(c) whether summary judgment was procedurally appropriate where the statutory appeal remains pending before the Special Commissioners. [31] The Defendant has also argued that the service of the notice of assessment does not automatically entitle the Plaintiff to summary judgment as strict requirements of Order 14 of the Rules of Court 2012 must still be satisfied. [32] In fact, the Defendant had invited the court to refer this matter for determination of constitutional questions pursuant to Section 84 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. [33] However, I am not persuaded by the Defendant’s arguments. As rightly pointed out by the Plaintiff, all of these constitutional issues and questions have already been comprehensively decided by the Federal Court in Mohd Najib Hj Abd Razak v Government of Malaysia & Another Appeal [2023] 10 CLJ 329. [34] The issues raised by the Defendant on Sections 99, 103 and 106 of the Income Tax Act 1967 has already been addressed by the Federal Court in Mohd Najib Hj Abd Razak v Government of Malaysia & Another Appeal as follows: - “[86] Put another way, adjudication of the merits of an assessment fall to be considered by the SCIT under s.99(1) of the ITA with recourse to the superior courts by way of appeal. However, for purposes of immediate collection and recovery of sums assessed to be due by the DGIR, recourse is made to the courts under s.106 of the ITA supported by s. 142(1) of the ITA and s.103B of the ITA to give effect to the 'pay first dispute later' scheme and operation of the ITA. [87] The court under s.106 of the ITA is fulfilling the purpose of recovery or collection only. It is not undertaking a full judicial adjudicatory role. Its full adjudicatory judicial power is deferred to the appeal arising from the decision of the SCIT by way of questions of law, or administrative or constitutional judicial review at a subsequent stage. [88] And this is consonant with the 'pay first dispute later' mode of tax imposition by the Government. There is no abrogation or suspension of the court's adjudicatory powers because those powers remain to be exercised in the course of the appeal proceedings brought in relation to the assessment itself. The judicial powers of judicial review as well as powers of judicial intervention in the form of a stay are also available and not ousted.” [35] On the issue of whether summary judgment was procedurally appropriate where the statutory appeal remains pending before the Special Commissioners, the Federal Court has explained as follows: - “[175] Therefore the 'some other reason' for a trial to be held under O.14 does not apply as a basis on which to enforce this statutory debt created by the taxing statute to enable payment to be made first, pending any challenge or dispute as to the sum assessed, which is effectively deferred under the statute. If it is found under the O.14 procedure that the matter should go to trial it would render the method prescribed under the Act for adjudication, nugatory. The Act should be construed such that the various sections are harmonious and provide a coherent structure for income tax collection. [176] Therefore the use of other 'some other reason for trial' should not be invoked. It is not tenable for a s.106 debt to be determined finally at trial, if the taxing statute also prescribes a specific manner of challenging the tax assessed, as is the case under the ITA. We have explained above in the body of the judgment that such a judgment does not enjoy the characteristics of a judgment issued after a full exercise of the court's dispute resolution powers. It is a judgment handed down for the purposes of collection, i.e., to enable recovery first, while the dispute is deferred. It does not enjoy the rights-determining character of finality which is to be found in a judgment delivered after full adjudication in a court of law.” [36] On the Defendant’s argument that there is no guarantee that any excess payment pursuant to a premature civil proceeding would be refunded if the statutory appeal ultimately succeeds, the Federal Court had answered as follows: - “[179] Enforcement may involve a writ of seizure and sale or garnishment of any amount due, and if the sum assessed is found to be erroneous after the merits of a dispute have been dealt with in full under the s. 99(1) challenge, the over-assessed portion will be refunded to the taxpayer. With the latest amendments to the ITA, such a refund will carry interest (see: s. 111D of the ITA). To that extent, the filing of civil proceedings in terms of s. 106(1) is nothing more than an enforcement mechanism and is distinct from a means of determining liability.” [37] In response to the Defendant’s submission that the SCJ had erred by misconstruing Section 106(3) of the Income Tax Act 1967 as a blanket ouster clause that precludes all forms of judicial scrutiny once an assessment had been issued, it was succinctly explained in Mohd Najib Hj Abd Razak v Government of Malaysia & Another Appeal that: - “[169] To reiterate, the enforcement provisions in ss. 103 and 106 are themselves premised on the exercise of judicial power, so it cannot be said that judicial power is in any way ousted. There is merely a temporary restriction of the taxpayer's rights of challenge, which are deferred while allowing for payment first. The courts' powers remain unaffected. So, when s.106(3) provides that the court shall not consider certain defences relating solely to the tax assessed, it is the taxpayer's right to raise these issues at that juncture that is deferred, not curtailed. The court's powers remain untouched as explained above.” [38] In their submissions, the Defendant does not dispute that the Federal Court in Mohd Najib’s case had considered and upheld the validity of Section 106 of the Income Tax Act 1967. However, the Defendant argued that the Federal Court in Mohd Najib’s case did not undertake a comprehensive constitutional reconciliation between Section 106 and 99 of the Income Tax Act 1967 in the manner now required in the present appeal. [39] Alas, I am not able to accept the Defendant’s arguments. I am of the opinion that all of the issues have already been comprehensively decided by the Federal Court in Mohd Najib Hj Abd Razak v Government of Malaysia & Another Appeal. Conclusion [40] Accordingly, for the reasons above, the Defendant’s appeal is dismissed with costs fixed at RM 5,000.00. Dated the 12th May 2026. (SEOW HOCK PENG) JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH COURT OF MALAYA SHAH ALAM, SELANGOR Counsel: For the Plaintiff/Respondent : Umisalamah binti Abd Latiff Lily Hardiany binti Harun (Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri (LHDN), Cyberjaya) For the Defendant/Appellant : Vignesh Kumar a/l Krishnasamy Nurul Aime binti Azwan (Messrs Balendran Chong) Case Reference: