GOOI & AZURA v Pendakwa Raya (WA-42(Ors)-9-06/2025)

1.

GENNEVA MALAYSIA SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 592576-A]

TAN LIANG KEAT (No. K/P: 720118075127)

LIM KAH HENG (No. K/P:711115085923)

NG POH WENG (No. K/P: 501011105541)

PHILIP LIM JIT MENG (No. K/P: 571207105715)

AHMAD KHAIRUDDIN BIN ILIAS (No. K/P: 580808075421) ...RESPONDEN Dalam perkara Mahkamah Sesyen Jenayah (3) di Kuala Lumpur Permohonan Jenayah No. WA-64-46-02/2025 Di antara Tetuan Gooi & Azura lwn Pendakwa Raya & lain-lain lagi) 10/05/2026 10:26:40 WA-42(Ors)-9-06/2025 Kand. 26 ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Lampiran 1)

In adalah satu rayuan terhadap keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen menolak permohonan Perayu untuk mencelah dalam prosiding pihak ketiga di dalam satu Permohonan Pelbagai Jenayah No: WA-64-137-10/2020 (“permohonan 137”) oleh Pendakwa Raya untuk pelupusan dan pelucuthakkan harta di bawah seksyen 407 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah (“KTJ”). Permohonan untuk mencelah ini bagi membolehkan bakal pencelah menuntut kos bayaran kepeguaman setelah mewakili Responden 2 hingga Responden 6 (yang dinamakan di atas) dalam prosiding di hadapan Mahkamah Sesyen, Mahkamah Tinggi dan Mahkamah Rayuan.

Kesemua Responden (Pendakwa Raya dikecualikan kerana Pendakwa Raya pihak yang membawa prosiding jenayah terhadap Responden-Responden lain) telah dituduh dengan pertuduhan seksyen 25(1) Akta Bank dan Institusi-Institusi Kewangan 1989 (“ABIK” singkatan Bahasa Malaysia atau “BAFIA” dalam Bahasa Inggeris sebagaimana dirujuk dalam Perintah Mahkamah). Responden turut dituduh dengan pertuduhan seksyen 4(1) Akta Pencegahan Penggubahan Wang Haram dan Pencegahan Pembiayaan Keganasan 2001 (“AMLATFA”), ia termasuk 8 yang lain. 8 yang lain ini bukan menjadi pihak kepada permohonan 137 ini.

Pertuduhan terhadap Responden 2 hingga Responden 6 (termasuk Responden 7) diperturunkan secara umum adalah seperti berikut: Offence of accepting deposit without a valid licence “Bahawa (nama tertuduh) di antara (tarikh kesalahan dikatakan telah dilakukan) di (tempat kesalahan dikatakan telah dilakukan) telah menerima deposit daripada orang awam melalui suatu akaun semasa bernombor (nombor akaun) di (nama bank) tanpa suatu lesen yang sah yang diberikan di bawah subseksyen 6(4) Akta Bank dan Institusi-Institusi Kewangan 1989 melalui satu skim yang melibatkan transaksi emas dan bahawa kamu pada masa berlakunya kesalahan penerimaan deposit tanpa lesen sah tersebut adalah pengarah syarikat tersebut dan oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 25 (1) Akta Bank dan Institusi-Institusi Kewangan 1989 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 103(1)(a) Akta yang sama dibaca bersama Nombor Siri 20 dalam Jadual Keempat Akta yang sama.” Being a director of the company who accepted deposit without a valid licence “Bahawa (nama tertuduh) di antara ( tarikh kesalahan dikatakan telah dilakukan) di (tempat kesalahan dikatakan telah dilakukan) telah menerima deposit daripada orang awam melalui suatu akaun semasa bernombor (nombor akaun) di (nama bank) tanpa suatu lesen yang sah yang diberikan di bawah subseksyen 6(4) Akta Bank dan Institusi-Institusi Kewangan 1989 melalui satu skim yang melibatkan transaksi emas dan bahawa kamu pada masa berlakunya kesalahan penerimaan deposit tanpa lesen sah tersebut adalah pengarah syarikat tersebut dan oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 25 (1) Akta Bank dan Institusi-Institusi Kewangan 1989 dibaca bersama seksyen 106 (1) Akta yang sama dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 103(1 )(a) Akta yang sama dibaca bersama Nombor Siri 20 dalam Jadual Keempat Akta yang sama.”

Berdasarkan alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Tinggi terdahulu yang mendengar rayuan daripada keputusan lepas bebas oleh Mahkamah Sesyen, terdapat 1,394 pertuduhan terhadap 14 tertuduh untuk kesalahan di bawah seksyen 4(1) AMLATFA.

Terdapat 7 tertuduh untuk pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 25(1) BAFIA dan terdapat 25 tertuduh untuk pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 4(1) AMLATFA. 6 daripada 7 tertuduh dipanggil membela diri bagi pertuduhan di bawah BAFIA manakala 13 tertuduh daripada 25 dipanggil membela diri di bawah pertuduhan AMLATFA. Di akhir kes pembelaan, kesemua tertuduh dilepas dan dibebaskan daripada kedua-dua pertuduhan oleh Mahkamah Bicara.

Atas rayuan Pendakwa Raya, Mahkamah Tinggi telah mengetepikan perintah lepas bebas di akhir kes pembelaan dan digantikan dengan sabitan. Mahkamah Rayuan telah mengekalkan sabitan terhadap kesemua tertuduh melainkan tertuduh Yao Kee Boon yang dibebaskan daripada sabitan di bawah seksyen 4(1) AMLATFA.

Rayuan Perayu terhadap perintah Mahkamah Sesyen menolak permohonan untuk mencelah, telah ditolak oleh Mahkamah ini. Mahkamah ini telah mengekalkan keputusan Mahkamah Sesyen. Dalam menolak rayuan ini, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa harta yang dirampas bukan merupakan harta Responden sebaliknya adalah “proceeds of unlawful activity”. Remedy yang ada terhadap Perayu adalah memfailkan “proof of debt” kerana Responden 2 telahpun digulung.

Ia bukanlah harta Responden 2 menurut seksyen 407 KTJ mahupun di bawah seksyen 44(3) AMLATFA. Mahkamah ini turut memutuskan terikat dengan prinsip di dalam kes Tetuan Wan Shahrizal, Hari & Co v PP [2023] 4MLJ 1 (MP) yang memutuskan “legislative object of the Act (AMLATFA) is paramount”, lebih-lebih lagi dalam kes ini sabitan telah diputuskan terhadap Responden-Responden di atas bagi kedua-dua pertuduhan. A. Latarbelakang kes

Pada 16.3.2017, Mahkamah Sesyen telah melepas dan membebaskan Responden 2 hingga Responden 7 daripada kedua-dua pertuduhan. Namun atas rayuan Pendakwa Raya, Mahkamah Tinggi telah mengetepikan keputusan ini pada 4.8.2020. Mahkamah Tinggi, telah mensabitkan mereka. Mahkamah Rayuan juga pada 29.10.2024 telah mengekalkan sabitan sebagaimana yang diperincikan di para 4 hingga 6 Alasan Penghakiman di atas.

Tetuan Gooi & Azura di peringkat Mahkamah Rayuan, mewakili 2 Responden baru yang sebelum ini diwakili peguam lain. Mahkamah Rayuan turut memerintahkan untuk perintah terhadap kesemua harta yang disita dikembalikan ke Mahkamah Sesyen untuk didengar dan diputuskan.

Ini membawa kepada Permohonan 137 yang difailkan oleh Pendakwa Raya sebelum ini, untuk didengar dan diputuskan. Permohonan ini ialah untuk suatu perintah pelupusan dan pelucuthakan kepada Kerajaan Malaysia di bawah seksyen 407 KTJ bagi wang tunai berjumlah RM1,791,100.00 dan emas seberat 115,660gram yang telah dirampas oleh Bank Negara Malaysia di bawah Akta Bank dan Institusi Kewangan 1989 (“ABIK”). Permohonan ini telah digantung prosiding sementara menunggu pelupusan rayuan di Mahkamah Rayuan.

Jumlah kos kepeguaman oleh bakal pencelah yang ingin dituntut melalui permohonan 137 ini ialah RM10,704,960.00 yang merupakan tuntutan yuran guaman bagi perkhidmatan guaman yang diberikan kepada Syarikat Genneva Malaysia Sdn. Bhd dan lainnya bermula dari Mahkamah Sesyen hingga ke Mahkamah Rayuan.

Perayu menghujahkan seksyen 407 KTJ tidak terpakai sebaliknya satu inkuiri perlu diadakan menurut seksyen 407(2) yang membolehkan tuanpunya sebenar dan/atau atau pihak yang mempunyai “legitimate legal interest” terhadap harta atau “property” tersebut, didengar.

Terlebih dahulu, Mahkamah ini mengambil maklum bahawa seksyen 25 BAFIA (pada masa kini seksyen 137 Financial Services Act 2013 [Act 758]) adalah termasuk dalam senarai kes-kes “serious offence” di bawah seksyen 3 Jadual 2

Berbalik kepada hujahan pihak Perayu, pihak Perayu meletakkan Perayu sebagai ‘bona fide third party” di bawah seksyen 61 AMLATFA yang memperuntukkan: Section 61. Bona fide third parties

(a) the claimant has a legitimate legal interest in the property;

(b) no participation, collusion or involvement with respect to the offence under subsection 4(1) or Part IVA, or a terrorism financing offence which is the object of the proceedings can be imputed to the claimant;

(c) the claimant lacked knowledge and was not intentionally ignorant of the illegal use of the property, or if he had knowledge, did not freely consent to its illegal use;

(d) the claimant did not acquire any right in the property from a person proceeded against under circumstances that give rise to a reasonable inference that any right was transferred for the purpose of avoiding the eventual subsequent forfeiture of the property; and

(e) the claimant did all that could reasonably be expected to prevent the illegal use of the property”.

Semasa pendengaran di Mahkamah Rayuan, Responden 2 iaitu syarikat Genneva Malaysia Sdn Bhd telah digulung pada 7.12.2022 dengan Tetuan Mohanna & Co dilantik sebagai peguam bagi pihak Genneva Malaysia Sdn Bhd. Lantikan dibuat oleh penyelesai (“liquidator”) iaitu A. James Insolvency Services untuk mengambil alih dan mewakili Responden 2 dalam permohonan 137 ini.

Atas lantikan ini, Tetuan Mohanna & Co membuat anggapan kebenaran tidak perlu dipohon. Isu ini bukanlah isu yang perlu diputuskan oleh Mahkamah ini. Tetapi fakta bahawa Responden 2 telah digulung adalah relevan kerana Pemohon Perayu turut memfailkan borang tuntutan hutang “Proof of Debt”. Tuntutan “proof of debt” ini akan dikendalikan oleh penyelesai terhadap asset termasuk harta “property” syarikat.

Sebagai tambahan, bagi tujuan tuntutan melalui pemfailan “Proof of Debt” juga, seksyen 483 Akta Syarikat 2016 memperuntukkan hanya harta milik syarikat sahaja yang akan diletakhakkan pada penyelesai. Seksyen 483 menyatakan seperti berikut: “Section 483. Custody and vesting of company’s property

Dengan sabitan yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap syarikat, maka tugas penyelesai hanyalah untuk berurusan mengendalikan harta milik syarikat dan bukan harta yang berkait dengan perlakuan jenayah seksyen 25(1) ABIK dan seksyen 4(1) AMLATFA, yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi dan Mahkamah Rayuan.

Seksyen 407 KTJ yang juga mempunyai takrifan pada perkataan “property” memperuntukkan seperti berikut: Section 407. Order for disposal of property regarding which offence committed.

Seksyen 44(3) AMLATFA yang disandarkan oleh peguam Perayu yang dihujahkan sebagai memberikan hak dan keutamaan kepadanya untuk mengemukakan tuntutan dalam permohonan 137 ini, pula menyatakan: Section 44. Freezing of property

(a) an investigation with regard to an unlawful activity has commenced against that person; and

(b) either—

(i) the enforcement agency has reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence under subsection 4(1) or a terrorism financing offence has been or is being or is about to be committed by that person; or

(a) an order to direct that the property, or such part of the property as is specified in the order, is not to be disposed of, or otherwise dealt with, by any person, except in such manner and in such circumstances, if any, as are specified in the order;

(b) an order to authorize any of its officers to take custody and control of the property, or such part of the property as is specified in the order if the enforcement agency is satisfied that the circumstances so require;

(c) where custody and control of the property is taken under paragraph

(b), an order to authorise any of its officers to sell any frozen moveable property by a public auction or in such other manner as may be practicable if the enforcement agency is of the opinion that the property is liable to speedy decay or deterioration;

(d) an order to authorise any of its officers to hold the proceeds of the sale, after deducting therefrom the costs and expenses of the maintenance and sale of the property sold under paragraph (c); and

(e) an order as to the manner in which the property should be administered or dealt with.

(a) determining any dispute as to the ownership of or other interest in the property or any part of it;

(b) its’ proper administration during the period of the order;

(c) the payment of the costs of that person to defend criminal proceedings against him.

Perkataan “proceeds of an unlawful activity” turut merangkumi perkataan “property” dan AMLATFA memperuntukkan maksudnya seperti berikut: “proceeds of an unlawful activity” means any property, or any economic advantage or economic gain from such property, within or outside Malaysia—

(a) which is wholly or partly—

(i) derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person from any unlawful activity;

(b) which, wholly or partly, due to any circumstances such as its nature, value, location or place of discovery, or to the time, manner or place of its acquisition, or the person from whom it was acquired, or its proximity to other property referred to in subparagraph (a)(i), (ii) or (iii), can be reasonably believed to be property falling within the scope of subparagraph (a) (i), (ii) or (iii); “property” means—

(a) assets of every kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, moveable or immovable, tangible or intangible, however acquired; or

(b) legal documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, including currency, bank credits, deposits and other financial resources, traveller’s cheques, bank cheques, money orders, capital market products, drafts and letters of credit, whether situated within or outside Malaysia, and includes a legal or equitable interest, whether full or partial, in any such property;

Mahkamah ini turut dirujuk kepada kes Chu Beow Hin v PP [1981] 2MLJ 85 (MT) yang membincangkan seksyen 407 KTJ dan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan tafsiran seksyen 407 KTJ seperti berikut: “In what circumstances can goods under section 407 be forfeited? I think it is confined to those goods which are by themselves an offence for anyone to own or possess or to have custody e.g. drugs, dangerous weapons, smuggles goods. But I am of the opinion that the court does not have jurisdiction to order the forfeiture of a motor taxi for instance where the driver is convicted for dangerous driving as this is not provided for under the Road Traffic Ordinance. … In the circumstances, in the absence of any express provision of the Price Control Act, the court can only exercise the provisions of section 407 of the Criminal Procedure Code as to the disposal of properties and in the circumstances of this case the lower court has no discretionary power to forfeit the cloths seized from the appellant’s shop under the Price Control Act and such powers should be exercised under section 407 of the Criminal Procedure Code under which in this case there is no discretionary power to forfeit. As such … I order that the goods be returned to the appellant.”

Keputusan Chu Beow Hin (MT) sebenarnya disahkan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam PP v Chu Beow Hin [1982] CLJ Rep 288 (MP) setakat Akta “Price Control Act” adalah Akta yang spesifik maka prinsip “generalibus specialia derogant” terpakai. Mahkamah ini telah meneliti alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Chu Beow Hin dan menuras intipatinya (“extract the core”) yang membincangkan peruntukan dalam Akta “Price Control Act 1946” dan seksyen 407 KTJ.

Bersandarkan kepada prinsip yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan, Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan pihak pendakwaan iaitu dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini, AMLATFA adalah suatu Akta yang khusus manakala seksyen 407 KTJ adalah satu peruntukan umum, ini adalah selari dengan keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam Chu Beow Hin sebagaimana dipetik di bawah.

Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam penghakiman oleh Raja Azlan Shah (“acting LP” ketika itu) memutuskan Mahkamah Tinggi yang mendengar rayuan telah khilaf apabila memutuskan Akta “Price Control Act 1946” tidak mempunyai peruntukan berhubung pelucuthakan, sebaliknya memakai seksyen 407 KTJ sedangkan seksyen 14(2) jelas mengandungi peruntukan pelucuthakan harta ini.

Seksyen 14(2) memperuntukkan:

(a) if, within thirty days of the seizure, no proceedings are instituted against any person for an offence alleged to have been committed in relation to those goods, the goods and accompanying appliances shall be restored to the person from whom they were seized if he can be found and, if not, shall be disposed of as may be directed by a Magistrate; or

(b) if, within thirty days of the seizure, proceedings are instituted against any person, the goods and accompanying appliances may be forfeited or otherwise disposed of in such manner as the Court may direct”.

Raja Azlan Shah (“acting LP”) menyatakan seperti berikut: “On appeal the learned Judge held that the Court had no discretionary power to order forfeiture. He noted that there is no separate provision for forfeiture or confiscation in the Price Control Act s. 22 of which is silent in this respect. … The decision of the learned Judge rested on the basis that there is no express provision regarding forfeiture. That seems to us to involve implying something wholly inconsistent with the words expressly used in s. 14(2)(b). … Forfeiture clauses are common in penal statutes. They can of course take many forms. We reiterate that there are cogent reasons of policy why the Price Control Act was passed. It provides for a forfeiture provision as an added penalty because we think that Parliament must have intended that a limited penalty without the forfeiture clause may prove illusory to remedy the mischief. Lastly, we need to say something on the provision of s. 407 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Judge seems to think it applies in the present case because there is no express provision in the said Act regarding forfeiture. Section 407 enacts that the Court's power to order forfeiture is "subject to any special provisions relating to forfeiture contained in the written law under which the conviction was had." That in our opinion is a general provision. The Price Control Ordinance 1946, the precursor to the Price Control Act was passed subsequently and brought into effect on 1 October 1946. It is a special enactment, and in passing it the Legislature had its intention directed to the special case which the statute was meant to meet, and considered and provided for all the circumstances of the special case. Where a special provision is made in a special statute that special provision excludes the operation of a general provision in the general law _ generalibus specialia derogant. Therefore the Price Control Act deals with a special case and to that extent the general provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code do not affect its operation”.

Ini menyaksikan merit dalam hujahan pihak pendakwaan bahawa apabila ada peruntukan khusus di dalam AMLATFA, maka peruntukan khusus tersebut adalah terpakai atas prinsip “generalibus specialia derogant” atau difrasakan secara negative “generalibus specialia non derogant”. Dalam kes semasa, tiada peruntukan pelucuthakan harta maka seksyen 407 KJT adalah terpakai.

Peguam Perayu membawa perhatian Mahkamah ini kepada kes Guan Hin Enterprise (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v PP [2015] CLJU 1522 (MR) di mana David Wong JCA (ketika itu) yang bersetuju dengan kes Chu Beow Hin (supra) apabila menyatakan seperti berikut: “25. We agree with the view of the learned Judge in Ngeranter Ripal v. Public Prosecutor [1990] 2 CLJ (Rep) 530 where he stated that forfeiture imposes a severe and harsh penalty. That being the case there is little doubt in our mind that forfeiture is a form of punishment and such punishment must be clearly provided for in the offended Act.

It is undisputed that the Money Services Business Act 2011 does not contain any provision on forfeiture. The punishment is only one of fine or imprisonment or both. The intention of the Legislature is thus clear. Forfeiture is not contemplated at all as a form of punishment for the offender. Hence, we say that P15A-G prima facie should not be forfeited”.

Meskipun demikian, Mahkamah Rayuan dalam Guan Hin Enterprise memutuskan seperti di bawah: “22. From our reading of the above cases, it is our view that Courts have under section 407 CPC a general discretion to forfeit property as described therein, ie, regarding which any offence appears to have been committed or which has been used for commission of any offence. …

This brings us to the question whether exhibit P15A-G can be considered as "property" within the meaning of section 407 CPC. What we have here is an offence of carrying on business of money changing without the appropriate licence. The relevant act is the act of "carrying on business" without licence. But can the 1st Appellant carry on its business without P15A-G. It can be argued with some force that it cannot for the simple reason that one cannot carry on the business of money changing without money.

That said, it is undisputed that P15A-G is not illegally obtained money. In other words, they are legitimate money belonging to the 1st Appellant and used by it for its business… …

Accordingly, we opine that where the property is not illegally obtained as in P1[5]A-G, the Courts can only forfeit the same when there is a specific provision in law for such forfeiture as say in the Customs Act 1967 and the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001. Conclusion:

This is simply a case where the general provision of forfeiture in section 407 CPC must be construed strictly as forfeiture amounts to some form of punishment which affects the liberty and proprietary rights of a person. Here we simply find that there is no specific provision for forfeiture of property of a nature to that of P1[5]A-G under the Money Services Business Act 2011. Hence, we say that the Learned Judge had erred when he ordered the forfeiture of P1[5]A-G for the simple reason that he had no such power to do so.”

Oleh itu, boleh disimpulkan bahawa keputusan kes Guan Hin Enterprise memberi fokus kepada takrifan “property” di bawah seksyen 407 KTJ dan ini membawa kepada keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan untuk seksyen 407 KTJ dibaca secara cermat dan “strictly”. Ia bukanlah otoriti untuk menyatakan seksyen 407 KTJ tidak boleh digunapakai apabila Akta di mana pertuduhan dibawa, tidak mempunyai peruntukan spesifik pelucuthakan.

Ini adalah kerana jika Akta khusus tersebut mempunyai peruntukan pelucuthakan, maka semestinya pelucuthakan di bawah Akta spesifik tersebut terpakai tanpa perlu rujukan dibuat kepada KTJ. Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Guan Hin Enterprise juga membuat rujukan kepada seksyen 407 KTJ bagi mencapai keputusan jika eksibit yang menjadi subjek pertuduhan adalah suatu “property” menurut takrifan di bawah seksyen 407 KTJ sebelum Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan ia tidak jatuh dalam definisi “property” di bawah seksyen 407 KTJ.

Oleh itu, untuk membolehkan harta yang tidak diperolehi secara salah, dilucuthakan kerana dikatakan bersangkut dengan kesalahan (dalam kes ini wang “P15A-G” yang digunakan dalam menjalankan kesalahan “money changing without licence”), perlu peruntukan yang jelas dalam Akta berkenaan dengan mengambil contoh Akta Kastam dan AMLATFA.

Peruntukan Akta Kastam dan AMLATFA diperincikan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Guan Hin Enterprise ini seperti berikut: “24 … In the Customs Act 1967, the provision for forfeiture is set out in section 126 which reads as follow: Goods liable to seizure liable to forfeiture All goods liable to seizure under this Act, shall be liable to forfeiture. In the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 the forfeiture provision is found in the following provisions: Forfeiture of detained cash or bearer negotiable instruments

28L.(1) Subject to section 61, in any prosecution for an offence under this Part, the court shall make an order for the forfeiture of the cash, bearer negotiable instruments or any other thing which is proved to be the subject-matter or evidence relating to the commission of the offence as it considers appropriate notwithstanding that no person may have been convicted of such offence.

Mahkamah ini berpendapat, harta-harta ini bukanlah harta milik tertuduh sebaliknya adalah suatu harta yang bersangkut dengan kesalahan dan/atau berupa “proceeds of unlawful activity” kerana harta-harta ini tidak dilepaskan di bawah peruntukan BAFIA. Seksyen 83 mempunyai peruntukan lanjut berhubung harta-harta yang dirampas seperti berikut khususnya seksyen 83(5)(b): Section 83. Powers of entry, search and seizure.

(a) enter any premises and there search for, seize and detain any property, book or other document;

(b) inspect, make copies of, or take extracts from, any book or other document so seized and detained;

(c) take possession of, and remove from the premises, any property, book or other document so seized and detained;

(d) search any person who is in, or on, such premises, and for the purpose of such search detain such person and remove him to such place as may be necessary to facilitate such search, and seize and detain any property, book or other document found on such person;

(e) break open, examine, and search, any article, container or receptacle; or

(f) stop, detain or search any conveyance.

(a) break open any outer or inner door of such premises and enter thereinto;

(b) forcibly enter such premises and every part thereof;

(c) remove by force any obstruction to such entry, search, seizure, detention or removal as he is empowered to effect; or

(d) detain all or any persons found on any premises, or in any conveyance, searched under subsection (1) until such premises or conveyance have been searched.

(a) on the close of investigations or any proceedings arising therefrom; or

(b) with the prior written consent of any officer of the Bank authorized by the Governor to act on his behalf for this purpose, or of any investigating officer superior to him in rank, at any time before the close of investigations, release any property, book or other document seized, detained or removed by him or any other investigating officer, to such person as he determines to be lawfully entitled to the property, book or other document if he is satisfied that it is not required for the purpose of any prosecution or proceedings under this Act, or for the purpose of any prosecution under any other written law.

Atas alasan-alasan ini, rayuan ini ditolak. Keputusan Mahkamah Bicara menolak permohonan Perayu untuk mencelah dikekalkan. Bertarikh 23 hb April 2026 Sgnd. (NURULHUDA NUR’AINI BINTI MOHAMAD NOR) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR Peguam bagi pihak Perayu :

Gooi Soon Seng

Belinda Low Siet Yen Tetuan Gooi & Azura Peguam bagi pihak Responden 1 :

Norzilati Izhani binti

Zainal @ Zainol Muhammad Azmi bin Mashud

Bank Negara Malaysia

Jabatan Peguam Negara, Bahagian Pendakwaan Putrajaya