Hamzan Binti Hamzah v 1. ) Dr Ahmad Zul Fikri B Mohamad (DA-21NCvC-1-01/2025)

KERAJAAN MALAYSIA … DEFENDANTS GROUND OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 9)

The enclosure 9 ("Encl. 9") is the Defendant's Notice of Application to strike out the Plaintiff's Writ and Statement of Claim under Order 18 Rule 19 (1)(a) and/or (b) and/or (d) of the Rules of Court 2012. This Court has allowed the Defendant's application in this Encl.9 and has struck out the Plaintiff's Writ and Statement of Claim. The Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal. 07/08/2025 14:35:45

This action, DA-21-NCvC-1-01/2025 ("the Suit") was brought by the Plaintiff against the Defendants in relation to a medical negligence alleged to had happened to the plaintiff when she was receiving series of medical treatment at Hospital Raja Perempuan Zainab II, Kota Bharu, Kelantan.

In her statement of claim, the plaintiff pleads, inter alia, as follows: Paragraph 12 of the statement of claim: “Plaintif kemudiannya dirujuk ke Hospital Raja Perempuan Zainab (HRPZ II) pada 15 Mei 2021 untuk tindakan selanjutnya. Beliau memerlukan pemerhatian rapi, maka beliau sepatutnya dimasukkan ke dalam ICU. Namun, atas arahan Defendan Pertama, ekoran daripada katil ICU yang tidak mencukupi dan wad ICU yang sudah penuh, Plaintif dihantar ke Wad Pembedahan sahaja.” Paragraph 13 of the statement of claim: “Dalam Wad Pembedahan tersebut, atas arahan Defendan Kedua dan Defendan Ketiga, beliau kemudian telah mendapat “Maximum Infusion Dose Of Noradrenaline” untuk tempoh lebih daripada 48 jam dari 16 Mei 2021 sehingga 18 Mei 2021 sedangkan Plaintif tidak akan mendapat pantauan rapi dari jururawat dan/atau doktor di wad pembedahan tersebut. Plaintif sepatutnya dimasukkan ke dalam ICU untuk memastikan beliau mendapat pantauan rapi sepanjang beliau menerima “Maximum Infusion Dose OF Noradrenaline”. Paragraph 15 of the statement of claim: “Pakar Urologi kemudiannya telah menjadualkan Plaintif untuk satu “Emergency Bilateral RPG” dan “Right Uteric Stenting”. Namun, Plaintif hanya dihantar ke dewan pembedahan pada 19 Mei 2021 untuk menjalani “Emergency Bilateral RPG” dan membuat proses “Stenting” di Ureter kanan Plaintif sekalipun Plaintif telah disyaki mempunyai masalah “Stones” dan/atau batu karang sejak dari rahun 2019 lagi. Pada masa tersebut jugalah, terdapat perubahan warna kebiruan didapati di tangan dan kaki Plaintif.” Paragraph 16 of the statement of claim: “Sewaktu di ICU, Plaintif telah mengalami beberapa isu antaranya: i. “Ischaemic Heart Disease” dengan fungsi ventrikel kiri yang sudah lemah; ii. Peringkat awal kegagalan masalah buah pinggang yang kronik bersama “Acidosis”; iii. “Liver Transminitis” bersama dengan “Thrombocytopaenia”; dan iv. Perubahan warna yang seakan-akan kehitaman berlaku di keempat-empat anggota badan (limbs). Paragraph 17 of the statement of claim: “Setelah stabil, Plaintif telah dipindahkan ke wad pembedahan pada 23 Mei 2021 dan keadaan keseluruhan kesihatan Plaintif dilihat telah ada peningkatan. Fungsi buah pinggang Plaintif telah dilihat kembali normal, tekanan darah kembali normal, pernafasan juga kembali normal dan beliau juga dilihat telah mula sedar sepenuhnya. Disebabkan itu Plaintif telah memohon untuk “AOR (At Own Risk) Discharge”. Beliau telah keluar dari hospital pada 28 Mei 2021 dan diberikan ubat-ubatan untuk dibawa balik ke rumah seperti “Antibiotics (Carfroxime)”, “Analgesics (Paracetamol & Tramal)” dan “Anti-Coagulants (Plavix & Aspirin)”.

The learned Defendant's counsel submits that the Plaintiff's Statement of Claim does not disclose any reasonable cause of action against the Defendant and the Plaintiff's claim against the Defendant is a scandalous, frivolous or vexatious and it is an abuse of the court process based on two grounds: Firstly, the Plaintiff’s claims are time barred under Section 2(a) of Public Authority Protection Act 1948; and Secondly, it is caught by the doctrine of res judicata.

The learned Defendant's counsel has also submitted that the Plaintiff's cause of action had commenced on 16.05.2021 when she received maximum infusion dose of Noradrenaline and she had not been given intensive care and as a result, she contracted gangrene on her four limbs. Hence, the Plaintiff’s cause of action has expired on 15.05.2024.

The learned Defendant's counsel has also submitted that the Plaintiff's claim should be struck out under the doctrine of res judicata as the Plaintiff’s previous suit under No. DA-21NCvC-7- 05/2024 for the same cause of action had been struck out by the court.

The learned Plaintiff's counsel has submitted that the Plaintiff’s action was filed within 36 months as provided by Section 2(a) of Public Authority Protection Act 1948 as the Plaintiff had undergone Vesicolithotripsy, Right URS and RPG under Spinal Anaesthesia on 03.08.2022 i.e the final treatment received by the Plaintiff. Hence the Plaintiff’s cause of action against the Defendant commenced on the same date and ended on 02.08.2025.

The Plaintiff’s learned counsel also argued that the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable in this case as the Plaintiff’s previous case had been struck out on technical issue and not on merit. It was struck out on the grounds that the Plaintiff did not name any particular doctor as co-defendant in the suit.

Upon examining the Plaintiff's claims as set out in her Statement of Claim, the Court finds that the Plaintiff’s cause of action against the Defendants had arisen between 16.05.2021 to 18.05.2021 when the Plaintiff alleged she had suffered several disease or infection as listed in paragraph 16 of the statement of claim while under the treatment of the defendants.

In the case of Government of Malaysia v Lim Kit Siang; United Engineers (M) Bhd v Lim Kit Siang [1988] 2 MLJ 12, the Supreme Court stated as follows regarding the meaning of "cause of action": “What then is the meaning of “a cause of action”? “ A cause of action” is a statement of facts alleging that a plaintiff’s right, either at law or by statute, has, in some way or another, been adversely affected or prejudiced by the act of a defendant in an action. Lord Diplock in Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232 at page 242 defined “a cause of action” to mean “a factual situation, the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person”. In my view the factual situation spoken of by Lord Diplock must consist of a statement alleging that, first, the respondent/plaintiff has a right either at law or by statute and that, secondly, such right has been affected or prejudiced by the appellant/defendant’s act.”

It is pertinent to refer to the provisions of Public Authority Protection Act 1948 (PAPA) in order the determine the issue at hand. Section 2 (a) of PAPA provides as follows: “the suit, action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within thirty-six months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or, in the case of a continuous injury or damage, within thirty-six months next after the ceasing thereof;”

Based on the limitation period of 36 months, the plaintiff’s cause of action would have expired on between 15.05.2024 and 17.05.2024 while this action had been filed by the Plaintiff on 09.01.2025.

In this case, the defendants had expressly pleaded the defence of limitation in paragraph 26.9 and 26.10 of their statement of defence. It states as follows: “26.9 Selanjutnya, Defendan-Defendan menyatakan bahawa kausa tindakan bagi tindakan ini telah dihalang oleh had masa di bawah Seksyen 2(a) Akta Perlindungan Pihak Berkuasa awam 1948; dan

26.10 Defendan-Defendan sesungguhnya menyatakan bahawa pembelaan had masa adalah bersifat mandatori dan muktamad (“absolute”). “

Section 38 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 provides as follows: “Any written law relating to the limitation of time for bringing proceedings against public authorities may be relied upon by the government as a defence in any civil proceedings against the government”.

This Court is unable to agree with the argument of the Plaintiff’s learned counsel that the Plaintiff’s cause of action had arisen on 03.08.2022 i.e. the date when the Plaintiff received final treatment from the defendants as mere giving medical treatment without any negligent act does not give rise to any cause of action. No complaint of any negligence whatsoever had been pleaded on the date of 03.08.2022.

The defence of limitation is a complete defence accorded to the defendants by the law. In the case of Alias Ismail v. Hairuddin Mohamad & Anor [1997] 4 CLJ 669 Abdul Malek Ahmad JCA (as he then was) said: “The court has no discretion to set aside a defence of limitation. In Riches v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1973] 1 WLR 1019, it was held that it was open to the defendant on an application to dismiss an action as being frivolous and vexatious or an abuse of the process of the court to show that the plaintiff's cause of action was statute barred and must inevitably fail for that reason.”

On the issue of res judicata, this Court is agreeable with the learned counsel of the Plaintiff that the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable in this case since the Plaintiff’s previous suit had been struck out on other technical reason i.e. for not naming particular medical officers in the suit hence not complying with provisions of Section 5 and 6 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956.

This Court is fully aware that the power to strike out a proceeding or a writ and statement of claim is a drastic power that must be exercised with caution and only in a plain and obvious case. This principle of law has been well established in the cases of Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 33; Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v State Government of Pahang Darul Makmur & Anor [2016] 3 MLJ 1 and Pengarah Hospital Selayang & Ors v. Ahmad Azizi Abdullah James & Ors [2013] 3 CLJ 833.

At the same time, this Court also has the duty to ensure that only meritorious cases with a reasonable cause of action to be brought to a full trial in order to save valuable judicial time.

In this case, this Court has carefully examined and considered the details of the Plaintiff's claim as well as the applicable principles of law in the exercise of the Court's powers to strike out the Plaintiff’s writ and statement of claim. Upon such examination and consideration, this Court finds that the Plaintiff's claim against the Defendants had been barred by the limitation period as stipulated in section 2(a) of PAPA and hence renders the Plaintiff’s claim as “must inevitably fail for that reason”.

The Plaintiff’s claims tantamount to a frivolous and vexatious or an abuse of the process of the court. Therefore, this Court allows the Defendants' application in Enclosure 9 and this Court strikes out the Plaintiff’s writ and statement of claim with cost of RM5,000.00 payable by the Plaintiff to the Defendants subject to the allocator fee. Dated this on 07.08.2025. (MOHD ROSLI BIN YUSOFF) Judge High Court (2) Kota Bharu Plaintiff's Counsel : Muhammad Zaid Bin Abu Hassan Kusaheri Tetuan Maisyarah & Co, Level 33, Ilham Tower, No. 8, Jalan Binjai, 50450 Kuala Lumpur. Defendant’s Counsel : Fariza Amira Binti Azman Peguam Persekutuan Jabatan Peguam Negara Malaysia Bahagian Guaman No. 45, Persiaran Perdana, Present 4, 62100 Putrajaya.