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1 IN THE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA 5 IN THE STATE OF PERAK DARUL RIDZUAN CIVIL SUIT NO. : AA-22NCvC-108-11/2019 BETWEEN 10 GANESAN A/L RAMASAMY …. PLAINTIFF [NRIC NO.: 610612-06-5031] AND 15 BLUE VALLEY PLANTATION BERHAD …..DEFENDANT [COMPANY NO.: 198901014214 (191526-V)] GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction 20 [1]. This judgment examines whether beneficial ownership of shares with full payment and documentary proof grants enforceable rights for share transfer despite procedural and registration objections. It also addresses whether the defendant’s “no case to answer” submission meets the legal required. 25 Background facts [2]. In 1993, the plaintiff purchased 10,000 shares in the defendant from Selvarajoo A/L Kalliannan (‘the deceased”) for RM10,000.00, and a Form 32A - Form of Transfer of Securities dated 12 June 1993 was executed by both parties. However, the transfer of the 30 28/10/2024 08:15:16 AA-22NCvC-108-11/2019 Kand. 70 shares to the plaintiff was never completed. Consequently, on 21 August 2008, Selvarajoo appointed the plaintiff as an attorney for the 10,000 shares in Blue Valley. [3]. In 2013, following Selvarajoo’s death, his spouse, Padma, obtained a grant of probate for his assets, including the disputed shares. The 35 plaintiff then initiated legal action against Padma, resulting in a 2018 consent order from the Ipoh Sessions Court, allowing the transfer of the shares to the plaintiff. Despite executing the necessary transfer documents in 2019, the defendant’s company secretary, acting on the board's instructions, refused to effect the 40 transfer, citing previous consent orders from 1996 and 2013 that allegedly included these shares. [4]. The plaintiff’s position is that the 10,000 shares from Selvarajoo were not part of the shares surrendered under those consent orders, as Selvarajoo was not a party to those proceedings. The 45 refusal of the transfer by Blue Valley is contested as unreasonable and without basis. The plaintiff seeks from this court to grant an order to enforce the share transfer as per the 2018 consent order . The consent order states: “DENGAN PERSETUJUAN ADALAH DIPERINTAHKAN 50 bahawa Plaintif akan membayar wang berjumlah RM5,000.00 kepada Defendan dan Defendan sebagai Wakil bagi harta pusaka si mati akan menandatangani kesemua borang-borang Pindahan Saham Khusus Borang 32A dan memindahmilik Saham-Saham dalam Sijil No. 058 saham-saham dalam 55 syarikat Blue Valley Berhad tersebut keatas nama Plaintif atau wakil-wakilnya dalam jangka masa 30 hari dari tarikh perintah ini.” The plaintiff’s claim [5]. The plaintiff seeks the enforcement of his beneficial ownership and 60 the transfer of these shares, based on a consent order and as such the plaintiff claims for the following orders: a) The defendant is directed to transfer the said shares to the name of the plaintiff and/or his nominees. b) The defendant is directed to instruct the defendant’s 65 company secretary to transfer the said shares to the name of the plaintiff and/or his nominees. c) The plaintiff is declared as the legal holder of the said shares. d) The defendant and/or its company secretary are to effect the transfer of the said shares as per Form 32A to the name of 70 the plaintiff and/or his nominees. The Defendant submits no case to answer [6]. The defendant at the end of the plaintiff’s case chooses not to call their witness and elects to submit no case to answer. This in principle means that the defendant believes they have a complete 75 answer to the plaintiff’s case, without having to call their own evidence and submit the case for the court’s decision based on the plaintiff’s evidence alone. The plaintiff has no objection to the election made by the defendant. I make this observation because the procedure ensures that the plaintiff is not deprived of the 80 opportunity to strengthen their case by potentially eliciting favourable evidence from the defendant’s witnesses. No Case to answer [7]. In Mohd Nor Afandi bin Mohamed Junus v Rahman Shah Alang Ibrahim & Anor [2008] 3 MLJ 81; [2008] 2 CLJ 369; [2008] 85 3 AMR 485, His Lordship Justice Suriyadi JCA (as he then was) clearly laid out the principle of "no case to answer." This principle highlights the legal implications when a defendant submits a "no case to answer" at the close of the plaintiff’s case. A submission of "no case to answer" allows a defendant to submit that the plaintiff 90 has not presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case, thereby negating the need for the defendant to respond with their own evidence. This submission can be made under two circumstances. [8]. Firstly, it applies when the plaintiff’s evidence, even if accepted at 95 face value, fails to establish a case in law. Here, the court assumes the plaintiff’s evidence is true but still finds that it does not meet the legal requirements necessary to support the claim. For example, in a breach of contract case, if the plaintiff’s evidence does not demonstrate the existence of a valid contract or a breach of 100 essential terms, the defendant can argue that no legal case has been established. Even accepting the plaintiff’s facts as true, they may not fulfil the legal criteria for a breach of contract, allowing the court to dismiss the claim without requiring the defendant to present their case. 105 [9]. Secondly, a submission of "no case to answer" can be made when the plaintiff’s evidence is so unsatisfactory or unreliable that it fails to meet the burden of proof. In such cases, the plaintiff’s evidence must demonstrate the likelihood of their claim being true, on the balance of probabilities. If the evidence is inconsistent, lacks 110 corroboration, or is derived from unreliable sources, the court may find it insufficient to meet this standard. Consequently, the claim can be dismissed on the basis of the plaintiff’s failure to present credible evidence. [10]. The principle of "no case to answer" was succinctly explained by 115 Justice Suriyadi JCA in Mohd Nor Afandi bin Mohamed Junus (supra), where His Lordship stated: “[28] It is trite that when a submission of no case is undertaken, it means that a defendant at the close of the plaintiff’s case (in this case the appellant’s) either had not made out a case in law, 120 or the evidence was unsatisfactory or unreliable for the court to hold that the burden had been discharged. In Storey v Storey [1960] 3 All ER 279, the court had opined in the following manner: “There are, however, two sets of circumstances under 125 which a defendant may submit that he has no case to answer. In the one case there may be a submission that, accepting the plaintiff’s evidence at its face value, no case has been established in law, and in the other that the evidence led for the plaintiff is so unsatisfactory or 130 unreliable that the court should find that the burden of proof has not been discharged.” [11]. In this case, the defendant contends that the plaintiff has failed under both circumstances. However, this court holds otherwise and 135 will address the defendant’s submission in detail hereafter. Whether the plaintiff has established a case in law in seeking the enforcement of the 2018 consent order [12]. The plaintiff argues that his case is not solely for the enforcement of the 2018 consent order but is based on the broader claim of 140 beneficial ownership of 10,000 shares in Blue Valley Plantation Bhd. The plaintiff asserts that the 2018 consent order is just one piece of evidence supporting his claim to these shares. [13]. The defendant contends that the plaintiff’s action is essentially an attempt to enforce the 2018 consent order. They argue that since 145 the defendant was not a party to this consent order, the plaintiff cannot compel the defendant to comply with the terms of the order. Whether the defendant ought to have been named in suit where the 2018 consent order was made is not an issue before this court but what is worth mentioning here is that the 2018 consent order is 150 valid and this court must give effect to it until and unless it is set aside. The defendant further submits that the plaintiff lacks locus standi to bring this action under s. 107 of the Companies Act 2016, as the plaintiff is neither the transferor nor the transferee. [14]. The consent order 2018 which directed the transfer of the 10,000 155 shares to the plaintiff or his nominees was issued in a separate proceeding against Padma A/P Ramoo, the executrix of Selvarajoo's estate. The defendant, however, is not a party to the consent order, hence the defendant argues that they cannot be compelled to act upon it. To buttress this argument the defendant 160 sought support of the case Lee Heng Moy & Ors v Pacific Trustees Bhd & Ors [2016] 6 CLJ 368; [2016] MLJU 1672; [2016] AMEJ 1086, which holds that a consent order is binding only on the parties involved. However, the plaintiff’s claim is broader than merely enforcing the consent order. The plaintiff relies 165 on beneficial ownership of the 10,000 shares, supported by substantial evidence, including the 1993 Transfer Form 32A, letters confirming the sale, and a power of attorney. Also, there is the consideration for the purchase of the 10,000 shares. The plaintiff is not merely seeking to enforce the consent order but is pursuing 170 a declaration of ownership based on his beneficial interest in the shares. [15]. Regarding the applicability of s. 107 of the Companies Act 2016, which provides: “s.107. Order of Court for registration 175