HARITHARAN A/L MUGUNTHAN v Ketua Setiausaha, Kementerian Dalam Negeri (KDN) (W-01(A)-499-09/2023)

AND

DALAM NEGERI

PENDAFTARAN NEGARA, MALAYSIA KERAJAAN MALAYSIA …RESPONDENTS In the High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur (Special Powers Division) Originating Summons No.: WA-24-52-09/2022 BETWEEN HARITHARAN A/L MUGUNTHAN (BIRTH CERTIFICATE No.: AV79829) … PLAINTIFF

AND

DALAM NEGERI

PENDAFTARAN NEGARA, MALAYSIA KERAJAAN MALAYSIA …DEFENDANTS 09/07/2026 09:29:19 Kand. 62 CORAM AZHAHARI KAMAL BIN RAMLI, JCA FAIZAH BINTI JAMALUDIN, JCA HAYATUL AKMAL BINTI ABDUL AZIZ, JCA GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This is an appeal against the decision of the learned High Court Judge dated 24 August 2023 dismissing the Appellant’s Originating Summons. [2] The Appellant, Haritharan a/l Mugunthan, seeks declarations that he is a Malaysian citizen. He relies principally on Article 14(1)(b) of the Federal Constitution, read with section 1(a) and/or section 1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule. He also relies on Article 18 and Article 19 of the Federal Constitution. [3] The Appellant further relies on the fact that he was born in Malaysia, that his biological father is a Malaysian citizen, that he was issued a Malaysian international passport, that he had earlier administrative records including a MyKid number, and that he has lived and been educated in Malaysia. [4] We are mindful of the Appellant’s circumstances. He was born in Malaysia. He has lived in Malaysia. He says he does not hold citizenship of any other country. Those matters deserve careful consideration. [5] However, the Court’s task is not to decide the appeal on sympathy. The Court must determine whether the Appellant has established, on the evidence before the Court, that he is a Malaysian citizen by operation of law under the Federal Constitution. Characterisation of the case [6] This is principally a citizenship by operation of law case under Article 14(1)(b) of the Federal Constitution. [7] It is not, in substance, an Article 15A case. The Appellant’s previous Article 15A applications form part of the factual background. They do not convert the present appeal into an appeal against the exercise of the Federal Government’s discretion under Article 15A. [8] It is also not a naturalisation case under Article 19. Article 19 concerns citizenship by naturalisation. Naturalisation is not citizenship by operation of law. [9] Nor is this a deprivation, withdrawal or cancellation case under Articles 24 to 27 of the Federal Constitution. The real issue is whether citizenship by operation of law arose at all. [10] The source of citizenship is the Federal Constitution, not the birth certificate, passport or administrative record. Those documents may be evidence of particulars recorded or administrative acts done. They are not, by themselves, the source of citizenship by operation of law. Salient facts [11] The Appellant was born on 29 April 2001 at Hospital Besar Ipoh, Perak, Malaysia. His birth was registered on 11 May 2001. [12] The Appellant’s birth certificate records his father as Mugunthan a/l Balakrishnan, a Malaysian citizen. It records his mother as Nipa Rukanna, a Thai citizen. [13] It is not disputed that Mugunthan and Nipa Rukanna were never married. The Appellant was therefore illegitimate at the time of his birth. [14] The Appellant’s case is that his biological mother left him when he was about one year and two months old and could not thereafter be traced. [15] On 29 June 2002, the Appellant was issued a Malaysian international passport. The Appellant places considerable reliance on this fact. [16] In or about 2009, when the Appellant was in Standard Two, his father attended at the National Registration Department in relation to the Appellant’s birth certificate. An extracted birth certificate was issued. The extracted birth certificate recorded the Appellant’s status as “Bukan Warganegara”. [17] The Appellant had made applications for citizenship under Article 15A of the Federal Constitution. Those applications were unsuccessful. [18] The Appellant also relies on his immunisation records, education in Malaysia, residence in Malaysia, travel to Sarawak using the Malaysian passport, and his present family circumstances. Relief sought and the High Court’s decision [19] By the Originating Summons, the Appellant sought, among others, the following reliefs:

a declaration that he is a Malaysian citizen by operation of law under Article 14(1)(b) and/or Article 18 of the Federal

a declaration that he is a Malaysian citizen pursuant to Article 19 of the Federal Constitution;

an order directing the Respondents to issue a birth certificate stating that he is a Malaysian citizen;

an order directing the Respondents to issue a MyKad stating that he is a Malaysian citizen;

an order directing registration or updating of his name under the

damages for alleged breach of constitutional rights. [20] The learned High Court Judge dismissed the Originating Summons with no order as to costs. [21] The learned Judge held, in substance, that the Appellant had not established citizenship by operation of law under Article 14(1)(b), read with section 1(a) or section 1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule. The learned Judge also held that the Malaysian international passport did not determine citizenship by operation of law, and that Article 18 and Article 19 did not assist the Appellant. Grounds of appeal and issues for determination [22] The Appellant contends that the learned Judge erred in law and fact in failing to give due effect to the following matters:

the Appellant was born in Malaysia after Malaysia Day;

the Appellant’s biological father is a Malaysian citizen;

the Appellant was issued a Malaysian international passport;

the Respondents did not deny that the passport was issued;

the Appellant had earlier administrative records including a MyKid number;

the Appellant has lived and studied in Malaysia;

the Appellant says he is stateless and does not hold citizenship of any other country;

the Appellant’s Article 15A applications were unsuccessful;

the Appellant’s biological mother is untraceable;

the decision in Nalvin Dhillon a/l Narangan Singh v Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara, Malaysia & 2 Ors (Originating Summons No.: WA-24-51-09/2019) (“Nalvin Dhillon”) which involved similar facts, where the High Court held the applicant to be a Malaysian citizen by operation of law; and

news reports concerning Azimah Hamzah, who was born in Pahang to Cambodian refugees, and media reports concerning footballers who were granted Malaysian citizenship by naturalisation, show inconsistent treatment by the authorities. [23] The issues for our determination are:

whether the Appellant has established citizenship by operation of law under Article 14(1)(b), read with section 1(a) of Part II of the Second Schedule;

whether section 17 of Part III of the Second Schedule applies to the Appellant by reason of illegitimacy at birth;

whether the Appellant has established citizenship by operation of law under Article 14(1)(b), read with section 1(e) and section 2(3) of Part II of the Second Schedule;

whether section 19B is engaged on the facts;

whether the Malaysian international passport and other administrative records establish citizenship by operation of law;

whether Article 18, Article 19 or Article 15A assist the Appellant in the present proceedings;

whether the Appellant’s reliance on Nalvin Dhillon, media reports or alleged inconsistent treatment affects the constitutional analysis; and

what relief should follow. Constitutional framework [24] Article 14(1)(b) of the Federal Constitution provides that, subject to the provisions of Part III, every person born on or after Malaysia Day and having any of the qualifications specified in Part II of the Second Schedule is a citizen by operation of law. [25] Section 1(a) of Part II of the Second Schedule provides that every person born within the Federation of whose parents one at least is, at the time of birth, either a citizen or permanently resident in the Federation, is a citizen by operation of law. [26] Section 1(e) of Part II provides that every person born within the Federation who is not born a citizen of any country otherwise than by virtue of that paragraph is a citizen by operation of law. [27] Section 2(3) of Part II provides that, for the purposes of section 1(e), a person is to be treated as having at birth any citizenship which he acquires within one year afterwards by virtue of any provision corresponding to section 1(e), or otherwise. Section 2(3) therefore remains anchored to the material date of birth. It treats citizenship acquired within one year after birth as citizenship held at birth. [28] Section 17 of Part III of the Second Schedule provides that, for the purposes of Part III of the Federal Constitution, references to a person’s father, or to his parent, or to one of his parents, are, in relation to a person who is illegitimate, to be construed as references to his mother. [29] Section 17 must be read together with Article 31 and with the opening words of section 1 of Part II of the Second Schedule, which make the citizenship provisions by operation of law subject to the supplementary provisions in Part III. The effect, as explained by the Federal Court in CTEB & Anor v Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara, Malaysia & Ors [2021] 4 MLJ 236; [2021] 6 CLJ 471; [2021] 5 AMR 661; [2021] 4 MLRA 678, FC (“CTEB”), is that where the person was illegitimate at birth, the relevant parent for the constitutional inquiry is the mother. [30] The material date for the constitutional inquiry under Article 14(1)(b) — read with section 1(a) or section 1(e) — is the date of birth. In this case, that date is 29 April 2001. The appeal must therefore be decided by reference to the constitutional facts existing, and the constitutional text applicable, on that date. [31] The legal burden rests on the Appellant to establish the constitutional facts necessary for the declarations sought. Citizenship by operation of law is determined by the Federal Constitution. The Court must not import requirements not found in the constitutional text. Equally, the Court cannot disregard requirements which the constitutional text imposes. Parties’ submissions in summary [32] The Appellant submits that he is a citizen by operation of law because he was born in Malaysia after Malaysia Day and because his biological father is a Malaysian citizen. He accepts that he was born out of wedlock, but contends that section 17 of Part III of the Second Schedule should not be applied so as to defeat his claim under section 1(a). [33] In support of a broad constitutional interpretation, the Appellant relies on Dato’ Seri Ir Hj Mohammad Nizar bin Jamaluddin v Dato’ Seri Dr Zambry bin Abdul Kadir [2010] 2 MLJ 285; [2010] 2 CLJ 925; [2012] 6 MLRA 259, FC (“Dato’ Seri Mohammad Nizar”) and Dato Menteri Othman bin Baginda v Dato Ombi Syed Alwi Syed Idrus [1981] 1 MLJ 29; [1984] 1 CLJ (Rep) 98; [1980] 1 MLRA 18, FC (“Dato Menteri Othman Baginda”). He submits that the Federal Constitution should be interpreted broadly, liberally and purposively. [34] The Appellant also relies on Yong Lee Hua v Director of National Registration Sabah & Anor [2011] 3 MLJ 684; [2011] 9 CLJ 125; [2010] 3 MLRH 856, HC (“Yong Lee Hua”) on the meaning of Malaysia Day. He submits that he was born after Malaysia Day and within the Federation. [35] On section 1(a), the Appellant relies on Madhuvita Janjara Augustin v Augustin Lourdsamy & Ors [2018] 1 MLJ 307; [2018] 4 CLJ 758; [2017] 8 AMR 436; [2017] MLRAU 455, CA (“Madhuvita”). He submits that the word “parents” should not be read restrictively and that his Malaysian biological father should be taken into account. He also refers to Pendaftar Besar Kelahiran dan Kematian, Malaysia v Pang Wee See & Anor [2017] 3 MLJ 308; [2017] 7 CLJ 33; [2018] 2 MLRA 406, CA (“Pang Wee See”) and Chin Kooi Nah (Suing By Herself And As Next Of Kin To Chin Jia Nee, An Infant) v Pendaftar Besar Kelahiran dan Kematian, Malaysia [2016] 7 MLJ 717; [2016] 1 CLJ 736; [2016] 1 AMR 224; [2015] MLRHU 1040, HC (“Chin Kooi Nah”). [36] The Appellant seeks to distinguish CTEB on the basis that said case concerned a child born outside Malaysia, whereas the Appellant was born in Malaysia. He also relies on CCH & Anor v Pendaftar Besar bagi Kelahiran dan Kematian, Malaysia [2022] 1 MLJ 71; [2022] 1 CLJ 1; [2022] 1 AMR 1; [2022] 1 MLRA 185, FC (“CCH”) to submit that citizenship provisions should be construed broadly and in a manner which avoids statelessness. [37] The Appellant also relies on section 1(e). He submits that he was born in Malaysia and did not acquire citizenship of any other country within one year of birth. He submits that section 1(e) is intended to prevent statelessness and should not be construed in a manner which renders it ineffective or redundant. He relies, in this context, on the principle against rendering constitutional provisions nugatory, including Karunairajah a/l Rasiah v Punithambigai a/p Poniah [2004] 2 MLJ 401; [2004] 2 CLJ 365; [2003] 2 AMR 649; [2004] 1 MLRA 228, FC (“Karunairajah”). [38] The Appellant further relies on the Malaysian international passport issued to him, his birth certificate, MyKid number, immunisation records, education in Malaysia, residence in Malaysia, and his unsuccessful Article 15A applications. He submits that these matters show recognition by the authorities of his Malaysian status, or at least a legitimate expectation that he should be treated as Malaysian. [39] The Appellant also relies on the unreported case of Nalvin Dhillon, news reports concerning Azimah Hamzah, and more recent media reports concerning naturalisation of footballers under Article 19. He submits that those materials show that persons in similar or less compelling circumstances have been granted or recognised as Malaysian citizens. [40] The Respondents submit that citizenship by operation of law must be determined by reference to the Federal Constitution and the facts at birth. They rely principally on CTEB for the proposition that the constitutional qualifications for citizenship by operation of law must be fulfilled at birth and that the Court cannot add to or subtract from the constitutional text. [41] The Respondents submit that the Appellant was illegitimate at birth because his biological parents were never married. They rely on section 17 of Part III of the Second Schedule, CTEB, Lim Jen Hsian & Anor v Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara & Ors [2018] 6 MLJ 548; [2017] 8 CLJ 412; [2017] 6 MLRA 426, CA (“Lim Jen Hsian”) and Chan Tai Ern Bermillo v Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara, Malaysia & Ors [2020] 3 MLJ 634; [2020] 4 CLJ 597; [2020] 3 AMR 421; [2020] MLRAU 51, CA (“Chan Tai Ern Bermillo”). They submit that, because the Appellant was illegitimate at birth, the relevant parent for section 1(a) is his mother. [42] The Respondents further submit that the Appellant’s mother was a Thai citizen and that the Appellant has not established that she was a Malaysian citizen or permanently resident in Malaysia. On section 1(e), the Respondents rely on Lim Jen Hsian, Than Siew Beng & Anor v Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara & Ors [2017] 5 MLJ 662; [2017] 8 CLJ 16; [2017] 6 MLRA 358, CA (“Than Siew Beng”), Tan Soo Yin v Registrar-General of Births and Deaths, Malaysia [2022] MLRAU 323, CA (“Tan Soo Yin”), and Azimah binti Hamzah v Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara & Anor [2023] 3 MLJ 227; [2023] 3 CLJ 475; [2023] 3 MLRA 239, CA (“Azimah Hamzah”). They submit that the burden rests on the Appellant to prove that he was not born a citizen of any country. [43] The Respondents also rely on the Thai Nationality Act to submit that a person born of a Thai father or mother acquires Thai nationality by birth, whether born within or outside Thailand. They submit that the Appellant has not established that he was stateless at birth. [44] On the Malaysian international passport, the Respondents submit that the passport is an administrative document. They say that the details of the passport application are no longer available and that, at the material time, the Immigration system and the National Registration Department system were not integrated. They submit that the passport does not confer citizenship by operation of law. [45] The Respondents further submit that CCH does not prevail over CTEB in this appeal. They say that CCH concerned abandonment and section 19B, whereas the present appeal concerns legitimacy, section 17, section 1(a), and section 1(e). They also submit that Nalvin Dhillon and media reports do not bind this Court or displace the Federal Constitution. Analysis and findings Issue 1: Whether the Appellant satisfies Article 14(1)(b), read with section 1(a) [46] The first requirement under Article 14(1)(b) is that the Appellant must have been born on or after Malaysia Day. That requirement is satisfied. The Appellant was born on 29 April 2001. [47] The Appellant referred to Yong Lee Hua on the meaning of Malaysia Day. Nothing turns on that point in this appeal. Malaysia Day refers to 16 September 1963. The Appellant was born after that date. [48] The second requirement under section 1(a) is that the Appellant must have been born within the Federation. That requirement is also satisfied. The Appellant was born in Perak, Malaysia. [49] The third requirement is that, at the time of birth, one of the Appellant’s parents must have been either a citizen or permanently resident in the Federation. [50] The Appellant relies on the citizenship of his biological father, Mugunthan a/l Balakrishnan. The difficulty is that the Appellant’s biological parents were never married. The Appellant was therefore illegitimate at the time of his birth. [51] The Appellant submits that the Federal Constitution should be interpreted broadly and purposively. We accept that general proposition. Dato’ Seri Mohammad Nizar and Dato Menteri Othman Baginda are authorities for a broad and generous approach to constitutional interpretation. However, a broad interpretation does not permit the Court to disregard express constitutional words. The Court must give the constitutional text a fair and purposive meaning. It cannot rewrite the text. [52] Section 17 of Part III of the Second Schedule must be applied in accordance with the majority decision of the Federal Court in CTEB. The Federal Court held that section 17 is clear. In relation to an illegitimate person, references to “father” or “parent” are to be construed as references to the mother. [53] The Appellant seeks to distinguish CTEB on the basis that the child in CTEB was born outside the Federation, whereas the Appellant was born in Malaysia. That distinction does not answer the section 17 point. The material principle in CTEB is the construction of section 17 where citizenship by operation of law depends on the relevant parent of an illegitimate person. [54] The Appellant also relies on Madhuvita. To the extent that Madhuvita supports a broader reading of “parents” which is inconsistent with section 17 as construed by the Federal Court in CTEB, it cannot assist the Appellant. This Court is bound by the Federal Court’s majority decision in CTEB. [55] Pang Wee See does not assist the Appellant on this point. That case emphasises that citizenship provisions are housed in the Federal Constitution and that the constitutional requirements cannot be supplemented by other statutes or by considerations outside the Constitution. It also recognises the importance of biological parentage for section 1(a). It does not displace section 17 where the person was illegitimate at birth. [56] Chin Kooi Nah also does not alter the position. In any event, the present appeal must be decided by applying the Federal Court’s later and binding decision in CTEB. [57] Nor does CCH alter the position. CCH concerned the operation of section 19B in relation to a new born child found exposed or abandoned. It did not overrule the majority decision in CTEB on section 17. This Court remains bound by CTEB. [58] The Respondents rely on Lim Jen Hsian and Chan Tai Ern Bermillo. Those cases are consistent with the majority decision in CTEB. They support the proposition that, where a person was illegitimate at birth, the relevant parent for the citizenship inquiry is the mother. [59] The relevant parent for the Appellant’s claim under section 1(a) is therefore his mother. [60] The Appellant’s mother, Nipa Rukanna, was recorded as a Thai citizen. There is no evidence that she was a Malaysian citizen. There is also no evidence that she was permanently resident in Malaysia at the time of the Appellant’s birth. [61] The fact that the Appellant’s biological father is a Malaysian citizen does not, by itself, satisfy section 1(a), having regard to section 17 and the binding effect of CTEB. [62] We therefore find that the Appellant has not established citizenship by operation of law under Article 14(1)(b), read with section 1(a) of Part II of the Second Schedule. Issue 2: Whether section 19B applies? [63] Section 19B applies to “any new born child found exposed in any place”. Where it applies, the child is presumed, until the contrary is shown, to have been born at the place where the child was found, of a mother permanently resident there. [64] The Appellant relies on CCH. CCH is an important authority on section 19B. It makes clear that “found exposed” is not confined to physical exposure in an open place. It may include abandonment of a newborn child at the place of birth. But the child must still be a “new born child” within section 19B. [65] On the facts before us, section 19B does not arise. The Appellant was born at Hospital Besar Ipoh. His birth was registered. His mother left him when he was about one year and two months old. This is not a case of a new born child found exposed or abandoned at birth or at the place of birth. [66] CCH is therefore distinguishable. It does not assist the Appellant in establishing citizenship under section 19B. It also does not displace the effect of CTEB on section 17. [67] We therefore find that section 19B does not apply. Issue 3: Whether the Appellant satisfies Article 14(1)(b), read with section 1(e) and section 2(3) [68] The Appellant also relies on section 1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule. [69] Section 1(e) requires the Appellant to establish that he was:

born on or after Malaysia Day;

born within the Federation; and

not born a citizen of any country otherwise than by virtue of section 1(e). [70] The first two requirements are satisfied. The Appellant was born on 29 April 2001 in Perak, Malaysia. [71] The difficulty lies in the third requirement. [72] The Appellant submits that section 1(e) is intended to prevent statelessness. He says that if section 1(e) requires proof through parentage or lineage in the same way as section 1(a), section 1(e) would be rendered nugatory. He relies on Karunairajah for the principle that a constitutional provision should not be construed so as to be rendered ineffective. [73] We accept the general principle that a constitutional provision should not be construed as redundant or ineffective. However, the argument does not answer the text of section 1(e). Section 1(e) requires proof that the person was not born a citizen of any country. That is a constitutional fact which must be established by the person seeking the declaration. [74] Section 1(e) is not rendered nugatory merely because the applicant must prove the negative requirement. It operates where the evidence establishes that the person was born within the Federation and was not born a citizen of any country. [75] The Appellant also relies on section 2(3). Section 2(3) does not create a free-standing route to citizenship. It provides that, for the purposes of section 1(e), a person is to be treated as having at birth any citizenship which he acquires within one year afterwards. It is a deeming provision as to the timing of acquisition of citizenship. It does not remove the Appellant’s burden to prove that he was not born a citizen of any country. [76] The Respondents rely on Lim Jen Hsian and Than Siew Beng. Those cases held that the burden rests on the applicant to establish, on the evidence, that he was not born a citizen of any country. They also explain that section 1(e) involves both the place of birth and the citizenship position by reference to blood or lineage. [77] The Respondents also rely on Tan Soo Yin. That case is consistent with Lim Jen Hsian and Than Siew Beng. It confirms that section 2(3) is a deeming provision as to the timing of acquisition of citizenship. It does not convert section 1(e) into a rule that a person becomes Malaysian merely because no foreign citizenship document has been produced within one year. [78] The Respondents further rely on Azimah Hamzah. In that case the Court of Appeal reiterated that the burden lies on the applicant to prove that he or she was not born a citizen of any country. That principle applies here. [79] The Appellant relies on Madhuvita in support of a more generous approach to section 1(e). Madhuvita turned on its own facts. In any event, it does not relieve the Appellant from proving the constitutional requirement in section 1(e), namely that he was not born a citizen of any country. The later authorities, including Lim Jen Hsian, Than Siew Beng, Tan Soo Yin and Azimah Hamzah, confirm that the burden remains on the applicant. [80] The legal burden rests on the Appellant to prove that he was not born a citizen of any country. The absence of evidence that the Appellant presently holds another citizenship is not, by itself, proof that he was not born a citizen of any country. [81] The material date is the date of birth. The question is not merely whether the Appellant is presently recognised by another state as its citizen. The question is whether, at birth, he was not born a citizen of any country. [82] The Appellant’s mother was a Thai citizen. The Respondents rely on the Thai Nationality Act to submit that a person born of a father or mother of Thai nationality acquires Thai nationality by birth, whether born within or outside Thailand. [83] It is unnecessary for this Court to make an absolute finding that the Appellant was born a Thai citizen. It is sufficient to say that the Appellant has not established, on the evidence before the Court, that he was not born a citizen of any country. [84] The Appellant’s present difficulty in obtaining recognition or documentation from another state does not, without more, prove the constitutional fact required by section 1(e) as at the date of birth. [85] We therefore find that the Appellant has not established citizenship by operation of law under Article 14(1)(b), read with section 1(e) and section 2(3) of Part II of the Second Schedule. Issue 4: The Malaysian international passport and legitimate expectation [86] The Appellant places considerable emphasis on the fact that he was issued a Malaysian international passport on 29 June 2002. [87] We accept that the issuance of the passport is a relevant factual matter. It explains why the Appellant and his family may have believed that he had been treated as Malaysian. [88] However, the passport is not the source of citizenship. Citizenship by operation of law arises only if the requirements of the Federal Constitution are satisfied. [89] The Appellant submits that the Respondents did not deny the issuance of the passport. That may be so. But non-denial of issuance does not establish that the constitutional requirements for citizenship by operation of law were met at birth. [90] The Appellant’s argument is also framed as one of legitimate expectation. Legitimate expectation cannot confer citizenship where the constitutional requirements are not met. It cannot operate against the Federal Constitution. [91] The Respondents’ explanation is that the details of the passport application are no longer available and that, at the material time, the Immigration system and the National Registration Department system were not integrated. Whether or not that explanation is complete, the decisive point remains that an administrative document cannot override the Federal Constitution. [92] There can be no estoppel against the Federal Constitution in determining citizenship by operation of law. If the constitutional requirements were not satisfied at birth, the later issuance of a passport cannot confer citizenship by operation of law. [93] We therefore agree with the learned High Court Judge that the Malaysian international passport does not establish the Appellant’s citizenship by operation of law. Issue 5: Birth certificate, MyKid number and administrative records [94] The Appellant also relies on his birth certificate, MyKid number, immunisation records, education records and other administrative dealings. [95] Those records show that the Appellant was born in Malaysia and that he has had substantial connections with Malaysia. The fact of birth in Malaysia is not disputed. [96] However, birth in Malaysia is not, by itself, sufficient to confer citizenship by operation of law under Article 14(1)(b). The Appellant must also satisfy one of the qualifications in Part II of the Second Schedule. [97] Pang Wee See is relevant in this context. It emphasises that the Federal Constitution is the source of citizenship and that other statutes or administrative acts cannot confer citizenship if the Federal Constitution does not. That principle applies equally to a passport, birth certificate, MyKid number and other administrative records. [98] The birth certificate is evidence of the particulars recorded. It is not, by itself, the source of citizenship by operation of law. [99] The later extracted birth certificate recording “Bukan Warganegara” is also not, by itself, the source of non-citizenship. The Court must independently decide whether the constitutional requirements are met. [100] For the reasons already given, the Appellant has not established those constitutional requirements. Issue 6: Article 18, Article 19 and Article 15A [101] Article 18 contains general provisions as to registration. It does not, on the facts of this case, provide an independent route by which the Court may declare the Appellant a citizen by operation of law. [102] Article 19 concerns citizenship by naturalisation. Naturalisation is a matter for the Federal Government under the Federal Constitution. It is not citizenship by operation of law. [103] The Appellant relies on media reports concerning the naturalisation of footballers. Those materials concern Article 19 and public statements on naturalisation. They do not determine the constitutional question before this Court. The present appeal concerns whether the Appellant is a citizen by operation of law under Article 14(1)(b). [104] Article 15A also concerns registration by the Federal Government in special circumstances. The Appellant’s previous applications under Article 15A were unsuccessful. Those applications do not establish citizenship by operation of law under Article 14(1)(b). [105] The present proceedings are not a proper vehicle for the Court to substitute a declaration of citizenship by operation of law for an unsuccessful Article 15A application, or to naturalise the Appellant under Article 19. Issue 7: Nalvin Dhillon, Azimah and alleged inconsistent treatment [106] The Appellant relies on the case of Nalvin Dhillon. The material before us consists of an order and media reports. There is no reasoned appellate judgment before this Court. [107] Nalvin Dhillon therefore does not bind this Court. It cannot displace the Federal Court’s decision in CTEB. Nor can it alter the constitutional requirements under Article 14(1)(b), section 1(a), section 1(e), section 2(3) and section 17. [108] The Respondents submit that Nalvin Dhillon is distinguishable because the explanation concerning the issuance of the passport and the fact that the parents were not married were not before the Court in the same way. It is unnecessary for us to make findings on the precise factual basis of Nalvin Dhillon. It is enough to say that the material before us is not a binding authority and does not determine this appeal. [109] Each citizenship case must be decided on its own evidence and by reference to the constitutional route invoked. The fact that another case may have resulted in a different order does not establish that the Appellant satisfies Article 14(1)(b), section 1(a) or section 1(e). [110] The Appellant also relies on media reports concerning Azimah Hamzah and the naturalisation of other persons under Article 19. Those materials do not determine the constitutional question before this Court. The reported Court of Appeal decision in Azimah Hamzah is relevant only for the legal principle that, under section 1(e), the applicant bears the burden of proving that he or she was not born a citizen of any country. [111] In Azimah Hamzah, the appellant was born in Malaysia to Cambodian refugee parents. Her claim was advanced under Article 14(1)(b), read with section 1(e). The Court of Appeal held that she had established birth within the Federation after Malaysia Day, but had not discharged the burden of proving that she was not born a citizen of Cambodia or of any other country. Her appeal was therefore dismissed. [112] The later reported grant of Malaysian citizenship to Azimah Hamzah does not alter that legal principle. It was a different constitutional route. Naturalisation under Article 19 is distinct from citizenship by operation of law under Article 14(1)(b). It does not reverse, qualify or overrule the Court of Appeal’s decision on section 1(e). [113] The Appellant’s marriage to a Malaysian citizen and the fact that he has a child are personal circumstances which we have not ignored. They do not alter the constitutional facts at the date of birth. They may be matters for the relevant authorities in an appropriate application. They do not establish citizenship by operation of law in this appeal. Issue 8: Whether this is a deprivation, withdrawal or cancellation case [114] The Appellant’s complaint is understandable. He was issued a Malaysian international passport. He says he has lived as a person treated as Malaysian. He later discovered that his extracted birth certificate recorded “Bukan Warganegara”. [115] However, this does not make the case one of deprivation, withdrawal or cancellation under Articles 24 to 27. [116] Articles 24 to 27 are engaged only where citizenship has first been acquired and is then deprived, withdrawn or cancelled under the constitutional mechanisms. The Appellant has not established that citizenship by operation of law arose under Article 14(1)(b). [117] The correction or later extraction of the birth record did not deprive the Appellant of citizenship. It recorded, or purported to record, the Respondents’ administrative position that citizenship by operation of law had not been established. [118] That administrative position is not conclusive. The Court has independently examined the constitutional requirements. Having done so, we are not satisfied that the Appellant has established citizenship by operation of law. Relief and conclusion [119] We have considered the Appellant’s circumstances with care. The result is difficult for him. However, the Court is bound by the Federal Constitution and by the evidence before it. [120] The Appellant was born in Malaysia after Malaysia Day. However, by reason of section 17 and the Federal Court’s decision in CTEB, the relevant parent for the purposes of section 1(a) is his mother. The Appellant has not established that his mother was a Malaysian citizen or permanently resident in Malaysia at the time of his birth. [121] The Appellant has also not established, on the evidence before the Court, that he was not born a citizen of any country for the purposes of section 1(e). [122] The Malaysian international passport, birth certificate, MyKid number, school records, immunisation records, residence in Malaysia, and other administrative records do not, by themselves, confer citizenship by operation of law. [123] Article 18, Article 19 and the previous Article 15A applications do not establish citizenship by operation of law in these proceedings. [124] The Appellant has not established, on the evidence before the Court, that he is a Malaysian citizen by operation of law under Article 14(1)(b), read with section 1(a) or section 1(e) and section 2(3) of Part II of the Second Schedule. [125] Before we conclude, we add the following observation. The Appellant’s personal circumstances are not sufficient to establish citizenship by operation of law under Article 14(1)(b). They may however, be matters for the appropriate authorities to consider in any application which the Appellant may be advised to make under the constitutional routes for citizenship by registration or naturalisation. [126] This is consistent with the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in Azimah Hamzah. There, having dismissed the appeal because the appellant had not established citizenship by operation of law under Article 14(1)(b), read with section 1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule, the Court nevertheless observed that it remained open to the appellant to apply for citizenship by naturalisation if the legal requirements were met to the satisfaction of the authorities. [127] Article 15A concerns registration in special circumstances for persons under the age of 21 years. It is not available to the Appellant, who is now above that age. Article 19 concerns citizenship by naturalisation. That is a distinct constitutional route and does not arise for determination in this appeal. If the Appellant satisfies the legal requirements under Article 27 19 to the satisfaction of the Federal Government, it remains open to him to pursue that route. We express no view on the merits of any such application.

[128] For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed. The order of the High Court dated 24 August 2023 is affirmed. [129] Given the nature of the appeal and the circumstances of the Appellant, we make no order as to costs. Dated: 30 June 2026 -SGD- (FAIZAH BINTI JAMALUDIN) JUDGE COURT OF APPEAL MALAYSIA COUNSEL: For the Appellant: R. Renuga a/p Ramayah [Messrs. R. Renuga Ram & Co.] For the Respondents: Shahidah Nafisah binti Leman [Jabatan Peguam Negara]