When a criminal act is done by several persons, in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone". [55] Peruntukan di bawah seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan mengkehendaki pihak Pendakwaan untuk mengemukakan keterangan sama ada secara langsung atau mengikut keadaan (direct or circumstantial) dan hendaklah sebelum berlakunya sesuatu jenayah itu dan sesuatu jenayah tersebut adalah hasil daripada 'in furtherance of the common intention which presupposes permutation or pre-concept of mind.' [56] Dalam memutuskan isu ini, Mahkamah telah membuat pemerhatian dan kesimpulan daripada keseluruhan keterangan yang dikemukakan. [57] Intipati di bawah seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan diterangkan di dalam Buku Ratanlal & Dhirajlal's Law of Crimes (Vol 1) di muka surat 116: - Accused persons physically presence in the scene of crime (not necessary to show some overt act); - There is common intention to commit the crime (common intention is to be inferred from facts and circumstances of each case when there is absence of direct evidence) which implies pre-arranged plan; and - Criminal act was done in concert, pursuant to pre-arranged plan. [58] Berbalik kepada fakta kes ini, mahkamah mendapati terdapat cukup keterangan yang menunjukkan niat bersama Tertuduh Pertama dan Kedua dalam kes ini apabila: i. Terdapat kehilangan dompet Si mati; ii. Tertuduh Pertama dan Kedua telah menekup muka dan menghalang ruang pernafasan Si mati; iii. Si mati kemudiannya ditinggalkan di bahagian penumpang belakang dengan muka di bawah; iv. Tiada bukti kedua-dua Tertuduh telah turun dari kereta Grab Si mati sebelum butang "complete trip" ditekan; v. Mengikut GPS 'tracking system' Grab menunjukkan pergerakan kereta Grab Si mati ke arah destinasi "drop off point"; vi. Tiada orang lain yang menempah perkhidmatan kereta Grab Si mati selepas kedua-dua Tertuduh; vii. Kereta Grab Si mati dijumpai di kawasan berhampiran arah tuju kedua-dua Tertuduh iaitu di Selayang Baru; viii. Kereta Grab Si mati ditinggalkan dengan Si mati begitu sahaja sehingga kereta Grab Si mati dijumpai oleh ahli keluarga dan rakan-rakan beliau; ix. Terdapatnya pandu arah Tertuduh Pertama akan kunci kereta Grab Si mati di bawah Seksyen 27 Akta Keterangan 1950; dan x. Kelakuan ataupun 'conduct' Tertuduh Pertama yang menunjukkan tali pinggang kereta Si mati yang mempunyai DNA Tertuduh Kedua adalah relevan di bawah Seksyen 8 Akta Keterangan 1950. [59] YA HMT telah mengupas isu 'niat bersama' kedua-dua Tertuduh di dalam Alasan Penghakimannya di perenggan 36 dan 38 apabila beliau berkata seperti berikut: - "Murder was committed by both the accused [36] The totality of the prosecution evidence points to an irresistible conclusion that both the accused committed murder against the deceased as firstly, the deceased would have been at the driver seat when he was smothered at his mouth and strangled at his neck, all these led to blockage of air and asphyxiation. SP8 did not find any evidence of a struggle put up by the deceased. The deceased would have been removed from the driver seat and left in a head down position at the back-passenger seat. [38] Aiman's wallet was not recovered thus it could mean that they both had planned to rob the deceased but only Aiman's handphone with Grab app was missing, leaving behind 2. Thus, to this Court's finding, Aimans' wallet was a possible motive to commit murder irrespective of the fact that the other 2 phones were not stolen as the possible explanation was that they both need a quick getaway." Analisis kes pembelaan [60] Secara ringkasnya, kedua-dua Tertuduh mengatakan pada hari kejadian mereka telah turun di dua (2) lokasi yang berbeza. Tertuduh Pertama telah turun di perhentian bas berdekatan dengan rumahnya manakala Tertuduh Kedua telah turun di kawasan berdekatan Petronas Sg. Tua dan selepas itu pergi ke sebuah restoran mamak untuk berjumpa dengan seorang rakan Tertuduh Kedua bernama Murti. [61] Menurut kedua-dua Tertuduh, mereka tidak mengetahui apa yang berlaku kepada Si mati selepas kedua-dua Tertuduh turun dari kereta Grab Si mati. [62] Menurut kedua-dua Tertuduh, pembelaan mereka telah disokong oleh Notis Alibi yang dikemukakan oleh mereka ke mahkamah. [63] Berdasarkan kepada pembelaan yang dikemukakan oleh kedua dua Tertuduh, dapat disimpulkan secara ringkasnya seperti berikut: - a. Kedua-dua Tertuduh tidak mempunyai niat untuk membunuh Si mati; dan b. Kedua-dua Tertuduh tidak mempunyai niat bersama membunuh Si mati. [64] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti kesemua keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak Pendakwaan dan meneliti pembelaan yang dikemukakan oleh kedua-dua Tertuduh. Kami bersetuju dengan dapatan yang dibuat oleh YA HMT bahawa pembelaan kedua-dua Tertuduh telah gagal menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes Pendakwaan i.e. pertuduhan yang telah dikemukakan ke atas kedua-dua Tertuduh. [65] Kami berpuas hati bahawa YA HMT telah membuat penelitian yang teliti dan maksimum terhadap semua keterangan yang dibentangkan di hadapannya, termasuk keterangan pembelaan kedua-dua Tertuduh dan saksi-saksi pembelaan dan setelah menilai kebolehpercayaan serta kredibiliti kesemua saksi tersebut, telah menerima keterangan saksi Pendakwaan seterusnya menolak keterangan saksi-saksi pembelaan. [66] YA HMT mempunyai kelebihan audio visual di dalam menilai keterangan dan kredibiliti saksi-saksi. Oleh itu, kami tidak nampak mengapa dapatan YA HMT tersebut harus diganggu oleh mahkamah ini. [67] Ini jelas dapat dilihat daripada penelitian, huraian, dan dapatan yang dibuat oleh YA HMT dalam Alasan Penghakimannya mengenai isu-isu yang dibangkitkan oleh kedua-dua Tertuduh seperti berikut: - a) Isu mengenai kewujudan DNA [15] The defence argued that it was only after about 10 days before the car was handed to Nurhaliza thus the car, having been accessed by many others had been tampered with. In addition, it was suggested to SP16 that both the accused had been brought to the said car and were directed to re-enact their presence in the said car by touching parts of the car mentioning specifically the seatbelt that caused DNA tracing belonging to them, collected at various spots. [16] This Court is of the view that the only incriminating DNA crucial to this case that requires some explanation from either of them is the DNA of the $ 2^{n d} $ accused found on the driver's seatbelt as firstly, the body of the deceased driver was found in a head-down position in the backpassenger seat behind the driver thus someone must have moved the body from the driver's seat, to the present spot there. There were also present the $ 1^{s t} $ and $ 2^{n d} $ accused's DNAs on the bottles and this evidence although may initially appear neutral as both did not deny being present in the said car, a scrutiny of this evidence is crucial and will be discussed at a later part of the judgment. The DNA of the 2nd accused found on the driver's seatbelt is the most incriminating evidence that invites some explanation from the accused. [20] The swab at the seatbelt was taken by the science officer Nurhaliza and an examination by SP17, the chemist found the DNA of the $ 2^{n d} $ accused Gupreet Singh on the said seatbelt. This Court could not accept the suggestion by the defence that both the accused were asked to re-enact the scene by touching parts of the car but from the list of tracing annexed by Nurhaliza and handed to SP17 (see 2nd p of P82), the list as confirmed by SP16 (IO) and SP17, no other DNA finding was suggested by the defence, as alleged that was said was directed and dictated by SP16 to be taken from any particular spots such as the steering wheel, the car door or the handbrake that would suggest the DNA samples of both the accused were found on these spots as a result of the recreation of the scene by the police. The non-calling of the scientific officer caused no prejudice as there are other evidence to suggest the challenge by the defence of the planted DNA could not be supported (See: Pathmanabhan Nalliannen v. PP & Other Appeals [2017] 4 CLJ 137 Federal Court) at page 178. [22] SP16 (IO) denied both the accused were brought to the car for the purpose of planting their DNA on it prior to the handing of the car to the science officer Dr. Nurhaliza. Hence, the presence of the $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ accused's DNA on the driver's seatbelt must have arisen from the fact that he had unfastened it to remove the body of the deceased from the driver's seat, prior to parking the said car at that location. Otherwise, there is no other way his DNA could make its way there." b) Isu mengenai pertuduhan yang dikatakan cacat dan tidak sempurna i. Pihak pembelaan mendakwa bahawa pertuduhan adalah cacat dan tidak sempurna kerana masa pertuduhan iaitu 10.08 malam adalah masa di mana "trip completed". ii. YA HMT telah mengupas isu ini di dalam Alasan Penghakimannya dan kami tidak nampak bagaimana dapatan YA HMT tersebut harus diganggu apabila beliau menyatakan seperti berikut: - "Time of death and charged framed [25] As to the DNA analysis, other swab sticks K6, K7 and K8 taken from the back, left and right part of the driver seat came back with the result 'no or mixed DNA which cannot be positively identified or weak/inconclusive DNA'. The pathologist found the deceased to have died at an estimated time of 1-2 days from the date of the discovery of his body. The pathologist report P12 would indicate the deceased was 'Brought In Dead on 24 June 2018 at 1.00 hours'. [26] The evidence of SP16 (IO) shows the body was traced in the Grab car on23 June 2018 and confirmed Aiman was no longer breathing. This is similarly noted in the summary of P12 that the body of the deceased was found in the MyVi car on 23 June 2018. Thus, rightly so, the calculation of 1-2 days from 23 June 2018 would roughly lock in the time that the act of murder happened between 21 June 2018 or 22 June 2018 as per the charge. [27] The IO SP16 in his WS said that SP8 in her statement recorded by SP16 during investigation said the time of death to be 2-3 days from the date the post-mortem was held which was on 24 June 2018 at 1400 hrs. This similarly would have also locked in the time of death to have occurred within the time stipulated as framed in the charge as 21 June 2018." c) Isu mengenai pembelaan kedua-dua Tertuduh yang mereka telah turun terlebih dahulu di dua (2) lokasi yang berbeza. i. YA HMT telah meneliti dan membuat penilaian mengenai pembelaan kedua-dua Tertuduh dan telah membuat dapatan seperti berikut: - "Defence of both: they alighted earlier than the actual drop-off point [33] As highlighted earlier, the findings of both the accused's DNA on the bottles in the said Grab car can invite a suggestion that it is a neutral evidence and merely supports the finding of their presence in that car. On the other hand, with this added finding of their presence in the said car, both the accused put forward the defence that they both had alighted earlier than the actual drop-off point 'Selayang Baru', contrary to the first booking made in P11 and therefore they were not the last person with Aiman and could not have caused Aiman's death. [34] Firstly, this Court finds this puzzling as if both had wanted to get down separately elsewhere as contended by the defence instead of the actual dropoff point that was determined when the booking was made as in P11, then what made them enter the said 'actual drop-off point' at the point booking was made but then both had made up their mind to alight the car at 2 different spots than the actual drop-off point? The 'last GPS ping' based on SP7's evidence is a system used to track the GPS location from the driver's Grab app and as indicated is shown at Post Office Selayang. [35] To this Court's finding, this defence invites an inference that both had absconded and wanted to distance themselves from the said car, more so this app booking being the last recorded by SP7. With the finding that the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ accused had pointed to the seatbelt of the driver and the 2nd accused's DNA was confirmed found on it, all these put together amount to confirmation by the subsequent fact that the seatbelt is relevant to show that it had been used in the commission of the actus reus of causing the death of the deceased, and with the pathologist's finding that the neck suffered from injuries that suggest blood contusion arising from air blockage, this Court concluded that in the absence of any reasonable explanation, both the accused had acted in common intention to cause the said injuries on the deceased that led to his demise." d) Isu sama ada kedua-dua Tertuduh membunuh Si mati i. Perkara ini juga telah disentuh oleh YA HMT di dalam Alasan Penghakiman apabila beliau menyatakan seperti berikut: - "Murder was committed by both the accused [36] The totality of the prosecution evidence points to an irresistible conclusion that both the accused committed murder against the deceased as firstly, the deceased would have been in the driver's seat when he was smothered and strangled, all these led to blockage of air and asphyxiation. SP8 did not find any evidence of a struggle put up by the deceased. The deceased would have been removed from the driver's seat and left in a head-down position in the back-passenger seat. [38] Aiman's wallet was not recovered thus it could mean that they both had planned to rob the deceased but only Aiman's handphone with the Grab app was missing, leaving behind 2. Thus, to this Court's finding, Aiman's wallet was a possible motive to commit murder irrespective of the fact that the other 2 phones were not stolen as the possible explanation was that they both needed a quick getaway. [41] All these evidence by smothering and followed with the further act of confining the body in a closed container that is the car cumulatively would only mean that both the accused knew the victim was already deceased at the time the body was abandoned in the Grab car hence would move this Court to a finding that they had the intention to cause the injuries under limb (c) of s 300 Penal Code: "(c) if it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person, and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death (See: Tham Kai Yau & Ors v. PP [1977] 1 MLJ 174 follows)." e) Isu mengenai kegagalan pihak Pendakwaan memanggil saksi-saksi: i. Pihak Tertuduh-Tertuduh telah menyatakan YA HMT telah khilaf apabila gagal mengambil kira inferens di bawah Seksyen 114 ilustrasi (g) Akta Keterangan 1950 terhadap Pendakwaan kerana gagal memanggil penama Brar Kulwant Singh dan Inderpal Singh untuk memberi keterangan di mahkamah sedangkan mereka adalah saksi penting; ii. Setelah meneliti keterangan yang dikemukakan di dalam kes ini, kami mendapati kegagalan pihak Pendakwaan memanggil saksi-saksi yang berkenaan ke mahkamah tidak mewajarkan anggapan di bawah Seksyen 114 ilustrasi (g) Akta Keterangan 1950 digunakan ke atas pihak Pendakwaan. iii. Oleh itu, kami bersetuju dengan dapatan YA HMT apabila beliau berkata di dalam Alasan Penghakimannya seperti berikut: - "Arrest of other suspects [43] SP16 conceded that there were other suspects arrested but they were subsequently released having been satisfied there were without any link to the deceased's murder. These suspects based on the chemist report P83 are without any finding of DNA tracing in the car to indicate their presence. These suspects are as follows: a) Umaidah Yusuf b) Raman Gosain c) Brar Kulwant Singh d) Inderpal Singh Darjeet Singh [44] This Court is of the finding that with P83 having excluded these suspects from being present in the said crime scene, there is no evidence to suggest their involvement save that they were either the alibi witness or the names arose from the questioning of the prime suspects Sua Lay and Gupreet Singh but with no value added. Even if an unknown DNA of a third person was present in one of the swabs, this does not exclude the presence of both the accused in the said car." f) Isu mengenai penemuan kunci kereta i. Kedua-dua Tertuduh telah mengatakan YA HMT telah terkhilaf apabila menerima masuk maklumat berkaitan penemuan kunci kereta dalam kes ini di bawah Seksyen 8 Akta Keterangan 1950; ii. Kami mendapati YA HMT telahpun memberi alasan kepada keputusannya mengapa penemuan tersebut diterima masuk sebagai keterangan sama ada di bawah Seksyen 8 atau 27 Akta Keterangan 1950 apabila beliau menyatakan sepertimana berikut: - "Section 27 leading to the discovery of the car key [45] In the cause of adducing evidence of either leading to the discovery of the car key by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ accused based on information received under s 27 or conduct under s 8 of the Evidence Act 1950, 4 main objections arose from the defence as follows: i. There was no caution as suggested under s 27 administered to the accused prior to him providing the information under s 27; ii. The information is inadmissible it being a confession and a trial within a trial must be held to determine its admissibility; iii. Even with the confession aside, the information does not make any sense and remains inadmissible as a confession; iv. There was doubt that there was such discovery as the police officer said to have followed the $ 1^{st} $ accused leading to said car key was uncertain of the exact spot the key was recovered. [46] The prosecution on the other hand argued that it is not a confession and is still admissible under s 27 or alternatively, it comes under evidence of conduct under s 8. This Court having heard arguments, similarly agreed that based on case authorities of Pulukuri Kottaya v. King Emperor [1947] 74 IA 65 that words amounting to confession ought to be expunged, this exercise is aimed with the purpose that a s 27 evidence is not to admit a confession through the back door. [47] The information transmitted to SP14 and reduced into writing by way of a police report Selayang Report 0139118/18 shows the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ accused had given information as follows: "OKT kemudian mengaku di hadapan saya — Tuan, saya boleh tunjuk itu kunci kereta, itu hari saya kereta kunci dan buang itu kunci kereta dekat sana juga". [49] As earlier highlighted on the application of s 24 Evidence Act, s 112 CPC or s 37A DDA and in this case when dealing with information leading to the pointing of the seatbelt, a similar stand is again taken by this Court in dealing with the discovery of the car key. Firstly, just because the word 'mengaku' was used in P40, it does not mean the information amounts to a total confession as s 27 in itself permits some degree of confession. Hence words like 'saya buang kunci' is admissible based on the case of San Soo Ha v. PP [1968] 1 MLJ 34 where Azlan Shah J said as follows: "It is established law that such words as "I have concealed," "I have hidden," "I have kept" are admissible in evidence as evidence as coming within the purview of s 27 of the Indian Evidence Act (see Rama v. State AIR [1952] Bom 299)." [51] In short, it means a trial within a trial is not necessary to determine the admissibility of the information obtained under s 27 of the Evidence Act 1950. The prosecution is under no obligation to prove voluntariness of the information given. Be that as it may, unlike in this present case before this Court where oral evidence of the information was adduced by SP14, in Amathevelli the Federal Court found that there was none but merely a recorded information in P51 produced which the Federal Court said was insufficient as the recorded document could be utilised only to refresh memory or as corroboration. For this reason, the s 27 evidence was admitted under s 8 of the same Act, instead." g) Isu mengenai pembelaan alibi; i. Kedua-dua Tertuduh telah mengadu bahawa YA HMT telah terkhilaf apabila membuat dapatan bahawa tiada keterangan yang telah menyokong pembelaan alibi yang dikemukakan Tertuduh-Tertuduh. ii. Kami mendapati YA HMT telah dengan panjang lebar mengulas mengenai isu pembelaan alibi ini di dalam Alasan Penghakimannya apabila beliau berkata seperti berikut: - "Defence of alibi [53] The evidence from SP18 (replacement IO who took over the investigation from SP16 from the beginning of 1 September 2020) was aware of the notice of alibi D84 dated 3 March 2022 (for the $ 2^{nd} $ accused) and D86 dated 26 August 2020 (for the $ 1^{st} $ accused), did his investigation on both the alibi notices D84 and D86. D84 states the $ 2^{nd} $ accused was not at the scene at the time as proffered in the charge but had alighted at a Petronas Sungai Tua. The $ 1^{st} $ accused alibi named his wife Umaidah as alibi who, based on D86 was at home at No 68 Tingkat 3, Komp. Pasar Borong Jalan 2/3A off KM12, Jalan Ipoh Batu Caves when the $ 1^{st} $ accused arrived. D86 also said a friend of the $ 1^{st} $ accused by the name of Adam Yunus was at the said home waiting for the $ 1^{st} $ accused from 9.55pm and stayed on until 10.30 pm. [54] As to SP18's investigation on D84, he testified that in 2021, he met with the manager of the petrol station by the name of Mr Sayuthi, and was given access to the CCTV but as the saving of the recording was just up to a period of 14 days, only the current recording was available. Thus, nothing came out of this alibi. As to D86, SP18 said the 2 names could not be traced at the 2 addresses given. SP18 testified that in the cause of the investigation conducted earlier which saw the statement of Umaidah taken, SP18 made the attempt to contact her on the said number given in her statement but failed. [55] The defence challenged SP18's evidence as no diary was tendered to corroborate his story. This Court did not agree that the absence of the investigation diary made SP18's testimony doubtful. The reason for this finding is that despite D86 not carrying any particulars of the handphone number of Umaidah, SP18 made the necessary effort to trace her at the said phone number that was provided in her statement but failed. This moves this Court to rule that SP18 has nothing to hide and that he is a credible and honest witness. [56] The approach taken by this Court above in analysing SP18's testimonies in order to rule the credibility of the alibi defence and the credibility of SP18 himself is supported by the decision of the Federal Court in Pathmanabhan Nalliannenn v. PP & Other Appeals [2017] 4 CLJ 137 which states that "the correct approach is to consider the alibi in the light of all the evidence in the case and the court's impressions of the witnesses and from that totality to decide whether the alibi might reasonably be true." [57] This Court is of the view that with no alibi witnesses contactable and no CCTV recording present to enable this Court to come to a finding of credibility as emphasized by Pathmanabhan's case, some form of explanation should be offered by both the accused as to why a different spot of the 'actual dropoff point' was entered when booking for Grab on P11, but ended with both deciding to get down elsewhere, separately. [58] None was offered. This Court is of the further view that this defence of 2 split drop-off points to a certain extent goes against the defence's challenge of the s 27 or s 8 of the Evidence Act 1950 by protesting that both could not comprehend Bahasa Melayu. This defence goes against the defence's contention that the evidence of SP14 that the accused gave certain information in Bahasa Melayu is illogical. This Court finds that such suggestion by the defence contradicted the defence's contention that both the accused could not comprehend Bahasa. [59] In the first place, for both to do that would require some communication with the deceased driver Aiman. Otherwise, how would the deceased be alerted and notified of the change of venues by both, where to stop and how payment was to be made or if there was any sum to be refunded and how much. This Court therefore concludes that both the accused could understand Bahasa and were able to communicate in this language even if not eloquently. However, whether both did get down at 2 different locations will only be determined by this Court at the defence stage, as at present these 2 stops merely remain a suggestion not supported by the defence's own testimonies (see: Ali Basher v. PP [2015] 1 CLJ 918 COA)." iii. Isu mengenai alibi ini juga telah dihurai dengan lebih lanjut oleh YA HMT selanjutnya di perenggan 87 hingga 93 Alasan Penghakiman YA HMT. h) Isu mengenai pembelaan kedua-dua Tertuduh i. Kedua-dua Tertuduh telah mengatakan yang YA HMT telah terkhilaf apabila gagal mengambilkira bahawa pembelaan yang dikemukakan oleh kedua-dua Tertuduh adalah satu pembelaan yang kredibel dan pembelaan yang dikemukakan telah berjaya menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah ke atas kes Pendakwaan. ii. Kami telah meneliti Alasan Penghakiman YA HMT dan mendapati YA HMT telah dengan terperinci dan panjang lebar menghuraikan mengenai pembelaan kedua-dua Tertuduh sepertimana yang terdapat di perenggan 66 hingga 86 Alasan Penghakimannya. iii. Setelah membaca dan meneliti alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan oleh YA HMT, kami tidak nmpak bagaimana dapatan beliau tersebut harus diganggu oleh mahkamah ini. [68] Berdasarkan apa yang dinyatakan di atas, kami berpuas hati bahawa keterangan pembelaan kedua-dua Tertuduh telah gagal menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah ke atas kes pihak pendakwaan dan pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kes terhadap kedua-dua Tertuduh melampaui keraguan munasabah. [69] Oleh yang demikian, kami mendapati Tertuduh Pertama dan Tertuduh Kedua bersalah dan mengekalkan sabitan kedua-dua Tertuduh dengan pertuduhan di bawah Seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan sepertimana yang dijatuhkan oleh YA HMT. Rayuan Kedua-dua Tertuduh terhadap sabitan adalah dengan ini ditolak. Hukuman [70] Kami mendapati perbuatan Tertuduh Pertama dan Kedua membunuh Si mati yang bekerja mencari nafkah daripada pendapatan yang halal dan bersih iaitu sebagai pemandu Grab adalah perbuatan melampau dan tidak bertimbang rasa. [71] Kejadian ini menyebabkan kegemparan kepada orang awam dan telah mendapat liputan meluas media apabila mayat Si mati ditemui sehinggalah kes dibicarakan dan diputuskan di Mahkamah Tinggi. [72] Tertuduh Pertama dan Kedua sebagai warganegara asing yang bekerja di Malaysia sepatutnya menghormati kedaulatan undang-undang Malaysia, sebaliknya melakukan jenayah bunuh yang kejam terhadap Si mati yang tidak berdosa. [73] Mengenai isu hukuman ini, YA HMT di perenggan 94 hingga 98 dalam Alasan Penghakimannya telah menyatakan seperti berikut: - The suitable sentence: death or imprisonment by virtue of the new law [94] In line with the new Act passed by Parliament on the abolition of the mandatory death sentence (Abolition of Mandatory Death Penalty Act 2023) giving the discretion as to what suitable sentence should be passed on the convicted person, the prosecution acting under s 183A of the Criminal Procedure Code invited the mother of the deceased to address this Court on the impact the murder committed against her son had on her and her family. This Court viewed this as suitable and permitted by the provisions of the law and allowed it. Similarly, Counsel for both the accused were invited to address this Court in mitigation as to what the appropriate sentence from their perspective, should be. [95] After hearing all the parties, this Court concludes that the existence of the Abolition of Mandatory Death Penalty Act does not in any way preclude this Court from the cornerstone of the sentencing principles of retribution, deterrence and prevention. Based on this analysis, the reason for imposing the death sentence is not only did they both commit the murder but the body was left dumped in the said car in a head-down position and both the car and body were abandoned at a location, added with the deceased's phone with the Grab app on it removed from his possession and the app being disconnected had made tracing very unlikely (even if the said phone was never recovered), the missing wallet of the deceased, all these aggravated the acts of both the accused. [96] The utmost importance is that it is not a case where recognised defences provided by the law come into play such as provocation or sudden fight but a murder done with a motive of robbery. This does not mean this Court has closed its mind from exercising the alternative sentence of imprisonment under the new Act in suitable cases. Another example where such exercise of discretion may be more suited is where there may be a thin line between legal and medical insanity that would make the alternative sentence of imprisonment more suitable than mandatory death. [97] Furthermore, in this present case, there is no defence put forth by both in their submissions that goes toward mitigation in seeking for a more lenient sentence than death. Based on this Court's deduction, their inconsistent defence at the prosecution stage even with the s 51A CPC documents served on them by the DPP which even goes to the extent of denying making the Grab booking despite being in possession of a handphone with the IMEI number as reflected in the Grab document P11 but the defence version was then altered halfway does not portray any feeling of remorse on their part. [98] Although it is the fundamental principle of 'innocent before proven guilty' that the defence rightly so is relying on, the s 51A CPC on disclosure and discovery must equally be intertwined with whatever defence both the accused proposed to pin on in the trial. Otherwise, the existence of these rules and procedures is merely cosmetic, without any foundation to tie or attach parties to, in the conduct of the trial. Having sight of the article 'Abolition of Mandatory Death Penalty Bill 2023 And Revision of Sentence of Death and Imprisonment for Natural Life (Temporary Jurisdiction of the Federal Court) Bill 2023' by Hisyam Teh Poh Teik in [2023] 3 MLJ (i-Ixxvii) and having determined that not all of these relevant points as laid out by this Court were addressed to satisfy the deviation from imposing such sentence except for those factors, this Court ordered for the death sentence to be imposed, the mandatory manner of execution is still death by hanging, against both." [74] Berdasarkan kepada alasan-alasan di atas, kami bersependapat dengan penemuan dan keputusan oleh YA HMT mengenai hukuman tersebut. Rayuan Tertuduh Pertama dan Kedua terhadap hukuman adalah dengan ini ditolak. Kesimpulan [75] Kami mendapati sabitan dan hukuman ke atas kedua-dua Tertuduh adalah selamat dan kami dengan ini mengekalkan hukuman gantung sampai mati yang dikenakan oleh YA HMT ke atas kedua-dua Tertuduh. Bertarikh: 21 April 2025 Ahmad Kamal Bin Md Shahid Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia Pihak-pihak yang hadir: Bagi pihak tertuduh-tertuduh: Dato' Rajpal Singh (bersama dengan Cik Siti Anis binti Che Abd Wahab) (Tetuan Rajpal, Firah & Vishnu) Bagi pihak Pendakwa Raya: TPR Puan Solehah Noratikah binti Ismail (Jabatan Peguam Negara)