H E K v I N G (WA-24F-113-04/2023)

This was an application (“this Application”) filed by the Applicant-Wife for, inter alia, guardianship, as well as custody, care, and control of the children of the marriage, and child and spousal maintenance.

Given the privacy of parties and sensitivity of issues in these proceedings, the Applicant, Respondent-Husband, and their children have been anonymised in these grounds of judgment respectively as HEK, ING, FEN, FOE, and FYE.

The Applicant and Respondent (collectively “the Parties”) were married in 2017, and had three children (collectively “the Children”), born respectively in 2017, 2019, and 2021.

The Applicant asserted that throughout their marriage, the Respondent subjected them to physical abuse. This culminated in November 2021, when the Applicant decided to depart from the matrimonial home, citing irretrievable breakdown of the marriage.

In April 2023, the Applicant filed this Application. The Respondent counterclaimed in his affidavit in reply affirmed in May 2023. 24 April 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 3 The issues

The issues for consideration were as follows: a) whether the Applicant should have sole guardianship, custody, care, and control of the Children, or if she was entitled to mere access to the Children; b) Whether the Applicant was entitled to maintenance for herself and the Children; and c) Whether the Applicant was entitled to be reimbursed for the mobile phone bill.

The Court had to also address a preliminary objection, raised by the Applicant, to the Respondent’s counterclaim in his affidavit in reply.

This Application was partially allowed, with joint guardianship awarded to both Parties. Custody, care, and control of the Children were granted to the Respondent, while the Applicant was given access. Additionally, the Applicant was awarded minimal maintenance and tasked with covering half of the mobile telephone bill incurred by the Respondent. Contentions, evaluation, and findings Whether Respondent’s counterclaim was filed in compliance with procedure [9] At the outset, the Applicant raised a preliminary objection to the Respondent’s counterclaim within his affidavit in reply, contending that it did not adhere to stipulations outlined in Order 28 rule 7 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“Rules of Court”), which reads: 24 April 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 4 Order 28 – Originating summons procedure Rule 7 – Counterclaim by defendant

A defendant to an action begun by originating summons who alleges that he has any claim or is entitled to any relief or remedy against the plaintiff in respect of any matter, whenever and however arising, may make a counterclaim in the action in respect of that matter instead of bringing a separate action.

A defendant who wishes to make a counterclaim under this rule shall at the first or any resumed hearing of the originating summons by the Court, but, in any case, at as early a stage in the proceedings as is practicable, inform the Court of the nature of his claim and, without prejudice to the powers of the Court under paragraph (3), the claim shall be made in such manner as the Court may direct under rule 4 or 8.

If it appears on the application of a plaintiff against whom a counterclaim is made under this rule that the subject matter of the counterclaim ought for any reason to be disposed of by a separate action, the Court may order the counterclaim to be struck out or may order it to be tried separately or make such other order as may be expedient. [Emphasis added.] [10] The Applicant argued that the procedure adopted by the Respondent was improper wherein the Respondent had filed a counterclaim without first informing the Court about its nature, and obtaining further directions from the Court. Instead, the Respondent expedited the matter by filing a counterclaim in his affidavit in reply without adhering to the proper procedure. As such, the Respondent had failed to comply with Order 28 rule 7(2) of the Rules of Court. [11] In my view, although I had agreed with the Applicant on the literal reading of Order 28 rule 7 of the Rules of Court, I did not think that it warranted striking out the Respondent’s counterclaim as most of the 24 April 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 5 reliefs sought by the Respondent, especially with regard to the custody and maintenance of the Children, were reliefs that were sought by the Applicant as well. A separate action was, therefore, not warranted for the reliefs sought by the Respondent. As such, the preliminary objection was dismissed. Whether presumption in section 88(3) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 had been rebutted [12] Given that all the Children were under the age of seven, the doctrine of tender years as specified in section 88(3) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (“Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act”) came into effect. This doctrine generally favours the mother as the custodial parent when the children are of such a young age. Section 88(3) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act reads: Section 88 – Power of court to make order for custody …

There shall be a rebuttable presumption that it is for the good of a child below the age of seven years to be with his or her mother but in deciding whether that presumption applies to the facts of any particular case, the court shall have regard to the undesirability of disturbing the life of a child by changes of custody. [Emphasis added.] [13] Consequently, the burden fell upon the Respondent to rebut this presumption by demonstrating, on the balance of probabilities, that 24 April 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 6 awarding custody, care, and control to the Applicant would not be in the best interests of the Children’s welfare. [14] The concept of 'welfare of the child' has been extensively referenced and defined across numerous judicial decisions, including Teh Eng Kim v. Yew Peng Siong, Mahabir Prasad v. Mahabir Prasad [1982] 1 MLJ 189, Tan Sherry v Soo Sheng Fatt [2016] 1 LNS 1586, and Tan Erh Ling v. Ong Khong Wooi [2021] 1 LNS

[15] I was also guided by the Federal Court's reference in Sean O'Casey Patterson v Chan Hoong Poh & Ors [2011] 3 CLJ 722, which cited the Singaporean case of Tan Siew Kee v. Chua Ah Boey [1987] 1 LNS 77. In the latter case, the term 'welfare of the child' was elucidated by Chan Sek Keong JC (as he then was), who stated in the following passage: The expression 'welfare'... is to be taken in its widest sense. It means the general well-being of the child and all aspects of his upbringing, religious, moral as well as physical. His happiness, comfort and security also go to make up his well-being. A loving parent with a stable home is conducive to the attainment of such well-being. It is not to be measured in monetary terms. [Emphasis added.] [16] The Federal Court in Sean O'Casey Patterson v Chan Hoong Poh & Ors, as articulated by James Foong FCJ, provided a detailed explanation of 'welfare of the child' in the following passage: [53] According to Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edn, reissue (Mackay edition), para 443 the term, "welfare principle" is a set of factors used when "a court determines any question with respect to the upbringing of a child or 24 April 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 7 the administration of a child's property or the application of any income arising from it, the child's welfare must be the court's paramount consideration". In the English Children Act 1989, under the heading ‘welfare of the child’ is a set of factors that must be taken into account when deciding on such cases. These are for example: the wishes of the child; his feelings; his age; his sex and his background and the capabilities of the parties involved. Thus, this term "welfare principle" relates to certain factors to be considered and their priority during deliberation in such cases. [Emphasis added.] [17] The term 'welfare of the child', therefore, must be interpreted in the broadest sense, taking into account all relevant factors for this Court to arrive at a decision. It was impractical to list specific criteria, as the circumstances unique to each case would significantly influence the considerations. [18] After reviewing the evidence adduced by both Parties, I concluded that the Children should remain with the Respondent. Notably, despite the separation of the Parties, all three Children have continuously resided with the Respondent, who has been their primary caregiver since the Applicant left the matrimonial home. Removing the Children from their current environment, where they enjoy the comfort and love of the Respondent's extended family, would not be in the best interests of their welfare. This position was reinforced by the precedent established in the case of Wong Kim Foong (F) v Teau Ah Kau @ Chong Kwong Fait [1998] 1 CLJ 358; [1998] 1 MLJ 359, where the Court stressed the importance of maintaining a child's stability by preserving their familiar surroundings and relationships. 24 April 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 8 [19] Consequently, as custodial parent, the Respondent shall maintain possession of the Children's identification and travel documents. [20] I must also state, at this juncture, that during the hearing, the Applicant ultimately agreed that, in the best interests of the welfare of the Children, it would be best for the Children to remain with the Respondent. Whether guardianship should be joint [21] Although the Applicant ultimately consented to the Respondent having custody, care, and control of the children, she insisted on joint guardianship, citing section 5 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 (“Guardianship of Infants Act”), which states: Section 5 - Equality of parental rights

In relation to the custody or upbringing of an infant or the administration of any property belonging to or held in trust for an infant or the application of the income of any such property, a mother shall have the same rights and authority as the law allows to a father, and the rights and authority of mother and father shall be equal.

The mother of an infant shall have the like powers of applying to the Court in respect of any matter affecting the infant as are possessed by the father. [Emphasis added.] [22] According to section 3 (Duties of guardian of person) of the Guardianship of Infants Act, both parents bear equal responsibilities for ensuring the comprehensive welfare of the child. This includes 24 April 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 9 aspects such as health, education, religious upbringing, and overall support. Central to these responsibilities is the child's inherent right to foster meaningful relationships with both parents. [23] I was also guided by the decision of Tan Sherry (P) v Soo Sheng Fatt

(L) [2016] MLJU 1264, whereby Vazeer Alam Mydin Meera J (as he then was) recognised the principle that in a family dynamic, raising children should ideally be a collaborative effort between both parents: Even when the marriage breaks down, instead of being at war with each other as husband and wife, both should put aside their personal differences, to jointly decide on what would be best for the child. This would entail them to communicate with each other in a civil and courteous manner for the sake of their child's upbringing and development. This would to some extent constrain and require both to discuss with each other on all matters relating to the child such that neither should make unilateral decisions to the exclusion of the other. See the application of that principle by Lee Swee Seng J in CY v. CC [2015] MLJU 930 HC. [Emphasis added.] [24] Upon a thorough examination of the evidence adduced, I found no compelling grounds to withhold guardianship from the Applicant. It was crucial to emphasise that the Children have an inherent right to maintain consistent and meaningful relationships with both parents. While their primary residence will remain with the Respondent, neither parent holds unilateral superiority. Acknowledging that the unique dynamics of the parent-child relationship is paramount, as exemplified in the Singaporean case of CX v. CY (minor: custody and access) [2005] 3 SLR 690, where the Court of Appeal in the Singapore case emphasised the importance of joint parenting. 24 April 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 10 [25] The contentions brought forward by the Respondent were primarily focused on the marital strife existing between him and the Applicant, a realm separate from the duties and responsibilities tied to the Applicant's role as a parent. Despite their possible relevance to the broader legal proceedings, these issues did not directly influence or impinge upon the Applicant's parental obligations. Moreover, it was essential to note that the Applicant vehemently contested these assertions, rendering them as mere allegations within the legal dispute, rather than established facts or circumstances. [26] As such, based on the cases of Diana Clarice Chan Chiing Hwa v. Tiong Chiong Hoo [2002] 1 CLJ 721, [2002] 2 MLJ 97, [2002] 2 AMR 1527 and Gan Koo Kea v. Gan Shiow Lih [2003] 4 CLJ 539; [2003] 4 MLJ 770, [2003] 6 AMR 459, in the face of conflicting accounts that have not been subjected to the thorough scrutiny of cross-examination and re-examination, as typically conducted in a comprehensive trial with live testimony, the Court's obligation was to set aside contested details and base its judgment on established facts beyond dispute. [27] Lord Templeman for the Privy Council eloquently encapsulated this vital aspect of civil litigation practice in Tay Bok Choon v. Tahansan Sdn Bhd [1987] CLJ Rep 24, [1987] MLRA 68, [1987] 1 MLJ 433, in the following words: At the end of the day, the judge must decide the petition on the evidence before him. If allegations are made in affidavits by the petitioner and those allegations are credibly denied by the respondent's affidavits, then in the absence of oral evidence or cross-examination, the judge must ignore the disputed allegations. The judge must then decide the fate of the petition by consideration of the undisputed facts. 24 April 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 11 [Emphasis added.] [28] The Respondent had also claimed, as part of his reliefs in his counterclaim, for the Applicant to undergo mental health evaluation to determine her fitness as a mother. I found such a claim to be absolutely unnecessary, as there was no evidence adduced to convince this Court that the Applicant’s mental health was compromised. If at all she had harboured any anger, it was towards the Respondent and his family, who had aggravated the Applicant’s situation. [29] Moreover, granting joint guardianship to the Parties emphasised the importance of collaborative decision-making regarding critical aspects of the Children's welfare. Whether Applicant was entitled to access to Children [30] Given that the Respondent had been granted custody, care, and control of the Children, it was only fitting for the Applicant to be granted liberal access to the Children. Therefore, the Applicant's access to the Children was decided in the following manner: a) Virtual or online access was granted every Tuesday and Thursday at any time between 7 pm and 8 pm for a maximum of 30 minutes only, which the Respondent must facilitate and not attempt to disrupt, interfere with, or frustrate. b) Unsupervised physical access was granted every Monday and Wednesday between 8 pm and 8.30 pm where the Children will 24 April 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 12 meet the Applicant at her car, which she has to park away from the house where the Children are residing. c) Unsupervised physical access was granted on alternate Saturdays and Sundays from 10.30 am to 7 pm on each day. [31] Despite being granted sole custody, care, and control of the Children, the Respondent objected to the access granted to the Applicant on the grounds that such access would impede the Children’s extracurricular activities. [32] I could not agree with the Respondent's contention. It is indisputable that a child requires both parents. Each parent has invaluable contributions to make to a child's life. It was also essential to impress upon the Parties that it was the Children’s right to have an ongoing and meaningful relationship with both parents, regardless of their fitness. Hence, denying access to the Children by any parent constitutes a violation of their rights. Whether Respondent was obliged to pay spousal/ child maintenance [33] In scrutinising the complexities surrounding the maintenance matter, special focus was placed on section 77(1) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, which states: Section 77 - Power of court to order maintenance of spouse

The court may order a man to pay maintenance to his wife or former wife: 24 April 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 13

during the course of any matrimonial proceedings;

when granting or subsequent to the grant of a decree of divorce or judicial separation;

if, after a decree declaring her presumed to be dead, she is found to be alive. [Emphasis added]. [34] While the Court retains discretionary power in adjudicating maintenance claims by a spouse, its decisions are influenced by factors such as the degree of responsibility attributed to each party for the breakdown of the marriage, as well as the 'means and needs' test delineated in section 78 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, which states: Section 78 – Assessment of maintenance In determining the amount of any maintenance to be paid by a man to his wife or former wife or by a woman to her husband or former husband, the court shall base its assessment primarily on the means and needs of the parties, regardless of the proportion such maintenance bears to the income of the husband or wife as the case may be, but shall have regard to the degree of responsibility which the court apportions to each party for the breakdown of the marriage. [Emphasis added.] [35] In my evaluation of whether the Applicant was deserving of maintenance, I am mindful of established legal precedents, specifically the cases of Dr Shameni Pillai PB Rajedran v Dr S Arulselvam Sanggilly & Anor [2011] 6 CLJ 782, and V Sandrasagaran Veerapan Raman v. Dettarassar Velentine Souvina Marie [1999] 5 CLJ 474. 24 April 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 14 These cases underscored the importance of considering the following factors:

the income, earning capacity, property, or financial resources that each party presently possesses or is likely to possess in the foreseeable future;

the financial needs, obligations, and responsibilities that each party currently or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;

the standard of living enjoyed by the family prior to the breakdown of the marriage;

the age of each party and the duration of their marriage;

any existing health, physical, or mental disability of the parties;

the respective contributions made by each party to the welfare of the family; and

the duration of the marriage. [36] However, since the cause of the breakdown of the marriage had been disputed, such factor could not be considered at this stage to determine the amount of maintenance the Applicant was to receive. On this note, I was guided by the case of Shireen Chelliah Thiruchelvam v Kanagasingam Kandiah [2010] 2 CLJ 736, where it was stated by Suraya Othman J (as she then was): 24 April 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 15 [30] Therefore before this court can decide whether the wife is entitled to any maintenance, the issue of whether the alleged adulterous relationship between the wife and Dr Suresh Marcandan led to the breakdown of the marriage has to be decided first. The defendant has to file a petition for divorce and cite the alleged adulterer as a co-respondent or if the wife filed for divorce, then the defendant has to cite the alleged adulterer in his answer to the divorce petition as required by s. 58 of the LRA. Until the divorce petition is filed and the allegation of adultery is ventilated the issue of apportionment of responsibility for the breakdown of the marriage cannot be decided upon by this court and as such the issue of maintenance to the wife too, had to be postponed till that date. [Emphasis added.] [37] Thus, my decision regarding maintenance was guided solely by the ‘means and needs’ test. In this particular instance, the Applicant requested a modest monthly sum of MYR250, which had already been reduced from her original claim of MYR500. I found the Respondent's objection to this amount perplexing, considering its minimal nature. Such resistance indicated the Respondent's inclination to oppose every request made by the Applicant, seemingly without valid cause. It was evident that the Respondent was inclined to engage in unnecessary contention, reflecting a desire to fight the Applicant merely for the sake of conflict. [38] Concerning the Children, the Respondent was ordered to continue paying for their insurance. However, expenses related to their education, optical needs, and medical bills were to be shared equally. The Party who incurred the expense shall provide official receipts to the other Party, who must reimburse the other within 14 days of receipt. 24 April 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 16 Whether Respondent was obliged to reimburse Applicant for mobile telephone bill [39] The Applicant had also raised the issue of the mobile telephone bill. It came to light that the Respondent had utilised the Applicant's mobile telephone account to purchase a mobile telephone for his personal use but had failed to make any payments toward the bill. During the hearing, the Respondent requested the production of the original bill to ascertain the outstanding arrears. Despite the production of the original bill by the Applicant’s Counsel, indicating an outstanding balance of MYR2,999.15, the Respondent refused to settle the amount. [40] Consequently, I ordered the Respondent to pay half of the outstanding amount owed, totaling MYR1,500, as indicated by the bill. Conduct of Counsel [41] Prior to the hearing of this Application in December 2023, the Parties engaged in a mediation attempt at the mediation centre, which unfortunately did not yield a resolution. Hence, the Court had proceeded to hear this Application. Despite the unsuccessful mediation, I must commend the Applicant's Counsel for his efforts and spirit of cooperation, demonstrated by the Applicant’s willingness, during the hearing of this Application, to make several concessions in the best interest of the Children, and to facilitate a swift resolution of the proceedings. [42] Regrettably, the same could not be said for the Respondent's Counsel, who consistently rebuffed any proposals and objected to nearly every 24 April 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 17 suggestion put forth by the Applicant's Counsel, including the modest monthly amount of MYR250 as spousal maintenance sought by the Applicant. The Respondent went so far as to nit-pick and raise objections about access times, despite the Applicant having very limited access to the Children. Additionally, despite agreeing during the hearing of this Application to settle the mobile telephone bill on the condition that the original was produced, the Respondent's Counsel failed to acknowledge it. [43] Given the straightforward nature of the issues, largely due to the concessions made by the Applicant and her Counsel during the hearing of this Application, this Court recommended that the Parties meet halfway. However, the Respondent and his Counsel remained steadfast and obstinate, refused to budge from their position, and fought tooth and nail throughout these proceedings. [44] I emphasised to the Parties that although there is no legal mandate compelling them to pursue mediation for out-of-court settlements, there is a growing inclination within courts to endorse and, at times, mandate such alternative dispute resolution methods. This inclination finds validation in the English Court of Appeal case of Churchill v Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council [2023] EWCA Civ 1416, where the Court had underscored the pivotal role of mediation and arbitration across all cases. [45] In the context of the present case, even after previous efforts by both Parties to pursue mediation, it became crucial to emphasise to the Respondent the significant importance of not perceiving mediation as 24 April 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 18 a mere procedural step. Instead, it ought to be regarded as a sincere and earnest endeavor to seek a resolution for the dispute at hand. Regrettably, it seemed evident that the Respondent fell short of demonstrating this requisite sincerity. Despite the potential for mediation to foster constructive dialogue and potential solutions, the Respondent's lack of genuine commitment to the process hindered its effectiveness and the prospects for an amicable resolution. [46] I found it necessary to acknowledge the distinct nature of family law, which delves into deeply personal and emotionally charged matters like divorce, child custody, and property division. Given the delicacy of these issues, it was crucial for family lawyers to discern which battles to engage in and to steer clear of unnecessary conflicts, particularly those involving children. In the realm of family court proceedings, there are no true victors; hence, lawyers and their clients should strive to adopt a less combative and more collaborative approach. While the family courts in Malaysia have yet to formally embrace any specific philosophy, in my view, a transition towards some form of collaborative and therapeutic justice is vital. This approach mandates that family justice be approached in a holistic, restorative, and forward-thinking manner. [47] In this case, the repeated assertion from the Respondent's Counsel that "I have no instructions from my client" had raised red flags regarding potential deliberate tactics aimed at prolonging the disposal of this Application. In court proceedings, judges depend on lawyers to propel cases forward efficiently. Invoking a lack of instructions can needlessly stall proceedings, causing frustration among judges, and 24 April 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 19 opposing counsel, and ultimately detriment to the client's case. Courts adhere to stringent timelines, and it falls upon lawyers to manage their cases in a manner that honours these constraints. [48] Frequent instances of Counsel appearing in Court and citing a lack of instructions from their client, especially when proposals have been presented by the opposing party, would cast doubts on their capacity to advocate effectively for their client's interests. This pattern of behavior not only erodes the integrity of the legal proceedings but also obstructs the swift resolution of disputes. Conclusion [49] In conclusion, having judiciously considered the arguments presented and thoroughly examined all the evidence brought before this Court, including both written submissions and oral presentations from both Parties, joint guardianship was awarded to the Parties; whilst custody, care, and control of the Children was granted to the Respondent, and access to the Applicant as outlined above. Furthermore, the Respondent was ordered to provide spouse and child maintenance as stipulated above, as well as settle half of the mobile telephone bill. Dated: 24 April 2024 SIGNED 24 April 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 20 …………………………………………. (EVROL MARIETTE PETERS) Judge High Court, Kuala Lumpur Counsel: For the Applicant – Rabinder Singh and CL Chu; Messrs Rabinder Budiman & Associates For the Respondent – Khoo Ai Teng; Messrs Ng, Zainurul, Seke & Khoo Cases referred to: ➢ Churchill v Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council [2023] EWCA Civ 1416 ➢ CX v. CY (minor: custody and access) [2005] 3 SLR 690 ➢ Diana Clarice Chan Chiing Hwa v. Tiong Chiong Hoo [2002] 1 CLJ 721, [2002] 2 MLJ 97, [2002] 2 AMR 1527 ➢ Dr Shameni Pillai PB Rajedran v Dr S Arulselvam Sanggilly & Anor [2011] 6 CLJ 782 ➢ Gan Koo Kea v. Gan Shiow Lih [2003] 4 CLJ 539; [2003] 4 MLJ 770, [2003] 6 AMR 459 ➢ Mahabir Prasad v. Mahabir Prasad [1981] CLJ Rep 182; [1982] 1 MLJ 189 ➢ Sean O'Casey Patterson v. Chan Hoong Poh & Ors [2011] 3 CLJ 722 ➢ Shireen Chelliah Thiruchelvam v Kanagasingam Kandiah [2010] 2 CLJ 736 ➢ Tan Erh Ling v. Ong Khong Wooi [2021] 1 LNS 1325 24 April 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 21 ➢ Tan Sherry v. Soo Sheng Fatt [2016] 1 LNS 1586 ➢ Tan Siew Kee v. Chua Ah Boey [1987] 1 LNS 77 ➢ Tay Bok Choon v. Tahansan Sdn Bhd [1987] CLJ Rep 24, [1987] MLRA 68, [1987] 1 MLJ 433 ➢ Teh Eng Kim v. Yew Peng Siong [1977] 1 LNS 138; [1977] 1 MLJ 234 ➢ V Sandrasagaran Veerapan Raman v. Dettarassar Velentine Souvina Marie [1999] 5 CLJ 474 ➢ Wong Kim Foong (F) v Teau Ah Kau @ Chong Kwong Fait [1998] 1 CLJ 358; [1998] 1 MLJ 359 Legislation referred to: ➢ Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 – sections 3, 5 ➢ Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act 1976 – sections 77, 78, 88 ➢ Rules of Court 2012 – Order 28 rule 7