HENG OOI HONG v Pendakwa Raya (KA-43-4-04/2026)

This Revision Application ("this Revision"), brought pursuant to Section 323 of the Criminal Procedure Code ("CPC") and Section 31 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 ("CJA"), calls upon this Court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction to review the legality, propriety, and correctness of two consequential sentencing orders passed by the Alor Setar Sessions Court: namely, the mandatory forfeiture of fishing vessel registration number PKFA 9650 under Section 52(1) of the Fisheries Act 1985 ("FA"), and the cancellation of fishing license F003524 pursuant to Section 33(1) of the FA. At its core, this Revision raises fundamental questions regarding the strict statutory limits of mandatory forfeiture regimes, the impermissibility of judicial legislation under the guise of purposive interpretation, and the mandatory procedural safeguards governing guilty pleas under Section 173(b) of the CPC. Facts of the Case 2. The Applicant was originally charged in the Alor Setar Sessions Court under Case No. KA-62EG-3-07/2024. On 22 April 2026, the Applicant entered a plea of guilty to all three charges under the Fisheries Act 1985 ("the FA") as follows: a) Section 8(a) of the FA allowing a local fishing vessel numbered PKFA 9650 to be operated for the purpose of catching fish without a valid license; b) Section 11(3)(a) of the FA allowing trawl net fishing equipment to be operated on the local fishing vessel numbered PKFA 9650 for the purpose of catching fish without a license in respect thereof; and c) Section 14(4)(b) of the FA using a vessel license issued in the name of another person while undertaking or operating a local fishing vessel with registration number PKFA 9650.

The Applicant pleaded guilty to all three (3) charges, and the learned Sessions Court Judge found the Applicant guilty and convicted him of the charges. The learned Sessions Court Judge recorded the guilty pleas and proceeded to sentence the Applicant to a global fine of RM12,000 (RM4,000 per charge, in default, 4 months' imprisonment per charge), the forfeiture of the RM50 cash proceeds from the auctioned fish, the forfeiture of the vessel PKFA 9650 to the Government of Malaysia, and the cancellation of the license F003524. It is pertinent to note that during the mitigation in the Sessions Court, the Applicant's counsel strongly opposed the forfeiture.

This Revision focuses solely on the forfeiture of the vessel PKFA 9650 to the Government of Malaysia and the cancellation of the license F003524. Absence of Judicial Reasoning by the Sessions Court 5. Despite the comprehensive legal debates raised by both parties, the Sessions Court Judge failed to address these legal issues or provide any grounds of judgment.

The defence highlighted the stark disproportionality between the mere RM50 value of the seized fish and the devastating loss of a vessel worth hundreds of thousands of ringgits. Furthermore, it was submitted that the 54-year-old Applicant is a first-time offender who supports a wife and an ailing elderly father, and that the forfeited vessel constituted his indispensable working capital and sole tool of trade for his family's survival.

Unfortunately, no legal reasoning was provided by the lower court judge to explain her statutory interpretations or her basis for rejecting the defence's arguments.

The record of proceedings also reveals that the prosecuting officer had urged the lower court to impose a harsh and severe sentence, including the maximum additional penalties. The prosecution justified this by pointing out that the case had been delayed for over a year due to the Applicant filing three separate representations to the authorities and an interlocutory affidavit application. The prosecution insisted that public interest must override the Applicant's personal interests.

Furthermore, a critical factual discrepancy on the face of the record went unheeded below: while the charge sheet specifies vessel PKFA 9650, the documentary exhibits (Exhibit P11 and vessel verification letters) refer to PKFA 9560. Ordering the forfeiture of a subject matter that suffers from an unresolved material misdescription underscores the unsafe nature of the order passed below.

While this Court acknowledges the principle of public interest in sentencing, the pursuit of deterrence must never be utilised as a justification to bypass strict statutory prerequisites or to validate orders that are fundamentally ultra vires or procedurally defective.

In opposing this Revision, the Respondent advanced a two-pronged argument.

First, the Respondent submitted that the offences under Section 8(a) and 11(3) of the FA are categorised as serious, non-compoundable offences under Section 31(2) of the FA. Premised on the severity of these offences, the Respondent argued that Parliament intended for the mandatory forfeiture under Section 52(1) to apply.

Secondly, the Respondent attempted to construct a hypothetical breach of condition by relying on a JUPEM report tendered in the Sessions Court. The Respondent argued that since the vessel was intercepted 8.5 nautical miles from the coast, the Applicant would have technically breached the fishing zone conditions (Section 8(b)) had a license actually existed.

This Court finds the Respondent's reliance on the JUPEM report to be legally misconceived. The Applicant was explicitly charged and convicted for operating without a license under Section 8(a). Hence, the prosecution cannot, during sentencing, attempt to prove the elements of a separate, uncharged offence under Section 8(b) of the FA merely to conveniently trigger the prerequisite of paragraph (b) of Section 52(1). A criminal conviction and its consequential penalties must be strictly confined to the four corners of the actual charges framed and pleaded to by the accused.

The crux of the polemic between the two parties is regarding the interpretation of the provision of Section 52(1) of the FA, which is reproduced here for the ease of reference:

“Forfeiture and disposal of vessel, etc.

Where any person is found guilty of any offence—

under paragraph 8(a), subsections 11(3), 15(1) or section 26; and

for the contravention of any condition of licence relating to permitted fishing areas under the licence, the court shall, in addition to any other penalty that may be imposed—

order that the vessel (including its equipment, furniture, appurtenances, stores, cargo and fishing appliance), vehicle, article or thing used in the commission of such offence or in relation to which such offence has been committed be forfeited; and

(ii) order that any fish caught in the commission of such offence or the proceeds of the sale of any fish or other article of a perishable nature referred to in section 48, and any explosive, poison, pollutant, apparatus or prohibited gear used or intended to be used in the commission of such offence be forfeited” [Emphasis added]

The Applicant argued that the statutory text of the provision clearly combines paragraphs (a) and (b) using the conjunctive word "and". This requires that before the mandatory forfeiture power is triggered, the prosecution must prove the accused is guilty of the offence under paragraph (a) as well as simultaneously contravening the license condition regarding the fishing area under paragraph (b).

Given that the Applicant's charge is for operating a vessel without a valid license, the Applicant argues it is legally impossible for him to contravene the condition for a license he never possessed. The Applicant insists that the court must give a literal interpretation and is prohibited from modifying the function of Parliament by changing the word "and" to "or".

Conversely, the Respondent strongly advocates for the purposive approach, contending that a strict literal interpretation would lead to an absurd and anomalous outcome. To fortify this proposition, the Respondent relies heavily on the High Court decision of Lau Siew Chai v PP [2026] 4 CLJ 112, wherein Dean Wayne Daly J supported the purposive construction with the following reasoning: "Notwithstanding the presence of the word 'and' between paras. (a) and (b) to s. 52(1) of the FA, these paragraphs ought to be read disjunctively. A literal interpretation of the word 'and' would lead to an absurd and conflicting outcome, undermining the legislative intent in amending s. 52(1) of the FA". [Emphasis added]

The parties acknowledge that the observation of Dean Wayne Daly J is not binding on this Court because a decision of another high court is never binding on another court. Nonetheless, this Court finds that the Respondent’s reliance on Lau Siew Chai is fundamentally misplaced, as the factual and procedural matrix of that case is readily distinguishable. In Lau Siew Chai, the accused was charged exclusively under Section 8(b) of the FA for contravening license conditions. Furthermore, there exists a fundamental procedural distinction between the two cases: in Lau Siew Chai, the additional penalties under Section 33(1) and Section 52(1) were explicitly stated on the face of the charge sheet, thereby affording the accused clear prior notice. In the instant revision, Section 33(1) was conspicuously omitted from the charge sheet altogether, rendering the factual and procedural matrix in Lau Siew Chai wholly inapplicable.

In that specific context, the High Court employed a purposive interpretation to disjoin paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 52(1) to prevent an absurdity where a licensed offender who breached their license conditions could escape the penalty of vessel forfeiture.

Conversely, the Applicant in the present case was convicted under Sections 8(a) and 11(3)(a) for operating a vessel and trawl net completely without a valid license. To trigger the mandatory forfeiture under a strict literal reading of Section 52(1), the prerequisite in paragraph (b) must be fulfilled, namely, the contravention of a license condition.

It is a sheer legal and logical impossibility for the Applicant to breach the conditions of a non-existent license. Applying the purposive approach in the present case would not merely prevent an absurdity; it would require this Court to unlawfully rewrite a penal statute to secure a forfeiture that the established facts do not support.

Therefore, since the factual and procedural circumstances in Lau Siew Chai differ fundamentally from the present case, its purposive approach is wholly inapplicable here.

Although the Respondent's reliance on the purposive approach appears logical and pragmatic to circumvent an absurd outcome, this Court must decline to adopt such an approach in the present case, premised on three binding legal principles.

First, the word "and" is plain, clear, and unambiguous. The purposive approach, such as the one envisaged under Section 17A of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967, is typically invoked only when there is an ambiguity in the statutory language. In this instance, the grammatical meaning of the conjunctive word "and" is explicit and leaves no room for linguistic doubt.

This Court is bound by the Apex Court's pronouncement in Tebin Mostapa v. Hulba-Danyal Balia & Anor [2020] 7 CLJ 561, where Vernon Ong Lam Kiat FCJ authoritatively established that the court must adhere to the literal rule when the statutory text is plain: "[30] In our opinion, the rules governing statutory interpretation may be summarised as follows. First, in construing a statute, effect must be given to the object and intent of the Legislature in enacting the statute. Accordingly, the duty of the court is limited to interpreting the words used by the Legislature and to give effect to the words used by it. The court will not read words into a statute unless clear reason for it is to be found in the statute itself. Therefore, in construing any statute, the court will look at the words in the statute and apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in the statute. Second, if, however the words employed are not clear, then the court may adopt the purposive approach in construing the meaning of the words used. Section 17A of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 provides for a purposive approach in the interpretation of statutes. Therefore, where the words of a statute are unambiguous, plain and clear, they must be given their natural and ordinary meaning. The statute should be construed as a whole and the words used in a section must be given their plain grammatical meaning. It is not the province of the court to add or subtract any word; the duty of the court is limited to interpreting the words used by the Legislature and it has no power to fill in the gaps disclosed. Even if the words in a statute may be ambiguous, the power and duty of the court “to travel outside them on a voyage of discovery are strictly limited.” Third, the relevant provisions of an enactment must be read in accordance with the legislative purpose and applies especially where the literal meaning is clear and reflects the purposes of the enactment. This is done by reference to the words used in the provision; where it becomes necessary to consider every word in each section and give its widest significance. An interpretation which would advance the object and purpose of the enactment must be the prime consideration of the court, so as to give full meaning and effect to it in the achievement to the declared objective. As such, in taking a purposive approach, the court is prepared to look at much extraneous materials that bears on the background against which the legislation was enacted. It follows that a statute has to be read in the correct context and that as such the court is permitted to read additional words into a statutory provision where clear reasons for doing so are to be found in the statute itself." [Emphasis added]

While the Federal Court in Tebin Mostapa undeniably recognised the existence of the purposive approach, it laid down a strict caveat, that is, such an approach may only be resorted to if the drafted words are unclear. Conversely, if the words within the statute are already plain, clear, and unambiguous, the court is duty-bound to ascribe to them their ordinary and natural meaning literally. In other words, it is not within the province of the court to omit or read words into a statute merely to cure a legislative lacuna.

Since the conjunctive word "and" in Section 52(1) of the FA is grammatically unequivocal and free from any ambiguity, the threshold requirement to invoke the purposive approach, as enunciated in Tebin Mostapa, remains unfulfilled.

Second, it is a cardinal principle of law that the Court is not clothed with the jurisdiction to usurp the legislative functions of Parliament by amending, reading words into, or rewriting statutes merely to remedy a statutory defect. In this regard, this Court is strictly bound by the doctrine of stare decisis and guided by the earlier Federal Court's pronouncement in Gan Joon Zin v. Fong Kui Lun & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 729.

The constitutional imperative articulated in Gan Joon Zin underscores that the judiciary’s role is strictly confined to interpreting statutes as enacted by Parliament, rather than repairing perceived drafting omissions under the guise of equity or purposive construction. Where statutory language is plain, reading words into a penal provision to expand the scope of a mandatory forfeiture regime violates the fundamental separation of powers.

Consequently, construing the word "and" to mean "or", as attempted in the Lau Siew Chai case, amounts to an impermissible act of judicial legislation. As Abdul Hamid Mohamad FCJ (later, CJ) aptly cautioned in Gan Joon Zin at p.741 (para. e - f): "Considering that jurisdiction is a matter conferred by law which is within the province of the legislature, it is certainly a usurpation of the legislative power for the court to fill the lacuna in the law whether or not it was intentional and even with the view to do justice in this case. In any event, it will set a very dangerous precedent, especially coming from this court." [Emphasis added]

The relevance of this principle to the present case is absolute. By urging this Court to read the clear conjunctive word "and" as "or" to secure the vessel's forfeiture, the Respondent is effectively asking this Court to rewrite Section 52(1) of the FA to cure a legislative defect. As cemented by Gan Joon Zin, such a remedy lies exclusively with Parliament, not the judiciary.

This Court’s literal reading of the unamended Section 52(1) of the Fisheries Act 1985 is heavily fortified by recent legislative developments. During oral submissions, the Applicant’s counsel rightly drew this Court’s attention to the Fisheries (Amendment) Act 2025 (Act A1780) (“the Amendment Act”), which was formally gazetted on 31 December 2025, but is scheduled to come into force only on 15 June 2026. This amendment explicitly replaces the conjunctive word 'and' (dan) with the disjunctive word 'or' (atau) in Section 52(1).

The passing of this Amendment Act constitutes the ultimate legislative acknowledgement that a statutory lacuna existed in the unamended text. Had the word 'and' in the unamended Section 52(1) been capable of a disjunctive reading as the Respondent contends, Parliament would have had no cause to intervene to alter the statutory text. Because the Applicant’s guilty plea was recorded on 22 April 2026—prior to the gazetted effective date of the 2025 Amendment—this Court is duty-bound to apply the law as it stood on the material date of the offence. To apply a disjunctive reading retrospectively before the formal Amendment has taken effect would amount to an act of judicial legislation, directly violating the doctrine of separation of powers.

In addressing the Respondent's alternative submission that the forfeiture order can be retrospectively sustained under the discretionary powers of Section 34 of the Fisheries Act 1985, this Court finds such a proposition to be fundamentally flawed in law.

A court exercising revisionary jurisdiction under Section 323 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Section 31 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 is strictly bound to examine the record of the proceedings below to satisfy itself of the correctness, legality, or propriety of the actual order passed by the subordinate court. The record in the present case is indubitable: the Sessions Court explicitly ordered the forfeiture of vessel PKFA 9650 under the mandatory regime of Section 52(1) of the Fisheries Act 1985.

The discretionary power of forfeiture under Section 34 of the FA is distinct, autonomous, and legally separate from the mandatory regime under Section 52(1). It requires the trial judge to independently evaluate the evidence and form a subjective satisfaction that the vessel was either the subject matter of, or directly used in, the commission of the specific offence charged. This statutory mechanism satisfies a separate legal test and is governed by vastly different mitigating thresholds. Because the learned Sessions Court Judge never invoked, considered, or exercised her discretion under Section 34, it is fundamentally improper for the Respondent to retrospectively invite this Court, sitting in revision, to substitute its own discretion and execute an order under Section 34 to cure a fatal statutory defect under Section 52(1). Such a course would amount to an impermissible retrospective rewriting of the lower court’s record. Consequently, the Respondent cannot exploit this revision proceeding as a backdoor method to remedy its own trial failing or oversight in omitting to move the lower court for a proper discretionary forfeiture order under Section 34 at first instance.

Despite this clear concession by the prosecution, the Sessions Court completely failed to differentiate the application of the law between the charges and erroneously issued a blanket, unified forfeiture order explicitly minuted pursuant to Section 52(1).

It is trite law that Section 52(1)(a) of the Fisheries Act 1985 strictly and exhaustively enumerates the offences that trigger mandatory forfeiture, namely paragraph 8(a), subsection 11(3), 11(3A), 15(1) or section 26. Section 14(4)(b) is conspicuously absent from this statutory list. Therefore, any forfeiture of a vessel in connection with a conviction under Section 14(4)(b) can only be ordered under the discretionary powers of Section 34. By failing to bifurcate the charges and applying Section 52(1) as a blanket mandatory catch-all, the learned Sessions Court Judge acted entirely outside the trial court’s statutory jurisdiction. In respect of the third charge, the blanket forfeiture order is patently ultra vires and cannot be allowed to stand.

In attempting to sustain this defective order, the Respondent’s reliance on the Court of Appeal case of Tan Van Chieu & Ors v PP [2016] 6 CLJ 841 is misconceived. While Tan Van Chieu recognises the court's discretion under Section 34, it does not serve as a legal authority to retrospectively cure or substitute the statutory basis of a defective forfeiture order that was explicitly and exclusively recorded under Section 52(1) at the lower court.

The Respondent cannot now be permitted to alter the statutory basis of the order at the appellate or revision stage merely to cure the fatal defect of the lower court's decision.

This Court is guided by the Court of Appeal's decision in PP v. Abul Hassan Mohamed Rashid [2022] 9 CLJ 502, which expressly endorsed the strict principles laid down by Zawawi Salleh J (later, FCJ) in Lim Hung Wang & Ors v. PP [2011] 7 CLJ 318. In striking down attempts to misuse the court's review jurisdiction, the appellate court firmly established that the appellate or revisionary power of the court cannot be abused to fix a party's trial errors. Delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Nordin Hassan JCA (now, FCJ) observed at paragraph [42]: "[42] Further, in Lim Hung Wang’s case, we noted that the judge did say that if the High Court has the power to review its own decision, it must be exercised in exceptional circumstances and cannot be used to allow parties to remedy their failing and oversights during trial or backdoor method to relitigate their case. At paras. [43] and [44] of the [Lim Hung Wang] judgment, this was said: ' [43] ... To my mind, exceptional circumstances include:

discovery of a new fact not known by the court at the time it made the original decision;

emergence of new evidence which could have a decisive factor in reaching the original decision;

a material change in circumstances since the original decision; and

a reason to believe that the original decision was erroneous or constituted an abuse of power that resulted in an injustice. [44] The court’s power to review, if any, is not designed for the purpose of allowing parties to remedy their own failing or oversights during trial or to provide a backdoor method by which the parties can seek to reargue or relitigate their cases.'” [Emphasis added]

Applying the restrictive threshold set out in Lim Hung Wang, the Respondent in the present case has failed to demonstrate any exceptional circumstances—such as new evidence, a material change in circumstances, or a fundamental abuse of power—that would justify altering the statutory basis of the lower court’s order. A revision proceeding under Section 323 of the CPC cannot be transformed into an avenue to fix prosecutorial omissions committed during the trial, nor can it serve to grant an order under Section 34 of the FA that was never sought, argued, or considered below.

In addressing the second main issue regarding the cancellation of the fishing license under Section 33(1) of the FA, the Applicant submits that the cancellation order is vitiated by a fatal procedural irregularity.

A meticulous examination of the charge sheet reveals a glaring omission: for the first and second charges, the additional penalty explicitly stated was Section 52(1), while for the third charge, it was Section 34. The provision of Section 33(1) was conspicuously absent from the charge sheet altogether. Crucially, the Sessions Court completely failed to read or formally explain to the Applicant the severe consequences of the license cancellation before the guilty plea was recorded.

According to the Applicant, this omission constituted a flagrant breach of the mandatory statutory safeguard enshrined in Section 173(b) of the CPC. This section strictly requires the presiding court to ascertain that an accused fully understands the nature and consequences of his plea before it is formally recorded. Unlike cases where statutory consequences are expressly set out on the face of the charge sheet—such as in Lau Siew Chai—the complete absence of Section 33(1) from the charge sheet in the present case denied the Applicant any formal notice of the severe administrative penalty he faced upon pleading guilty.

To fortify this argument, the learned counsel for the Applicant cited Teh Geok Chin v PP [2025] CLJU 3585, where the Mohamed Zaini Mazlan JCA established the strict mandatory guidelines and procedural safeguards that a court must follow before recording a guilty plea from an accused person: “Garis panduan merekodkan sabitan kesalahan selepas pengakuan salah 32. Dalam penghakiman ini, kami berhasrat untuk menggariskan garis panduan yang wajar dipatuhi oleh mahkamah perbicaraan sebelum mensabitkan seseorang tertuduh yang berhasrat mengaku bersalah. Garis panduan berikut adalah berdasarkan kaedah-kaedah yang terkandung dalam Kanun Tatacara Jenayah serta kes-kes yang telah diputuskan sebelum ini:

Sebelum sesuatu pertuduhan dibacakan kepada tertuduh, mahkamah hendaklah terlebih dahulu memastikan bahawa pertuduhan tersebut adalah teratur dan betul, dengan mengambil kira tatacara penggubalan pertuduhan sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah Bab XVIII Kanun Tatacara Jenayah; …

(viii) Mahkamah hendaklah memastikan tertuduh memahami sepenuhnya pertuduhan tersebut, termasuk elemen-elemen kesalahan. Akibat pengakuan bersalah hendaklah dijelaskan, khususnya jenis dan julat hukuman yang boleh dikenakan, termasuk jika pertuduhan tersebut membawa hukuman mandatori atau hukuman mati;

(xiii) Mahkamah hendaklah berpuas hati bahawa tertuduh memahami sifat dan akibat daripada pengakuan tersebut, dan pengakuan bersalah dibuat secara sukarela, tanpa sebarang paksaan, ugutan, janji atau salah faham. Tertuduh harus dimaklumkan mengenai tiga perkara berikut:

Pertama, tertuduh hendaklah dimaklumkan bahawa sekiranya beliau mengaku bersalah, perbicaraan tidak akan dijalankan. Dengan kata lain, tiada saksi akan dipanggil dan hukuman boleh dijatuhkan semata-mata berdasarkan pengakuan bersalah tersebut;

Kedua, tertuduh hendaklah dimaklumkan bahawa beliau boleh dijatuhi hukuman maksimum bagi kesalahan yang dilakukan, termasuk hukuman mati, penjara, denda dan juga sebatan, sekiranya hukuman tersebut diperuntukkan bagi kesalahan berkenaan; dan

Ketiga, tertuduh hendaklah dimaklumkan bahawa sekiranya beliau mengaku bersalah, beliau hanya boleh merayu terhadap hukuman dan bukan terhadap sabitan.” [Emphasis added]

Applying the authoritative principles articulated in Teh Geok Chin, it is clear that the statutory mandate under Section 173(b) of the CPC extends beyond a mere mechanical reading of the primary charge. Where a conviction carries severe, non-custodial or administrative penal consequences—such as the statutory cancellation of a commercial fishing license under Section 33(1) of the FA—the trial court is under a strict judicial obligation to explicitly inform and satisfy itself that the accused fully comprehends the complete spectrum of penalties before recording a plea of guilty. The failure to do so deprives the plea of its informed and voluntary character, amounting to a fatal procedural irregularity that vitiates the consequential order.

Substantively, the Applicant also contended that since the primary charges were predicated on operating a vessel "without a valid license", the subsequent cancellation of a specific license registered in the name of a third party fundamentally destroyed the legal nexus between the license and the offences committed.

During the oral submission, the Applicant's counsel emphasised that cancelling a license belonging to a separate registered owner without affording that actual owner the right to be heard was unjust and violated the fundamental principles of natural justice.

In staunch rebuttal, the Respondent heavily anchored their submissions on the mandatory statutory nature of Section 33(1) of the FA. The Respondent vehemently asserted that the power conferred under this section is devoid of any judicial discretion. Since the provision employs the mandatory term “shall”, the Respondent argued that the court is strictly obligated to cancel any licence related to the offence committed once a conviction is recorded, leaving no room for leniency.

To counter the Applicant's argument regarding the license being registered in a third party's name and the deprivation of the right to be heard, the Respondent relies on the broad and encompassing interpretation of the word owner (pemunya) under Section 2 of the

The Respondent's reliance on the broad interpretation of "owner" (pemunya) under Section 2 of the FA to justify the cancellation is inherently contradictory to their own framed charges. The Applicant's third charge under Section 14(4)(b) explicitly states that the Applicant was using a license issued "in the name of another person".

Having legally acknowledged and convicted the Applicant on the premise that the license legally belongs to a separate, registered third party, it is a grave miscarriage of justice to then cancel that specific license (F003524) summarily without ever calling the actual registered owner to enter a defence or granting them the fundamental right to be heard. Such an action constitutes a flagrant violation of the rules of natural justice.

The right to be heard (audi alteram partem) is a cornerstone of natural justice and is encapsulated within the guarantee of procedural fairness under Article 5(1) of the Federal Constitution. A statutory fishing license constitutes a recognised proprietary right and primary livelihood. To summarily cancel a license belonging to an uncharged third party without notice or an opportunity to show cause is ultra vires and constitutionally unsustainable.

The Respondent further argued that this definition extends to sub-lessees or operators such as the Applicant, thereby establishing the requisite legal link between the Applicant, the vessel, and the license. Additionally, the Respondent defended the procedural omission by asserting that the prosecuting officer had verbally highlighted the application for license cancellation under Section 33(1) twice during the aggravation and mitigation stages in the lower court. The Respondent contended that these verbal pronouncements served as adequate and timely notice, thereby affording the Applicant ample opportunity to raise an objection or withdraw his guilty plea before the final sentence was pronounced.

On this issue, this Court decides in favour of the Applicant, quashing and setting aside the license cancellation order. The Court rules that the Respondent's arguments rested entirely on a mechanical reading of the statutory wording, ignoring fatal procedural irregularities and substantive legal inconsistencies.

This Court must also address and firmly dismiss the Respondent’s submission that the cancellation of the fishing license under Section 33(1) of the FA is an "automatic and logical consequence" of the vessel’s forfeiture on the premise that a license cannot be operated independently of the vessel. This argument is legally untenable on two distinct grounds. First, since this Court has quashed the vessel’s forfeiture under the first issue, any derivative argument predicated on the automatic consequence of such forfeiture naturally collapses. Second, Section 33(1) and Section 52(1) constitute distinct statutory powers governed by separate statutory prerequisites. The mandatory requirement under Section 173(b) of the CPC—demanding that an accused fully comprehend the nature and full penal spectrum of a guilty plea before it is formally recorded—cannot be bypassed, diluted, or cured by treating a severe, livelihood-depriving penalty like license cancellation as a mere appendage or administrative shadow of the vessel. The statutory failure to observe these strict procedural safeguards under Section 173(b) of the CPC constitutes a fatal defect that exists completely independent of any physical or functional connection between the vessel and the license.

The Court extensively scrutinised the procedural safeguards mandated by the law, noting that although Section 33(1) contains mandatory sentencing language, such provisions absolutely do not excuse the prosecution or the court from following strict procedural due process under the CPC.

The Court finds that the Prosecution's failure to specify the potential penalty of license cancellation under Section 33(1) of the Fisheries Act 1985 on the face of the charge sheet, compounded by the Sessions Court's failure to independently identify this omission and formally explain this devastating consequence to the Applicant prior to recording the plea, constitutes a fatal procedural breach of Section 173(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code.

While the drafting, framing, and tendering of criminal charges remain the exclusive constitutional province of the prosecution, the solemn judicial duty to ensure that an accused person’s guilty plea is recorded with a complete and informed comprehension of its entire penal spectrum rests squarely upon the shoulders of the trial judge. A severe, livelihood-altering consequence such as the cancellation of a statutory fishing license cannot be treated as a minor administrative afterthought. This dual failure by both the prosecution and the trial judge cannot be retrospectively cured or salvaged by the prosecuting officer's verbal assertions during the post-plea aggravation stage.

Where a statute prescribes collateral administrative penalties that severely impact a party's civil rights or livelihood, failure to give explicit notice on the charge sheet—or failure by the bench to explain such consequences prior to recording a plea—amounts to a fatal departure from procedural due process under Section 173(b) of the CPC.

To fortify this decision, the court heavily applied the principles laid down by the Court of Appeal in Teh Geok Chin, which emphasised that while Section 305 of the CPC generally acts as a statutory bar against appealing a conviction derived from a guilty plea, the appellate or revisionary court retains the inherent power to quash the order if the lower court failed to strictly adhere to the procedures of Section 173(b) of the CPC.

The judgment of Teh Geok Chin specifically adopted the rigid safeguards established by the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Lee Weng Tuck & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1989] 1 CLJ (Rep) 75.

Applying the Lee Weng Tuck safeguards as endorsed in Teh Geok Chin, the court highlighted that it is wholly insufficient for a judge to merely record a plea; the court must actively ensure three safeguards:

that the accused himself/ herself wishes to plead guilty,

(ii) that the court ascertains the accused understands the nature and consequences of the plea, and

(iii) that the accused intends to admit to the offence without qualification.

The Supreme Court in Lee Weng Tuck ruled that a failure to strictly adhere to these steps renders the plea of guilty invalid. Hence, it is the finding of this Court that the Sessions Court judge in the present case failed to execute the second safeguard. The court explicitly rejected the Respondent's defence regarding the verbal notice given by the prosecutor. Relying on the procedural strictness dictated by Lee Weng Tuck, it is ruled that the statutory burden lies entirely on the presiding judge, not the prosecuting officer, to explain the consequences.

Because the solemn duty to explain the full penal spectrum rests exclusively on the shoulders of the presiding judge prior to recording the plea, a trial court cannot delegate or outsource this statutory responsibility to the prosecution. Verbal statements made by a prosecuting officer during post-conviction aggravation or mitigation stages are procedurally incapable of fulfilling the mandatory judicial requirements under Section 173(b) of the CPC.

Furthermore, informing an accused of a severe, livelihood-altering penalty only during the mitigation stage, after the guilty plea has already been recorded, defeats the entire purpose of the statutory safeguard meant to ensure the plea is fully informed before it is finalised. Substantively, this Court agrees with the Applicant's submission regarding the illogical legal nexus applied below.

Section 33(1) of the FA requires the cancelled license to be one "in relation to which the offence has been committed". Since the Applicant was explicitly charged and convicted of operating a vessel and fishing equipment without a valid license, the court found it legally and logically inconsistent to cancel a specific license in relation to offences whose very core premise is the absence of a license.

Finally, the Court finds that utilising the broad definition of an "owner" to cancel a license legally registered to a separate third party, without ever calling that actual owner to enter a defence or granting them the right to be heard, fundamentally violates the rules of natural justice. For these comprehensive procedural and substantive reasons, fortified by strict adherence to the CPC safeguards outlined in Teh Geok Chin and Lee Weng Tuck, the court concluded that the cancellation order was unsafe and irregular and had to be set aside. Conclusion 71. For the comprehensive statutory, procedural, and constitutional reasons set out above, this Revision is allowed. The orders of the Sessions Court ordering the forfeiture of fishing vessel PKFA 9650