Kos tindakan ini ditanggung oleh Pempetisyen dan Responden 17 masing-masing.” 18 19 [10] On 27.11.2024 the PW filed a Notice of Appeal against the Consent 20 Order dated 8.11.2024 disputing Paragraphs (b) and (c) of the Consent 21 Order aforesaid. 22 23 [11] The PW has sought to challenge the Consent Order by mode of 24 appeal. 25 26 [12] The Consent Order recorded by this Court was with the consent of 27 parties. The effect of a consent order was clearly explained in the case of 28 Tan Geok Lan v La Kuan [2004] 2 CLJ 301 where the Federal Court held 29 as follows: 30 31 “A consent judgement or order is not the less a contract, and subject to 32 the incidents of a contract, because there is superadded the command 33 of the court and its force and effect derives from the contract between 1 the parties leading to, or evidenced by, or incorporated in, the consent 2 judgement or order.” 3 4 [13] In view that an order by consent is evidence of the contract between 5 the parties and is binding on all the parties to the order, the PW is 6 estopped from appealing it. This position of the law is made clear in the 7 Federal Court case of Ganapathy Chettiar v Lum Kum Chum & Ors, 8 Meenachi v Lum Kum Chum & Ors [1981] 2 MLJ 145 His Lordship Raja 9 Azlan Shah CJM (as his Royal Highness then was) held: 10 11 “The answer to the question is obvious and, with respect, is so clearly 12 explained in Paragraph 2011 of Volume 2 of either the 1976 or the 1979 13 Supreme Court Practice that we will merely content ourselves with 14 repeating that an order by consent is evidence of the contract between 15 the parties and is binding on all the parties to the order. It may be 16 pleaded as an estoppel: Kinch v Walcott [1929] AC 482. All the more so, 17 in our view, since there is not the slightest question of any mistake as to 18 facts or law. Since there had been no mistake on the part of anyone 19 when the consent order for the sale by public auction was made, the 20 only possible way in which this order could be altered would be by the 21 consent of all the parties: Australasian Automatic Weighing Machine 22 Co v Walter 1891 WN 170.” (Emphasis added). 23 24 [14] In Vadivellu a/l Kalimuthu v Rajes a/p Subramaniam [2015] 9 25 MLJ 149, the Learned High Court Judge referred to the case of Chen 26 Choy & Son Realty Sdn Bhd v Ganesha Ganapathy & Anor [1987] 2 27 CLJ 433 whereby Siti Norma Yaakob J observed as follows: 28 29 “The order sought to be rescinded by the defendants is a consent order 30 and following the decision of Ganapathy Chettiar v Lum Chum & Ors 31 [1981] 2 MLJ 145, that in itself is evidence of a contract between the 32 parties to the order, all the more so, where there is not the slightest 33 question of mistake as to facts or law. It can also be pleaded as an 1 estoppel and the only way the consent order can be rescinded is when 2 the plaintiff agrees to the rescission and since it is objecting to the 3 defendants’ application, the only cause open to the defendants is to file 4 a fresh action against the plaintiff to impeach the consent order 5 (Emphasis added) 6 See also the case of Tay Hup Lian v Histyle Sdn Bhd & Anor [2010] 7 9 MLJ 569; [2010] 1 LNS 418. If there had been any consent given 8 mistakenly to the divorce on some erroneous facts then it is for her to 9 apply in a fresh action to impeach the consent order. So too if there are 10 terms that she had mistakenly agreed to whether it be the amount of 11 maintenance or the return of his gold chain. AN order for maintenance 12 may only be varied if there has been a change in material 13 circumstances. See Gee Siew Yee v Ann Wam Tiang [2008] 1 MLJ 14 754; [2008] 1 CLJ 229. 15 As this court had conscientiously and carefully ascertained that the 16 respondent wife had freely consented to the divorce and that she was 17 not labouring under some erroneous fact or misrepresentation when she 18 consented to the amount of maintenance of RM200 per month and to 19 the return of his gold chain, there is no basis either for setting aside the 20 consent decree nisi or for that matter, an appeal.” 21 22 [15] Furthermore being in the nature of a consent order, the PW is barred 23 from filing the Notice of Appeal pursuant to Section 68(1)(b) of the CJA 24 1964 which reads as follows : 25 26 “(1) No appeal shall be brought to the Court of Appeal in any of the 27 following cases: 28 … 29