the terms upon which the order and any consequential directions, including as to registration and costs, should be made. D. STATUTORY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK [16] The governing statute is the Trustee Act 1949 [Act 208]. By section 3, "land" means immovable property and includes any interest therein "and also an undivided share of land", and "the Court" means the High Court in Malaya. The subject matter of the application is therefore "land" within the meaning of the Act and within the jurisdiction of this Court. [17] Section 48 confers the power to make vesting orders of land. It opens "In any of the following cases, namely—" and enumerates limbs (a) to (h), upon any of which the Court may make an order " (in this Act called a vesting order) vesting the land or interest therein in any such person in any such manner and for any such interest as the Court may direct". Limb (h) is engaged "where land or any interest therein is vested in a trustee whether by way of charge or otherwise, and it appears to the Court to be expedient". [18] Section 60(1) identifies who may apply. An order under the Act concerning any interest in land subject to a trust "may be made on the application of any person beneficially interested in the land ... or on the application of any person duly appointed trustee thereof". [19] Section 23(1) provides that where a trust is given to or imposed on two or more trustees jointly, it "may be exercised or performed by the survivors or survivor of them for the time being". [20] Three further provisions bear on the form of relief. Section 53 provides that the effect of a vesting order operates, "subject to due compliance with the requirements of the laws relating to the registration of interests in land", as if the persons formerly entitled had executed all proper conveyances. Section 66 provides that an order under the Act is a complete indemnity to all persons acting upon it. Section 62 empowers the Court to order the costs of a vesting application to be borne as it thinks just. The manner in which a vesting order is brought onto the register is in turn governed by the land law. Section 420 of the National Land Code is directed specifically to the registration of vesting orders, and section 417 confers upon the Court its general authority over the Pendaftar Hakmilik and the Pentadbir Tanah. It is these provisions, and not the joinder of the registering authority as a party, that furnish the Court with power to make an order which the authority is bound to give effect to. [21] The remaining law engaged is not seriously in contest and need be stated only shortly. The rule in Saunders v Vautier (1841) 4 Beav 115 (Rolls Court, England) that a beneficiary who is sui juris and absolutely entitled may require the trustee to transfer the trust property to him has long formed part of the trust law applied in Malaysia, though it is not necessary to the determination of a trust limited to subsist "until ... majority", which determines by effluxion of its own terms. It confirms only, a fortiori, that the beneficiaries may call for the property once absolutely entitled. E. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION Issue (a): jurisdiction and standing [22] The first question is whether the Court has power to make the order and whether the applicant may seek it. The vesting jurisdiction in section 48 is exercisable over "land", which by section 3 includes an undivided share of land. The trust property is 10/27 undivided shares in each of three registered titles. It is "land" within the Act, and the jurisdiction is engaged. [23] As to standing, section 60(1) admits an application by a person "duly appointed trustee". The applicant was appointed trustee by the Deed of Trust (Exhibit "C"), and section 23(1) confirms that, upon the death of the co-trustee, the surviving trustee may exercise the trust. It is necessary, however, to distinguish two questions which section 23(1) does not answer together. The devolution of the office and powers of the trusteeship is governed by that subsection: on the death of one of two trustees the trust may be performed by the survivor. The devolution of the legal estate is a distinct matter, upon which section 23(1) is silent. As to that, trustees hold the trust property as joint tenants, so that on the death of one the trust estate passes to the survivor by the right of survivorship, and not to the personal representatives of the deceased trustee. The distinction has practical importance here, for the late Tan Ah Ngan held in two capacities: as trustee of the 10/27 share now in question, and personally as owner of a separate 9/27 share. As to the trust share the legal estate devolved upon the applicant as surviving trustee; the personal share devolves through her estate and is, rightly, no part of this application. That the register continues to record both names is a matter of registration only, to be regularised under the National Land Code; it does not displace the survivor's entitlement, and the vesting order, taking effect under section 53 as a conveyance by all persons formerly entitled, vests title in the beneficiaries without the register first being regularised as between the trustees. In my judgment the applicant has standing both as the surviving trustee and as the person in whom the legal estate is now vested. The beneficiaries, who could themselves have applied under section 60(1), have given their consent. [24] It follows that the Court has jurisdiction and that the applicant has standing. Issue (b): maintainability — the misdescription and the ex parte mode [25] The intitulement of the originating summons refers to "Seksyen 48(h) Akta Pemegang Amanah 1947". There is no Trustee Act of 1947. The empowering statute is the Trustee Act 1949, as its long title and section 1 make plain; and because the vesting jurisdiction is a creature of that Act, it is right that an originating summons seeking a vesting order should identify the empowering provision correctly. [26] The question is whether the misdescription is fatal. The section and paragraph relied upon section 48(h) are correctly stated; only the year of the Act is wrong; and the substance of the relief is unmistakable. A misdescription of that kind is a misnomer. It is an irregularity, not a defect going to jurisdiction. Order 7 rule 2(1A) of the Rules of Court 2012 requires that an originating summons state in its intitulement any provision of written law under which the Court is moved, so that the misdescription is properly understood as a non-compliance with that rule. By Order 2 rule 1 of the Rules of Court 2012 a failure to comply with the rules does not nullify the proceedings, and the Court may cure the non-compliance; by Order 20 the Court may allow amendment. The governing consideration is whether the irregularity has occasioned injustice. The application being unopposed and the substance plain, none arises. The defect is curable by amendment of the intitulement, which the Court would require as a condition of relief rather than treat as a bar. [27] As to the ex parte mode, nothing in section 48 or section 60 requires a vesting application to be brought inter partes, and applications of this nature are commonly commenced ex parte. The matter requiring attention is the prayer seeking a direction addressed to the land registering authority, which is not a party. Section 53 provides that the effect of a vesting order is "subject to due compliance with the requirements of the laws relating to the registration of interests in land". The order therefore does not displace the registration machinery of the National Land Code; it operates as a conveyance, leaving registration to be effected under that Code, and section 66 protects the registering authority in acting upon it. The appropriate course is accordingly to grant the vesting order and to direct that it be presented for registration in accordance with the National Land Code, rather than to compel the authority as though it were a party. So framed, the ex parte character of the application presents no obstacle, though the Court would direct that the order be served on the Land Administrator. The land law furnishes the vehicle for that course. Section 420 of the National Land Code is directed specifically to the registration of vesting orders, and section 417 confers the Court's general authority over the Pendaftar Hakmilik and the Pentadbir Tanah; together they enable the Court to make a registrable order binding upon the registering authority without that authority being joined as a party. [28] The originating summons is therefore maintainable, subject to amendment of the intitulement and to the registration direction being framed consistently with section 53. Issue (c): expediency under section 48(h) and the shares [29] The dispositive question is whether the condition in section 48(h) is satisfied: that the land is vested in a trustee, and that a vesting order appears to the Court expedient. [30] The first element is established. The 10/27 undivided shares are vested in the applicant as surviving trustee. That appears from the Deed of Trust (Exhibit "C") and is confirmed by the register as disclosed in the searches (Exhibit "E"), which record the shares as held "sebagai Pemegang Amanah". [31] Whether a vesting order is expedient turns first on the true construction of the trust. By Exhibit "C" the shares were held for the five children in equal shares "until they shall attain the age of majority". The limitation fixes the time at which the beneficiaries are to receive the property; it does not render their entitlement contingent in substance. Upon the beneficiaries attaining majority the determining event stipulated by the instrument occurred, and the trust period expired according to its own terms. Each beneficiary thereupon became absolutely and indefeasibly entitled to a 2/27 share, and the trust became a bare trust under which the only remaining duty of the trustee is to convey the legal estate to the beneficiaries upon demand. The same conclusion follows, a fortiori, from the rule in Saunders v Vautier (1841) 4 Beav 115 (Rolls Court, England), applied in Malaysia, under which a beneficiary who is sui juris and absolutely entitled may in any event require the trustee to transfer the trust property; but the result rests on the expiry of the trust period by the express terms of the instrument, and does not depend upon that rule. [32] The beneficiaries having all attained majority, the purpose of the trust is spent. It is plainly expedient that the legal estate follow the equitable entitlement and be vested in those now absolutely entitled. Three features reinforce that conclusion: the co-trustee has died, so that the shares are now held by a sole survivor; the trust instrument is some forty-five years old; and a vesting order furnishes the beneficiaries with a clean and registrable title. The consent recorded in the consent affidavit places beyond doubt that the order accords with the beneficiaries' wishes. In my judgment it appears expedient, within section 48(h), that the shares be vested in the beneficiaries. [33] It is right to confirm that limb (h) is the correct gateway, for the other limbs of section 48 do not fit these facts. There is no appointment of a new trustee, so limb (a) is not engaged. The surviving trustee is neither under disability, nor out of the jurisdiction, nor untraceable, so limb (b) does not apply. There is no uncertainty as to which trustee survived, nor as to whether the last trustee is living, so limbs (c) and (d) are inapplicable. There has been no wilful refusal or neglect to convey for twenty-eight days after a requirement to do so, so limb (g) is not in point. Limb (h), which rests upon expediency, is the apt provision, and is the provision the applicant has invoked. [34] A surviving trustee may, under section 23(1), execute a transfer to beneficiaries who are absolutely entitled without an order of court, and it might be asked whether a vesting order is necessary at all. The answer is that necessity is not the statutory test; expediency is. Where the registered description is that of trustees, one of whom has died, and where a clean registrable title is sought after the passage of many years, resort to the vesting jurisdiction is expedient; and the order carries with it the effect conferred by section 53 and the indemnity conferred by section 66. The availability of a transfer by the surviving trustee does not render the order inappropriate. [35] As to the shares, the Deed provides for equal shares among five beneficiaries. Ten twenty-sevenths divided equally among five yields a share of 2/27 to each beneficiary in each of the three titles. That accords with the Schedule to the originating summons, and the vesting will be ordered accordingly. [36] One discrepancy in the materials must be addressed, since the order will direct a change to the register and identity must be exact. Paragraph 6 of the supporting affidavit records the identity card number of the third beneficiary, Goh Soh Teng, as 671009 04-5342, whereas both the Schedule to the originating summons and the consent affidavit record it as 671009-04-5432. Although the latter figure is corroborated in two places, it would not be right for the Court to determine, on the affidavit evidence alone, which is the correct national registration identity number. The beneficiary will accordingly be identified in the order by name, and the correct number established by production of documentary identification to the satisfaction of the registering authority before the order is extracted or registered. This concerns the accuracy of the order and does not bear upon the merits. A like divergence touches the name of the fourth beneficiary, recorded in the Deed of Trust (Exhibit "C") as Goh Soh Lin but in the written submissions as Goh Soh Lim. As the Deed of Trust is the operative instrument and the source of the beneficiaries' entitlement, the Court adopts the spelling it bears, namely Goh Soh Lin, the correct spelling to be confirmed, if need be, by documentary identification before extraction or registration of the order. [37] The condition in section 48(h) is therefore satisfied, and it is expedient that the 10/27 undivided shares be vested in the five beneficiaries in equal shares of 2/27 each. Issue (d): relief, registration and costs [38] For the reasons given under issue (b), the order vesting the shares will provide that a sealed copy may be lodged for registration in accordance with the National Land Code, rather than direct the registering authority, which is not a party, to register it. The Pendaftar Hakmilik and the Pentadbir Tanah are entitled to act upon the order, and to the protection afforded by section 66 of the Trustee Act 1949, which operates by force of the statute itself and not by any conferral of this Court. A sealed copy of the order will be served on the Pentadbir Tanah. The authority to provide for registration in this manner is found in the land law itself: section 420 of the National Land Code governs the registration of vesting orders, and section 417 confers the Court's general authority over the Pendaftar Hakmilik and the Pentadbir Tanah. [39] Section 62 empowers the Court to order the costs of a vesting application to be borne as it thinks just. The originating summons asks that costs be borne by the named beneficiaries in equal shares. As the beneficiaries take the benefit of the order, and the application is unopposed, that is the just order. F. CONCLUSION [40] Drawing the threads together: the Court is vested with jurisdiction under section 48 of the Trustee Act 1949 and the applicant has standing under section 60; the misdescription of the empowering statute and the ex parte mode are not fatal, but fall to be addressed by amendment of the intitulement and by framing the registration direction in accordance with section 53; and, on the true construction of the Deed of Trust and on the undisputed facts, it is expedient within section 48(h) that the 10/27 undivided shares be vested in the five beneficiaries in equal shares of 2/27 each. The application accordingly succeeds, upon the terms set out below. G. ORDERS OF THE COURT [41] It is ordered that: