Giib Holdings Berhad (Dahulunya Dikenali Sebagai Goodway Integrated Industries Berhad) v Wong Weng Yew (WA-22NCC-254-06/2022)

P 4th application to amend its pleadings since the present suit was filed in June 2022. This amendment application via Enclosure 404 was filed by P in September 2025 amendment application , despite knowing that the trial was scheduled to begin in December 2025.

The affidavit in support of Enclosure 404 was only filed and served in October 2025. Notably and despite the trial slated to begin in about two months at that point in time, P had not filed the necessary documents for trial. This included the agreed facts and issues to be tried.

On 28.11.2025, I dismissed the amendment application. It is my finding that th time is not made bona fide. The amendment application would derail the trial that is scheduled to start in December 2025. Here are the grounds of my decision. Background facts

The present suit was filed by P on 3.6.2022. Since then, P has amended its statement of claim thrice on 22.12.2022, 25.10.2023 and 13.5.2024 respectively. The present amendment th go at fixing its pleadings.

A chronology of the key events is set out below. Date Event 3.6.2022 P filed the writ and statement of claim.

22.12.2022 st round of amending the statement of claim.

25.10.2023 nd round of amending the statement of claim pursuant to the order of court dated 25.10.2023, which allowed application.

3.4.2024 The court fixed the trial to commence on 8.4.2025.

13.5.2024 rd round of amending the statement of claim pursuant to the order of court dated 3.4.2024, which allowed application.

22.10.2024 The 2nd ) filed his notice of application alongside his affidavit in support to amend his countercl counterclaim amendment application

28.10.2024 st D1 Their solicitors filed an application to solicitors on this date. amendment application to be held in abeyance.

5.11.2024 The court allowed the withdrawal application.

11.12.2024 their notice of appointment.

18.12.2024 Following the appointment of the Tai f present solicitors, the court gave directions for counterclaim amendment application.

31.12.2024 Around two months after counterclaim amendment application their affidavit in reply.

20.1.2025 There was no news from P regarding the exchange of the trial documents. Hence, the 1st to 5th Defendants initiated the exchange of trial documents. The 1st to 5th Defendants proposed 26 bundles in their first batch of documents 1st exchange . WhatsApp group chat, which P is largely relying on in the present amendment application.

23.1.2025 The court allowed s counterclaim amendment application. his counterclaim approval.

27.1.2025 for the counterclaim amendment application.

28.1.2025 D2 filed the draft order for the counterclaim amendment application.

3.2.2025 D2 filed the fair order for the counterclaim amendment application.

15.2.2025 D2 filed his amended counterclaim.

19.2.2025 The 1st to 5th Defendants further exchanged two documents. At this point, there was no response from P since 20.1.2025. Hence, the 1st to 5th Defendants informed that should P fail to revert by

24.2.2025, all documents proposed by the 1st to 5th Defendants will be categorised as Part B.

21.2.2025 - amended defence.

24.2.2025 P reverted on the categorisation of the 1st to 5th proposed documents shared on 20.1.2025 and 19.2.2025.

25.2.2025 P reverted on the categorisation of the 1st to 5th proposed documents shared on 15.2.2025.

25.2.2025 The 1st to 5th Defendants filed their bundle of documents.

6.3.2025 P requested the 1st to 5th Defendants for further documents. Namely, omitted media in the WhatsApp messages adduced in the 1st exchange and other messages.

7.3.2025 To speedily resolve this request for further documents, the 1st to 5th Defendants were agreeable to directly producing their phones for an inspection of their WhatsApp conversations.

10.3.2025 P filed an application for discovery against the Defendants discovery application , notwithstanding the trial being less than a month away on 8.4.2025.

14.3.2025 discovery order st to 5th Defendants commenced preparation and compilation of documents to comply with the discovery order.

14.3.2025 D2 filed his reply to the his counterclaim.

21.3.2025 The 1st to 5th Defendants filed their list of witnesses, which includes Tee Jun Shern and Yong Wei Sang, whom P is seeking to add as parties to this suit.

5.4.2025 Three days before trial was to commence, P filed two unaffirmed expert affidavits :

Expert affidavit of Ferrier Hodgson (13 volumes); and

Expert affidavit of PKF Malaysia (one volume with 482 pages).

7.4.2025 In compliance with the discovery order, D1 and D2 filed and served their respective affidavits to P.

7.4.2025 P filed the two affirmed expert affidavits :

Expert affidavit of Ferrier Hodgson (13 volumes); and

Expert affidavit of PKF Malaysia (one volume with 482 pages).

8.4.2025 In compliance with the discovery order, the 3rd and 4th Defendants filed and served their respective affidavits to P.

8.4.2025 The trial was scheduled to commence. The court vacated the April trial dates and rescheduled new trial dates, with the earliest date being on 11.12.2025.

29.4.2025 Whilst complying with the discovery order, D1 met with technical issues. D1 eventually filed and served his 2nd affidavit to P. D1 also provided P with his redacted bank statements. The court directed P to specify which transaction details they required, but P never responded.

6.5.2025 Whilst complying with the discovery order, D2 met with technical issues. D2 eventually filed and served his 2nd affidavit to P.

13.6.2025 In compliance with the discovery order, D1 and D2 filed and served their respective 3rd affidavits to P.

25.6.2025 The discovery order was already complied with by the 1st to 5th Defendants, but there was no indication from P that it intends to amend the pleadings. The 1st to 5th Defendants wrote to P to enquire the same and requested for P to respond by 30.6.2025.

26.6.2025 P did not inform which bank transactions details it required after D1 shared his redacted bank statements on 29.4.2025. Hence, D1 proceeded to file the redacted bank statements as provided earlier in his 4th affidavit.

30.6.2025 P informed that it intends to amend the pleadings.

18.8.2025 P shared with the 1st to 5th Defendants its proposed re - amended writ and 2nd further re - proposed amendments . P requested for a reply by 25.8.2025 25.8.2025 The 1st to 5th Defendants requested for an extension of time till 2.9.2025 to peruse the same.

28.8.2025 The 1st to 5th Defendants replied P, informing that they were not agreeable to the proposed amendments.

18.9.2025 P filed and served the notice of application (without the affidavit in support) for the present amendment application.

2.10.2025 P filed and served its affidavit in support.

11.12.2025 Upcoming trial date which was scheduled on 8.4.2025.

As can be seen from the above, a rd application to re - amend its statement of claim on 3.4.2024, the court scheduled trial to commence on 8.4.2025. P did not reach out on trial preparation. Thus, on 20.1.2025, the 1st to 5th Defendants took matters into their own hands and kickstarted the exchange of documents (1st exchange). Notably, this , which P is largely premising their proposed amendments on.

There were two further exchanges of documents on 15.2.2025 and 19.2.2025. Comparatively, the 1st to 5th Defendants provided around 80 % of their total documents during the 1st exchange. However, the 1st to 5th Defendant the trial being less than 1 ½ months away, the 1st to 5th Defendant in their letter dated 19.2.2025. To wit, should P fail to revert on categorisation by 24.2.2025, all documents will be filed as Part B. This impelled P to categorise the 1st to 5th Defendant prescribed deadline.

On 10.3.2025, P filed a discovery application even though trial was less than a month away. On 14.3.2025, the court allowed the discovery application in part. To accommodate compliance with the discovery order, the April 2025 trial dates were vacated. The court scheduled new trial dates to commence on 11.12.2025.

Since 10.3.2025, the 1st to 5th Defendants strived to comply with the discovery order and had provided their non - privileged as well as recovered documents by 13.6.2025. After the process of complying with the discovery order, there was no indication to suggest that P would amend its pleadings. To avoid being caught by any surprise application, on 25.6.2025, the 1st to 5th Defendants reached out to P asking the same. Only then P replied on 30.6.2025 that it now intends to amend its pleadings again.

This did not materialise until 18.8.2025, which is when P furnished its proposed re - amended writ and 2nd further re - amended statement of claim. Following the 1st to 5th Defendants proposed amendments on 28.8.2025, P filed the present amendment application on 18.9.2025 to be granted leave to amend its pleadings for the 4th time. The supporting affidavit was filed two weeks later on 2.10.2025. The law governing amendments

The court s power to allow amendments to a party s pleadings is found in Order 20 rule 5 of the Rules of Court 2012. The tripartite test for granting amendments is laid down in the Federal Court case of Yamaha Motor Co Ltd v Yamaha Malaysia Sdn Bhd & Ors [1983] 1 MLJ 213 at 214 - 215, which held : The general principle is that the court will allow such amendments as will cause no injustice to the other parties. Three basic questions should be considered to determine whether injustice would or would not result, (a) whether the application was bona fide; (b) whether the prejudice caused to the other side can be compensated by costs and (c) whether the amendments would not in effect turn the suit from one character into a suit of another and inconsistent character.

Since the new Rules of Court 2012 regime, case law has emphasised for expeditious disposal of cases and frown upon hindrances that steer a case away from progressing to trial. Hence, further to the tripartite Yamaha Motor delay in amending its pleadings.

The Federal Court in Hong Leong Finance Bhd v Low Thiam Hoe and another appeal [2016] 1 MLJ 301 at 315 held : Having considered the facts and the circumstances of the present case, our views are as follows :

when dealing with an application to amend the pleadings, which introduce a new case in the claim or defence, on the eve of the trial, the principles in Yamaha Motor are not the sole considerations;

the principles in Yamaha Motor applies to cases where the application to amend the pleadings is made at an early stage of the proceedings;

affidavit as to why the application was filed late;

that the application to amend the pleadings is not a tactical manoeuvre;

that the proposed amendment must disclose full particulars for the court to ascertain if there is a real prospect of success in proving the same; and

that lateness in the application to amend the pleadings cannot necessarily

The later the application is made, the greater the justification needed to convince the court that it should allow the amendment application. (See the English Court of Appeal case of Savings and Investment Bank Ltd v Fincken [2004] 1 All ER 1125, which was applied by the Federal Court in Hong Leong Finance (supra)).

Inevitably, the later the application is made, the greater the prejudice to the opponent. On this aspect, the Federal Court in Hong Leong Finance (supra) recognised the practical aftermath caused by delay renders monetary awards inadequate in comparison to the prejudice inflicted to the defendant. The Federal Court cited the following statement - the proper rule or guideline calls for a sliding scale : the later the amendment, the more it may require to commend it delay

In Taisho Co Sdn Bhd v Pan Global Equities Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ 359 at 364, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the applicant therein failed to provide any explanation as to why their amendment application was delayed. This failure was recognised by the Court of Appeal as demonstrating lack of bona fides. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that it would not be just to grant leave to amend.

In Khor Cheng Wah v Sungai Way Leasing Sdn Bhd [1996] 1 MLJ 223, the Court of Appeal highlighted that it is imperative any litigant seeking judicial intervention does so timeously. A dawdling litigant bears the burden to render a satisfactory explanation for their procrastination. In a matter which involves the exercise of discretion, a court may refuse relief to an indolent litigant.

On this note, I will amendments to its pleadings and also throughout the course of proceedings. P in P is expected to be proactive in moving its case forward.

The chronology of events outlined earlier, however, shows the contrary. P does not seem to be interested in getting the suit ready for trial. Rather, it has been the 1st to 5th Defendants pushing the case forward by initiating the exchange of documents.

P attempts to blame the 1st to 5th Defendants for its own delay on grounds that it needed more time to peruse the 1st to 5th Defendant voluminous documents. That is unreasonable. The 1st to 5th Defendants are entitled to take the necessary steps to defend themselves by adducing all the documents that they intend to rely on at the trial. P has only itself to blame for its failure to initiate the document exchange at an earlier time i.e. before the 1st exchange.

P has admitted in its affidavit in reply that it had a hunch that there was further conspiracy (as per its proposed amendments) when it categorised the 1st to 5th Defendants 24.2.2025 and 25.2.2025. Hence, P is taken to have admitted that they were wary of and could have formulated their amendments since February 2025.

P is attempting to cover its awareness which arose in February 2025, by stating that its realisation arose only after its review of the documents post - compliance with the discovery order. This cannot be the case unless st to 5th Defendant 24.2.2025 and prepared their discovery application on 10.3.2025 without perusing the same.

In this regard, it is pertinent that the proposed amendments rely on that was provided during the 1st exchange. In other words, the key material which P hinges the present amendment application on was already in its hands since 20.1.2025 and perused by 24.2.2025. Thus, it is incumbent on P to justify its belated amendment application and why its proposed amendments should be allowed at this juncture.

This belated amendment application was only made on 18.9.2025. Even then, the present amendment application was filed without a supporting affidavit. The earliest that the Defendants grounds to support this amendment application was on 2.10.2025. At that juncture, the trial was a short 2 ½ months away.

It seems to me that the present amendment application is tactical and intentionally made at the last minute to frustrate the trial from proceeding as scheduled. Recall that P filed the discovery application less than a month before the original April 2025 trial dates. Which resulted in the April 2025 trial dates having to be postponed. I will not have the same thing happen to the December 2025 trial dates. The present amendment application was not made bona fide

Apart from the tardiness of this amendment application being a tactical manoeuvre, the proposed amendments are not only prolix but also introduce new points. Amendments must improve the clarity of the

This point was stressed in the case of Swain - Mason & others v Mills & Reeve LLP [2011] EWCA Civ 14, where the English Court of Appeal said : [82] I also consider that the judge was too relaxed as to what the claimants ought to have shown. They ought to have put forward a significantly clearer, fuller and more precise pleading, one which immediately satisfied all the obligations on a party as to proper pleading, without any need to be supplemented or clarified by evidence or by further information. They ought also to have supported their case for justifying the amendment with evidence as to why the application was made at this extraordinarily late stage

I will cite a few examples from the proposed amendments to illustrate the point.

First, paragraphs 12 (h) - (j) and 100 K - 100 O of the proposed amendments (reproduced below). Upon reading the same, there is no clear and immediate point that catches the eye. T existing case. They create more confusion than clarity.

As employee and / or director of the Plaintiffs and / or its subsidiary, WONG, YEE, Nicole, and Michelle, TEE and YONG owed a duty of care and skill to GHB and its group of companies and was under express and implied contractual duties and a duty of fidelity including, inter - alia, the following duties :

To discharge their duties honestly, diligently, and loyally in their capacity as employees and / or directors of the Plaintiff, by refraining from promoting or pursuing their own personal interests or gain in circumstances where such interests conflicted, or were reasonably likely to conflict, with the interests of the Plaintiff and / or its group of companies, whom they were legally and equitably bound to serve, protect, and prioritise at all times;

To refrain from engaging in any conduct or omission that would, directly or indirectly, prejudice, compromise, or undermine the interests, business, assets, opportunities, or goodwill of the Plaintiff and / or its group of companies, including but not limited to acting for the benefit of, or advancing the interests of, third parties, competitors, or related entities, whether for personal gain, due to bias, or for any collateral or improper purpose, and whether or not such conduct was intended to or had the effect of causing loss, harm, or disadvantage to the Plaintiff and / or its related or affiliated entities; and

To act at all times with good faith, integrity, and fidelity in all matters affairs, including but not limited to providing full and candid disclosure of all relevant dealings and interests, avoiding actual or perceived conflicts of interest, refraining from making secret profits, and rendering a full and accurate account of all transactions and actions undertaken or influenced by them in connection with the Plaintiff and / or its group of companies.

Each of the acts pleaded hereinbefore was done by the person or persons hereinbefore alleged on behalf of himself or herself or themselves and his or her or their co - conspirators in furtherance of the said conspiracy.

At all material times, the Defendant or each of them knew or had means of knowledge that their aforesaid acts will injure the Plaintiff and / or its subsidiaries and / or affiliated companies and cause them loss and damage.

and / or its subsidiaries and / or affiliated companies has suffered loss and damage and suffered

to reasonable grounds to believe that two or more of the Defendants have conspired to commit an actionable wrong. In this regard, the Plaintiff relies on section 10 of the Evidence Act 1950, which provides that where there is such reasonable ground, any act, statement or writing made by any one of the conspirators in reference to their common intention whether made after the formation of that intention or during the continuance of the conspiracy is admissible and relevant not only for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy, but also for establishing the participation and complicity of each conspirator.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff relies upon all acts, omissions, communications and writings undertaken or made by each of the Defendants, and / or by any third parties acting in furtherance of the common design, whether or not such acts were within the direct knowledge of all other conspirators. The Plaintiff avers that such acts and statements are admissible and probative of both the existence of the conspiracy and the participation of each Defendant, even where certain acts were committed outside the Pl immediate knowledge, or at a time before a particular conspirator joined, or after a conspirator had exited the conspiracy.

Next, paragraphs 38 B and 41 (I) of the proposed amendments (reproduced below) are examples and pleadings of evidence. However, examples are immaterial facts and ineffectual in painting a clear summary (See the High Court case of Ponnusamy & Anor v Nathu Ram (1959) 25 MLJ 228).

It was further uncovered that WONG had demanded or arranged or manoeuvred for the provision of unlawful gratification, including a purported kickback payment to be made to him personally. For instance, unauthorised payments which were supposed to be arranged to be paid to WONG prior to arranged to be released to him in mixed forms of cash and online transfer via YONG. Moreover, on or about end of February 2022, YONG paid approximately RM 10,000 to WONG. This amount was purportedly derived from or associated [Chinese characters] a term that suggests involvement in illicit or unlawful activities.

ar evidence of such premeditation and malicious intent, including but not limited to :

01/10/2021

21/11/2021

20/02/2022 :

15/03/2022

15/03/2022 demand of 4.1 mil mil (by D8);

15/03/2022

16/03/2022 [Chinese characters] annihilate and

17/03/2022 D1); and

14/04/2022

The English High Court in Various Claimants v MGN Ltd [2020] EWHC 553 observed that pleadings should not be littered with examples, in : [59] depend on putting forward a number of incidents which they say must have come However, I do not think it right that the claimants should be able to find brick after the addition of more is unlikely to improve matters.

The extent of the proposed amendments is wide ranging and is an A-F and 38 A-D of the proposed amendments (reproduced below) are s current claim. Bearing in mind that pleadings must be succinct, P should not be allowed to raise various permutations

The Plaintiffs will contend that the repeated requests to WONG and / or YEE for contribution were met either with silence or evasive responses. This conduct commitment without offering any corresponding performance and/or contribution.

The Plaintiffs will contend that the entire structure of the Project, including the incorporation of GGM, the appointment of WONG as director, and the quotation from Glomaxes, were all premised on a mutual understanding and representation that both GHB and YEE and / or WONG would contribute to the financing of the Project in accordance with their respective shareholding proportions. This was critical to the Plaintiff's decision to commit substantial resources towards the Project.

In reliance on such representations and the assumption of good faith participation by YEE and / or WONG, GHB proceeded to incur significant liabilities and advance substantial funds for the Project. GHB would not have proceeded to finance the Project in the manner it did, but for such representations made by YEE and / or WONG, whether expressly or impliedly, and their silence or failure to dissent at material junctures.

The failure of YEE to make any contributions, despite repeated requests and opportunities, coupled with the acquiescence or complicity of WONG, demonstrates a calculated and deliberate effort to shift the entire financial burden of the Project onto GHB, while retaining the benefit of equity participation and operational control through GGM and later GHPSB.

The Plaintiffs will further contend that such conduct by YEE and / or WONG forms part of a wider pattern of behaviour, through which the Defendants intended to misappropriate corporate resources, avoid personal financial exposure, and abuse corporate control mechanisms within GHB and its subsidiaries to further their own personal or collateral interests.

The silence and evasion exhibited by YEE and / or WONG in response to legitimate financial contribution requests, and their continued exercise of control - performance of their own obligations, are consistent with their dishonest and oppressive conduct amounting to breach of fiduciary duty, abuse of office, and participation in a conspiracy to injure the Plaintiffs.

In furtherance of the above, it was also discovered that WONG had without proper authorisation and in breach of his fiduciary and contractual duties, engaged in improper financial dealings which included directing or facilitating payments to and / or with parties without legitimate justification or supporting documentation, thereby exposing the Plaintiffs and its group of companies to financial loss and reputational risk.

The Plaintiff avers that the aforesaid was in fact a covert and unethical inducement linked to his position of influence within the group. Such acts are constitute a serious breach of integrity and anti-corruption standards.

The Plaintiff further avers that the above instances of misconduct are not exhaustive. Additional acts of impropriety, breach, or abuse of position by WONG and / or YEE may be further identified and established through the discovery and examination of the various affidavits, documentary records, internal correspondence, and communications including, inter alia, messages exchanged within WhatsApp groups involving WONG, namely G Force and Soldier Boys. All of which the Plaintiff shall refer to and rely upon at the trial of this action for their full evidential weight.

The vagueness of the proposed amendments create confusion as to In Ketteman and others v Hansel Properties Ltd [1988] 1 All ER 38 at 62, the UK House of Lords amplified the distinction between amendments clarifying the issues in dispute and amendments debuting novel issues. The UK House of L between allowing amendments to clarify the issues in dispute and those that permit a distinct defence to be raised for the first time

The proposed amendments have also ignored the distinction to introduce G-L of the proposed amendments (reproduced below).

Further and in addition to the acts pleaded hereinabove, the Defendants, acting in concert and in furtherance of the common design, embarked on a sustained and malicious campaign directed personally against the Tai family, namely :

- Former Chairman and CEO;

- CEO; and

- Executive Director. / .

It is respectfully pleaded that the objective of this campaign was amongst others, to undermine control of GHB, and cause irreparable reputational, professional, and / or personal harm, including but not limited to by :

lodging a complaint to the Malaysian Anti - Corruption Commission and / or other regulatory and enforcement agencies;

taking deceptive steps to induce the Tai Faction to sign a guarantee letter which was subsequently used as part of a claim for RM 4.1 million to pressure surrender of control; and

lodging a CTOS c creditworthiness.

These messages, among others, clearly demonstrate a coordinated plan to to harass the Tai Faction with multiple legal and financial pressures, and to target them personally and professionally. The conspiracy included the fraudulent issuance of a RM 14 million invoice under Glomaxes arising from a purported progress claim which TQY was misled into signing under the belief it was legitimate. This invoice was later used to issue a statutory demand under Section 466 (1) (a) of the Companies Act 2016, thereby exposing TQY personally to allegations of fraudulent financial conduct.

The Defendants / Conspirators have further engaged in concealment by deleting WhatsApp messages and other communications from their devices to remove evidence of their collusion, demonstrating their awareness of wrongdoing and their intent to destroy evidence.

As a direct result of the above acts, the Tai Family have suffered :

unwarranted legal expenses in defending against those groundless and malicious accusations, complaints and / or enforcement actions;

reputational damage in the eyes of the public, employees, suppliers, bankers, and peers in the business community;

loss of professional standing and opportunities for future board appointments and advisory roles;

financial losses from the devaluation of their investments in GHB, where the share price fell from approximately RM 0.80 (December 2020) to RM statement;

emotional and psychological distress, including TQY hospitalisation from 13 to 25 September 2024 at Subang Jaya Medical Centre for stress related conditions, ongoing high blood pressure requiring permanent medication, and mental anguish suffered by family members;

personal share trading account was frozen; and

a travel ban was imposed as a result of the MACC complaint, causing disruption to corporate duties and personal hardship.

The question is this : how could P, a company, suffer personal reputational damages on behalf of its shareholders and controllers? Moreover at all material times, D1 and D2 are also shareholders of P. It their pleadings to sue themselves for loss of reputation.

The concept of separate legal entity is well - established. The Court of Appeal in Mak Siew Wei v Yeoh Eng Kong and other appeals [2020] 1 MLJ 258 recognised the principle of reflective loss. To wit, that the loss suffered by a company is separate, distinct and disparate from that suffered by a shareholder. The Court of Appeal emphasized the need for the claims to be separated : [62] A separation of claims is essential for the defendants and the court to comprehend which reliefs the shareholder is entitled to (if at all), and which reliefs the company is entitled

losses, a separate claim should be initiated. The Tai faction cannot exploit

Any suggestion that they are unaware of the correct path would be hard to believe as the leader of the Tai faction, Tai Boon Wee, has already initiated a defamation claim against D1 in his personal capacity in Kuala Lumpur High Court Suit No. WA - 22 NCvC - 422 - 06 / 2023. That suit is to be heard together with the present action.

The absence of the bona fide element in the present amendment a purported defamation against the entire Tai faction and label it as part of their existing claim. This issue has never been pleaded by P in all three previous versions of its statement of claim. Costs are an inappropriate remedy at this juncture

Not everything can be resolved with money, and definitely not justice. P initiated this suit in the year 2022 and has dragged the Defendants into seemingly never - ending litigation. The Defendants (save for the 5th Defendant) in this suit are sentient individuals, not emotionless corporations.

The strain of litigation on individuals versus corporations was recognised by the House of Lords in Ketteman (supra) : justice cannot always be measured in terms of money and in my view a judge is entitled to weigh in the balance the strain the litigation imposes on litigants, particularly if they are personal litigants rather than business corporations, the anxieties occasioned by facing new issues, the raising of false hopes, and the legitimate expectation that the trial will determine the issues one way or the other.

Under the current regime where cases must be resolved at the earliest opportunity, it is against the interests of justice to empower a wealthy plaintiff to cause unnecessary delay and prejudice to the defendant on the basis that they can offer some monetary compensation. In the words of the English Court of Appeal in Worldwide Corpn Ltd v GPT Ltd [1998] EWCA Civ 1894 : in truth the payment of the costs of an adjournment may well not adequately compensate someone who is desirous of being rid of a piece of litigation which has been hanging over his head for some time, and may not adequately compensate him for being . Furthermore the courts are now much more conscious that in assessing the justice of a particular case the disruption caused to other litigants by last minute adjournments and last minute applications have also to be brought into the scales.

It is noteworthy that D1 and D2 have filed their counterclaims against the controllers of P i.e. the Tai faction. As long as there is delay to the trial, their counterclaims are prevented from moving forward. of serving justice is not only to the applicant but rather to all litigants in the present suit.

Bearing in mind that this case has dragged on for over three years, I do not think costs is an appropriate remedy to compensate parties for any further turmoil inflicted by the perpetuation of this suit.

For the reasons above, I dismissed the amendment application in Enclosure 404. I awarded costs of RM 5,000 to the 1st to 5th Defendants, and costs of RM 5,000 to the 6th and 7th Defendants. Dated 6 January 2026 Quay Chew Soon Judge High Court of Kuala Lumpur (Commercial Division NCC 2 & Admiralty 9) Counsels Marcus Lee, How Li Nee and Lee Min Yau (Messrs. How & Partners) for the Plaintiff Tharminder Singh, Jane Chan and Esther Soo (Messrs. Izral Partnership) for 1st to 5th Defendants Terrence Lee Rohui and Kang Zhi Han (Messrs. Terrence Lee & Co.) for 6th and 7th Defendants Case reference 1. Yamaha Motor Co Ltd v Yamaha Malaysia Sdn Bhd & Ors [1983] 1 MLJ 213 2. Hong Leong Finance Bhd v Low Thiam Hoe and another appeal [2016] 1 MLJ 301 3. Savings and Investment Bank Ltd v Fincken [2004] 1 All ER 1125 4. Khor Cheng Wah v Sungai Way Leasing Sdn Bhd [1996] 1 MLJ 223 5. Taisho Co Sdn Bhd v Pan Global Equities Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ 359 6. Swain - Mason & others v Mills & Reeve LLP [2011] EWCA Civ 14 7. Ponnusamy & Anor v Nathu Ram (1959) 25 MLJ 228 8. Various Claimants v MGN Ltd [2020] EWHC 553 9.

Ketteman and others v Hansel Properties Ltd [1988] 1 All ER 38

Mak Siew Wei v Yeoh Eng Kong and other appeals [2020] 1 MLJ 258 Worldwide Corpn Ltd v GPT Ltd [1998] EWCA Civ 1894 Legislation reference 1. Order 20 rule 5 of the Rules of Court 2012