Gobi A/L Loganathan v Allianz General Insurance Company (M) Berhad (WA22NCC-1-01/2017)

As such, the plaintiff in the instant case is seeking to impeach and set aside the Order of the High Court in Suit 373 on account of the grounds that the Order was obtained by the defendant either by fraud, or non-disclosure of material facts or active concealment of material facts or by deliberately misleading the Court or contrary to express statutory provision or by an abuse of the process of the Court, or due to illegality or lack of jurisdiction.

On the same day the defendant filed its defence, it also initiated an application for the striking out of this claim by the plaintiff. Which I had refused. Hence the trial before me.

As just stated, given the background facts, the plaintiff is pursuing this suit to impeach and set aside the Order in Suit 373 by reason that the Order, it was alleged, had been obtained by the defendant either by fraud, or non-disclosure of material facts or active concealment of material facts or by deliberately misleading the Court; or contrary to express statutory provision or by an abuse of the process of the Court, or due to illegality or lack of jurisdiction.

The primary contention of the defendant insurer in contesting this claim is that Suit 373 was entirely between an insurer and an insured; and the argument that the governing insurance policy was founded on contractual principles. The plaintiff, according to the defendant, was never a party to that insurance contract. As such, the plaintiff has no locus to bring this suit against the defendant.

Secondly, the defendant argued that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the Order in question had been obtained by the defendant fraudulently or by active concealment of material facts or by any deliberate misleading of the Court. This is especially given the fact that the plaintiff produced only one witness who did not give any evidence on such purported improprieties on the part of the defendant.

Thirdly, the defendant maintained that this suit was an abuse of Court process. This is on the basis that notice of Suit 373 had been given to the solicitors for the plaintiff on 7 September 2016 as per Section 96(3) of the RTA. Thus, the plaintiff had full knowledge of Suit 373 but chose not to take any steps at the material time to be made a party to that Suit 373. His filing of this instant suit is therefore an attempt at having a second bite at the cherry and is an abuse of process.

The trial heard only one witness, who was the plaintiff himself. The defendant did not call any witnesses. The proceedings concluded in the same morning of the trial itself. And the decision of the Court was delivered in the same morning after a short adjournment after the close of the defendant’s case. Evaluation & Findings of this Court Plaintiff has no contractual nexus in insurance contract in Suit 373?

It is undeniable that the plaintiff is not a party to the contract of insurance between the defendant and Ms Suganthi which had been declared as void by the Order in Suit 373. Neither was he a party in Suit

As such, it was argued that the plaintiff has no locus to commence this instant suit against the defendant. Page 5 of 16 [18] I agree that action by the defendant under Section 96 of the RTA concerns the contract of insurance to which the plaintiff is not privy. But the very scheme of Section 96, whilst enabling an insurer to seek a Court declaration to avoid the relevant policy, also confers on the third party who claimed to have been involved in an accident with a vehicle insured with the insurer under the relevant coverage to apply to be made a party and to oppose the granting of such declaration. The plaintiff is the third party to this insurance contract vis-à-vis the said accident. [19] It is apposite that I reproduce the relevant parts of Section 96 of the RTA, as follows:- 96 Duty of insurers to satisfy judgements against persons insured in respect of third party risks

If, after a certificate of insurance has been delivered under subsection 91(4) to the person by whom a policy has been effected, judgement in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under paragraph 91(1)(b) (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy) is given against any person insured by the policy, then notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel, or may have avoided or cancelled the policy, the insurer shall, subject to this section, pay to the persons entitled to the benefit of the judgement any sum payable thereunder in respect of the liability, including any amount payable in respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any written law relating to interest on judgements.

No sum shall be payable by an insurer under subsection (1)- ……..….…

No sum shall be payable by an insurer under subsection (1) if before the date the liability was incurred, the insurer had obtained a declaration from a court that the insurance was void or unenforceable: Provided that an insurer who has obtained such a declaration as aforesaid in an action shall not thereby become entitled to the benefit of this subsection as respects any judgement obtained in proceedings commenced before the commencement of that action unless, before or within seven days after the commencement of that action, he has given notice thereof to the person who is the plaintiff in the said proceedings specifying the grounds on which he proposes to rely, and any person to whom notice of such an action is so Page 6 of 16 given shall be entitled if he thinks fit to be made a party thereto. …………………….” [emphasis added] [20] Thus, the argument of the defendant on the absence of contractual nexus as equating to lack of locus standi in respect of that suit (Suit 373) or the instant claim is misconceived because Section 96(3) of the RTA plainly confers on the third party such right to contest the declaration despite the patent absence of any contractual relationship between the plaintiff as the third party with either the insured (Ms Suganthi) or, what more, with the insurer or the defendant herein. As such, the argument that simply focuses on the absence of a contractual relationship on the part of the third party is wholly devoid of merit in the face of the clear provisions of Section 96(3) of the RTA. [21] The defendant, on the other hand, referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Government of Malaysia v Lim Kit Siang [1988] 2 MLJ 12, and of the Federal Court in Ikatan Kelab-kelab Melayu Negeri Pulau Pinang & Ors v Yayasan Bumiputra Pulau Pinang & Ors and another appeal [2014] 1 MLJ 27 which held that the requisite locus standi must be in place before the initiation of any proceedings. However I think the said cases are of little consequence to the instant proceedings given that those cases concerned the issue of locus standi generally, and not in the context of the relevance of Section 96(3) of the RTA, like presently. [22] No clearer judicial pronouncement on the right of the third party under Section 96(3) has probably been made other than by the Court of Appeal in Pacific & Orient Insurance Co Berhad v Rasip bin Hamsudi & Ors [2017] 4 CLJ 572, a case cited by the defendant itself, as follows:- “[20] This interest of the first, second and third respondents was statutorily and expressly recognised by virtue of the terms of the proviso to s. 96(3) of the RTA. Any third party (like in this instance, the first, second and third respondents as plaintiffs) bringing a claim in court involving a vehicle (the subject of the mandatory third party risk insurance under RTA) was a recognised party named in the proviso to s. 96(3) as being entitled to be notified by the insurer (in this case the appellant) before or within seven days of the commencement of any proceedings under s. 96(3) to declare the relevant insurance policy to be void and unenforceable. Such notice, it would also be noticed, required the appellant to specify the grounds that would be relied on by the insurer in such an application”. Page 7 of 16 [23] Thus the argument that the plaintiff lacks locus standi to maintain thus suit is devoid of merit given the provisions in Section 96(3) of the RTA. The plaintiff able to prove Order in Suit 373 was obtained fraudulently, by active concealment of material facts or by the defendant misleading the Court, etc? [24] In the instant case, the plaintiff seeks the setting aside of the declaration as per the Order in Suit 373 which had rendered void and unenforceable the relevant insurance contract between the defendant insurer and Ms Suganthi. He claims that instead of the matter, including particularly, the allegation of fraud and collusion, having already been fixed for trial involving all three principal parties, namely, the insurer, the insured and the third party, the defendant had misled the High Court in pre-emptively granting the declaration in a separate court proceeding, in the absence of the plaintiff (with the insured choosing not to appear) despite the plaintiff, as the third party, having the right under Section 96(3) of the RTA to be made a party to the proceedings initiated by the insurer. [25] It is crystal clear that Suit 501 certainly included the primary issue of whether the defendant, as the insurer, could avoid liability under the insurance contract with Ms Suganthi, the trial of which all parties had full knowledge would commence on 28 February 2017. It was certainly a live issue in Suit 501 when the defendant sought to (and did manage to) separately avoid the very same policy in Suit 373 filed later in time. [26] At the stage of the proceedings for the striking out of the suit, which I had earlier refused, I ruled that there were aspects about the claim of the plaintiff that in my view call for a full and proper adjudication at trial. These included the assertion by the plaintiff that the statutory declaration (by Ms Suganthi denying the accident which formed the crux of the defence of the insurer in Suit 501 and its application in Suit 373) is itself fraudulent because it was dated on 22 October 2015 being a date prior to the filing of the defence in the original Suit 591 on 20 November 2015 which had to the contrary earlier admitted the road accident. [27] Secondly, I noted the allegation that the defendant did not disclose to the High Court which granted the Order of the fact that the same issue on the liability of the insurer was already before the Magistrate Court in Suit 501. Although the cause papers for Suit 501 Page 8 of 16 were exhibited to support its application in Suit 373, such papers did not reflect the position subsequent to the inclusion of the defendant as the second defendant in Suit 501 following the intervener application referred to earlier. [28] Further, neither did the defendant exhibit its defence already filed in Suit 501 which would clearly show the very same grounds subsequently relied on by the defendant in Suit 373. The defence of the second defendant in Suit 501 (the insurer) was indeed filed after the filing of Suit 373. Then I considered it less than clear whether at the hearing of Suit 373 itself the Court had been apprised by the parties of the insurer’s involvement as a party in Suit 501 on substantially the same issues. [29] However, notwithstanding these issues that required further arguments at the trial proper, the plaintiff chose not to seriously address these concerns through any of his witnesses. To start with, the plaintiff only called himself as the sole witness, who testified for not more than half an hour in total (see further below). No other witnesses were called to explain the various cause papers referred to by the plaintiff at all. [30] As such I find little difficulty in agreeing with the submission of the defendant that the plaintiff had failed to prove his case on a balance of probabilities in relation to any the allegations of fraud, or non-disclosure of material facts or active concealment of material facts or deliberate misleading of the Court. There was an obvious paucity of evidence to support the case of the plaintiff on this allegation that could cross the threshold of the standard of proof of balance of probabilities. [31] In this connection, I must make a brief mention of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Juahir Sadikon v. Perbadanan Kemajuan Ekonomi Negeri Johor [1996] 4 CLJ 1 which reaffirms the rule that “he who asserts must prove”, whereby Siti Norma Yaakob JCA (as she then was) instructively held as follows:- “He who alleges must prove such allegation and the onus is on the appellant to do so. See section 103 of the Act. Thus, it is incumbent upon the appellant to produce Tan Sri Basir as his witness to prove the allegation. The fact that the appellant was unable to secure the attendance of Tan Sri Basir as a witness does not shift the burden to the respondent to produce the witness and testify as to what he had uttered, as firstly, the respondent never raised such an allegation and, secondly, has denied even making one. For this very reason, the adverse inference under section 114(g) of the Act relied upon by the Page 9 of 16 appellant cannot be accepted as establishing that if the witness had been produced, his evidence would work against the respondent. There is no obligation in law for the respondent to produce the witness as that obligation rests with the appellant, the party who alleges, and the fact that the appellant was unable to do so is fatal to his case. For this very reason too, the adverse inference under section 114(g) is invoked against the appellant”. [32] This the plaintiff did not succeed in proving. But this is not to say that he failed to prove all allegations. His testimony did try to focus on the issue of whether he had personal notice of the proceedings in Suit 373. His evidence did concern the contention of the plaintiff that the Order was granted to the defendant contrary to an express statutory provision, and possibly also at the same time, illegally due to lack of jurisdiction. [33] Thus while the evidence at trial do not sufficiently substantiate allegations of fraud or related contentions on wrongful concealment of facts on the part of the defendant, I consider that the only issue of substance raised and pleaded by the plaintiff is on whether the declaration obtained by the defendant earlier in Suit 373 was contrary to the provision of the law. And the provision in question is the requirement of notice to the third party under Section 96(3) of the RTA

This relates also to the third line of the resistance of the defendant to this suit. Did plaintiff have knowledge of Suit 373 but refused to join as party? [34] The defendant alleged that the filing of this instant suit to impeach the Order is an abuse of court process because the plaintiff had knowledge of the commencement of Suit 373 by the defendant but the plaintiff refused to be made a party in that Suit 373. As stated earlier, the defendant filed Suit 373 on 6 September 2016 and gave notice of the same to the plaintiff’s solicitors the day after on 7 September 2016. The plaintiff simply failed to exercise his statutory right to be made a party under Section 96(3) of the RTA despite the notice. Thus the instant suit, according to the defendant, is also an abuse of the process of the Court. [35] I cannot agree with the position taken by the defendant. Section 96(3), as set out earlier, clearly states that for the declaration (for the insurer) to be effective, notice must be given to the person who is the plaintiff in the underlying proceedings on accident liability before or Page 10 of 16 within seven days after the date of the action. Here it was given a day after. But it was given to Messrs Sodhi Chambers. Not to the plaintiff personally. This fact is not in dispute. [36] Messrs Sodhi Chambers are the solicitors for the plaintiff in Suit 501. But crucially they denied that they acted or had instructions to act for the plaintiff in Suit 373. The notice was therefore, according to Messrs Sodhi Chambers not communicated to the plaintiff. Suits 501 and 373 are, after all, different proceedings. The defendant or its solicitors could not simply assume that Messrs Sodhi Chambers were also acting for the plaintiff in Suit 373. [37] In fact at that stage, the plaintiff could not have decided whether or not to be made a party in Suit 373 and in any event it is not automatic that under Section 96(3) of the RTA the third party will be made a party in an action brought by the insurer against the insured over the policy between the latter two. It is for the third party to make that election. Thus it would have been more appropriate for the notice be sent directly to the third party personally. [38] The issue then is whether notice to Messrs Sodhi Chambers could be deemed good notice to the plaintiff. My answer is in the negative by reason of the clear provision of Section 118(1) of the RTA on service of notice, the relevant parts of which read:-

Any notice required to be given or served under this Act may, unless some other form of service is prescribed, be served on the person affected thereby as follows:

by giving the original copy of the notice personally to such person;

by affixing a copy of the notice on any conspicuous part of the house or any other place such person usually resides;

by affixing a copy of the notice on any conspicuous part of such person's motor vehicle; or

by sending the notice through registered post. [39] In the instant case, the defendant could not show that the notice had been either personally served on the plaintiff under (a) or that, the said notice of Suit 373 had been sent by registered post under

to the plaintiff’s own address as against that of Messrs Sodhi Page 11 of 16 Chambers. Neither has it been shown that the notice was affixed at his house or on his motor vehicle under items (b) or (c). [40] I cannot emphasise enough that the scheme of Section 96(3) is quite unmistakable. It seeks to protect the competing interests of the insurer, the insured and the third party. That is why the statutory provision makes it manifest that any declaration obtained by the insurer can only be effective if notice of the proceedings is sent to the third party. [41] The Court of Appeal in Pacific & Orient Insurance Co Berhad v Rasip bin Hamsudi & Ors referred to earlier made it manifest that the notice requirement is mandatory, as follows:- "[22] On the facts of this case, there was no issue that the appellant had not served the requisite notice on the first, second and third respondents as stipulated in the proviso. The declaratory order obtained by the appellant under saman pemula-1 was clearly in violation of the provisions of s. 96(3) of the RTA. The appellant's omission therefore amounted to not just an infringement of that statutory provisions but had the effect of denying the first, second and third respondents of their right to be made a party and be heard on the matter in saman pemula-1. There was no two ways about this. It was our view that if the relevant cause papers had been served by the appellant, it would have satisfied the two limbs of the requirement, namely, of notice of the saman pemula-1 proceedings and also of the grounds that was being relied upon by the appellant in such an application". ……………… [42] In view that any such declaration, as is the Order in Suit 373, could potentially render any judgment that the third party secures against the liability of an insured in a motor vehicle accident to be illusory given the invalidity of the underlying insurance contract, the law would insist, if not common sense would dictate, that there must be clear evidence that the third party was indeed served with the notice or that such could be presumed by reason of any evidence of registered post to the address of the third party, or the plaintiff herein. [43] However, absolutely no such evidence is forthcoming from the defendant in the instant case. As such, the defendant’s argument on the plaintiff having knowledge of Suit 373 but refusing to be a party thereto is unsubstantiated and as a result unsustainable. Page 12 of 16 [44] I reiterate that in my view, notice to Messrs Sodhi Chambers could not be deemed good notice to the plaintiff himself because the provisions of Section 96(3) and Section 118(1) of the RTA on service of notice must be strictly complied with. [45] I should refer to the leading authority in the Federal Court decision in Badiaddin bin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ 393 which permits the setting aside of a High Court judgment on account of among others, it having been made in breach of legislation. Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) held thus:- “It is one thing to say that an order of a court of unlimited jurisdiction must be obeyed until it is set aside. It is quite a different thing to say that a court of unlimited jurisdiction may make orders in breach of written law. Isaacs v. Robertson is certainly not authority for the latter proposition. I take it to be well settled that even courts of unlimited jurisdiction have no authority to act in contravention of written law. Of course, so long as an order of a court of unlimited jurisdiction stands, irregular though it may be, it must be respected. But where an order of such a court is made in breach of statute, it is made without jurisdiction and may therefore be declared void and set aside in proceedings brought for that purpose. It is then entirely open to the court, upon the illegality being clearly shown, to grant a declaration to the effect that the order is invalid and to have it set aside. It is wrong to assume that such an order may only be corrected on appeal”. [emphasis added] [46] The defendant referred to a recent Court of Appeal decision in L. Aruul a/l S Lurthusamy v Ringganazall a/l Ponnigilee & Anor [2017] 2 MLJ 51 where the Court of Appeal, in reversing the decision of the High Court which had set aside an order of another High Court, held:- “[24] There was in this instant case no breach of any written law or statute occasioned by the orders made by the High Court in the 2013- Saman Pemula. It was regularly obtained from a court who had jurisdiction and was competent to deal with such an application and issue those orders. The learned judge who gave those orders might perhaps have misdirected himself in law or on the facts surrounding the grievance or issue. That was however a matter to be taken up in a proper appeal to be brought against that decision by an aggrieved party. [25] We have also now the benefit of further observations of the Federal Court on this issue. In the judgment in Serac Asia Sdn Bhd v Sepakat Insurance Brokers Sdn Bhd [2013] 5 MLJ 1. Abdull Hamid Embong FCJ shed further light on this subject in the following passages: [35] We are thus in agreement with the appellant’s stand that an earlier judgment can only be impeached when it is prohibited by Page 13 of 16 statute; and that Badiaddin to us merely reaffirmed that rule and does not extend the inherent jurisdiction of the court to correct a perfected order or judgment beyond any statutory prohibition. … We think that the Badiaddin’s phrase ‘to intervene and correct a serious defect in the order’ should be read in the context of where an order was obtained in a manner which contravened a statute, resulting in that order being illegal or made outside the jurisdiction of the court. It is in this respect that the court’s inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, to strike out an earlier order, ex debito justitiae and without the need for file a fresh unit. [36] As regards the appellant’s submission on the court being functus officio and that a fresh suit needs to be filed to strike out a previous regularly obtained order on the ground of fraud, we adopt the finding of this court in Hock Hua Bank Bhd v Sahari bin Murid [1981] 1 MLJ 143 which we think has settled these issues. The headnotes from the report in that case, which need no further explanation, or expansion, is now reproduced as our answer to those related questions: ……………………. [26] Having given the matter our utmost consideration, we were of the view that the recourses validly open to the respondents in the circumstances was, either:

to appeal against the order of court of 27 March 2014 in the 2013-Saman Pemula, and therein possibly apply for material further or fresh evidence to be adduced, to have any order made therein reversed; or

to institute separate proceedings by way of a writ action to impeach any of the orders issued in the 2013-Saman Pemula on the grounds that those orders had been obtained by the appellant upon a fraud or deception being perpetrated on the court to secure those orders. [27] The learned judge had therefore in this case, with respect, clearly misdirected himself on the law in proceeding to entertain and consequently granting the orders sought in his 2014-Saman Pemula including the declaration the appellant’s marriage to Chitradevi was invalid in law and of no effect. [47] It is to be readily appreciated that in the above case, the critical basis for the decision was that there was no breach of statute. In the instant case, I have established that absence of evidence of personal notice to the third party breaches the mandatory notice requirements of Section 96(3) read with Section 118 of the RTA. [48] As such, consistent with Badiaddin, the case of L. Aruul in fact further supports the case of the plaintiff. Page 14 of 16 [49] If the position on the notice requirement were otherwise, the omission by a lawyer with notice of the action filed by an insurer, to notify his third party client of the same, either by design or negligently, would still render the third party to be deemed to have the notice, even though he actually has no notice of the insurer's action. This cannot be correct as the law in Section 96(3) also seeks to protect the interest of the third party. [50] The notice requirement as spelt out in Section 118 is a necessary pre-requisite to the application of a declaration under Section 96(3). The onus is on the insurer to demonstrate that notice has been served on the third party in accordance with Section 118 of the RTA. Without it, no such declaration can be lawfully given. Plaintiff entitled to damages? [51] Finally, the plaintiff has also prayed for damages in his claim against the defendant. However the plaintiff has not adduced any evidence whatsoever to show the loss for which the damages are being claimed. Neither is this prayer adequately dealt with in the plaintiff's written submissions. [52] It is settled law that in a claim for damages, it is not sufficient for the plaintiff to merely state the amount of damages that he is claiming, for he must prove the damage that he had in fact suffered to the satisfaction of the Court. The plaintiff must therefore adduce at least sufficient evidence to enable the Court to make a fair and reasonable assumption of loss. The often quoted dictum of Lord Goddard CJ in Bonham Carter v Hyde Park Hotel [1948] TLR 177 would be most apt in the context, and it is worth reiterating what had been said, as follows:- “Plaintiffs must understand that, if they bring actions for damages it is for them to prove their damage; it is not enough to write down particulars and, so to speak, throw them at the head of the court, saying: ‘This is what I have lost, I ask you give me these damages’. They have to prove it”. [53] I am also guided by the Federal Court case of Datuk Mohd Ali Bin Hj Abdul Majid & Anor (Both Practising As Messrs Mohd Ali & Co.) v Public Bank Berhad [2014] 6 CLJ 269 where it was held by His Lordship Arifin Zakaria CJ as follows:- Page 15 of 16 “[32] It is trite law that a claimant claiming damages must prove that he has suffered the damage. The claimant has the burden of proving both liability and quantum of damages, before he can recover the sum claimed. This follows from the general rule that the burden of proving a fact is upon him who alleges it and not upon him who denies it, so that where a particular allegation forms an essential part of a person's case, the proof of such allegation falls on him. (See s. 103 of the Evidence Act 1950). If he fails to prove both the liability and the quantum of damages, he loses the action. [33] Therefore, in a claim for damages, it is not sufficient for the plaintiff to merely state the amount of damages that he is claiming, he must prove the damage that he had in fact suffered to the satisfaction of the court. This principle is borne out in the case of Bonham-Carter v. Hyde Park Hotel [1948] 64 TLR 177 where Lord Goddard CJ observed: ……………………. This statement was cited with approval by Edgar Joseph JR FCJ in Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat & Anor v. Plenitude Holdings Sdn Bhd [1995] 1 CLJ 15; [1994] 3 MLJ 777. [34] The claim by the plaintiff in the present case is for general and special damages arising out of breach of contract and/or negligence. Therefore, the burden rests on the plaintiff to prove the damages and it is not sufficient for the plaintiff to merely assert that he had suffered such damages without proving it. (See The Susquehanna [1926] AC 655 and Bolag v. Hutchison [1905] AC 515). In the circumstances, we hold that the learned High Court Judge was right in ordering that summary judgment be entered on liability with damages to be assessed. (See Dummer v. Brown and Another [1953] 1 QB 710; Tan Ah Chim & Sons Sdn Bhd lwn. Lim Kean Siew Dan Lain-Lain [2000] 1 LNS 206; [2000] 6 MLJ 670)”. [54] In fact, in the instant case, the plaintiff has not even written the particulars of the alleged loss, let alone attempted to prove it. The plaintiff has not even prayed the amount of damages he is claiming, much less any evidence to support such claim. Neither did the plaintiff demonstrate the basis for his claim for aggravated and exemplary damages. As such, there is no basis for the award of any damages by this Court to the plaintiff. In my judgment, I am constrained therefore to hold that the plaintiff has so patently not on a balance of probabilities sufficiently proven its loss given the lack of evidence. Its claim for general, aggravated and exemplary damages is thus not allowed. Page 16 of 16 Conclusion [55] Accordingly, in the instant case, since there is absolutely no evidence that notice had been personally given to the plaintiff, in violation of the mandatory requirement of Section 96(3) of the RTA, the Order in Suit 373 had clearly been granted contrary to a statutory provision, and must therefore be set aside. I therefore allow the setting aside of the Order in Suit 373 on this basis, with costs. However, the claim for damages is declined. Dated: 18 October 2017 t.t (MOHD NAZLAN BIN MOHD GHAZALI) Judge High Court NCC1 Kuala Lumpur Counsel: Counsel for Plaintiff Datuk R S Sodhi Messrs Sodhi Chambers Kuala Lumpur Counsel for Defendant R.Ratha Messrs S. G. Lingam & Co.