Mana-mana orang yang mendapat kemudaratan dengan keputusan, tindakan atau peninggalan berhubung dengan penjalanan kewajipan atau fungsi awam adalah berhak untuk membuat permohonan itu.” [12] Sementara itu Aturan 53 kaedah 3 KKM 2012 memperihalkan berkenaan dengan kebenaran yang perlu diperolehi sebelum semakan kehakiman dikemukakan di Mahkamah. [13] Peguam Pemohon berhujah melalui hujahan bertulis dan hujahan lisan bahawa Pemohon adalah orang yang mendapat kemudaratan daripada keputusan dan tindakan Responden Pertama. Ini adalah disebabkan Pemohon adalah merupakan bapa kepada kanak-kanak yang menjadi mangsa kepada kejadian jenayah tersebut. Malahan keputusan yang dibuat oleh Responden Pertama untuk mengemukakan pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 323 Kanun Keseksaan adalah tidak rasional dan memerlukan campur tangan Mahkamah ini dengan memberikan kebenaran untuk keputusan itu disemak melalui proses semakan kehakiman. Pemohon menyatakan bahawa dia telah diberitahu oleh pegawai penyiasat bahawa siasatan sedang dibuat di bawah seksyen 31(1) Akta Kanak-kanak 2001. Sepatutnya pertuduhan dibuat di bawah seksyen tersebut dan bukannya di bawah seksyen 323 Kanun Keseksaan. [14] Sebaliknya Peguam Kanan Persekutuan berhujah bahawa pihak Pemohon tidak dapat menunjukkan bahawa Pemohon adalah pihak yang mendapat kemudaratan dengan keputusan Responden Pertama. [15] Dalam hal ini adalah wajar untuk Mahkamah meneliti apakah yang dimaksudkan dengan frasa mana-mana orang yang mendapat kemudaratan dengan keputusan, tindakan atau peninggalan. Ini adalah disebabkan pihak Pemohon menyatakan bahawa terdapat dua perkara yang perlu dilihat dalam aspek kemudaratan iaitu bagi menentukan locus standi seseorang itu untuk mengemukakan semakan kehakiman. [16] Adalah didapati bahawa kedudukan terkini berkenaan dengan perkara tersebut telah diperjelaskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur v Perbadanan Pengurusan Trellises & Ors and other appeals [2023] 3 MLJ 829 seperti berikut: “[401] As such the availability of remedies to a citizen in the field of public law, albeit in the form of prerogative writs or otherwise, in this jurisdiction are provided for in the Federal Constitution and the CJA. [402] That is the macroscopic position. In practice, in order to give effect to a claim for such a remedy, a litigant has to bring an action in the manner and form specified by the RC 2012. However, to achieve the standing to sue, the prospective litigant is required vide O 53 r 2(4) to fall within the category of persons who are ‘adversely affected’. [403] Who is a person who is ‘adversely affected’? There is no statutory definition of persons who fall within the category of being ‘adversely affected’. It is not to be found in any statute. Instead, the rules relating to standing were and continue to be made by judges. These rules have accordingly changed and evolved over the years to meet and maintain the integrity of the rule of law, notwithstanding changes to the social structure reflected in the form of rapid industrial progress, scientific development and globalisation. [404] If the term ‘adversely affected’ is construed narrowly, this serves to restrict the body of persons who can initiate such actions. If construed broadly it expands the body of persons who can bring such an action. The determination of whether a person is ‘adversely affected’ is primarily a matter of construction by the courts predicated on case law and statute as it stands presently. This requires a comprehension of how standing has been dealt with in Malaysia over the years.” [17] Malahan di perenggan [444] Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan bahawa kedudukan undang-undang berkenaan dengan kebenaran untuk semakan kehakiman adalah mengikut keputusan YA Hakim Abdoolcader, Hakim Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Government of Malaysia Lim Kit Siang [1988] 2 MLJ 12. Ini dinyatakan seperti berikut: “[444] For these reasons we reiterate that the dissenting decision of the minority judges, particularly as reflected in the judgment of Abdoolcader SCJ, reflects the correct position in law and ought to be followed. His decision outlines the fundamental requirements that are to be considered by a court when determining whether or not to grant leave for judicial review. The cases of Lim Cho Hock and Othman Saat provide a sound basis for the evolution of the law on standing to sue from that period to the present as it presents a rational and coherent development/progression.” [18] Dalam kes Government of Malaysia Lim Kit Siang (supra) YA Hakim Abdoolcader menyatakan: “I have given judgment in two cases setting out the relevant precepts relating to standing – in the High Court in Lim Cho Hock v Government of The State of Perak & Others [1980] 2 MLJ 148 and in the Federal Court in Tan Sri Haji Othman Saat v Mohamed bin Ismail [1982] 2 MLJ 177 and I see no reason to depart from the principles expounded in these two decisions. The Federal Court approved Lim Cho Hock in Tan Sri Haji Othman Saat and endorsed (at p. 179) the concept of liberalizing the scope of individual standing, and these two judgments must be read in the light of the continuing development of the doctrine of locus standi here and in other jurisdictions. I alluded to the necessity of keeping in tune with the times in the development of the approach to the question of locus standi in Tan Sri Haji Othman Saat (at p. 179) to this effect: "Even if the law's pace may be slower than society's march, what with increased and increasing civic-consciousness and appreciation of rights and fundamental values in the citizenry, it must nonetheless strive to be relevant if it is to perform its function of peaceful ordering of the relations between and among persons in society, and between and among persons and government at various levels." Liberalization of standing has in varying degrees been proceeding or proposed in other common law jurisdictions as I have shown in these two judgments, and it would be a shame if we were to lag behind. The imbroglio that has arisen in this matter is the result of the myopic obfuscation of the distinction between public law and private law cases. The appellants contend that the principle that is applicable is that laid down in Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1977] 3 All ER 70; [1978] AC 435 and Boyce v Paddington Borough Council [1903] 1 Ch 109 which I have dealt with in Tan Sri Haji Othman Saat. The English courts no longer worry about Gouriet. It has been authoritatively distinguished by the House of Lords in Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617; [1981] 2 All ER 93. The applicant in that case was a company formed to promote the interests of small business. Alleging that its constituents and other non-unionists were pursued without leniency for not paying their taxes, the applicant sought judicial review of a deal that the Revenue had struck with printing industry unions whereby certain tax investigations would be dropped in return for union cooperation in securing an end to casual workers evading income tax by using fictitious names. The unions, it was said, were receiving preferential treatment, and mandamus and declaratory relief were sought. Lords Diplock, Scarman and Roskill (at pp. 638–639,649 and 657–658 respectively) distinguished Gouriet on the basis that it concerned only private law. The House of Lords held that the Court of Appeal had been wrong, in an application for judicial review, to treat the question of locus standi as a threshold issue to be decided in isolation from the legal and factual context of the case; his is where the bifurcation into public law and private law aspects of litigation assumes vital significance in determining the issue. The general conclusion to be drawn from National Federation is that the majority thought the issue of standing should usually be considered along with the merits, as it is now a matter for the court's discretion – the graver the illegality, the less insistence on showing standing. The minority would abolish standing.” [19] Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Malaysian Trade Union Congress & Ors v Menteri Tenaga, Air dan Komunikasi & Anor [2014] 3 MLJ 145 telah menggunakan satu ujian sahaja bagi menentukan sama ada terdapatnya mana-mana orang yang mendapat kemudaratan dengan keputusan, tindakan atau peninggalan kewajipan atau fungsi awam. Ini dinyatakan seperti berikut: “[57] In view of the foregoing we are of the view that the view expressed by the Court of Appeal in QSR Brands Bhd v Suruhaniava Sekuriti & Anor that the 'adversely affected' test was a single test for all the remedies provided for under O 53 of the RHC is to be preferred. Hence the answer to the question posed in this appeal has to be in the negative.” [20] Ini juga telah dijelaskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Perbadanan Pengurusan Trellises & Ors v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Ors [2021] 3 MLJ 1 seperti berikut: “[65] In our view, this objection on lack of locus standi is without merit. The application before us is an application for judicial review wherein the provisions of O 53 of the Rules of Court 2012 apply. The Rules of Court 2012 are made pursuant to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (Act 91) which expressly provide for the supervisory jurisdiction of the court to judicially review decisions of inferior or subordinate bodies and the executive such as the first respondent, the Datuk Bandar. [66] Order 53 r 2(4) expressly allows persons who are ‘adversely affected’ by the decision made by a public authority to initiate judicial review applications: Any person who is adversely affected by the decision of any public authority shall be entitled to make the application. (Emphasis added.) [67] It is not in dispute that the impugned decision is made by the first respondent, the Datuk Bandar who is a public authority. What is in dispute is the appellants’ right to challenge that impugned decision, that O 53 r 2(4) merely provides for a threshold locus standi and that the appellants must further establish substantive locus standi; and substantive locus standi is as provided under r 5(3) of the Planning Rules. [68] In our view, this line of submission is without merit. Order 53 r 2(4) does not make any distinction between threshold and substantive locus standi. Order 53 is the written manifestation of the court’s power on supervisory [2021] 3 MLJ 1 at 27jurisdiction through judicial review and as to how that jurisdiction may be engaged. Consequently, we should not read into O 53, any requirements which are not simply not there. The approach of requiring two thresholds of locus standi as expressed in Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor v Kajing Tubek & Ors and other appeals [1997] 3 MLJ 23 (‘Kajing Tubek’) has since been rejected and was in any case, the position under the old O 53 of the Rules of the High Court 1980. [69] This was made clear by the Federal Court in Malaysian Trade Union Congress & Ors v Menteri Tenaga, Air dan Komunikasi & Anor [2014] 3 MLJ 145 (‘Malaysian Trade Union’). In our view, this decision has put to rest the argument that there must be established both threshold and substantive locus standi. The Federal Court examined the decision in Kajing Tubek which had made that proposition and where at pp 40–41, the Court of Appeal opined as follows: In public law — and, in so far at least as the appellants in the first and second appeal are concerned, the summons in the present instance lies in public law — there are two kinds of locus standi. The first is the initial or threshold locus standi: the second is the substantive locus standi. Threshold locus standi refers to the right of a litigant to approach the court in relation to the facts which form the substratum of his complaint. It is usually tested upon an application by the defendant to have the action struck out on the ground that the plaintiff, even if all that he alleges is true, cannot seek redress in the courts. Although a litigant may have threshold locus standi in the sense discussed, he may, for substantive reasons, be disentitled to declaratory relief. This, then, is substantive locus standi. The factors that go to a denial of substantive locus standi are so numerous and wide ranging that it is inappropriate to attempt an effectual summary of them. Suffice to say that they range from the nature of the subject matter in respect of which curial intervention is sought to those settled principles on the basis of which a court refuse declaratory or injunctive relief.” [21] Ia disahkan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur v Perbadanan Pengurusan Trellises & Ors and other appeals [2023] 3 MLJ 829. [22] Namun demikian jika diteliti pandangan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur v Perbadanan Pengurusan Trellises & Ors and other appeals (supra) adalah didapati bahawa perlu diseimbangkan di antara hak pihak-pihak untuk mengemukakan sesuatu permohonan semakan kehakiman terhadap keputusan badan awam dengan lambakan permohonan semakan kehakiman yang mungkin akan dibuat oleh pihak-pihak terhadap badan awam dalam mempertimbangkan sama ada terdapat mana-mana orang yang mendapat kemudaratan dengan keputusan badan awam tersebut. [23] Walau bagaimanapun Peguam Pemohon berhujah bahawa kini Mahkamah telah menyatakan bahawa keputusan yang dibuat oleh Pendakwa Raya di bawah bidang kuasa Perkara 145 (3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan adalah tertakluk kepada semakan kehakiman. Dalam erti kata lain bidang kuasa Pendakwa Raya bukan lagi tidak boleh dijadikan perkara untuk semakan kehakiman. Ini telah dinyatakan dalam kes Sundra Rajoo Nadarajah v. Menteri Luar Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2021] 6 CLJ 199. [24] Malahan dalam penggunaan budi bicara oleh Peguam Negara juga telah diputuskan tertakluk kepada semakan kehakiman. Ini telah dinyatakan dalam kes Peguam Negara Malaysia v. Chin Chee Kow & Another Appeal [2019] 4 CLJ 561 seperti berikut: “[77] Reverting back to our present appeals, we have carefully considered the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Appeal No. 58 while keeping in mind the principles of law on the subject as propounded by the courts in other jurisdiction. We found there was no flaw in its reasoning in holding that the power of the AG to give or refuse consent under s. 9(1) of Act 359 is amenable to judicial review. We are in total agreement with the Court of Appeal's reasoning as alluded to earlier in para. [18].” [25] Sebenarnya Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Mohd. Nordin Johan v. The Attorney-General, Malaysia [1983] CLJ Rep 271 melalui penghakiman YA Raja Azlan Shah Pemangku Ketua Hakim Negara telah membenarkan rayuan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi yang telah menolak permohonan kebenaran semakan kehakiman di atas keputusan Peguam Negara mengeluarkan sijil di bawah ESCAR 1975 Regulation 2 (2) dan 6 (1). YA Raja Azlan Shah menyatakan seperti berikut: “We allowed the appeal and granted the appellant leave to apply for an order of certiorari because we are of the view that the learned Judge was wrong in refusing leave as the point taken was not frivolous to merit refusal of leave in limine and justified argument on a substantive motion for certiorari. When this Court grants leave, it has jurisdiction to hear the substantive motion itself. This practice is not inconsistent with the one in vogue in England; See Regina v. Industrial Injuries Commissioner, Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union [1966] 2 QB 21 which was followed in Regina v. Croydon Justices, Ex Parte Lefore Holdings Ltd.[1980] 1 WLR 1465.” [26] Namun demikian Peguam Kanan Persekutuan telah menyatakan bahawa dalam kes Sundra Rajoo Nadarajah (supra) Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menyatakan bahawa pihak yang ingin mendapatkan semakan kehakiman perlulah mematuhi dua ujian seperti yang dinyatakan di perenggan [112] hingga [115] seperti berikut: “[112] Article 145(3) of the FC provides the AG/PP with a wide discretion to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceeding for a criminal offence. This wide discretion means the AG/PP has sole and exclusive discretion in that only he/she can exercise such power. However, the AG/PP does not have absolute or unfettered discretion under art 145(3). As alluded to in the preceding discussion and following from it, it is our judgment that in appropriate, rare and exceptional cases, such discretion is amenable to judicial review. [113] In all challenges against the decisions of the AG/PP exercising his powers under art 145(3) of the FC, the position is that his decisions are cloaked with the presumption of legality. The onerous burden lies on the challenging party to overcome the strong presumption of legality with compelling prima facie evidence of grounds to review the AG/PP’s decision within the recognised reasons for judicial review. [114] Based on the foregoing authorities, it can be surmised that any challenge must therefore pass a two-step threshold which must be satisfied at the leave stage of any application for judicial review. [115] Firstly, the burden of proof lies on the applicant. The applicant will have to show that he has a legal basis to challenge the decision of the AG/PP. This refers to the traditional grounds of judicial review and other bases implicitly recognised by the earlier judgments on this subject, including but not limited to: