Greenclipper Corporation Sdn Bhd v Regal Enterprise Sdn Bhd (WA-22NCvC-469-08/2022)

The trial takes place on 26.4.2024, 17.5.2024, 28.5.2025,

5.2025, 19.7.2025, 25.11.2024 and 26.12.2024. 18/09/2025 09:47:38 WA-22NCvC-469-08/2022 Kand. 109 [3] The Plaintiff calls 2 witnesses and the Defendant calls 3 witnesses for the trial. The list of witnesses is as follows-Plaintiff’s witnesses i. Thian Yin Yin (PW-1); and ii. Lau Cheng Yew (PW-2). Defendant’s witnesses: i. Lim Chee Kiang (DW-1); ii. Wee Kee Kim (DW-2); and iii. Ooi Chun Hau (subpoena witness) (DW-3). [4] At the end of the trial, on a balance of probabilities, this Court allows the Plaintiff’s claim and dismissed the Defendant’s counterclaim. BRIEF FACTS [5] The Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a tenancy agreement dated 12.12.2011 (“Tenancy Agreement”) for the land held under Geran 69717 Lot 682 Seksyen 92 Bandar Kuala Lumpur, District of Kuala Lumpur with postal address at Lot 682, Jalan Metro Pudu, Fraser Business Park, Jalan Yew, 55100 Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur (“Premises”) with a 2 Storey Detached House erected thereon at the rental of RM20,000.00 per month for a term of 3 years from 1.1.2012 untill 31.12.2014 (“First Term”) with the option of renewal for a further term of 3 years. [6] The Tenancy Agreement was then renewed through the Plaintiff’s letter dated 3.6.2015, from 1.1.2015 to 31.12.2017 (“Second Term”). [7] Subsequently, the Tenancy Agreement was extended through the Plaintiff’s letter dated 27.9.2017 at the rental of RM22,000.00 per month for a further term of 3 years commencing from 1.1.2018 until 31.12.2020 (“Third Term”), with an option to renew for a fixed term of 3 years subject to the terms and conditions of the letter dated 27.9.2017 therein. [8] According to the Plaintiff, the Defendant breached the terms and conditions of the Tenancy Agreement by, inter alia, failing to make payment for the sewerage charges to Indah Water Konsortium Sdn Bhd (IWK) since some time in 2016. [9] Despite negotiation and settlements for the outstanding amount, the Defendant failed to make the instalment payments to IWK. Consequently, the Plaintiff had to pay the outstanding sewerage charges amounting to RM192,629.24. [10] The Plaintiff also claims that during the subsistence of the Tenancy Agreement, the Defendant has been always late in making the monthly rental, thus, is in breach of the Tenancy Agreement. [11] According to the Plaintiff, there was also no renewal of the Tenancy Agreement after the Third Term since the Plaintiff and the Defendant did not agree on the terms in the Plaintiff’s letter dated 29.1.2021 (“draft Renewal”) i.e. to renew the Tenancy Agreement for one year from 1.1.2021 to 31.12.2021 (“proposed Fourth Term”) at the rental of RM22,000.00 per month with options to renew two further terms of one year each. However, there was no confirmation and/or acceptance by the Defendant. Hence, the Tenancy Agreement ended on 31.12.2020. [12] The Plaintiff through its solicitor’s letter dated 23.6.2021 terminated the tenancy-at-will and sought the Defendant to deliver vacant possession of the Premises to the Plaintiff in a good and substantial repair and condition within 2 months i.e. on or before 23.8.2021. [13] Later, on 27.8.2021, the Defendant’s solicitors replied alleging that the Defendant had accepted the draft Renewal, and sent a letter dated 3.6.2021. [14] The Plaintiff denied receiving the same and claims that the letter dated 3.6.2021 is a document forged by the Defendant. [15] The Plaintiff claims that if the letter dated 3.6.2021 was genuine, then the Tenancy Agreement would have been renewed until 31.12.2021 and if so, the Defendant needed to pay the outstanding rentals from January 2021 to October 2021. However, no payment was made by the Defendant. Thus, the Plaintiff issued a letter dated 9.11.2021 to the Defendant’s solicitors demanding the Defendant to-i. deliver vacant possession of the Premises to the Plaintiff by 30.11.2021 in a good and substantial repair and condition; ii. pay the outstanding rental; and iii. resolve the sewerage charges with IWK. [16] This was not met by the Defendant. [17] Therefore, the Plaintiff claims against the Defendant as follows- a) Delivery of vacant possession of the Premises to the Plaintiff within 7 days from the date of judgment, delivered in a good and substantial repair and condition; b) Outstanding rental for January 2021 until November 2021 amounting to RM232,000.00 to be paid to the Plaintiff by the Defendant; c) Double rental of RM44,000.00 per month to be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff from December 2021 until the delivery of vacant possession of the Premises; d) The outstanding sewerage charges of RM192,629.24 or any other and further sewerage charges until the delivery of the vacant possession of the Premises to be paid to the Plaintiff by the Defendant; e) Outstanding water charges of RM58.00 as at 23.2.2022 or any other and further water charges until the delivery of the vacant possession of the Premises to be paid to the Plaintiff by the Defendant; f) Any other and further utilities charges incurred by the Defendant until the delivery of the vacant possession of the Premises to be paid to the Plaintiff by the Defendant; g) Interest on the damages at paragraphs (b) to (f) above at the rate of 5% per annum from the date of filing of this suit until the date of full settlement; h) Costs. [18] The Defendant claims that the Defendant had made a payment of RM100,000.00 to the Plaintiff at the time of signing the Tenancy Agreement, which was a tenancy coupled with equity, comprising RM60,000.00 as a security deposit, RM20,000.00 as a utility deposit, and RM20,000.00 as one month's rent. [19] The Defendant also claims that the Defendant is to enjoy a rent-free period of six (6) months or more to carry out renovation and development works at the Premises. Upon the expiry of the rent-free period, the Defendant will begin paying monthly rent of RM20,000.00 under the Tenancy Agreement. In calculating the monthly rental payments, the Plaintiff failed to take into account the RM20,000.00 that was paid by the Defendant at the commencement of the Tenancy Agreement. [20] The Defendant has spent over RM2 million renovating and developing the Premises, which was done with the Plaintiff’s encouragement and assurances of extensions. [21] Via a letter dated 23.6.2021, the Plaintiff attempted to terminate the Tenancy Agreement by issuing invalid notice, despite benefiting from the renovations and improvements made by the Defendant. Hence, the Defendant seeks relief from forfeiture under section 237 of the National Land Code on the basis of equitable principles since the Defendant has invested heavily on the Premises. [22] The Defendant argues that sewerage charges spiked due to the Plaintiff’s failure to appeal against Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur’s (DBKL) revised property valuation. [23] The Defendant has made partial payments of RM11,700.00, RM11,700.00 and RM35,000.00 through Plaintiff as stakeholder. However, these were not forwarded to IWK. [24] Through its counterclaim, the Defendant seeks the following reliefs-i. The Defendant is to be grant relief against forfeiture of the tenancy of Premises; ii. A declaration that the tenancy period be extended until 3.12.2026. Alternatively, iii. The development and building for the entertainment centre erected on the land held at the Premises to be assessed and paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant; iv. Punitive damages; v. General damages; vi. A declaration that the Plaintiff is to indemnify the Defendant against any action taken to to be taken by the sub-tenants against the Defendant for the Premises or any part thereof held under Geran 69717 Lot 682 Seksyen 92 Bandar dan Daerah Kuala Lumpur bearing address Lot 682 Jalan Metyro Pudu, Fraser Business Park, Jalan Yew, 55100 Kuala Lumpur; vii. Interest at the rate of 5% per annum on the judgment sum from the date of action until realisation; viii. Costs Parties’ Contentions [25] Generally, the Plaintiff contended that-i. By failing to pay the outstanding rental until to-date and to pay the IWK sewerage charges, the Defendant had breached the Tenancy Agreement. ii. There was no concluded tenancy agreement after the Tenancy Agreement expired on 31.12.2020. As such, the Tenancy-At-Will continued until the Plaintiff’s termination in June 2021. iii. As a result of the Defendant’s failure to deliver vacant possession of the Premises (and failure to pay any rental until to-date), the Plaintiff is entitled to apply for double rental from December 2021 until the delivery of vacant possession. iv. The Defendant’s tenancy coupled with equity is unproven for the following reasons-

the parties’ relationship was one of contractual in which the Tenancy Agreement spells out the respective contractual obligations;

the “tenancy coupled with equity” runs contrary to the express terms of Tenancy Agreement. As such, the Defendant’s contention is unsubstantiated; and

in any event, the Defendant must come with clean hands in order for it to claim equity. The defendant does not even pay any rental until to-date and is expecting to use the Premises as a free rider. [26] On the other hand, the Defendant contended that-i. The Defendant at all material times informed the Plaintiff of its intention for the option to extend the Tenancy Agreement which can be seen from Whatsapp messages between PW2 and DW1, as early as 22.6.2018. ii. Non-payment of the rental was never an issue between the parties as the only issue raised in the Plaintiff’s letter dated 25.5.2021 was that the notice of exercising the option was not in compliance with the terms and also the issue of IWK. Therefore, the termination of tenancy by the Plaintiff through their solicitor’s letter dated 23.6.2021 is unlawful. iii. Assuming the termination of the Tenancy Agreement by the Plaintiff is lawful, the Defendant had paid a sum of RM20,000.00 as advance rental to the Plaintiff on 25.2.2011. However, this amount was not taken into account by the Plaintiff in their claim. The Plaintiff had also did not set off the deposit sum of RM80,000.00 paid to the Plaintiff prior to the execution of the Tenancy Agreement. iv. A total sum of RM58,500,00 was paid to the Plaintiff but the Plaintiff did not set off the amount in their claim nor did the Plaintiff utilise the monies to pay IWK. v. It is undisputed, that the Defendant had spent monies to put out a business park on the land by increasing the floor area from 4,488 sq. ft to 25,023 sq. ft. By terminating the tenancy, the Defendant thereby suffered losses and damages. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS [27] It is trite law that the onus lies on the Plaintiff to prove his claim in order to succeed against the Defendant pursuant to sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act 1950. (See Datuk Mohd Ali bin Hj Abdul Majid & Anor v. Public Bank Berhad [2014] 4 MLRA 397; [2014] 4 MLJ 465; [2014] 6 CLJ 269; [2014] 4 AMR 301 and Tenaga Nasional Berhad (Formerly Lembaga Letrik Negara Tanah Melayu) v. Perwaja Steel Sdn Bhd (Formerly Perwaja Terengganu Sdn Bhd) [1995] 3 MLRH 196; [1995] 4 MLJ 673; [1995] 4 CLJ 670). [28] Clearly, the burden of proof is on the Plaintiff and parties are bound by the contract executed by them. The Tenancy Agreement, which terms are clear and unambiguous, must be construed in its literal and natural meaning without any addition or improvement. [29] In this regard, the Federal Court in Sumbangan Aneka Sdn Bhd v KNK Development Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] 4 MLJ 514, held- “[39] To summarise, what we have decided above basically is to give effect to what the parties themselves have agreed in their agreements as to the particular event that gives rise to the right to terminate and the consequences following such termination. In this regard it is pertinent to reproduce what was held by the House of Lords in Trollope and Colls Ltd v North West Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board [1973] 1 WLR 601 which was quoted by this court in SPM Membrane Switch Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor [2016] 1 MLJ 464: The court does not make a contract for the parties. The court will not even improve the terms which the parties have made for themselves, however desirable the improvement might be. The court’s function is to interpret and apply the contract which the parties have made for themselves. if the express terms are perfectly clear and free from ambiguity, there is no choice to be made between different possible meanings: the clear terms must be applied even if the court thinks some other terms would have been suitable. An unexpressed term can be implied if and only if courts finds that the parties must have intended that term to form part of their contract.”. [30] Likewise, In Zhou Xing Chen v. Ong Eng Lock & Ors [2017] MLJU 964; [2017] CLJU 871; [2017] 1 LNS 871, the Court of Appeal held- “[31] Again, where the terms of an agreement is clear and unambiguous the Court must always construe the contract in its literal and natural meaning, within the four corners of the document. Once the term is clear the Court is in no position to improve or to make the term fairer or reasonable because the Court must only be concerned with what it means, as enunciated in Berjaya Times Square Sdn Bhd v M-Concept Sdn Bhd [2010] 1 MLJ 597 (See also Mulpha Pacific Sdn Bhd v Paramount Corporation Berhad [2003] 4 MLJ 367).” [31] The undisputed facts in the present action are that-

from January 2021 until to-date, the Defendant had not paid the Plaintiff any rental and;

despite that, the Defendant continues to occupy the Premises. [32] Undoubtedly, these are the evidence of breach of the Tenancy Agreement. [33] As such, based on the facts, this Court finds that the Defendant had breach the Termination Agreement on its failure to pay a full rental from January 2021 until to-date to the Plaintiff. The Defendant had also failed to pay sewerage charges as required under clause 3(vi) of the Termination Agreement. This was further confirmed by the Defendant’s witness- “CHONG: Okay, if you say so. And I put to you, Mr. Ooi, after you issued this email in 2021 February, Regal Enterprise did not pay the entire IWK outstanding sum? Do you agree? DW3” Agreed. …. CHONG: Okay. So, in this case, you being a former employee of Vacaron and who take care of this account Regal Enterprise, do you agree that Regal Enterprise in the end, did not obtain any confirmation or any written rebate by IWK to waive the IWK outstanding? DW3” Agree.” [34] Furthermore, the Defendant’s contention that the tenancy is coupled with equity is unsubstantiated as there is in existence, a validly express provisions of a Tenancy Agreement duly executed by the Parties (see Mohd Ridza bin Abdul Latiff (berniaga sebagai Rimbunan Niaga) v Majlis Agama Islam Negeri Johor & Anor [2016] MLJU 424). [35] This Court is inclined to the case referred by the Plaintiff of Abdul Manan bin Mohamed Ali lwn Suzana bt Mat Sukor @ Mat Salim [2017] MLJU 1870; [2017] CLJU 1864, where the High Court held- “[29] Di dalam keadaan ini, Defendan tidak boleh mengatakan bahawa penyewaan beliau adalah suatu tenancy coupled with an equity, sedangkan Defendan adalah terikat dengan terma-terma jelas perjanjian sewaan 2014 tersebut. [30] Defendan di dalam kes ini telah cuba meletakkan penyewaannya ke atas hartanah sebagai suatu tenancy coupled with an equity dengan bergantung kepada perjanjian dengan syarikat keluarga Plaintif sejak tahun 2009 dan fakta yang beliau telah membelanjakan wang sebanyak RM283,700.00. [31] Berhubung dengan perbelanjaan yang telah dibelanjakan oleh Defendan bagi membangunkan kedai makan di atas hartanah tersebut yang mana perbelanjaan ini telah dijadikan asas kepada dakwaan Defendan bahawa penyewaan beliau adalah tenancy coupled with equity, Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan peguam Plaintif bahawa Defendan tidak boleh meletakkan dirinya sebagai penyewa yang penyewaan adalah bersama ekuiti semata-mata atas perbelanjaan yang dibelanjakan ke atas hartanah tersebut. [32] Berhubung dengan perbelanjaan sebanyak RM283,700.00 yang didakwa telah dibelanjakan oleh Defendan, Mahkamah ini perlu menekankan bahawa Defendan telah memasuki perjanjian sewaan 2009 dengan syarikat tersebut untuk sewaan untuk tapak kosong untuk digunakan sebagai kedai makan ke atas hartanah tersebut. Di dalam butiran 3, jadual 1 perjanjian sewaan 2009 jelas dinyatakan bahawa sewaan hartanah tersebut oleh syarikat tersebut kepada Defendan adalah tapak tanah kosong seperti di bawah:-… [32] Di dalam klausa 5.3 perjanjian sewaan 2009 telah dinyatakan dengan jelas seperti berikut: “The tenant may, upon prior consent of the landlord and required approval from the relevant authorities, carry out within the said Land at his own costs and expenses any relevant lawful works required by the Tenant on the said Land for the purpose of the tenant’s use of the land under this Agreement. The Tenant shall indemnify and keep the Landlord indemnifies against any claims demand or proceedings brought by any authorities, person, owners Tenant, occupies or member of the public arising howsoever from out of or in connection with the said works. [33] Klausa 5.18 dan Klausa 5.19 perjanjian sewaan 2009 pula memperuntukkan: Klausa 5.18 Yielding up of premises At the expiration or sooner determination of the terms hereby created to yield up the said Land in good clean tidy and tenantable repair and condition (fair wear and tear only excepted) and if requested by the Landlord the Tenant shall restore the said Land to their original state (fair wear and tear excepted) at the expenses of the Tenant.” (Emphasis Added) [36] Thus, this Court is of the considered view that the Defendant’s contention on tenancy coupled with equity must fail and the alleged loss and damage for the construction costs, ought to be dismissed. Double rental [37] Obviously, the Tenancy Agreement expired on 31.12.2020 when there was no further tenancy agreement signed. Thereafter, the Plaintiff has given the Defendant for an option to stay at the Premises even without formal documentation as a “Tenancy at Will” until June 2021. The Defendant was later given a notice to quit within two months by the Plaintiff’s solicitors’ letter dated 23.6.2021. For ease of reference, Tenancy at Will typically arises when a tenant is permitted to occupy a property but there is no written tenancy agreement, making the tenancy essentially terminable by either party at any time. It transitions into a periodic tenancy on a monthly or yearly basis. Likewise, as elaborated in Rohasassets Sdn Bhd v. Weatherford (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [2019] 6 MLRA 594; [2020] 1 CLJ 638, where the tenancy expired and the tenant continued to occupy the land, the Federal Court held- “[20] In relation to the fourth issue on the validity of the notices to quit, we are of the view that after the expiry of the fixed term of the respective tenancies, the defendants became in law and in fact monthly tenants of the premises they occupied. We do not think that the notices to quit is unreasonable. As such, we would allow Perkasa’s claim for double rental in respect of the 11th, 12th and 14th floors calculated from the period commencing immediately after the expiry of the notices to quit up to the date of the delivery of vacant possession of the premises by the defendants.” [38] The Defendant has not delivered vacant possession of the Premises, despite the Notice given by the Plaintiff. This can also be seen from the Defendant’s solicitors’ letter dated 27.8.2021, in reply to the notice to quit, asserted as reproduced- “Following from the above, GCSB’s purported termination of the Tenancy Agreement via your letter dated 23.6.2021 was wrongful and amount to a breach and/or repudiation of the Tenancy Agreement which our client has no choice but to accept and deem that the Tenancy Agreement to be terminated.” [39] Despite this, the Defendant still refused to deliver vacant possession until to-date. therefore, the Plaintiff is entitled to claim for double rental as provided under section 28(4)(a) of the Civil Law Act 1956. [40] Accordingly, in Rohasassets (supra), it was held- “[87] On expiry of the tenancy, s 28(4)(a) kicks in to give the landlord the right, at his option, to charge double rent and the double rent continues to be chargeable until possession is given up by the tenant who holds over without the landlord's consent. The landlord may decide not to charge double rent at all or even allow the tenant to hold over for free after the expiry of the tenancy but that is entirely a matter for the landlord to decide. [88] The legislative scheme of s 28(4)(a) of the Civil Law Act is clearly to give the landlord the right of option to charge double rent if the tenant fails or refuses to deliver vacant possession of the demised premises after the expiry of the tenancy. The right is given by statute and can only be taken away by statute. [89] But that said, it does not mean that holding over simpliciter is all that the landlord needs to prove in a claim for double rent under s 28(4)(a) of the Civil Law Act. To entitle the landlord to charge double rent, there must be failure or refusal by the tenant to give up possession after being told to do so by the landlord. This has to be so because the landlord's claim is actually not rent but a penal sum which the former tenant has to pay for the inconvenience and loss the tenant causes the landlord in refusing to give up possession: Panicka (supra). [90] At the risk of repetition, it needs to be emphasised that the court's duty in a claim under s 28(4)(a) of the Civil Law Act is merely to determine whether the option to charge double rent had been exercised properly and lawfully by the landlord. The court is not concerned with contumacious conduct on the part of the tenant who holds over. Even if the tenant is not guilty of contumacious conduct, the tenant is still liable to pay double rent if the landlord has decided to charge double rent and does not consent to the tenant's holding over and has asked the former tenant to vacate the premises.”. [41] In this instant case, the Plaintiff had given 2 months’ notice for the Defendant to deliver vacant possession but the Defendant failed to do so. Thus, this Court is of the considered view that the Plaintiff has rightfully claimed for double rental from December 2021 until delivery of vacant possession as stipulated at clause 6(vi) of the Tenancy Agreement. (see Rohasassets (supra)). [42] Accordingly, on a balance of probabilities, the Plaintiff has been successful in proving its case. The Defendant’s Counterclaim [43] This Court dismissed the Defendant’s counter claim on the basis that there was never in existence of any formal tenancy agreement after the expiry of the Tenancy Agreement. Therefore, the Defendant is not entitled to claim for the purported extension of the tenancy period of 2 plus 3 plus 2 as there was no tenancy coupled with equity. [44] Furthermore, the Defendant had also breached the Tenancy Agreement for its failure to pay the sewerage charges and the rental timely, and thus, the relief for specific performance as sought by the Defendant, must fail. In Ganam d/o Rajamany v Somoo s/o Sinnah [1984] 2 MLJ 290; [1984] 2 CLJ 268 the Federal Court held- “[42] In our judgment, in the context of this case, it was not sufficient for a purchaser to prove that he had at all times been ready and willing to complete the sale; he must also prove that he had performed or had been at all times been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract (see Mama v. Sassoon (supra) and Tan Ah Boon v. State of Johor [1936] AIR PC 236) or his part of the obligations under the contract as fixed or interpreted by the Court (see Berners v. Fleming (supra) and Warren case (supra). Since the defendant was unable to bring his case under this principle, we think the learned Judicial Commissioner was wrong to decree an order that the contracts Exh P1 and P2 be specifically performed. In our judgment, the learned Judicial Commissioner ought to have refused to make the order on the ground of unreasonable conduct of the defendant coupled with the fact that the case of the defendant, as pleaded and proved, comes within the principle of Babu Bindeshri Prashad case (supra). [43] Another matter which the learned Judicial Commissioner ought to consider which he did not appear to have done so is s 21(3) of the Specific Relief Act 1950 which reads: A case in which the court may properly exercise a discretion to decree specific performance is where the plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a contract capable of specific performance. [44] It seems clear that the defendant would be unable to bring his case under the provision of this subsection on the evidence produced before the Court below. Up-to-date of hearing in the High Court the defendant was proved to have paid the sum of RM26,000 only to the plaintiff and this amount represents less than one-third of the contract price of RM90,000. Furthermore, this cannot by any stretch of imagination be said to constitute substantial acts within the meaning of the subsection.”. [45] Further, this Court also observed that clauses 3(x) and 3(xix) of the Tenancy Agreement, clearly stated that the Plaintiff is not liable for the construction costs, expenses and damages incurred (which is unproven). The costs and expenses must be borne by the Defendant and the Defendant is to restore the Premises to its original state and condition at the time when the Plaintiff first delivered the Premises to the Defendant. [46] Additionally, the prayer for forfeiture is irrelevant to the present suit as it is premised on the Tenancy Agreement and not under the National Land Code 1965. The primary relief sought for in the present suit is an order for delivery of vacant possession under the Tenancy Agreement. The plaintiff did not seek an order for forfeiture of interest under the National Land Code. Hence, the Defendant’s reliance on section 237 of NLC 1965 is wrong-footed. [47] Thus, the Defendant has failed in its counterclaim and is not entitled for general nor punitive damages. The Ruling [48] The Defendant had also questioned the ruling of this Court. In this regard, reference is made to section 3 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 which provides- "decision" means judgment, sentence or order, but does not include any ruling made in the course of a trial or hearing of any cause or matter which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties; [49] The definition of "decision" was deliberated in Gobinath Sinnaya v. PP & Other Appeals [2022] MLRAU 250; [2023] 1 CLJ 174 where the Court of Appeal held- [9] The word "decision" has been defined under s 3 of the CJA as follows: "decision" means judgment, sentence, or order, but does not include any ruling made in the course of a trial or hearing of any cause or matter which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties; [Emphasis Added] [10] The definition of "decision" under s 3 is plain and unambiguous that it excludes any ruling which does not finally dispose of the rights of parties. This as opposed to the earlier definition of "decision" before the amendment by amendment Act A1031 of 1998 that came into force on 31 July 1998 which is as follows: "decision" means any judgment, sentence, or order." [11] Hence, after the said amendment, a decision that is appealable under s 50 of CJA is only those that have finally disposed of the rights of parties, not any interlocutory judgment or order where the final rights of parties are yet to be disposed of although the judgment, ruling or order is conclusive or final to the subordinate matter. This has been succinctly explained in the Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim's case (supra) at p 549 in the following manner: "This new definition of "decision", as in the amendment, does not include a judgment or order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties on the matters in dispute. In other words, what has been excluded from the meaning of the word "decision" is the type of judgments and orders which is termed "interlocutory" by Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn, Vol 26, para 506, at p 240, which reads:

Interlocutory judgments and orders. An order which does not deal with the final rights of the parlies, but either (1) is made before judgment, and gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, but is merely on a matter of procedure, or (2) is made after judgment, and merely directs how the declarations of right already given in the final judgment are to be worked out, is termed 'interlocutory'. An interlocutory order, even though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals. Shortly stated, what the amendment means is that a judgment or order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but is made pendente lite, and gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, is not a "decision" within the meaning of that word in the current version of s 3 Courts of Judicature Act, and therefore is not appealable." It makes no difference that such a judgment or order is final, that is to say conclusive, as to the subordinate matter with which it deals." [Emphasis Added] [50] Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the Defendant is not at liberty to appeal to that ruling of this Court. CONCLUSION [51] Based on the above deliberations, and upon having considered the pleadings of the Plaintiff and the Defendant and a proper evaluation of the undisputed facts and evidence adduced at the trial, both oral and documentary, in their totality, the contentions of learned counsel as per their submissions and upon an evaluation of the credibility of witnesses called, it is found that the Plaintiff has succeeded to prove its pleaded claim, based on the particulars and ingredients of its pleaded cause of action, primarily based on the Tenancy Agreement and on a balance of probabilities. Therefore, the Plaintiff has succeeded to discharge the burden of proof placed on the Plaintiff throughout the trial to prove its claim on the applicable standard of proof for civil actions. Accordingly, this claim is allowed with costs. [52] On the other hand, this Court finds that the Defendant has failed to prove its counter claim, thus is dismissed with costs. Dated: 14 SEPTEMBER 2025 -SGD- (SUZANA BINTI MUHAMAD SAID) Judicial Commissioner of the High Court NCVC1 Kuala Lumpur COUNSELS For The Plaintiff : Chong Tze Lin, Tan Hanaibal Liang dan Hoo Sit Huey Messers Chong Tze Lin & Partners For the Defendant : Ho Hon Keong Messrs Ho & Ho & Co.