In Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd v Puteri Nusantara Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 CLJ 229, at [24]-[26], Mary Lim Thiam Suan JCA delivered the following judgment of the Court of Appeal: “[24] Section 28 confers discretion on the High Court. Although there are no express terms as to how that discretion is to be exercised, in our opinion, the discretion must be exercised judiciously, having regard to the underlying facts and the applicable principles under [CIPAA]. We must also bear in mind principles of statutory interpretation; that we cannot read into s. 28 terms which are not there, or give s. 28 a construction which cannot bear up when the other provisions in the Act are read and taken into consideration. [25] From a reading of [CIPAA], in particular, ss. 13, 15, 16, 27 and 31, it is plain that though s. 28 vests the High Court with discretionary power, it does not extend to requiring the applicant to show that there are no grounds for setting aside the adjudication decision under s. 15. All that the applicant needs to do is to satisfy the High Court that there is an adjudication decision that has been rendered in the applicant’s favour, that there has been non-payment of the adjudicated sum by the date specified in the adjudication decision, and that there is no prohibition to the grant of the order that is sought. [26] By this, we mean that the adjudication decision has not been set aside or stayed, that there is no written settlement of the subject matter between the parties, or that there is no final decision 18 rendered on the payment claim, whether made in arbitration or by a court of law. Once these matters are established as matters of fact, the order to enforce ought to be granted. When making the order, the High Court may also make appropriate orders in respect of the whole or part of the adjudicated sum including make orders on interest - see sub-s. 28(2).” (emphasis added).