Gjh Properties Sdn. Bhd. v Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah, Kementerian Kesejahteraan Bandar, Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan (M-01(A)-104-03/2019)

TRIBUNAL TUNTUTAN PEMBELI RUMAH, KEMENTERIAN KESEJAHTERAAN BANDAR,

AHMAD ZAMANI BIN ZAINUDDIN ...RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN [Dalam Perkara Permohonan Bagi Semakan Kehakiman No. MA-25-08- 05/2017 dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Di Melaka Dalam perkara Aturan 53 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 Dan Dalam perkara Aturan 15 Kaedah 12 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 Dan Dalam perkara perenggan 1 Jadual kepada Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 Dan Dalam perkara Akta Pemajuan Perumahan (Kawalan dan Pelesenan) 1966 2 Dan Dalam perkara Peraturan-Peraturan Pemajuan Perumahan (Kawalan dan Pelesenan) 1989 Dan Dalam perkara Peraturan-Peraturan Pemajuan Perumahan (Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah) 2002 Dan Dalam perkara Award bertarikh 18 April 2017 Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah Di Putrajaya, Negeri Wilayah Persekutuan Malaysia Tuntutan No. TTPR/M/0835(T)/16 Antara GJH Properties Sdn. Bhd …Pemohon

Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah, Kementerian Kesejahteraan Bandar, Perumahan Dan

Ahmad Zamani Bin Zainuddin …Responden-Responden] CORAM: NOR BEE BINTI ARIFFIN, JCA LEE HENG CHEONG, JCA MARIANA BINTI HAJI YAHYA, JCA 3 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

In the High Court, the Appellant applied for an Order of Certiorari to quash the entire decision of the 1st Respondent, in granting an Award dated 18.4.2017 wherein the Appellant was ordered to pay AHMAD ZAMANI BIN ZAINUDDIN, the 2nd Respondent herein, the sum of RM32,300.00 being damages allegedly arising from a negligence claim by the 2nd Respondent.

On 8.2.2019, the learned High Court Judge made inter alia the following Order:- "DENGAN INI DIPERINTAHKAN bahawa:-

Permohonan Substantif Pemohon Untuk Semakan Kehakiman dibenarkan sebahagian iaitu amaun yang diawadkan di bawah Award bertarikh 18hb April 2017 Dalam Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah Di Putrajaya, Negeri Wilayah Persekutuan, Malaysia Tuntutan No. TTPR/M/0835(T)/16 dikurangkan dari RM32,500.00 kepada RM25,300.00"

This is an appeal by the Appellant/Applicant against that part of the decision of the learned High Court Judge who allowed in part, the Appellant's Substantive Application for Judicial Review in that the amount awarded under the Award dated 18.4.2017 by Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah, Kementerian Kesejahteraan 4 Bandar, Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan, the 1st Respondent herein, be reduced from RM32,500.00 to RM25,300.00 given on 8.2.2019.

We pause here to note that the learned High Court Judge has wrongly referred to the award made by the 1st Respondent to the 2nd Respondent as RM32,500.00 when the sum awarded was RM32,300.00. In this Grounds of Judgment, reference to be the award by the 1st Respondent shall be the sum of

For ease of reference, parties will be referred to as they are in the proceedings before this Court.

We heard the appeal and having carefully considered the submissions of both parties, we found that there are merits in the appeal and unanimously allowed the appeal with costs. We now give reasons for our decision with respect to the appeal.

The Appellant is a licensed housing developer of a development project known as Taman Vista Kirana Fasa 3, Melaka.

The 1st Respondent is the Housing Development (Tribunal for

The 2nd Respondent is an individual purchaser. 5

By a Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 23.2.2012 (“SPA”), the Appellant agreed to sell and the 2nd Respondent agreed to buy a double-storey semi-detached house (Type J) Unit No. J39 erected on land known as Pajakan Negeri No. 36940, Lot No. 11670, Mukim Bukit Katil, Daerah Melaka Tengah, Melaka ["the said Property"] at the purchase price of RM460,000.00.

The SPA is a Statutory Contract in the form of a Schedule G type contract under the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989.

12.

On the 19.9.2016, the 2nd Respondent filed a claim vide Borang 1 Pernyataan Tuntutan di bawah Peraturan 6 Peraturan-Peraturan Pemajuan Perumahan (Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah) 2002 (“the said Borang 1”) with the 1st Respondent.

In the said Borang 1, the 2nd Respondent complained under the title "Soil Settlement Problems Surrounding the House" (Masalah Pemendapan Tanah Di Sekeliling Rumah) [Encl. 6 p. 109 RR2A] that the construction of the 2nd Respondent's double-storey semi-detached house was on an earth-filled site and that the earth compaction was not carried out properly which resulted in some 6 damage to the house and the alleged damage arose from the Appellant's negligence in failing to carry out the compaction process properly are cracked walls and floor tiles, cracked concrete fence on the side and at the back of the house on the said Property and cracked pillars of the house and that the 2nd Respondent’s claim was for RM25,300.00.

Later, the 2nd Respondent filed a second blank Borang 1 dated 17.11.2016, attaching various documents to it.

On 21.11.2016, officers of the 1st Respondent carried out a technical inspection on the 2nd Respondent's said Property. Arising from the technical inspection, the Penolong Pegawai Senibina Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah prepared the Laporan Pemeriksaan Teknikal (“the Laporan Pemeriksaan Teknikal”) wherein it was noted in the attachment at Encl. 7 p. Exhibit C-7 RR2B as follows:- "Nota:- Sebarang lakaran dan gambarajah serta cadangan teknikal yang dicadangkan hanyalah berdasarkan pemeriksaan teknikal sahaja. Segala rekabentuk terperinci dan struktur binaan adalah tertakluk kepada rekabentuk asal pihak pemaju dan penyelarasan di tapak. Sebarang keputusan adalah tertakluk kepada Tuan 7

After hearing the 2nd Respondent’s complaint, the 1st Respondent awarded a sum of RM32,500.00 to the 2nd Respondent (“the 1st Respondent’s Award”) which is in excess of the sum claimed by the 2nd Respondent, in the said Borang 1.

The Appellant, being dissatisfied with the 1st Respondent’s Award then applied for Judicial Review of the decision of the 1st Respondent.

The High Court after hearing the Appellant’s Application for Judicial Review, reduced the 1st Respondent's Award to RM25,300.00.

The learned High Court Judge held inter alia as follows:

That the Engineering report prepared by the 1st Respondent is more convincing as the affected and damaged parts of the house are not related to the 2nd Respondent’s renovations;

That the inspection report by Geo-Excel Consultants Sdn. Bhd. dated 22.2.2017 should be conducted during the rainy season, which will show how serious is the situation of the state of the slope and not when the terrain is dry and stable and even then, state of the slope is still being classified as threatening; 8

That the amount claimed by the 2nd Respondent is is based on a quotation dated 19.9.2016 from an independent contractor, Valuemax Home Sdn Bhd;

That the 1st Respondent’s decision was correct as the defects appeared on the walls around the house where no renovations were made by the 2nd Respondent;

For these reasons, the High Court has only reduced the 1st Respondent’s Award to RM25,300.00 whilst the liability of the Appellant as determined by the 1st Respondent is upheld and there is no order on costs. THE CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The contentions of the Appellant are inter alia as follows:-

That the 2nd Respondent in the said Borang 1 filed, contended under the heading, "Soil Settlement Problems Surrounding the House" (Masalah Pemendapan Tanah Di Sekeliling Rumah) that the construction of the 2nd Respondent's double-storey semi-detached house was on an earth-filled site and that the earth compaction was not carried out properly which resulted in some damage and the alleged damage caused by the Appellant's negligence in failing to carry out the compaction process properly are cracked wall and floor tiles, cracked concrete fence on the side and at 9 the back of the house and cracked pillars of the house and that the alleged claim was for RM25,300.00 which was taken from the Quotation dated 19.9.2016 for "Demolish All Fence and Tiles, Wall Fence, Tiling and Piling" annexed to the said Borang 1;

That the 2nd Respondent is bound by its pleadings as the 2nd Respondent contended that the Appellant's negligence in carrying out the earth compaction works, had resulted in soil settlement problems around the house which in turn caused the damage as alleged in the said Borang 1;

It is clear from the pleadings as stated in the said Borang 1 and from the said Laporan Pemeriksaan Teknikal that the 2nd Respondent's claim for the tort of negligence resulting in the alleged damage which falls outside the purview of the four corners of the SPA and hence, is beyond the jurisdiction of the Homebuyers' Tribunal ie. the 1st Respondent;

that the learned High Court Judge had misdirected himself in law and/or erred in law when the court dismissed the Appellant's application for an Order of Certiorari to quash the whole decision of the 1st Respondent given through the Award dated 18.4.2017 wherein the Appellant was ordered to pay the 2nd Respondent the sum of RM32,300.00 being damages allegedly arising from a negligence claim and the court 10 only allowed in part, the Appellant' Substantive Application for Judicial Review by reducing the amount of RM32,300.00 awarded by the 1st Respondent to RM25,300.00 as damages; and

that there are no reasons and/or grounds given by the 1st Respondent for the Award made on the 18.4.2016 thereby rendering the Award, bad in law and/or illegal. THE CONTENTIONS OF THE 2ND RESPONDENT

In response, the 2nd Respondent contended inter alia as follows:-

That the 1st Respondent has jurisdiction to hear the Claim under Section 16N

(2)

Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 if the claim is filed not more than twelve (12) months from the expiry date of the "defect liability period" and the 2nd Respondent’s Claim has been filed within that period and is thus within the jurisdiction of the 1st Respondent;

That the 1 s t Respondent’s Award is also not beyond the limits of Section 16M (1) Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 which states that the 1st Respondent only has jurisdiction to allow award not more than RM50,000.00 and accordingly, the 1st Respondent’s Award, which amounted to RM32,300.00, did not exceed the jurisdiction of the 1st Respondent; and 11

that there was no element of "illegality" or invalidity or "procedural impropriety" in the decisions of the 1st Respondent or the High Court. Although the amount of the 1st Respondent’s Award was reduced by the High Court, the Appellant is still liable to pay damages to the 2nd Respondent, as ordered by the High Court. THE FINDINGS OF THIS COURT The Jurisdictional Issue

We are of the considered view that there is merit in the Appellant’s contention that the learned High Court Judge erred in law when he failed to consider and appreciate that the 1st Respondent's jurisdiction is limited to a cause of action arising from the express terms of the SPA and that the 1st Respondent had in fact exceeded its jurisdiction conferred upon it, by Section 16N(2) Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 and/or committed an error of law, by adjudicating upon the 2nd Respondent's claim which is grounded on the tort of negligence and as a consequence thereof, the Award was tainted with illegality.

Section 16N

Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 dealt with the jurisdiction of the 1st Respondent and reads as follows:- "(2) The jurisdiction of the Tribunal shall be limited to a claim that is based on a cause of action arising from 12 the sale and purchase agreement entered into between the homebuyer and the housing developer ..."

The legal position of the SPA, being a Statutory Contract in the form of a Schedule G type contract under the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 is well settled by the case of Ang Ming Lee & Ors v Menteri Kesejahteraan Bandar, Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan & Anor and Other Appeals [2020] 1 MLJ 281 where the court held inter alia as follows:- "[38] In the case of Sentul Raya Sdn Bhd v Hariram Jayaram & Ors [2008] 4 MLJ 852, Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) speaking for the Court of Appeal said: The contract which has fallen for consideration in the present case is a special contract. It is prescribed and regulated by statute. While parties in normal cases of contract have freedom to make provisions between themselves, a housing developer does not enjoy such freedom. Hence parties to a contract in Form H cannot contract out of the scheduled form. Terms more onerous to a purchaser may not be imposed. So too, terms imposing additional obligations on the part of a purchaser may not be included in the statutory form of contract.” 13

In the present appeal, the relevant facts related with this jurisdictional point are as follows. In the said Borang 1, the 2nd Respondent pleads as follows:- "Masalah Pemendapan Tanah di Sekeliling Rumah Tanah di sekeliling persekitaran rumah berkembar dua tingkat saya dibina di atas tapak tanah tampal. Saya dapati pemadatan tanah tersebut tidak dilakukan dengan sempurna oleh Pihak Pembina rumah iaitu GJH Properties Sdn. Bhd. yang mengakibatkan pelbagai kerosakan yang membimbangkan terhadap kediaman saya. Keadaan ini amat mengkhuatirkan kerana ianya melibatkan nyawa keluarga saya yang tinggal di rumah tersebut." "Antara kerosakan yang diakibatkan oleh kecuaian pihak Pembina kerana gagal melakukan proses pemadatan yang sempurna adalah:

Kerosakan jubin lantai dan dinding rumah sehingga terdapat jurang di celah-celah jubin, dinding dan lantai rumah;

Pagar konkrit tepi dan belakang rumah mengalami keretakan serius dan condong sehingga hampir runtuh; dan 14

Tiang-tiang utama yang menyokong rumah didapati retak." (Emphasis added)

From the above, the 2nd Respondent was contending that the Appellant was negligent, in carrying out the earth compaction works which had resulted in soil settlement problems around the said Property which in turn caused the damage as stated in the said Borang 1.

In the present appeal, the Borang F which is the Certificate of Completion and Compliance dated 23.10.2013 of the house on the said Property was issued by the Architect who certified that the buildings in the project including the said Property were inter alia completed in accordance with the approved plan as stated in Borang F and that the buildings in the project including the said property were safe for occupation (Encl. 6 p. 102‒103 RR2A).

29.

Approximately 3 years later, on 19.9.2016, the 2nd Respondent filed a claim vide the said Borang 1 Pernyataan Tuntutan di bawah Peraturan 6 Peraturan-Peraturan Pemajuan Perumahan (Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah) 2002 with the 1st Respondent. 15

Further, the evidence adduced showed that on 21.11.2016, the 1st Respondent’s officers conducted a technical inspection on the 2nd Respondent's said Property and thereafter, the Penolong Pegawai Senibina Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah prepared the Laporan Pemeriksaan Teknikal (Encl. 7 p. 8 Exh. C-7 RR2B) which stated inter alia as follows:- "Nota: Kajian terperinci soil investigation terhadap tanah hendaklah dilaksanakan terlebih dahulu bagi mengetahui kaedah yang sesuai. Cadangan teknikal ini adalah cadangan pembaikan biasa tanpa menjalankan soil investigation atau kajian terperincian bagi mengetahui kondisi tanah. Keputusan tertakluk kepada presiden." (Emphasis is added)

From the 2nd Respondent’s pleadings as contained in the said Borang 1 and from the said Laporan Pemeriksaan Teknikal, the 2nd Respondent's claim is grounded on the tort of negligence which falls outside the purview of the four corners of the SPA and hence, is beyond the jurisdiction of the Homebuyers' Tribunal ie. the 1st Respondent.

Support and guidance can be found in the Federal Court case of Country Garden Danga Bay Sdn Bhd v Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah & Ho Chee Kian vide Dalam Mahkamah Persekutuan Malaysia (Bidang Kuasa Rayuan) Rayuan Sivil No. 01(f)‒17‒07/2020 (J) which held inter alia that the 16 Homebuyers' Tribunal can only decide on claims based upon the express terms of the sale and purchase agreement.

In light of the said Federal Court decision of Country Garden Danga Bay Sdn Bhd. supra, it is clear that the claim in negligence brought by the 2nd Respondent is not based upon express terms of the SPA as it is a tortious claim. Hence, it is also crystal clear that a cause of action arising from a sale and purchase agreement cannot possibly include a claim in the tort of negligence as complained by the 2nd Respondent.

Thus, when a court or tribunal makes a decision which is outside its jurisdiction, such a decision is null and void (see Akitek Tenggara Sdn Bhd v Mid Valley City Sdn Bhd [2007] 5 MLJ 697).

Thus, we find that on this jurisdictional point alone, the appeal should be allowed. However for the sake of completeness, we shall proceed to consider the other grounds of appeal. Whether the learned High Court Judge ought to dismiss or grant the Appellant’s Application for Judicial Review

The Appellant's application for judicial review was made pursuant to paragraph 1 of Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (“CJA 1964”) and Order 53 Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC 2012”) and sought for inter alia an Order of Certiorari to quash the 1st Respondent’s Award dated 18.4.2017, which ordered the appellant to pay the sum of RM32,300.00 to the 2nd Respondent 17 and for a Declaration that the 1st Respondent’s Award is invalid, ultra vires and null and void and of no effect.

The Order of the High Court dated 8.2.2019 states inter alia as follows:- "DENGAN INI DIPERINTAHKAN bahawa:-

Permohonan Substantif Pemohon Untuk Semakan Kehakiman dibenarkan sebahagian iaitu amaun yang diawadkan di bawah Award bertarikh 18hb April 2017 Dalam Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah Di Putrajaya, Negeri Wilayah Persekutuan, Malaysia Tuntutan No. TTPR/M/0835(T)/16 dikurangkan dari RM32,500.00 kepada RM25,300.00"

We are of the considered view that the learned High Court Judge had misdirected himself in law and/or erred in law when he allowed in part, the Appellant's Substantive Application for Judicial Review by reducing the amount of the 1st Respondent’s Award of RM32,300.00 to RM25,300.00 as damages.

Further, the learned High Court Judge erred in law when he failed to apply the relevant principles of law pertaining to a judicial review application by which the Appellant was seeking to quash the whole decision of the 1st Respondent, by an Order of Certiorari.

Since the Appellant’s application for Judicial Review was made under paragraph 1 Schedule to CJA 1964 and Order 53 ROC 18 2012 to quash the 1st Respondent’s Award dated 18.4.2017 by an Order of Certiorari, the learned High Court Judge ought to have exercised the power in conformity with paragraph 1 Schedule to CJA 1964 and Order 53 ROC 2012 either to dismiss the Appellant’s Application for Judicial Review or grant it. The learned High Court Judge however allowed the Appellant's Substantive Application in part and proceeded to reduce the said Award in contravention of paragraph 1 Schedule to CJA 1964 and Order 53 ROC 2012 and the principles laid down in R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145.

In the Federal Court case of R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor, supra, where the Federal Court inter alia stated as follows:- "In Malaysia, the High Courts are conferred with similar powers by para 1 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 which states: Power to issue to any person or authority directions, orders or writs, including writs of the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any others, for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part II of the Constitution, or any of them, or for any purpose. The procedure relating to an application for certiorari is laid out in O 53 of the Rules of the High Court 1980. 19 I cannot find any provision in the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, the Rules of the High Court 1980 or the Act expressly or impliedly prohibiting the High Court from granting any relief as provided for in the Act when quashing an Award of the Industrial Court. The court cannot override an express provision of the law, but if there is no express provision in the statute, then the court can exercise its powers in a suitable case." "It is true that both appellate review and supervisory review are concerned with the correction of error but, it has often been said, that they are radically different processes. Where statute provides simply for an appeal, the appellate court has power to re-hear the whole case and, when satisfied that the judgment appealed against cannot stand, it may set aside the judgment and make such orders as ought to have been made at first instance. Thus, appellate jurisdiction is concerned with the merits of a case." "The particular rule of court applicable in this instance is O 53 of the Rules of the High Court 1980. Under this order, certiorari may be issued to remove the record of the proceedings from an inferior court or administrative tribunal or other public authority to the High Court to be quashed. Under the pre-amended English O 53 which is identical to our O 53, there is no power to amend the 20 proceeding ― see Walsall Overseers v LNW Ry (1878) 4 App Cas 30 but there is power to quash and order retrial: R v Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal [1951] 1 KB 711. The inescapable inference from this reasoning leads us to the conclusion that the power of review under certiorari must be exercised in conformity with the provision of O 53; and when so applied, the power to issue certiorari is confined only to the quashing of the order or remitting it to the inferior court or tribunal for retrial." (Emphasis is mine)

In the case of ROHANA BTE ARIFFIN & ANOR v UNIVERSITI SAINS MALAYSIA [1989] 1 MLJ 487, the court held inter alia, at p. 489 that “the court will not substitute its judgment or discretion for the judgment or discretion of the body under review”.

Further, we find that from his Grounds of Judgment, the learned High Court Judge adjudicated the Appellant's Substantive Application for Judicial Review, by not exercising supervisory jurisdiction in reviewing the decision-making process of the 1st Respondent but instead, by exercising its appellate jurisdiction, by allowing the appeal in part and reducing the damages payable by the Appellant to the 2nd Respondent. Thus, we find that the decision of the learned High Court Judge has no legal basis and is plainly wrong which warrants appellate intervention.

As an appellate court, we will not readily interfere with findings of fact arrived at by the court of first instance unless that court is 21 shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its decision. (Dream

Property Sdn Bhd v Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd [2015] 2 MLRA In the present appeal, the learned High Court Judge’s decision to reduce the sum awarded by the 1st Respondent, amounting to RM32,300.00 as damages to RM25,300.00 based on the 2nd Respondent's Quotation dated 19.9.2016 by Valuemax Home Sdn Bhd [Encl. 6 p. 112 RR2A] as per para. 19 Alasan Penghakiman [Encl. 17 p. 21 RRT] is erroneous, as he failed to take into consideration the relevant factor that the 2nd Respondent's Piling claim of RM7,200.00 in the said Borang 1 was mutually agreed to be abandoned by the 2nd Respondent and Appellant as evidenced in the 1st Respondent's Laporan Pemeriksaan Teknikal (Encl. 7 p. 22‒23 RR2B).

Further, the 1st Respondent is bound by the pleadings in this case ie. the claim as stated in the said Borang 1 is for RM25,300.00 and by awarding a sum far in excess of the 2nd Respondent’s pleaded claim, the 1st Respondent had acted irrationally. As such, the 1st Respondent’s Award ought to have been quashed by the learned High Court Judge.

In the case of Ranjit Kaur S Gopal Singh v Hotel Excelsior (M) Sdn Bhd, supra, the court held inter alia as follows:- "The Industrial Court, like the civil courts must confine itself to the four corners of the pleading. This had been held to be so by this court in Rama Chandran which are as follows: 22 It is trite law that a party is bound by its pleadings. The Industrial Court must scrutinise the pleadings and identify the issues, take evidence, hear the parties' arguments and finally pronounce its judgment having strict regards to the issues."

Thus, the learned High Court Judge had failed to appreciate the evidence when arriving at his decision such that warrants appellate intervention. Whether the 1st Respondent’s Award comply with Section 16AA Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966

Section 16AA Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 reads as follows:- "The Tribunal shall in all proceedings give its reasons for its award in the proceedings."

We noted that the Appellant, by a series of letters from its' solicitors dated 19.5.2017, 10.7.2017, 4.8.2017 and 14.8.2017 respectively addressed to the 1st Respondent, had requested for the 'Alasan Penghakiman' and 'Nota Keterangan' from the 1st Respondent. Notwithstanding such repeated series of requests, the 1st Respondent failed and/or refused to furnish same to the Appellant's solicitors. 23

In the total absence of such reasons and/or grounds given by the 1st Respondent for the 1st Respondent’s Award made on the 18.4.2016 which was in contravention of Section 16AA Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966, we are of the considered opinion that the 1st Respondent’s Award, is bad in law and/or illegal. (see Oxbridge Height Sdn Bhd v Rozila Razli [2010] 15 MLRH 563; Seraimas Bina Sdn Bhd v Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli & Anor [2017] MLRHU 1; Hartaplus Realty Sdn Bhd v Rosmawati Binti Jaafar [2010] MLJU 997; and Denia Development Sdn Bhd v

Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah & Anor [2019] 5 MLRH )

Premised on the reasons enumerated above, we find that there are merits in the appeal and the appeal is allowed and the 2nd Respondent is to pay costs to the Appellant, in the sum of RM5,000.00 subject to allocator. The Orders of the 1st Respondent and the High Court dated 8.2.2019 are set aside. Dated: 17 September, 2021 sgd (LEE HENG CHEONG) Judge Court of Appeal, Malaysia 24 For the Appellant : Ms. SHEENA SINNAPPAH and Ms. VALERIE FERNANDO For the 2nd Respondent : Ms. PHANG JAI JUET and Ms. CHU SHIR