Gavin Edward O'Luanaigh v Serina Binti Redzuawan (BA-23NCvC-10-02/2021)

In March 2020, the Plaintiff had filed a defamation suit against the Defendant in Shah Alam High Court No.: BA-23NCvC-16-03/2020 (“Suit 16”) before Y.A. Tuan Tee Geok Hock in SAHC NCvC 10.

For Suit 16, the Plaintiff has filed an injunction application against the Defendant whereby the Plaintiff sought to, inter alia, injunct the Defendant from making defamatory statements towards the Plaintiff. 08/04/2023 11:57:07 BA-23NCvC-10-02/2021 Kand. 90

On 7-7-2020, the Defendant subsequently gave an undertaking to SAHC NCvC 10 in the following terms:

to remove all the impugned statements complained of by the Plaintiff as pleaded in the Statement of Claim dated 12-3-2020 respectively from the Defendant’s Instagram account “@serina redzuawan” and the Defendant’s other social media accounts; and

not to repeat publication of or cause to be published words of similar effect or nature with the impugned statements pending the trial and disposal of the Enclosure 1 i.e. writ action. The relationship between the Plaintiff and Defendant [4] The Plaintiff is a British citizen and has lived and resided in Malaysia from 2001 until today. The Plaintiff has embraced Islam on 20-11-2006 under the Muslim name “Salahudin Ghaffar”. The Plaintiff owns a sports company with a regional business throughout Southeast Asia called “Football Focus Asia” with over 15 years’ experience in marketing football campaigns as well as building football academies. [5] The Defendant is an actress, TV host, entrepreneur and model. The Defendant is the daughter of a celebrity chef, Datuk Redzuawan Ismail or Chef Wan. [6] The Plaintiff was married to the Defendant on 20-2-2010 and they were blessed with 2 children. The marriage ended on 1-8-2017 by a judgment pronounced by the Syariah Court. Statement of Claim [7] Paragraphs 7 to 21 in the statement of claim pleaded and had detailed out the defamatory statements made by the Defendant. [8] The Plaintiff pleaded that the Defendant has breached the undertaking by refusing to remove some of the postings which she has made previously against the Plaintiff and has proceeded to upload defamatory postings via the Defendant’s public Facebook accounts by names “Serina Redzuawan” and “Serina Datuk Redzuawan” and also via the Defendant’s Instagram account “@serinaredzuawan”. Both the Facebook accounts and Instagram account are under the Defendant’s full care, control and supervision. [9] The particulars of the defamatory postings were reproduced in the table in paragraph 9 of the statement of claim. There were 6 postings. [10] The Plaintiff pleaded that – • all the 6 postings clearly refer to the Plaintiff whereby the Defendant has referred to the Plaintiff as “Gavin”, “Bekas suami saya”, “daddy dia”, “My X Husband”. • the Defendant’s massive number of followers on the Facebook accounts and Instagram account knew and understood the context and the background information that the Plaintiff and the Defendant were once married and had 2 children before they got divorced. • the natural and ordinary meanings as well as the innuendo meanings of the 6 postings contained the defamatory statements. The Plaintiff stated that the defamatory statements are allegations as follows:

that the Plaintiff was involved and guilty of close proximity “khalwat”.

(ii) that the Plaintiff had denied the Defendant’s access to the children.

(iii) that the Plaintiff does not observe and adhere to the Islamic way of life and that the Plaintiff does not provide/is unable to provide adequate Islamic teaching to the children.

(iv) that the Plaintiff’s negligence had caused the injury to the eyes of their daughter. [11] The Plaintiff pleaded that the Defendant is not entitled to the –

defence of justification. This is because the defamatory statements were not truthful in substance and made on completely false facts, were made and published dishonestly and maliciously, and did not concern with the interest of the public but the Defendant had posted the defamatory statements in the public domain through the Facebook accounts and Instagram account.

defence of fair comment. This is because the defamatory statements were not the Defendant’s expression of opinion about the Plaintiff, the statements were completely false and made based on false facts have been published by the Defendant as assertions of facts defamatory of the Plaintiff, the defamatory statements were still being posted by the Defendant and published in the Facebook accounts and Instagram account even though the statements did not concern with the interest of the public.

defence of qualified privileged. This is because the Defendant does not have any legal, social or moral duty and/or interest to communicate and publish the defamatory statements in the Facebook accounts and Instagram account, the defamatory statements as communicated and published by the Defendant in the Facebook accounts and Instagram account were not made in the interest of the Defendant’s followers, the statements were made in the Facebook accounts and Instagram account of the Defendant’s personal vendetta against the Plaintiff, the defamatory statements were the Defendant’s personal attacks on the Plaintiff as a public figure (resulting from the Plaintiff being the ex-husband of the Defendant who is an actress and being an ex-son in law to Chef Wan), the Defendant’s followers as well as the public do not have the corresponding legal, social or moral duty and/or interest to receive the defamatory statements from the Defendant. [12] The Plaintiff pleaded that the defamatory statements have been made and published by the Defendant recklessly and maliciously despite knowing that the statements are false and unsubstantiated. The Defendant’s undertaking [13] The Plaintiff has agreed to withdraw the injunction application in view of the undertaking given by the Defendant. [14] The Defendant had not removed and/or refused to remove the defamatory statements. The Plaintiff had stated that the particulars of malice are as follows:

the Defendant’s stubbornness and audacity in publishing the defamatory statements despite knowing that the statements are false, misleading and highly libellous of the Plaintiff and despite knowing that she does not have any proof to support her accusation against the Plaintiff.

the Defendant’s refusal to remove the defamatory statements as well as her continuous publication of the defamatory statements despite the undertaking that the Defendant herself has given to the Honourable Court to do so, which shows the Defendant’s determination and ill-will to defame the Plaintiff and to destroy the Plaintiff’s reputation.

the absence of any provocation and any retaliation by the Plaintiff regarding the publication made by the Defendant. This fact clearly shows the Defendant’s tenacity, tendency and propensity to repeatedly defame the Plaintiff.

the Defendant’s full knowledge regarding the defamatory statements which have not been removed on the Facebook accounts and the Instagram account which are still in the public domain for the open viewing and easy access by her followers on the Facebook accounts and the Instagram account.

the Defendant’s high-handed attitude in replying to the Plaintiff’s Letter of Demand dated 4-9-2020 where the Defendant stated that it would be to her inconvenience to locate, retrieve and remove the postings which were posted by her a long time ago despite the undertaking given to the Honourable Court in which the terms of the undertaking have been proposed by the Defendant herself.

as the defamatory statements made by the Defendant concerned with family affairs and/or issues being litigated in the Syariah Court, there is therefore no necessity for the Defendant to make and publish such statements in her social media accounts. Obviously, the making and the publication of these statements were intended to injure the Plaintiff’s reputation by seeking for cheap publicity and by making subjudice comments. [15] The Plaintiff pleaded that it is a contempt of court as the Defendant has breached the undertaking given to the Honourable Court by refusing to remove the defamatory statements and continuing to publish further defamatory statements. [16] Even after the Defendant had given the undertaking to the Honourable Court, the defamatory statements remained in the public domain to date. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s persona, reputation and standing in the public have been gravely and severely injured. The defamatory statements have also damaged the Plaintiff’s goodwill, credit and character and cause ridicule, scandal, public hatred and contempt towards the Plaintiff and further had caused the Plaintiff’s considerable distress and embarrassment. As a result, the Plaintiff has suffered damages. Prayers for relief [17] The Plaintiff claim against the Defendant for –

general damages for libel.

exemplary damages in the sum of RM1,000,000.00 or such sum as to be determined by this Court.

aggravated damages in the sum of RM1,000,000.00 or such sum as to be determined by this Court.

an order for injunction to restrain the Defendant, whether by herself or by her agents, servants or otherwise whosoever from publishing or causing to be published any libellous and false allegations and accusations defamatory of the Plaintiff or any part thereof or any words similarly defamatory of the Plaintiff.

an order that the Defendant removes and/or cause to be removed all posts defamatory of the Plaintiff, made and published by the Defendant including but not limited to the said defamatory statements and similar words, from any social media platform, including but not limited to the Facebook accounts and the Instagram account within 7 days from the date of judgment of this Court.

interest rate of 5% per annum from the date of the issuance of the letter of demand on 1-10-2020 by the Plaintiff to the Defendant via the Plaintiff’s solicitors Messrs Chris Lim Su Heng, to the date of full and final settlement of the judgment sum.

an order for the Defendant to publish and/or cause to be published an unqualified apology notice upon terms acceptable to the Plaintiff on the Defendant’s Facebook accounts and the Instagram account within 7 days from the date of judgment of this Court.

costs.

costs on solicitor-client basis to be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff.

Any orders and/or further reliefs that this Court deems fair and reasonable. The decision on 27-1-2023 [18] On 27-1-2023, this Court allowed the claim but dismissed the reliefs for general damages for libel, exemplary damages and aggravated damages. The decision is as follows: “KEPUTUSAN BICARA PENUH [1] Berdasarkan latar belakang tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan, Plaintif memplidkan bahawa Defendan telah melanggar suatu akujanji dalam tuntutan saman fitnah yang difailkan oleh Plaintif di MTSA No.: BA-23NCvC-16-03/2020 di hadapan Y.A. Tuan Tee Geok Hock (MTSA10), selepas ini disebut sebagai “Saman No. 16”. [2] Dalam tuntutan Plaintif di hadapan Mahkamah ini (NCvC12), Plaintif memplidkan bahawa Defendan telah melanggar akujanji dalam Saman No. 16 dan telah terus mengeluarkan/menerbitkan kenyataan fitnah lanjut melalui akaun media sosial Defendan iaitu akaun Facebook (FB) dan Instagram (IG) Defendan. [3] Akibat daripada pelanggaran akujanji tersebut, Plaintif menyatakan bahawa reputasinya sebagai pemilik syarikat sukan “Football Focus Asia” rosak dan Plaintif telah mengalami kerugian. [4] Perenggan 9 dalam Pernyataan Tuntutan menyenaraikan 6 penerbitan “perkataan yang dipersoalkan” di akaun FB dan IG yang mana Plaintif memplidkan ianya adalah kenyataan fitnah terhadap Plaintif, iaitu –

post pertamadi FB Defendan bertarikh 24-4-2018.

post kedua di FB Defendan bertarikh 25-3-2018.

post ketiga di FB Defendan bertarikh 24-4-2018.

post keempat di IG Defendan bertarikh 21-3-2018.

post kelima di FB Defendan bertarikh 21-3-2018.

post keenam di FB Defendan bertarikh 6-9-2020. [5] Plaintif dalam perenggan 9 Pernyataan Tuntutan, menggariskan perenggan bagi menyatakan penekanan untuk mencerahkan/menunjukkan kenyataan fitnah terhadap Plaintif. [6] Selanjutnya, pada perenggan 11 PernyataanTuntutan memplidkan maksud semula jadi dan biasa serta maksud tersirat bagi penerbitan 6 penerbitan “perkataan yang dipersoalkan” di akaun FB dan IG Defendan. [7] Plaintif memplidkan bahawa Defendan tidak mempunyai apa-apa pembelaan Justifikasi, tidak mempunyai pembelaan Komen Berpatutan dan tidak mempunyai pembelaan Perlindungan Bersyarat. [8] Plaintif menuntut bahawa Kenyataan Fitnah tersebut dibuat dan diterbitkan dengan Niat Jahat oleh Defendan terhadap Plaintif. [9] Oleh yang demikian, Plaintif menuntut terhadap Defendan yang berikut:

Ganti rugi am untuk libel.

Ganti rugi Teladan sebanyak RM1,000,000.00 atau apa-apa jumlah yang ditentukan oleh Mahkamah.

Ganti rugi Teruk sebanyak RM1,000,000.00 atau apa-apa jumlah yang ditentukan oleh Mahkamah.

suatu Perintah Injunksi untuk menahan Defendan, sama ada menerusi diri sendirinya atau menerusi ejennya, pekerjanya atau selainnya sesiapa sahaja dari menerbitkan atau menyebabkan diterbitkan dakwaan dan tuduhan fitnah dan tuduhan palsu dan tuduhan yang memfitnahkan terhadap Plaintif ataupun mana-mana bahagian atau perkataan yang sama maksud memfitnah terhadap Plaintif.

suatu Perintah bahawa Defendan memadam (menurunkan) dan/atau menyebabkan dipadam (diturunkan) semua posts yang memfitnah Plaintif, dibuat dan diterbitkan oleh Defendan yang termasuk dan tidak terhad kepada Kenyataan Fitnah tersebut dan perkataan yang serupa, dari apa-apa media sosial termasuk tetapi tidak terhad kepada akaun FB dan akaun IG dalam tempoh 7 hari dari tarikh penghakiman Mahkamah ini.

Faedah pada kadar 5% setahun dari tarikh Surat Tuntutan Plaintif kepada Defendan menerusi peguam cara Plaintif Tetuan Chris Lim Su Heng bertarikh 1 Oktober 2020 ini hingga tarikh penyelesaian penuh dan muktamad Jumlah Penghakiman.

Perintah bahawa Defendan menerbitkan dan/atau menyebabkan diterbitkan notis permintaan maaf yang tidak bersyarat dengan terma yang boleh diterima oleh Plaintif pada akaun IG dan akaun FB Defendan dalam masa 7 hari dari tarikh penghakiman Mahkamah ini.

Kos.

Kos atas dasar peguam cara-anak guam untuk dibayar oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif.

Apa-apa perintah dan/atau relief lanjut dan lain yang difikirkan adil dan munasabah oleh Mahkamah ini. Saman No. 16 dan pelanggaran akujanji: [10] Saman No. 16 ini difailkan pada 12-3-2020 dan kes ditetapkan di MTSA NCvC10 di hadapan YA Tuan Tee Geok Hock. Tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan yang juga pihak-pihak yang sama dalam tuntutan di hadapan Mahkamah ini iaitu BA-23NCvC- 10-02/2021. [11] Dalam Saman No. 16 itu, reliefs yang dituntut Plaintif ialah sebagaimana pada perenggan 25 di mana kausa tindakan ialah mengenai fitnah yang diterbitkan oleh Defendan dalam akaun FB dan akaun IG milik Defendan. [12] Dalam prosiding di hadapan Y.A. Tuan Tee Geok Hock pada 3-6-2022, Saman No. 16 ini diteruskan untuk Bicara Penuh di hadapan Y.A Tuan Tee bersama-sama dengan 3 kes lain iaitu BA- 23NCVC-11-03/2020; BA-23NCVC-12-03/2020; dan BA-23NCVC- 17-03/2020. [13] Berdasarkan semakan rekod Saman No. 16 dalam proses sambung bicara. [14] Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada Surat Tetuan Chris Lim Su Heng bertarikh 9-7-2020 berkenaan dengan “undertaking” oleh Defendan kepada Mahkamah NCvC10 (rujuk perenggan 2 Surat tersebut). Selanjutnya, peguam cara Plaintif pada perenggan 3 Surat tersebut mengakui bahawa Saman No. 16 ditarik balik tanpa kos. [15] Saman No. 16 ini diteruskan di hadapan Y.A. Tuan Tee dan kes di peringkat sambung bicara. [16] Mahkamah ini mendapati Plaintif memfailkan tuntutan di hadapan NCvC12 atas tuntutan perlanggaran “undertaking” oleh Defendan kepada Mahkamah NCvC10 dan 6 postings di akaun FB dan akaun IG Defendan diplidkan sebagai memfitnah Plaintif. [17] Perbicaraan penuh telah dijalankan dengan pihak-pihak memanggil 2 orang saksinya masing-masing. [18] Mahkamah ini mendapati perlanggaran akujanji (“undertaking) bagi 6 postings yang diplidkan sebagai Kenyataan Fitnah oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif adalah sedang dibicarakan oleh Y.A. Tuan Tee. [19] Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah ini memutuskan untuk membenarkan sebahagian sahaja relief yang dipohon oleh Plaintif dan adalah dihakimi bahawa –

Perintah Injunksi untuk menahan Defendan, sama ada menerusi diri sendirinya atau menerusi ejennya, pekerjanya atau selainnya sesiapa sahaja dari menerbitkan atau menyebabkan diterbitkan dakwaan dan tuduhan fitnah dan tuduhan palsu dan tuduhan yang memfitnahkan terhadap Plaintif ataupun mana-mana bahagian atau perkataan yang sama maksud memfitnah terhadap Plaintif. Perintah Injunksi ini berkuat kuasa serta-merta dari tarikh Penghakiman ini.

Perintah bahawa Defendan memadam (menurunkan) dan/atau menyebabkan dipadam (diturunkan) semua posts yang memfitnah Plaintif, dibuat dan diterbitkan oleh Defendan yang termasuk dan tidak terhad kepada Kenyataan Fitnah tersebut dan perkataan yang serupa, dari apa-apa media sosial termasuk tetapi tidak terhad kepada akaun FB dan akaun IG dalam tempoh 7 hari dari tarikh Penghakiman.

Perintah bahawa Defendan tidak menerbitkan dan/atau menyebabkan diterbitkan apa-apa komen, reviews, dan pernyataan pada akaun IG dan akaun FB Defendan mengenai Plaintif dan isteri Plaintif.

Kos sebanyak RM20,000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif. [19] The Plaintiff is unsatisfied and aggrieved by the decision for not allowing the reliefs for general damages for libel, exemplary damages and aggravated damages appeal to the Court of Appeal. [20] This judgment focuses on the general damages for libel, exemplary damages and aggravated damages. Essence of the contentions of the parties on damages The Plaintiff’s contentions: [21] The learned counsel for the Plaintiff submitted in 142 pages of their written submission and sum up that that the factual circumstances in the present case relevant in assessing the quantum of damages warrants the grant of general damages on higher scale, exemplary damages and aggravated damages. [22] The Plaintiff takes the view that the Plaintiff and his wife (Ms Kiran) had initiated 4 separate defamation suits against both the Defendant and Chef Wan (the Defendant’s father) as follows which are currently in the midst of trial before YA Tuan Tee Geok Hock:

Suit No. BA-23NCVC-11-03/2020 Kiran (Plaintiff) v. Chef Wan (Defendant) [Suit 11].

(ii) Suit No. BA-23NCVC-12-03/2020 Kiran (Plaintiff) v. Serina (Defendant) [Suit 12].

(iii) Suit No. BA-23NCVC-16-03/2020 Gavin (Plaintiff) v Serina (Defendant) [Suit 16].

(iv) Suit No. BA-23NCVC-17-03/2020 Gavin (Plaintiff) v Chef Wan (Suit 17). [23] The Undertaking by Defendant specifically for Suit 16 between the Plaintiff and Defendant, is an application for an ex parte interim injunction was filed by the Plaintiff on 5-6-2020 to injunct the Defendant from publishing any further words similarly defamatory of the Plaintiff (refer to as “Injunction Application for Suit 16”). (see Bundle B at pages 1-17). [24] During the hearing for the Injunction Application for Suit 16 on 7.7.2020, the Defendant’s then solicitor, Datuk M Reza had informed YA Tuan Tee Geok Hock that the Defendant wishes to give an undertaking to delete all existing words in the impugned statements in Instagram or social media and also not to repeat them pending the decision of the suits. (see Bundle B at pages 48-50). [25] Therefore, the Injunction Application for Suit 16 was withdrawn by the Plaintiff as there is no longer a necessity to apply for Court orders in view of the undertakings given by the Defendant. [26] The Plaintiff filed this Suit before this Court i.e. the present Suit, for the breach of the undertaking given by the Defendant to remove all existing words in the impugned statements in Suit 16 on the Defendant’s Facebook accounts and the Instagram account and not to repeat them pending the decision of Suit 16. The Plaintiff pleaded that the Defendant had failed to remove all postings on her social media containing similar subject matter. Moreover, the Defendant published further words which were alleged to be defamatory. [27] The learned counsel for the Plaintiff admitted that the postings in the Defendant’s media social accounts containing similar subject matter to the 4 Suits above which the Defendant had failed to remove and published subsequently are the subject matter of the present case. [28] The learned counsel for the Plaintiff did submit the “Principles on Damages” and I would reproduce them as follows: “310. General damages in a defamation claim serves three purposes –

310.1. Consolation for the personal distress and hurt caused to the Plaintiff’s by the publication.

310.2. Reparation for the harm done to the appellant’s personal and (if relevant) business reputation.

310.3. Vindication of the Plaintiff’s reputation. See: MGG Pillai v Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun [1995] 2 MLJ 493 at 526.

In terms of the purpose of vindication, the sum awarded must be at least the minimum necessary to signal to the public the vindication of the Plaintiff’s reputation.

To put things into context, in Liew Yew Tiam & Ors v Cheah Cheng Hoc & Ors [2001] 2 CLJ 385 at 395, the Court of Appeal held that injury to reputation is as, if not more, important to a member of our society than the loss of a limb.

In assessing the quantum of damages against the three purposes as submitted above, several considerations must be looked at. The Federal Court in Datuk Harris Mohd Salleh v Datuk Yong Teck Lee (sued in his personal capacity and as an officer of the second respondent) & Anor [2017] 6 MLJ 133 at 186-187 and 190, paragraphs 76 and 82 held that the following considerations are relevant to be considered assessing compensatory damages−

313.1. The gravity or seriousness of the allegation;

313.2. The size and influence or extent of the circulation;

313.3. The effect of the publication;

313.4. The extent and nature of the claimant’s reputation;

313.5. The behaviour or conduct of the defendant including absence of remorse; and 313.6. The behaviour of the claimant. (see Big Man Management Sdn Bhd v TNB [2020] 11 MLJ 472 at 508, paragraph 142; Mox-Linde Gases Sdn Bhd v Wong Siew Yap [2015] 10 MLJ 413 at 526, paragraph 35; and Chin Choon @ Chin Tee Fut v Chua Jui Meng [2005] 3 MLJ 494 at 498, paragraph 5)

In considering the above factors in assessing damages for a defamation suit, the actual standing and reputation of the plaintiff in the community prior to the libel is one relevant factor. The higher the reputation the plaintiff has, the greater the damages. Similarly, the more the libel gets away from the truth, the greater is the effect on the award of damages.

Considering the above factors, we submit that−

315.1. the accusations made by the Defendant against the Plaintiff are serious libels constituting an attack on the Plaintiff’s dignity and moral character especially emphasizing on his religious faith.

315.2. The size and influence of the circulation of the publication is wide in view of the Defendant’s status as a celebrity with a huge number of followers on her social media where the Impugned Statements are published on.

315.3. The effect of the publication has caused the Plaintiff huge embarrassment such that his friends and acquaintances have questioned him about the allegations and the publics who condemned the Plaintiff with harsh words by commenting under the Impugned Statements.

315.4. The behaviour of the Defendant is disrespectful and shows no remorse. This can be seen that actions were already initiated against the Defendant by the Plaintiff based on earlier publications and undertakings were given by the Defendant. There has been no apology by the Defendant after the publication as well.

Another relevant factor in assessing damages in a defamatory action is the fact that the defence of justification has been raised. It is a maxim in the law of libel that ‘damages multiply when justification fails’. (see: MGG Pillai v Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun [1995] 2 MLJ 493 at 525; Dato Seri Mohammad Nizar bin Jamaluddin v Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Bhd [2014] 4 MLJ 242 at 580, paragraph 18).

We further submit that aggravated damages and exemplary ought to be awarded in the present case.

Aggravated damages is merited in the event the Defendant has no genuine belief in the truth and deliberately avoids to ascertain the truth or was guilty of wilful blindness that although there were strong grounds of suspicion that what was being published was false, the defendant deliberately avoids making further inquiries in order to forestall the suspicion turning into certainty. In assessing this, the conduct of the Defendant, and her state of mind should be considered. We submit that this is a clear case as the Defendant had showed an express malice in publishing the Impugned Statements. (see: Lim Guan Eng v Ruslan bin Kassim and another appeal [2021] 2 MLJ 514 at 574, paragraph 188)

Another factor which warrants the grant of aggravated damages is that the Defendant is a celebrity who is active in the social media. Being a celebrity in social media, the Defendant is in the position to disseminate information widely through the interne t. Therefore, aggravated damages ought to be granted in order to send a strong message to the Defendant to exercise a proper degree of care and diligence not to injure others. (see: Mox-Linde Gases Sdn Bhd v Wong Siew Yap [2015] 10 MLJ 413 at 434, paragraph 36)

We further submit that exemplary damages ought to be awarded in the present case. The Defendant’s gain and profit as a celebrity is proportionate to her exposure and extent of discussion by the public. On this, we submit that the gain of the Defendant would be better off financially by making accusations and publications on her family matter involving the Plaintiff. (see: Lim Guan Eng v Ruslan bin Kassim and another appeal [2021] 2 MLJ 514 at 575, paragraph 189)

However, the form of advantage gained by the Defendant need not be in monetary terms. It is sufficient as long as the publication would produce an immediate non-pecuniary advantage that may translate itself into a monetary reward sometimes later. On this, the Defendant’s gain of exposure in the public had in fact been improved due to the circulation relating to her accusations victimising herself. This advantage is crucial to a celebrity and can be translated into monetary reward in terms of securing more embassadorship. This can be seen in the Sixth Posting in which the Defendant had mentioned her family matters relating to the Plaintiff and the children when the interview was on her experience in terms of religion (see Chin Soon @ Chin Tee Fut v. Chua Jui Meng [2005] 3 MLJ 494 at page 500 para 12). The Defendant’s contentions: [29] Pertaining to the undertaking given by the Defendant, the learned counsel for the Defendant submitted that – “3.5 Adalah tidak munasabah untuk Plaintif berhujah berkenaan dengan permohonan ex parte interim injunction apabila tiada Perintah diberikan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi. Tuntutan Plaintif di perenggan 7 adalah satu tuntutan yang tidak munasabah apabila saksi-saksi Plaintif (SP-1 dan SP-2) dengan jelas menunjukkan niat jahat apabila telah mengatakan bahawa kewujudan fitnah mahkamah akan terjadi selepas habis perbicaraan.

3.6 Daripada rumusan soal balas di antara peguam cara Defendan dengan SP-2 dengan jelas menunjukkan bahawa SP-2 enggan bekerjasama dalam menunjukkan kewujudan Perintah ex parte interim injunction malah menunjukkan niat jahat terhadap Defendan.

3.7 Adalah Hujahan Defendan bahawa ia adalah satu hujahan yang tidak munasabah memandangkan Plaintif telah gagal untuk menunjukkan kewujudan Perintah Mahkamah serta ia fakta yang jelas bahawa Plaintif telah menarik balik permohonan tersebut. Makai a adalah hujahan yang tidak berasas serta tidak dapat dibenarkan.”. [30] On the reliefs for damages that amount to RM2,000,000.00, the learned counsel for the Defendant submitted as follows: “3.42 Defendan turut berhujah bahawa Plaintif telah dengan sengaja serta berniat jahat telah menuntut jumlah sebanyak RM2,000,000.00 terhadap Defendan tanpa sebarang bukti bahawa Plaintif telah mengalami sebarang kerugian. Ia dengan jelas bahawa tuntutan Plaintif merupakan satu tuntutan untuk Plaintif mendapatkan kekayaan.”. The learned counsel for the Defendant learned counsel for the Defendant cited the Federal Court decision in Lim Guan Eng v. Ruslan bin Kassim [2021] 2 MLJ 514. Evaluation & Findings of this Court The proceeding before Y.A. Tuan Tee Geok Hock: [31] This Court had read the transcript pertaining to 2 the Suits before Y.A Tuan Tee dated 7-7-2020 @ 2.30 p.m. (Bundle B at pages 48 to50) that are the applications for 2 injunctions. In the proceeding, the Plaintiff was represented by Puan Nurkhidmah together with Encik Colin Liew and the Defendant was represented by her previous solicitor that is Datuk Mohammad Reza and Cik Farhan. [32] In the proceeding it is clear that the undertaking was given by the Defendant not to publish those words complained of by the Plaintiff. Y.A Tuan Tee had asked as follows: “Y.A Tuan Tee: So, Defendant is giving undertaking not to publish those words complained of. Datuk Reza: Correct, pending the resolution of this trial. Y.A Tuan Tee: Pending the final decision in other words. Pending the trial, and final decisions in these 2 Suits. You apply to both Suits isn’t it? So, with that, there is no need for the Court to make an order for an injunction. Datuk Reza: Yes, correct. … Mr Colin: YA, just to sum it up, so basically the undertaking is given by the Defendant in respect of removing the words to the like effect from the social media, and the undertaking not to publish words to the similar effect. just to clarify on that. Y.A Tuan Tee: Yes. Existing words in the Instagram or social media to be deleted, not to repeat it pending the final decision of the Court in the 2 Suits. Y.A Tuan Tee: So, with that, what do you want to do with the applications? Mr Colin: Yes, my Lord. I am grateful that the undertaking has been taken. Y.A Tuan Tee: You want to withdraw those? There is no need for the Court to make those decision on those application for interim injunction. Mr Colin: I agree. And on that basis, we will withdraw that application with no order as to costs.”. [33] Next, this Court had read the learned counsel for the Plaintiff’s letter dated 9-7-2020 (that is about 2 days after the proceeding before Y.A Tuan tee) to the previous learned counsel for the Defendant and had copied the same to the Secretary to Y.A Tuan Tee. Paragraphs 2 and 3 are as follows: “2. We write to confirm that during the hearing and the case management, your Datuk M Reza informed Yang Arif that your client, Serina binti Redzuawan (the Defendant) gave an undertaking to the Honorable Court in the following terms (which minuted/recorded by Yang Arif) – “The Defendant gives an undertaking (regarding the reliefs sought for by the Plaintiff under Enclosure 7 of 12-03 Suit and Enclosure 11 for Suit 16-03), to this Honorable Court to remove the words complained of by the Plaintiff as pleaded in the Statement of Claim for Suit 12-03 and Suit 16-03 and words of similar effect or nature from the Defendant’s Instagram account “@serinaredzuawan” and on other forms of social media within seven (7) days from 7th July 2020 and not to repeat publication of or cause to be published the same words or words of similar effect or nature with the words complained of until the disposal of the Enclosure 1 i.e. writ action for both Suit 12-03 and Suit 16-03 (i.e. the trial of the Suits).

With the undertaking in effect, our clients here withdrawn the said Enclosure 7 and Enclosure 11 with no order as to costs and Yang Arif had struck out both Enclosure 7 and Enclosure 11 with no order as to costs. Regarding this, please be informed that we are currently preparing the draft orders for both Enclosures for your approval.”. [34] To date there is no draft orders prepared and/or orders filed by the learned counsel for the Plaintiff. [35] The next action taken by the Plaintiff is filing the present Suit before this Court for the breach of the undertaking that was given on 7-7-2020 and the full trial both parties proceed by trying their best ability to proof all the defamatory statements without alerting this Court that the 2 Suits specifically Suit 16 (between the Plaintiff and the Defendant) pending the final decision of Y.A Tuan Tee in the Suit 16. [36] My decision on this case is only allow the Plaintiff’s prayers for reliefs for –

Perintah Injunksi untuk menahan Defendan, sama ada menerusi diri sendirinya atau menerusi ejennya, pekerjanya atau selainnya sesiapa sahaja dari menerbitkan atau menyebabkan diterbitkan dakwaan dan tuduhan fitnah dan tuduhan palsu dan tuduhan yang memfitnahkan terhadap Plaintif ataupun mana-mana bahagian atau perkataan yang sama maksud memfitnah terhadap Plaintif. Perintah Injunksi ini berkuat kuasa serta-merta dari tarikh Penghakiman ini.

Perintah bahawa Defendan memadam (menurunkan) dan/atau menyebabkan dipadam (diturunkan) semua posts yang memfitnah Plaintif, dibuat dan diterbitkan oleh Defendan yang termasuk dan tidak terhad kepada Kenyataan Fitnah tersebut dan perkataan yang serupa, dari apa-apa media sosial termasuk tetapi tidak terhad kepada akaun FB dan akaun IG dalam tempoh 7 hari dari tarikh Penghakiman.

Perintah bahawa Defendan tidak menerbitkan dan/atau menyebabkan diterbitkan apa-apa komen, reviews, dan pernyataan pada akaun IG dan akaun FB Defendan mengenai Plaintif dan isteri Plaintif.

Kos sebanyak RM20,000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif. [37] The Plaintiff is not entitled for the general damages, exemplary damages and aggravated damages as stated in the statement of claim just for breach on undertaking given by the Defendant. No Court Order was filed in order to enforce the undertaking just remained in the transcript of proceeding as recorded in Y.A Tuan Tee’s Court and in the letter by the learned counsel for the Plaintiff dated 9-7-2023. [38] As for the 3 types of damages sought by the Plaintiff i.e general damages, exemplary damages and aggravated damages, the authority of cases on damages for libel can be read in the decisions by the apex Court till the High Court, namely – • Federal Court in Tenaga Nasional Bhd v. Evergrowth Aquaculture Sdn Bhd & Other Appeals [2021] 9 CLJ 179. • Federal Court in Ling Wah Press (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Tan Sri Dato’ Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & Other Appeals [2000] 3 CLJ 728. • Court of Appeal in Yang Dipertua Majlis Daerah Gua Musang v. Pedik Busu & Ors [2014] 3 CLJ 847. • Court of Appeal in Mahadevi Nadchatiram v. Thiruchelvasegaram Manickavasegar [2001] 3 CLJ 65. • Court of Appeal in M.G.G. Pillai v. Tan Sri Dato’ Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & 2 Other Appeals [1995] 2 CLJ 912. • High Court in Malaya at Ipoh in Al Maarif Travel & Tours Sdn Bhd v. Nur Farhana Yeop Hussin & Anor. [2022] 1 LNS 69. [39] In the case of Lim Guan Eng v. Ruslan Kassim & Anor Appeal [2021] 4 CLJ 155 it was held – “Now, aggravated damages are classified as a species of compensatory damages, which are awarded as additional compensation where there has been intangible injury to the interest of personality of the plaintiff, and where this injury has been caused or exacerbated by the exception conduct of the defendant.”. And also, in Lim Guan Eng v. Ruslan Kassim [2021] 4 CLJ 155 it was held – “[122] Now, the award of damages is meant to be compensatory and not a scheme for untold wealth. In a case where there is damage to reputation, the compensation must include such sum as would vindicate his or her good name and take into account the distress, hurt and humiliation which the defamatory publication has caused. The primary aim of a remedy in defamation came up for discussion in Anwar Ibrahim v. NST, supra, with the following outcome: [82] However, compensation in defamation is not quite the same as in other torts. Compensation for a successful plaintiff in most areas of the law involves the intention to place such plaintiff, as far as money is capable of doing so, in the position the plaintiff would have been but for the defendant's wrongdoing. The tort of defamation, however, exposes the defendant to a monetary remedy that includes both vindication of the plaintiff to the public and as consolation to him for a wrong done (see Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118 at p 150). Compensation in this sense might also include an element of social disapproval of the defendant's conduct not unlike punishment in criminal cases. This is probably why although the law presumes harm to reputation, there will invariably be lengthy accounts in defamation trials of the plaintiff’s hurt, outrage, distress, dignity and the like rather than proof of any actual damage to reputation. Lord Diplock in Cassell & Co Ltd v. Broome & Anor [1972] AC 1027 at p 1125 lent credence to this idea in a seminal passage where he said: ‘The harm caused to the plaintiff by the publication of a libel upon him often lies in his own feelings, what he thinks other people are thinking of him, then in any actual change made manifest in their attitude towards him.’ [83] To muddy the waters further, although there can be no action in defamation for a publication merely because it injures a person’s feelings, damages can be awarded for the plaintiff’s injured feelings including the hurt, anxiety, loss of self-esteem, the sense of indignity and the outrage felt by the plaintiff once it is established that such person’s reputation has been harmed. Of course, such damages are awarded because these are consequences that flow naturally from the publication of the defamatory matter (see Carson v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 44 at p 71). [84] The question that arises is therefore this. Should the primary aim of a remedy in defamation be in satisfying the plaintiff’s hurt feelings etc or should it be in vindicating his or her standing in the community? In my respectful view, if we concern ourselves primarily with putting the plaintiff in the position he or she was before the defendant’s wrongdoing, vindication of his or her standing in the community should be the focus of the remedy rather than any award of large sums of money for the plaintiff s hurt feelings. Plaintiff may however also feel that only substantial damages may vindicate or restore their reputation and good name. But I think that vindication of reputation can also be achieved through non-monetary means. For example, the best vindication would be an almost immediate and prominent apology, correction or retraction by the defendant after publication of defamatory material. In that situation, there would be minimal damages. It should also follow that a court-ordered correction on a defendant after a trial would serve just as well if not better in the vindication or restoration of a damaged reputation than large money damages.”. [40] As a further example, the Court of Appeal in Sambaga Valli K R Ponnusamy v. Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Ors And Another Appeal [2017] 1 LNS 500; [2018] 1 MLJ 784 through the judgment of Mohd Zawawi Salleh JCA noted as follows: “[32] Now, aggravated damages are classified as a species of compensatory damages, which are awarded as additional compensation where there has been intangible injury to the interest of personality of the plaintiff, and where this injury has been caused or exacerbated by the exceptional conduct of the defendant.”. [41] For breach of so called “the undertaking given by the Defendant” in the Suit 16 before Y.A. Tuan Tee that was yet to be disposed via a full trial but was said to be breached by the Defendant, this Court had decided that the words as stipulated in the undertaking as per the transcript of proceeding before Y.A Tuan Tee and the learned counsel for the Plaintiff must be made clearly vide the decision of the present Suit before me. [42] The full trial regarding the defamatory statements that were alleged by the Plaintiff against the Defendant is still on going and the prayers for reliefs i.e. the general damages, exemplary damages and aggravated damages for whatever sum sought by the Plaintiff will be determined in Suit 16 before Y.A Tuan Tee. Conclusion [43] For the foregoing reasons, it is my judgment that having evaluated the evidence adduced at trial, I allowed the Plaintiff’s claims with costs and had decided that Ganti rugi Am, Teladan dan Teruk untuk libel tidak dibenarkan. Dated: 8 April 2023. RoziBainon ( ROZI BINTI BAINON ) Judicial Commissioner High Court NCvC12 Shah Alam Counsels: For the Plaintiff: Nurkhidmah Huzaisham with Tan Soo Yew and Munisha Diong Ramachandran (PIC) Tetuan Chris Lim Su Heng, Petaling Jaya, Selangor For the Defendant: Ahmad Naqib bin Azhar with Fatimah Az-Zahra binti Mohamed Ibrahim Tetuan Asiah & Hisam, Bandar Baru Bangi, Selangor