(iii) there is a pending third attempt of Article 15A of the Federal Constitution application where the Federal Government has yet to make any decision. Legal Principles at Leave Stage [6] To consider this application for leave to commence judicial review proceedings against the respondents, this court alluded to case law for the principles governing a leave application for judicial review. In WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v. Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2012] 4 CLJ BA-25-65-09/2022 478 the Federal Court at page 488 held that the test for leave to commence judicial review are as follows: “[12] …Without the need to go into depth of the abundant authorities, suffice if we state that leave may be granted if the leave application is not thought of as frivolous, and if leave is granted, an arguable case in favour of granting the relief sought at the substantive hearing may be the resultant outcome. A rider must be attached to the application though ie unless the matter for judicial review is amenable to judicial review absolutely no success may be envisaged.” [Emphasis added] [7] In Bandar Utama Development Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Lembaga Lebuhraya & Anor [1998] 1 MLJ 224 His Lordship Visu Sinnadurai J at page 225 held as follows: “... The court, in exercising its discretion that an application for leave be granted must be convinced by the applicants that prima facie the application is genuine and that there is some substance in the grounds supporting the application. The test’s threshold is very low; a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion, an arguable case must be shown, not a prima facie case. Additionally, an application must fail if it is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived, made by busybodies with misguided or trivial complaints of administrative errors, groundless, where there are more appropriate alternative remedies, and where the application for judicial remedies is inappropriate.” [Emphasis added] Analysis [8] In this application for judicial review, the applicant seeks to quash the Federal Government’s rejection of the applicant’s second application for citizenship under Article 15A of the Federal Constitution which was communicated to the applicant vide letter dated 27.4.2018. [9] Apart from that quashing order, the applicant also seeks a declaration that he is a Malaysian citizen by operation of law under Section 1(a) Part II of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution. [10] Learned Senior Federal Counsel for the Honourable Attorney General objected to this application seeking leave to commence judicial review. Tuan Liew Horng Bin submitted that the impugned decision is non-reviewable and not appealable to court as Section 2 of Part III of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution provides that a decision of the Federal Government under Part III of the Federal Constitution shall not be subject to appeal or review in any court. [11] Tuan Liew Horng Bin further argued that the impugned decision made under Article 15A of the Federal Constitution falls under Part III of the Federal Constitution. [See: Yu Sheng Meng & Anor v. Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara & Ors [2015] MLJU 637] [12] Reference was made to the case of Madhuvita Janjara Augustin v. Augustin a/l Lourdsamy & Ors [2018] 1 MLJ 307 which had upheld the validity of Section 2 of Part III of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution and came to the conclusion that a decision of the Federal Government under Article 15A of the Federal Constitution is not open to appeal or review in any court. [13] Senior Federal Counsel also stated that it is settled law that an illegitimate child is not entitled to Malaysian citizenship by operation of law under Section 1(a) of Part II of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution read together with Section 17 of Part III of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution. [See: CTEB & Anor v. Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara, Malaysia & Ors [2021] 4 MLJ 236] [14] Moreover, it was submitted by Tuan Liew Horng Bin that there is still a pending third application of the Article 15A of the Federal Constitution application where the Federal Government has yet to make any decision. It is trite law that a court of law would be slow to interfere when a constitutional remedy has not been exhausted by the Plaintiff. [See: Pendaftar Besar Kelahiran dan Kematian Malaysia v. Pang Wee See & Anor [2017] 3 MLJ 308 (CA)] [15] The applicant argued that to obtain leave the applicant is required to show that his application is not frivolous or vexatious. The applicant stated that at the leave stage, the court does not need to delve into the merits of the case. [16] The applicant further submitted that sections 3 and 4 of the Legitimacy Act 1961 gives the applicant the merits to challenge the decision of the respondents. To support this contention, the applicant cited the case of Lew Yee Hong @ Liew Yee Hong & Anor v. Ketua Setiausaha Kementerian Dalam Negeri & Ors [2020] 8 MLJ 62 and the case of Madhuvita Janiara Auqustin (suing through next friend Margaret Louisa Tan) v. Auqustin a/l Lourdsamy & Ors [2018] 1 MLJ 307. [17] Pertaining to the objection raised by learned Senior Federal Counsel that there is still a pending third application of the Article 15A of the Federal Constitution where the Federal Government has yet to make any decision, this court had on 12.9.2022 allowed the applicant’s application for extension of time to file an application seeking leave for judicial review. This extension of time granted by this court is in relation to the decision of the respondents dated 27.4.2018. Hence, this application for leave is against the decision of the respondent dated 27.4.2018. [18] In the case of Mkini Dotcom Sdn Bhd & Ors v Chief Judge of Malaya & Ors [2016] 8 MLJ 357, Asmabi J (as Her Ladyship then was) stated the following: “It is settled law, the function of the court in exercising its power to grant leave for judicial review is to sieve through the application before it by examining the facts and the law and decide if the case is one which is frivolous and or one which merits further argument on the substantive motion. In exercising this function the court is guided by the principles laid down by the Court of Appeal in England in R v Secretary of State for Home Department, ex p Rushkanda Begum [1990] COD 107; [1990] Crown Office Digest 109, Dip as follows: