific to achieve certainty. It does indeed go without saying that a party intending to rely on the oral agreement cannot make an assumption of any date and failure to provide the precise date necessarily means that the plaintiff has failed to prove the existence of the same (Keongco Malaysia Sdn Bhd v. Ng Seah Hai [2011] CLJU 703; [2011] 1 LNS 703; [2012] 7 MLJ 288). The respondent therefore had failed to plead and provide the material particulars as to the exact date of the purported 2004 agreement at this preliminary stage which was highly prejudicial to the appellants and fatal to the respondent's case. The above analysis to the respondent's amended statement of claim as well as the appellants' defences and the application of the case authorities above, clearly demonstrate and is more than sufficient to support our inevitable conclusion that by merely looking at the pleadings, it is plain and obvious that the respondent has no reasonable cause of action. In coming to this conclusion, we are guided by the Supreme Court's case of Sim Kie Chon v. Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors [1985] 2 CLJ 449; [1985] CLJ Rep 293 which authoritatively held that on an application to strike out a statement of claim under O. 18 r. 19(1)(a) of the Rules of Court 2012, the right course for this court to take is to strike out the claim if we are satisfied that the claim does not disclose a reasonable cause of action. On this ground alone, the appeals must be allowed and the respondent's claim struck out.” The Plaintiff’s argument on the purported representation of the Defendant is negated by the terms of the SPA 16/4/2012 [33] All along since 2012 until the filing of this Suit in June 2023 – for the entire period of 11 years - there has never been even a single occasion where the Plaintiff had exerted its position about the 3-2 Division of The Land. The Plaintiff could have entered a private caveat to preserve its beneficial interest over the 2 acres of The Land that it now claimed. The Plaintiff had 11 years to do so but chose to remain silent. Instead, in Clause 9 of the SPA 16/4/2012 the Plaintiff had unequivocally, irrevocably agreed and consented for the Defendant to lodge a private caveat over The Land to protect the Defendant’s registrable interest over The Land. [34] Clause 15 of the said SPA sets out the conditions to which the sale of The Land are subjected to. It provides that The Land is sold on an “as is where is basis” and on the assumption that the Defendant had examined and inspected The Land and having satisfied with every condition relating to The Land. [35] The most relevant part of this Clause 15 that deals with the Plaintiff’s argument on the issue of representation is where it provides: “ ... the purchaser shall be deemed to have purchased the Said Land in its present state and condition on an “as is where is basis” and not upon or pursuant to any representation statement, warranty or condition whatsoever other than the representations and warranties contained in Clause 16 hereof made to the Purchaser ... “. [36] Examination of Clause 16 shows that it sets out numerous covenants, warranties, undertakings and representations made by the Defendant as the seller of The Land. Clause 17 sets out covenants, warranties, undertakings and representations made by the Plaintiff as the Purchaser. [37] Clauses 15, 16 and 17 of the SPA 16/4/2012 without doubt negated the Plaintiff’s arguments on the alleged representations made by the Defendant. Even if there really was such representations made by the Defendant’s representatives, it had been vitiated by virtue of Clause 15. [38] The Plaintiff cannot argue that it was not represented by solicitors when the said SPA 16/4/2012 was drafted by the Defendant’s solicitors as the Plaintiff had consciously chosen not to be legally represented as shown in Preamble G of the said SPA. Plaintiff consciously left out any reference to the 3-2 Division of The Land even when it had the opportunity to do so [39] The Plaintiff had all the opportunities when it filed Suit 2015, and then Suit 2017, to raise the 3-2 Division of The Land. The 3-2 Division of The Land, if true as claimed, is such an important, substantive and major issue that it cannot had been unintentionally left out by the Plaintiff. On the contrary, all the documents in the Suit 2017 showed that the SPA 16/4/2012 relates to the entirety of The Land and not subject to the 3-2 Division of The Land. [40] When both parties entered into the Consent Judgment in September in the Suit 2017, there was no mention whatsoever about the 3-2 Division of The Land. The Plaintiff had every opportunity to ensure that the 3-2 Division was reflected unequivocally in the Consent Judgment, but yet the Plaintiff chose to remain silent on this important fact. The Consent Judgment was for the settlement of the Plaintiff’s claims in the Suit 2017 – and that claim was for the RM7.8mil sum for the sale of The Land in its entirety, and not subject to the 3-2 Division of The Land. [41] This Court agrees with the Defendant, that the proper action that should have been taken by the Plaintiff was to amend its Statement of Claim in the Suit 2017 to bring in the element of 3-2 Division of The Land, and not file a separate action as in the current Suit. If the Statement of Claim was amended to reflect the Plaintiff’s claim on the 3- Division of The Land, the Consent Judgment would have certainly been agreed upon on that claim too. But that was never the case. Again, the Plaintiff consciously chose to let the opportunity went by without any hesitation. [42] Based on all the findings as set out above, this Court concluded that the Plaintiff’s attempt to raise the issue of representation is a non-starter. The Plaintiff’s pleading discloses no reasonable cause of action. It devoid of any merit and requires no examination by this Court in a full trial as it is frivolous and vexatious and must be struck off in accordance with O. r.19(1)(a) and (b) of the Rules. Duplicity of proceedings [43] The Plaintiff argued that its filing of this action while the Suit 2017 is still alive does not tantamount to a duplicity of proceedings. This is because the Plaintiff’s action in this Suit is not premised upon any evidence given in that Suit 2017. While that Suit 2017 revolves around the issue of balance purchase price, this current action is premised upon the Defendant’s representation prior to the signing of the SPA 16/4/2012. Therefore, duplicity of proceedings or subjudice does not arise. [44] This Court disagreed with the Plaintiff. In both Suits, the parties are the same. Solicitors representing them are the same. The claims by the Plaintiff in this Suit and the other Suit 2017 stemmed from the exact same SPA 16/4/2012, which sets out agreement between parties over the same piece of land. The only difference, if any, is that in this current Suit the Plaintiff is seeking for 2 acres to be carved out of The Land and return to it, whereas in the Suit 2017 the Plaintiff asked for the Defendant to pay the full purchase price for the entire piece of The Land. [45] In Nazaruddin Mohd Shariff @ Masari & Anor v Roslan bin Maulud & Anor [2020] MLJU 1362, the Court held that there is a substantial duplication of issues raised and reliefs sought by the plaintiff in two separate suits which tantamount to multiplicity/duplicity of actions. This is an abuse of the court process and an attempt to bite the same proverbial cherry not once but twice at the very same time. [46] In Penang Port Commission v Kanawagi a/l Seperumaniam [2009] 1 CLJ 169, the Court of Appeal held that there was multiplicity of proceedings that amounts to an abuse of process when the issue to be determined in one action by the plaintiff is similar with the issue to be determined in another action by the plaintiff. This runs counter to the bona fide doctrine. [47] It is this Court’s finding that the Plaintiff had attempted to draw up different actions between this current action and Suit 2017. Although the reliefs sought are different in both actions, those reliefs are consequential to the substantive finding that are exactly the same that must be determined by this Court in both actions – the existence of the alleged representation by the Defendant on the 3-2 Division of The Land. This is the reason why this Court agreed with the Defendant’s contention that what should have been done by the Plaintiff was to apply for the amendment to its claims in the Suit 2017 to add the relief sought in this current action instead of filing a separate Suit. [48] There is a substantial duplication of issues raised and determination of issues sought by the plaintiff in both suits which tantamount to multiplicity/duplicity of actions. This is an abuse of the Court process, a ground for which the Plaintiff’s action should be struck off pursuant to O.18 r.19(1)(d) of the Rules. CONCLUSION [49] This Court is fully aware of the reminder by the Court of Appeal in See Thong & Anor v Saw Beng Choong [2012] 1 LNS 817; [2013] 3 MLJ 235 that this Court shall exercise sparingly the power to strike a case without having to go for trial and only in a plain and obvious case. The Plaintiff should not be deprived of its right to have its case proceeded by a proper trial unless the claim is obviously unsustainable. See also : Raja Zainal Abidin bin Raja Haji Tachik v British-American Life & General Insurance Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 16; [1993] 3 CLJ 606, Tractors Malaysia Bhd. v. Tio Chee Hing [1975] 1 LNS 133; [1975] 2 MLJ 1. [50] The Plaintiff’s claims are obviously unsustainable as the pleadings disclosed no reasonable cause of action, they are frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of the process of the Court. [51] The Defendant’s application was henceforth allowed with costs. Dated : 16 April 2024 -signed- (MOHD RADZI BIN HARUN) Judge High Court of Malaya PARTIES: Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Syazlinda Nadia bt Md Nasir Messrs. Balendran Chong 42A, Jalan Putra Square 6 Putra Square, 25200 Kuantan, Pahang Ref : VK/NAD/yatie/69951 Email : bcb@bcblaw.com.my Solicitor for the Defendant: Aundre Kok Onn Messrs. Onn & Partners 13, Jalan Kemuja, Off Jalan Bangsar 59000 Kuala Lumpur Ref. : 2023G.2798.PDC Email: onnpts13@gmail.com