Lampiran
Lampiran 47 ialah Notis Permohonan Perayu iaitu Defendan Kedua dalam tuntutan balas untuk memohon perintah penepian penghakiman ingkar kehadiran terhadapnya. [2] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen (HMS) Shah Alam tersebut mendapati bahawa Responden telah memasukkan penghakiman ingkar kehadiran (JID) secara teratur mengikut undang-undang dan HMS mendapati pembelaan Perayu adalah tidak bermerit. [3] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti Rekod Rayuan, Rekod Rayuan Tambahan dan hujahan bertulis. [4] Tuntutan Responden terhadap Perayu adalah untuk memperoleh baki bayaran yang terhutang kepada Responden apabila Kerja sebagaimana Kontrak sudah disiapkan dan diselesaikan. Jumlah keseluruhan ialah RM912,396.93 dan daripada jumlah itu, Perayu sudah membayar sebanyak RM427,000.00 kepada Responden. Maka, baki yang terhutang ialah sebanyak RM485,396.93. [5] Mahkamah ini mendapati tiada pertikaian mengenai isu kontrak, dan nilai kontrak. Perkara yang dibangkitkan oleh Perayu tertumpu kepada aduan mengenai hasil kerja yang defektif dan kelewatan menyiapkan Kerja. Selain itu, Perayu membangkitkan perkara bahawa tuntutan balas ini perlu dirujuk kepada timbang tara memandangkan wujud klausa timbang tara dalam Kontrak. [6] Berdasarkan analisa Mahkamah ini mendapati isu sama ada JID dimasukkan secara teratur mengikut undang-undang terhadap Perayu telah dikupas dan dipertimbangkan dengan jelas oleh HMS. Penafian Perayu bahawa penyampaian kertas kausa secara tidak teratur gagal membidas keterangan yang ada di mana Responden berjaya menyampaikan dan menyerahkan kertas kausa ke alamat Perayu. [7] Berdasarkan kepada analisis dan dapatan HMS mengenai sama ada Perayu mempunyai pembelaan bermerit, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa HMS berdasarkan dokumen yang diekshibitkan adalah jelas bahawa Perayu mempunyai baki tertunggak sebanyak RM485,396.93 untuk dibayar kepada Responden. [8] HMS telah memperoleh dapatan mengenai isu yang dibangkitkan oleh Perayu iaitu – a) sama ada perkara yang dipertikaikan ini perlu dirujuk kepada timbang tara? b) sama ada wujud kelewatan Kerja oleh Responden? c) sama ada Responden gagal menyiapkan Kerjanya? d) sama ada wujud kecacatan dalam Kerja Responden? e) sama ada terdapat variation order dalam Kerja sebagaimana yang dituntut oleh Responden? f) sama ada wujud kegagalan untuk mengemukakan final claim? [9] Mahkamah ini mendapati setiap isu di atas telah dianalisa oleh HMS dan setiap dapatan HMS adalah disokong oleh keterangan yang ada di hadapannya iaitu surat-menyurat, e-mel dan Bill of Quantity. HMS juga berlandaskan kepada prinsip undang-undang. Di sini, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa HMS tidak khilaf dari segi fakta dan/atau undang-undang apabila memutuskan bahawa permohonan Perayu (Lampiran 47) ditolak dengan kos. [10] Selain itu, Mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa HMS telah mempertimbangkan fakta material yang melingkari fakta dan pada peringkat rayuan Mahkamah ini tidak boleh untuk mengganggu mencampuri dapatan fakta oleh HMS. [11] Dengan ini, Mahkamah ini memutuskan untuk menolak rayuan Perayu dengan kos sebanyak RM5,000.00 tertakluk kepada fi alokatur. Keputusan HMS dikekalkan.”. [21] Now the Appellant appeal to the Court of Appeal and the grounds of judgment contain my reasons. Principles of appellate intervention [22] In the case of Ahmad Zulfendi bin Anuar v. Mohd Shahril bin Abdul Rahman [2022] 4 MLJ 892, Y.A. Mohd Nazlan JCA held − “[7] The central feature of appellate intervention is well-established. It is to ascertain whether or not the trial court had arrived at its decision or finding correctly on the evidence and on the basis of the governing law. The Federal Court in the case of Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v. Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1, where the Federal Court held as follows: [14] In our view, the Court of Appeal in citing these cases had clearly borne in mind the central feature of appellate intervention, ie to determine whether or not the trial court had arrived at its decision or finding correctly on the basis of the relevant law and/or the established evidence. In so doing, the Court of Appeal was perfectly entitled to examine the process of evaluation of the evidence by the trial court. Clearly, the phrase ‘insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence’ melerly related to such process. This is reflected in the Court of Appeal’s restatement that a judge who was required to adjudicate upon a dispute must arrive at his decision on an issue of fact by assessing, weighing and, for good reasons, either accepting or rejecting the whole or any part of the evidence placed before him. The Court of Appeal further reiterated the principle central to appellate intervention, ie that a decision arrived at by a trial court without judicial appreciation of the evidence might be set aside on appeal. This is consistent with the established plainly wrong test. [8] Thus in Kerajaan Malaysia v. Global Upline Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2017] 1 MLJ 170 the Court of Appeal held that an appellate court will not intervene unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its conclusion and where there has been insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence. [9] In the leading case of Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng (administratrix for the estate of Tan Ewe Kwang, deceased) & Ors [2020] 10 CLJ 1 the Federal Court affirmed with unmistakable clarity that the principle on which an appellate court could intervene with findings of fact by the trial court is ‘the plainly wrong test’ principle. [10] This important principle involves a number of circumstances, but must necessarily extends to situations where it can be shown that the impugned decision is vitiated with plain material errors, or where crucial evidence had been miscontrued, or where the trial judge had so manifestly not taken proper advantage of having seen and heard the witnesses or not properly analysed the entirely of the evidence before him, or where a decision was arrived without adequate judicial appreciation of the evidence such as to make it rationally unsupportable. [11] Above all, the Federal Court in Ng Hoo Kui established that the criterion that is central to appellate intervention must remain that deference to the trier of fact is still the rule and not the exception. And the plainly wrong test should not be used by the appellate court as a means to substitute the impugned decision with its own.”. Evaluation, Analysis and Findings of this Court in deciding the appeal against the learned SCj’s decision [23] Having perused the Appellant (Hektar Juara Sdn Bhd) written submission and on 16-11-2022, both parties had made their verbal submission, this Court is of the view that the first and foremost principle in setting aside the JID is to determine whether the JID entered was regular and whether there is merit in the defence. [24] Both principles and tests were carefully examined and analysed by the learned SCj. All the issues raised by the Appellant were answered by the learned SCj as in accordance with the facts and the correct principles of laws. There are no mistake or errors made by the learned SCj in dismissing the Appellant’s application to set aside the JID. [25] An application in setting aside JID is the discretion of the Court as held in the case of Evans v. Bartlam [1937] AC 473 dan Cheow Chew Khoon (T/A Cathay Hotel) v. Abdul Johari Bin Abdul Rahman [1995] 1 MLJ 457. [26] The guide in exercising the discretion it was discussed in the case of Mirra Sdn Bhd v. The Ayer Molek Rubber Co Bhd [2008] 2 MLJ 348 where it was held that the Court will ascertain whether the JID is a regular or irregular judgment. [27] As to whether there is arguable and triable defence, the principle was laid down in the case of Mines Waterfront Business Park Sdn Bhd Lwn Quantum March Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 965, as below: “[60] Persoalan seterusnya yang perlu diputuskan oleh Mahkamah ini samada Defendan membangkitkan pembelaan-pembelaan yang bermerit. [61] Merujuk sekali lagi kepada kes Lai Yoke Ngan, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “The principle of setting aside a default judgment under O 13 r 8 has been well established and needs no detailed repetition. What is important to observe is that a default judgment is not judgment on the merits. Accordingly, when such judgment is obtained irregularly, such irregularity would be a sufficient ground by itself for setting it aside. But where the default judgment has been obtained regularly, in order to succeed, the defendant must file an affidavit of merits, i.e. the defendant must disclose by affidavit evidence that prima facie he has a defence on the merits. Put in another way, the affidavit must disclose that he has an arguable or triable issue in the merits…”. [62] Berhubung dengan pembelaan bermerit ini juga, adalah menjadi prinsip undang-undang yang mantap dan jitu bahawa pembelaan yang bermerit bermaksud pembelaan-pembelaan yang dibangkitkan mendedahkan isu-isu yang perlu dipertikaikan dan wajar dibicarakan (lihat PL Construction Sdn Bhd v Abdullah Said [1998] 1 MLJ 60).” [28] The Appellant is the main contractor; the Appellant is the most important party to ensure about the sub-subcontract works were completed as promised and agreed by the parties. Once the Works were done, the next steps is to make the necessary payments. [29] The unpaid works by the Appellant to its subcontractor was supported by the documents produced at the trial before the learned SCj. The counterclaim action brought by the Respondent against the main contractor that is the Appellant is to get back the sum of RM485,396.93. The reasons raised by the Appellant were just to escape from its obligations to pay the Respondent. [30] The issues raised by the Appellant were never been ignored by the learned SCj. Once the learned SCj conclude that the JID entered was a regular judgment, next step is to see whether the Appellant had merits in its defence. [31] The Appellant should not use the shield on the arbitration clause. as pointed out by the Appellant in the sub-subcontract there was no arbitration clause. [32] The Appellant reasons for the unpaid works to the Respondent, ie the Appellant’s subcontractor were the failure to proceed with the subcontract works regularly and diligently; delay in the Works to be completed; the delay was for 290 days; the respondent’s incomplete and/or defective works; and no rectification works were carried out from the Respondent, were denied by the Respondent [33] The Appellant had only focussed on the errors made by the learned SCj that arbitration clause was inapplicable in the counterclaim action but the main issue whether it is a regular or not, was ignored by the Appellant. [34] The learned SCj had analysed this submission with the evidences before him and I cannot say that the SCj was plainly wrong or that there was any flaw in the evaluation of the evidence led. Conclusion [35] For the reasons given above, I see no good reason to interfere with the learned SCj’s finding. I appreciate that the learned SCj had considered all the cases in dismissing Enclosure 47. [36] As such, my judgment is – “Mahkamah ini mendapati setiap isu di atas telah dianalisa oleh HMS dan setiap dapatan HMS adalah disokong oleh keterangan yang ada di hadapannya iaitu surat-menyurat, e-mel dan Bill of Quantity. HMS juga berlandaskan kepada prinsip undang-undang. Di sini, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa HMS tidak khilaf dari segi fakta dan/atau undang-undang apabila memutuskan bahawa permohonan Perayu (Lampiran 47) ditolak dengan kos. Selain itu, Mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa HMS telah mempertimbangkan fakta material yang melingkari fakta dan pada peringkat rayuan Mahkamah ini tidak boleh untuk mengganggu mencampuri dapatan fakta oleh HMS. Dengan ini, Mahkamah ini memutuskan untuk menolak rayuan Perayu dengan kos sebanyak RM5,000.00 tertakluk kepada fi alokatur. Keputusan HMS dikekalkan.”. Dated: 6 February 2023. RoziBainon ( ROZI BINTI BAINON ) Judicial Commissioner High Court NCvC12 Shah Alam The Counsels: For the Appellant/2nd Defendant in the counterclaim : Michelle Toh Xinran Tetuan Vin Carmen Cheng, Kuala Lumpur For the Respondent/Plaintiff in the counterclaim: Gavin Jay Anand A/L Jayapal Tetuan Gavin Jayapal, Petaling Jaya