the improper admission or rejection of any evidence, unless such error, omission, irregularity, want, or improper admission or rejection of evidence has occasioned a failure of justice. [27] Maka dengan itu, isu berkaitan kecacatan pertuduhan pertama adalah ditolak kerana ternyata ia tidak bermerit. [28] Dapatan kami ini dibuat bersandarkan kepada kes Ahmad Zubir Hj Mursid v. PP [2014] 1 CLJ 697 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan melalui penghakiman yang disampaikan oleh Azahar Mohamed HMR (beliau pada ketika itu) menyatakan seperti berikut: “[6] Datuk Mohd Yusof bin Zainal Abiden, learned counsel for the appellant argued that the amended criminal breach of trust charges was flawed, defective and tantamount to the appellant being charged for an offence unknown to the Code for the reasons that the charges did not specify the direction of law prescribing the manner in which the trust was to be discharged or of any legal contract made touching on the discharge of the trust. [7] With respect, we are unable to agree with the contention of learned counsel for the appellant. In our view, the omission to state the mode in which the trust is to be discharged or of any legal contract made touching of the trust is not fatal at this stage of the proceedings. We agree with the submissions of Encik Kevin Morais, learned Deputy Public Prosecutor (‘DPP’) to the effect that the prosecution during the course of the trial can amend and lead evidence to identify the breach. In this regard, it is an established principle that with the leave of the court, the prosecution is entitled to amend the charges at any stage of the trial (see: PP v. Heng You Nang [1949] 1 LNS 61; [1949] MLJ 285, Francis Dang Anak Nuya v. PP [1988] 1 LNS 32; [1988] 1 MLJ 89, PP v. Tan Kim Kang & Ors [1962] 1 LNS 137; [1962] MLJ 388). The rules governing amendment of charges are provided for in ss. 158 to 162 and in s. 173(h)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Code (“the CPC”). The case of PP v. Yeoh Teck Chye and Lim Hong Pung & Anor v. PP [1981] 1 LNS 93; [1981] 2 MLJ 176 demonstrates that in the course of the trial, the prosecution is entitled to amend the criminal breach of trust charges. [8] Furthermore, s. 156 of the CPC provides that no error in stating either the offence or the particulars to be stated in the charge and no omission to state the offence or those particulars shall be regarded at any stage of the case as material, unless the appellant was in fact misled by that error or omission. More than that, s. of the CPC provides that any error or omission in the charges would not vitiate the proceedings, unless such error or omission has occasioned a failure of justice. In our view, whether the appellant was misled by any error or omission in the charges or whether such error or omission has occasioned a failure of justice can only be determined at the conclusion of the trial having regard to the entire evidence being placed before the trial judge.” [29] Di dalam kes Hee Nyuk Fook v. PP [1988] 2 MLJ 360, Mahkamah Agung melalui penghakiman yang disampaikan oleh Syed Agil Barakbah HMA (beliau pada ketika itu) menyatakan seperti berikut: “The question that arises is whether section 158(ii) is mandatory or directory. In our view, the word "shall" appear therein, though generally taken as mandatory, does not mean to be so in every case. No hard and fast rule can be laid down because it depends on the facts and circumstances of a particular case, the purpose and object for which such provision is made, the intention of the legislature in making the provision and the serious inconvenience or injustice which may result in treating the provision one way or the other (see Interpretation of Statutes by Bindra, 7th Ed., p. 662). We are of the view that the safest way is to look into the subject-matter of the case, consider the importance of the provision that has been disregarded, the relation of the provision to the object of the Code and decide in that order whether the matter is imperative or only directory (see Howard v Bodington (1877) 2 PD 203 at p 211). Applying the test to the facts and surrounding circumstances of the case, we hold that in so far as this case is concerned, the provision of section 158(ii) is not imperative but directory. The provisions contained therein only lay down a rule of procedure and do not relate to the mode of trial. A fortiori in the light of the provision of section 422 of the Code. The nature of the amendment being purely technical and in no way, substantial has not rendered the omission to read over and explain the amended charge to the applicant at the close of the defence a serious irregularity as to vitiate the proceeding or has occasioned a failure of justice.” [emphasis added] [30] Di dalam kes Aisyah Mohd Rose & Anor v. PP [2016] 1 MLJ 840, Mahkamah Rayuan melalui penghakiman yang disampaikan oleh Tengku Maimun HMR (beliau pada ketika itu) menyatakan seperti berikut: “[30] Based on the above provision, what is of significance is not the error per se in the charge but whether the error had resulted in the appellants being misled. We are not convinced that the appellants had in fact been misled or prejudiced by the error in the particulars of the charge such that they were not able to put up a proper defence.” [31] We wish to add that this court had considered similar issue in Ahmad Zubair @ Ahmad Zubir bin Hj Murshid v. Public Prosecutor [2014] 1 MLJ 624; [2014] 1 CLJ 697 where the charge of criminal breach of trust under s 409 Penal Code was similarly worded ‘… telah diamanahkan dengan penguasaan ke atas dana syarikat tersebut … ’. Applying ss 156 and 422 of the CPC, it was held that the charge so framed was not fatal to the prosecution case. [32] On the charge for abetment, s 107 of the Penal Code provides as follows: A person abets the doing of a thing who: