The applicable law in this area is trite. I refer to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Mesuntung Property Sdn Bhd v Kimlin Housing Development Sdn Bhd [2014] 7 CLJ 202 where David Wong Dak Wah JCA held: - “[19] Before we deal with the respondent's submission we wish to state what the legal position is as far as what is the threshold test envisaged in s. 226(3) of the Companies Act 1965 before leave is granted. [20] In Bruno Phillipe Fehrenbach v. Pegawai Penerima Malaysia [1999] 6 CLJ 177 Abdul Malik Ishak J held as follows: In the context of our s. 226(3) of the Companies Act 1965, leave would readily be given by the court if all the requirements are fulfilled. It is a correct statement of the law to say and I so say that the court considers whether leave to proceed should be granted by looking at the nature of the plaintiff's claim, the balance of convenience and the justice of the case (Re Gordon Grant & Grant Pty Ltd (supra); Re Stuart Bros Pty Ltd [1995] 16 ACSR 451; and Speiser v. Locums Financial Management Pty Ltd [1997] 22 ACSR 478 [15 ACLC 278] (SC NSW)). Thus, in a situation where it is unlikely that the plaintiff will obtain any advantage over the creditors and that no prejudice will be caused either to the creditors or to the orderly winding up of the company, leave will be granted as a matter of course (Re Gordon Grant & Grant Pty Ltd (supra); and Ex p. Walker [1982] 6 ACLR 423). The court in Re Coastal Constructions Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) [1994] 13 ACSR 329 in determining whether leave to proceed should be granted was of the view that there was a necessity to examine the amount and seriousness of the claim, the degree of complexity of the legal and factual issues involved and, lastly, the stage which the proceedings have reached. It must not be forgotten that the applicant too must establish that he or she has a prima facie case meaning that the applicant must show that there is a real dispute between the parties (Zempilas v. JN Taylor Holdings Ltd (In Prov Liq) [1991] 3 ACSR 755 (SC SA); and Vagrand Pty Ltd (In Liq) v. Fielding [1993] 41 FCR 550 [113 ALR 128]). All these are factual situations where the courts are willing to grant leave to the applicants. [21] In Shencourt Sdn Bhd v. Perumahan NCK Sdn Bhd [2008] 3 CLJ 582 the Court of Appeal opined as follows: [11] On the guiding principle for the court to grant leave with a view to commencing action against a company that has been wound up, we would like to refer to the case of Mosbert Berhad (In Liquidation) v. Stella D'Cruz [1985] CLJU 47; [1985] 1 LNS 47; [1985] 2 MLJ 446 wherein Seah SCJ, in delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court at p. 447 had this to say: In re Cuthbert Lead Smelting Co Ltd [1886] WN 84 it was held that if the applicant could obtain all the relief in the winding up leave would be refused. In short, the Court will always give an application for leave if his claim cannot be dealt with adequately in the winding up or if the remedy he seeks cannot be given to him in a winding up proceedings. [12] It is clear, based on the above cited case authority, leave to proceed would only be granted when the plaintiff's claim cannot be adequately dealt with in winding up of the defendant's company or when the plaintiff is seeking a remedy which cannot be given in the winding up of the defendant's company. [22] The approach of the Australia jurisdiction can be seen in the following two cases which dealt with the Australia equivalent of s. 226(3) of the Companies Act 1965. In Vagrand Pty Ltd (in liq) v. Fielding & Ors [1993] 11 ACLC 411 where the Federal Court of Australia held as follows: The second matter raised by Mr Coles, in his challenge to the order of Morling J, is the standard applied by his Honour in considering the merits of the case demonstrated by the applicants for leave. After referring to a number of authorities on the point, Morling J said at ACLC 175; ALR 317: In summary, in the exercise of its discretion under s. 371(2) the Court should only grant leave to proceed where it is satisfied that a real dispute exists between the parties and that in light of all the circumstances it is more convenient (or otherwise appropriate) to allow the matter to proceed to judgment. Mr Coles submits that the test, "real dispute", imposes too small a burden upon an applicant for leave. The true position, he says, is that an applicant must demonstrate a prima facie case; that is, the applicant must provide evidence of each element of its claim. There are authorities in which the term "prima facie case" has been used to describe the case required to be demonstrated by an applicant for leave. But we are not aware of any case in which it has been held that an applicant must adduce evidence of every element of its claim. To impose that burden would be to shut out many meritorious claims. It is commonplace for actions against companies to depend upon documentary evidence. Until there is discovery of relevant documents, it may be impossible for an applicant to prove each element in its case. On occasions, it may also be necessary for the applicant to interrogate the respondent or subpoena other parties. These steps cannot be taken until the action is commenced. The reason for imposing a requirement of leave, in the case of litigation against companies in liquidation, was explained a century ago by Manning J, of the New South Wales Supreme Court, in Thomson v. Mulgoa Irrigation Co Ltd (1893) 4 BC (NSW)33: All that s. 140 means is that a company in liquidation is not to be harassed and its assets wasted by unnecessary litigation, and the leave of the Court is therefore required as a safeguard. Before any action can be brought or continued against a company, the Court must investigate the intended litigation. Manning J did not suggest that it was necessary to prove all the elements of an applicant's claim. In the case before him, he was content that the applicant for leave "pledge his oath that he has a valid and unimpeachable document". By the word "document", he was referring to the mortgage relied on in a foreclosure suit, the validity of which was under challenge. It was sufficient that "an affidavit of merits" was provided, covering the basic issue in the case. In Re Sydney Formworks Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [1965] NSWR 646 at 649-650 McLelland CJ in Eq expressed the reason for the requirement of leave in this way: This view is in keeping with what I consider to be the obvious intention of the section, namely, to ensure that the assets of the company in liquidation will be administered in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act and that no person will get an advantage to which, under those provisions, he is not properly entitled, and to enable the Court effectively to supervise all claims brought against the company which is being wound up. [23] In Capita Financial Group Ltd v. Rothwells Ltd (No 2) [1989] 7 ACLC 634 where Rogers CJ in Comm D said as follows: It is necessary to understand the rationale which buttresses the requirement for showing the existence of a prima facie case. The provisional liquidators and liquidator, respectively, are entitled to be protected from involvement in court proceedings which may be perhaps only of a nuisance nature, or which may be thought to be totally devoid of any substance. The resources of the company in liquidation should not be frittered away in defending baseless claims. It seems to be that it is considerations of this nature which have led the courts uniformly over the years to demand that there be evidence showing a prima facie case. As Mr Reeves, for the provisional liquidators, pointed out, the requirement goes back to a decision of Manning J in Thomson v. The Mulgoa Irrigation Co. Ltd [1894] 4 N.S.W. Bankruptcy Company and Probate Cases 33. As His Honour pointed out: The Court will strain a point to avoid the absurdity of merely requiring the same pleadings to be put on the file again so as to make the matter merely one of costs; but grounds must be shewn on the merits, which would justify the court in granting leave in the first instance. The plaintiff should pledge his oath that he has a valid an unimpeachable document. All that s. 140 means is that a company in liquidation is not to be harassed and its assets wasted by unnecessary liquidation and the leave of the court is therefore required as a safeguard. Before any action can be brought or continued against a company, the court must investigate intended litigation. This approach has been maintained thereafter in successive decisions of courts. (See Re Sydney Formworks Pty Ltd (in liq)