Hiq Resources Sdn Bhd v Liong Shan Group Sdn Bhd (CB-22NCvC-19-09/2024)

LIONG SHAN GROUP SDN BHD

ADVANTAGE COMMON SDN BHD … DEFENDAN- (NO. PENDAFTARAN: 201801018484 (128500-M)) DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pendahuluan [1] Ini adalah permohonan Plaintif untuk mendapatkan satu injunksi interlokutori dan perintah-perintah seperti yang berikut di KM 4: 28/02/2025 10:16:33

sehingga tindakan ini dilupuskan sepenuhnya, suatu injunksi yang menghalang Defendan Pertama, sama ada oleh mereka sendiri, pegawai-pegawai, pekerja-pekerja, ejen-ejen dan/atau wakil-wakil mereka atau sebaliknya, daripada melakukan apa-apa perbuatan dan/atau peninggalan yang akan mengakibatkan perlanggaran dan/atau pembatalan Perjanjian Pengambilalihan Eksklusif bertarikh 27.09.2024 (“Perjanjian Pengambilalihan Eksklusif”) dan/atau Surat Aku Janji bertarikh 30.09.2024 (“Surat Aku Janji”);

sehingga pelupusan penuh dan muktamad tindakan ini, suatu injunksi yang menghalang Defendan Pertama, sama ada oleh mereka sendiri, pegawai-pegawai, pekerja-pekerja, ejen-ejen dan/atau wakil-wakil mereka atau sebaliknya, daripada mengambil sebarang tindakan-tindakan dan/atau langkah-langkah yang mempunyai kesan berurusan dengan dan/atau melupuskan dan/atau memindahkan sebarang kepentingan, hak, dan faedah yang tertimbul daripada dan/atau berkaitan dengan produk bijih besi yang dihasilkan dari tapak perlombongan yang terletak di Lot 35775, Sungai Yu, Mukim Batu Yon, Daerah Lipis, Pahang (“Tapak Perlombongan”) kepada mana-mana pihak ketiga, termasuk Defendan Kedua;

sehingga pelupusan penuh dan muktamad tindakan ini, suatu injunksi yang menghalang Defendan Pertama, sama ada oleh mereka sendiri, pegawai-pegawai, pekerja-pekerja, ejen-ejen dan/atau wakil-wakil mereka atau sebaliknya, daripada menjual, membekal, menghantar dan/atau melupuskan produk bijih besi yang dihasilkan dari Tapak Perlombongan kepada Defendan Kedua;

sehingga pelupusan penuh dan muktamad tindakan ini, suatu injunksi yang menghalang Defendan Kedua, sama ada oleh mereka sendiri, pegawai-pegawai, pekerja-pekerja, ejen-ejen dan/atau wakil-wakil mereka atau sebaliknya, daripada membeli, menerima dan/atau berurusan dengan produk bijih besi yang dihasilkan dari Tapak Perlombongan daripada Defendan Pertama;

suatu injunksi yang menghendaki Defendan-Defendan, sama ada oleh mereka sendiri, pegawai-pegawai, pekerja-pekerja, ejen-ejen dan/atau wakil-wakil mereka atau sebaliknya untuk mengemukakan dan membekalkan: (1) butiran-butiran semua rundingan dan mesyuarat berkaitan dengan penjualan dan pembelian produk bijih besi dari Tapak Perlombongan; dan (2) semua akaun, rekod kewangan dan dokumen yang berkaitan dengan penjualan dan pembelian produk bijih besi yang dihasilkan dari Tapak Perlombongan, termasuk tetapi tidak terhad kepada invois-invois, pesanan-pesanan pembelian, pesanan-pesanan penghantaran, resit-resit dan slip-slip jambatan timbang mengenai produk bijih besi yang dihasilkan dari Tapak Perlombongan, melalui affidavit yang akan difailkan dan disampaikan oleh Defendan-Defendan dalam tempoh tujuh

hari dari Perintah ini;

Notis menurut Aturan 45 Kaedah 7 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 diendors pada Perintah ini; dan

Kos. [2] Permohonan ini disokong oleh affidavit Li Lirong yang dideposkan pada 20.09.2024. Plaintif menyatakan bahawa Plaintif adalah sebuah syarikat sendirian berhad. Pada 10.12.2020 telah termeterai satu perjanjian di antara Spring Timegold Sdn Bhd (STSB) dengan Defendan Pertama untuk menjalankan dan menguruskan kerja-kerja perlombongan, penjualan dan pemasaran bijih besi dari kawasan di Lot No. 35775, Sungai Yu, Mukim Batu Yon, Daerah Lipis, Pahang Darul Makmur. [3] Pada 27.09.2023 telah termeterai satu Perjanjian Pengambilalihan Eksklusif di antara Defendan Pertama dan Plaintif. Defendan Pertama telah bersetuju untuk menjual dan Plaintif telah bersetuju untuk membeli secara eksklusif semua produk besi Defendan Pertama dan Spring Timegold Sdn Bhd (STSB) yang dihasilkan dari tapak perlombongan. Ini dapat dilihat di perenggan 1 perjanjian tersebut yang ditandakan sebagai eksibit “LLR-5” seperti yang berikut: “1. Exclusive Right to Purchase The Buyer shall have the exclusive and only rights to buy all of Seller’s and STSB’s iron ore product produced from the above Mining Site.” [4] Li Lirong dalam affidavitnya juga menyatakan di perenggan [11] bahawa Plaintif telah membayar sepenuhnya bayaran pendahuluan kepada Defendan Pertama yang terdiri daripada:

Sejumlah RM 500,000.00 pada 29.09.2023 menurut Klausa 5 (a) Perjanjian Pengambilalihan Eksklusif (“Bayaran Awal”); dan

Sejumlah RM 1,000,000.00 pada 03.10.2023 dan jumlah selanjutnya sebanyak RM 800,000.00 pada 11.10.2023

he must ask himself whether the totality of the facts presented before him discloses a bona fide serious issue to be tried. He must, when considering this question, bear in mind that the pleadings and evidence are incomplete at that stage. Above all, he must refrain from making any determination on the merits of the claim or any defence to it. It is sufficient if he identifies with precision the issues raised on the joinder and decides whether these are serious enough to merit a trial. If he finds, upon a consideration of all the relevant material before him, including submissions of counsel, that no serious question is disclosed, that is an end of the matter and the relief is refused. On the other hand if he does find that there are serious questions to be tried, he should move on to the next step of his inquiry;

having found that an issue has been disclosed that requires further investigation, he must consider where the justice of the case lies. In making his assessment, he must take into account all relevant matters, including the practical realities of the case before him. He must weigh the harm that the injunction would produce by its grant against the harm that would result from its refusal. He is entitled to take into account, inter alia, the relative financial standing of the litigants before him. If after weighing all matters, he comes to the conclusion that the plaintiff would suffer greater injustice if relief is withheld, then he would be entitled to grant the injunction especially if he is satisfied that the plaintiff is in a financial position to meet his undertaking in damages. Similarly, if he concludes that the defendant would suffer the greater injustice by the grant of an injunction, he would be entitled to refuse relief. Of course, cases may arise where the injustice to the plaintiff is so manifest that the judge would be entitled to dispense with the usual undertaking as to damages (see Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1988] 3 MLJ 90). Apart from such cases, the judge is entitled to take into account the plaintiff's ability to meet his undertaking in damages should the suit fail, and, in appropriate cases, may require the plaintiff to secure his undertaking, for example, by providing a bank guarantee; and

the judge must have in the forefront of his mind that the remedy that he is asked to administer is discretionary, intended to produce a just result for the period between the date of the application and the trial proper and intended to maintain the status quo, an expression explained by Lord Diplock in Garden Cottage Foods Ltd v Milk Marketing Board [1984] AC 130; [1983] 2 All ER 770; [1983] 3 WLR 143 and applied in Cheng Hang Guan. It is a judicial discretion capable of correction on appeal. Accordingly, the judge would be entitled to take into account all discretionary considerations, such as delay in the making of the application or any adequate alternative remedy that would satisfy the plaintiff's equity, such as an award of monetary compensation in the event that he succeeds in establishing his claim at the trial. Any question going to the public interest may, and in appropriate cases should, be taken into account. A judge should briefly set out in his judgement the several factors that weighed in his mind when arriving at his conclusion.” Prinsip ini juga adalah berakar daripada prinsip yang dinyatakan dalam kes American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396. Adakah terdapat isu serius untuk dibicarakan? [13] Berdasarkan kepada affidavit-affidavit dan hujahan pihak-pihak dalam kes ini, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa Perjanjian Pengambilalihan Eksklusif dipertikaikan oleh kedua-dua pihak sama ada ia adalah perjanjian perwakilan (agency) ataupun ia adalah merupakan perjanjian jual beli bijih besi oleh Plaintif kepada Defendan Pertama. Ia juga akan menyebabkan Mahkamah perlu memutuskan sama ada terdapat pemecahan terma-terma kontrak dalam perjanjian tersebut. [14] Ini ditambah pula dengan hujahan yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama bahawa perjanjian di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama itu hanyalah satu perjanjian perwakilan. Dalam erti kata lain Plaintif adalah menjadi ajen kepada Defendan Pertama dalam menjual produk bijih besi tersebut. Dalam hal ini juga Mahkamah perlu meneliti sama ada affidavit-affidavit dan eksibit-eksibit yang dikemukakan telah jelas menunjukkan bahawa sebenarnya perjanjian tersebut adalah perjanjian perwakilan dan bukannya perjanjian di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama bagi membeli dan menjual bijih besi tersebut. [15] Mahkamah ini berpendapat pada masa yang sama sekiranya ia adalah merupakan perjanjian perwakilan (agency) maka peruntukan di bawah seksyen 138 Akta Kontrak 1950 juga perlu diambil perhatian yang memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut: “138 Consideration not necessary No consideration is necessary to create an agency.” [16] Hakikat perjanjian perwakilan (agency) dapat dilihat dalam Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency Seventeenth Edition oleh F. M. B. Reynolds, Sweet & Maxwell, 2001 di halaman 1 seperti berikut: “(1) Agency is the fiduciary relationship which exists between two persons, one of whom expressly or impliedly consents that the other should act on his behalf so as to affect his relations with third parties, and the other of whom similarly consents so to act or so acts. The one on whose behalf the act or acts are to be done is called the principal. The one who is to act is called the agent. Any person other than the principal and the agent may be referred to as a third party.

In respect of the acts which the principal expressly or impliedly consents that the agent shall so do on the principal's behalf, the agent is said to have authority to act; and this authority constitutes a power to affect the principal's legal relations with third parties.

Where the agent's authority results from a manifestation of consent that he should represent or act for the principal expressly or impliedly made by the principal to the agent himself, the authority is called actual authority, express or implied. But the agent may also have authority resulting from such a manifestation made by the principal to a third party; such authority is called apparent authority.

A person may have the same fiduciary relationship with a principal where he acts on behalf of that principal but has no authority and hence no power to affect the principal's relations with third parties. Because of the fiduciary relationship such a person may also be called an agent.” [17] Ini perlu dilihat bersama-sama dengan perjanjian tersebut dan pembayaran yang dikemukakan oleh pihak Plaintif kepada Defendan Pertama. Adakah bayaran tersebut merupakan balasan kepada perjanjian tersebut. Jika begitu keadaannya maka tidak timbul isu bahawa perjanjian ini adalah perjanjian wakil atau bukan. [18] Hal ini pada hemat Mahkamah adalah isu serius yang perlu diputuskan oleh Mahkamah dalam satu perbicaraan tuntutan Plaintif kepada Defendan-Defendan. Pihak-pihak akan mengemukakan keterangan masing-masing. Pada hemat Mahkamah ia tidak boleh diselesaikan dengan hanya berdasarkan kepada affidavit dan eksibit-eksibit yang dikemukakan di Mahkamah. Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada apakah yang dimaksudkan dengan isu serius yang perlu dibicarakan. Ini dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Agong dalam kes Alor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 241 dan menunjukkan bagaimanakah dalam kes tersebut diputuskan sama ada ia adalah isu serius yang boleh dibicarakan ataupun sebaliknya. Ini dapat dilihat di halaman 266 seperti yang berikut: “Since Encik Low raised the serious issues to be tried point and argued on it at considerable length before us and Encik John Khoo before the learned judge, it is incumbent on us to make our finding on this issue. It would be necessary, at the risk of being repetitive, to recapitulate on the plaintiffs’ cause of action. Basically, the action is for a declaration that the agreement of 1 September 1992 is void being ultra vires the resolution of the extraordinary general meeting of the company held on 23 August 1992 and that even if it is valid, which is denied, there is also a breach of the terms of the agreement, particularly cll 3 and 5, resulting in the automatic termination of the agreement. It is also founded on the breach of the agreement, assuming that it valid, and also on tort, because of the fraud on the minority shareholders being perpetrated by Lim Cheng Teek in conspiracy with Choong Keng Kor. We have highlighted the various allegations on these issues earlier on and what we need to consider now is whether the statements contained in the affidavits of the plaintiffs have raised a prima facie plausibility to merit further investigation as to their truth. The breach of cl 3 of the agreement is a highly contentious issue in these proceedings. Encik Low's contention is that the balance of the purchase price should have been settled on the completion date which fell on 28 February 1993 or at the latest 1 March 1993, ie six months from the date of the agreement, but as far as the plaintiffs are concerned there had been no transfer to Choong Keong Kor because no evidence of the payment of the completion sum and no instrument evidencing the transfer of the shares had been produced. Besides, all the relevant forms under the National Land Code 1965 or the Companies Act 1965 were not exhibited as proof of the settlement of the purchase price.” [19] Seterusnya Mahkamah Agong menyatakan fakta seperti yang berikut: “Then there was the other allegation that the agreement was ultra vires the resolution of the extraordinary general meeting of the company on 23 August 1992 and even if there was payment, which was denied, the completion date, was extended by Lim Cheng Teek without the resolution of the extraordinary general meeting of the company. On the question of the discharge of the charge, we are mindful that the provisions of s 278(1) of the National Land Code 1965 are relevant. Under this section, the discharge of the charge only takes effect from the date on which the instrument is registered and in this case it was on 4 May 1993. Encik Low also alleged that there was no evidence of the transfer of 97,000 shares which, according to the MGR circular, could be disposed of on 9 December 1993. The question in this respect is by whom and when were the shares disposed of and to whom? As has been adverted to earlier on, there is another allegation that 292,500 shares were offered to the public and that another lot of 424,500 shares were transferred to UWB Nominees Sdn Bhd without the knowledge and consent of the shareholders and that the proceeds of the sale of these lots of shares were not accounted for to the company or to the shareholders. The next question raised in connection with the disposal of these two lots is who disposed of them or if they were disposed of by Choong Keong Kor, whether in view of the absence of proof of his ownership of the shares the disposal of these shares was valid.” [20] Dan setelah menganalisa fakta tersebut Mahkamah memutuskan seperti berikut berkenaan dengan dengan isu serius perlu dibicarakan: “All the issues raised by the plaintiffs adverted to above are prima facie serious issues to be tried and on the materials available there is no reason for us to say that they are not plausible.” [21] Dalam kes ini Mahkamah mendapati dakwaan Plaintif yang menyatakan bahawa perjanjian tersebut adalah perjanjian jual beli bijih besi yang dinafikan oleh Defendan Pertama dengan menyatakan ia adalah perjanjian wakil. Begitu juga terdapatnya pembayaran deposit yang telah dibuat oleh Plaintif kepada Defendan Pertama. Dakwaan bahawa Defendan Pertama akan menjual bijih besi tersebut kepada pihak ketiga yang perlu ditentukan sama ada ia adalah suatu pemecahan perjanjian di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama adalah mencukupi untuk menyatakan bahawa ia adalah merupakan isu-isu serius yang perlu dibicarakan. Ia bukannya satu dakwaan kosong oleh Plaintif tanpa sebarang sokongan. Dakwaan-dakwaan tersebut pada hemat Mahkamah perlu ditentukan kebenarannya melalui satu perbicaraan terhadap tuntutan Plaintif kepada Defendan-Defendan. [22] Mahkamah juga berpendapat bahawa pihak Plaintif berkemungkinan akan berjaya dalam tuntutan kepada Defendan Pertama berdasarkan kepada perjanjian tersebut bagi mendapatkan suatu injunksi kekal. Ini adalah disebabkan Plaintif menyatakan bahawa Defendan Pertama sewajarnya menjual biji besi tersebut kepada Plaintif berdasarkan kepada perjanjian tersebut. [23] Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah juga perlu mengambil kira peringatan yang dinyatakan oleh Lord Diplock dalam kes American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd (supra) berkenaan dengan dengan tujuan injunksi interlokutori seperti yang berikut: “My Lords, when an application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain a defendant from doing acts alleged to be in violation of the plaintiff's legal right is made upon contested facts, the decision whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction has to be taken at a time when ex hypothesi the existence of the right or the violation of it, or both, is uncertain and will remain uncertain until final judgment is given in the action. It was to mitigate the risk of injustice to the plaintiff during the period before that uncertainty could be resolved that the practice arose of granting him relief by way of interlocutory injunction; but since the middle of the 19th century this has been made subject to his undertaking to pay damages to the defendant for any loss sustained by reason of the injunction if it should be held at the trial that the plaintiff had not been entitled to restrain the defendant from doing what he was threatening to do. The object of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial; but the plaintiff's need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated under the plaintiff's undertaking in damages if the uncertainty were resolved in the defendant's favour at the trial. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where "the balance of convenience" lies.” Adakah gantirugi memadai? [24] Pada masa yang sama Plaintif juga menyatakan gantirugi yang akan diperolehi akibat daripada kegagalan Defendan Pertama menyediakan atau membekalkan bijih besi tersebut kepada pihak Plaintif, ia akan menyebabkan Plaintif akan kehilangan pelanggan serta menjejaskan perniagaan Plaintif. Ia juga akan melonggarkan perhubungan perniagaan Plaintif dengan pelanggan-pelanggannya selama ini. Oleh itu gantirugi yang akan diberikan tidak sekali-kali setimpal dan sepadan dengan kerugian nama baik perniagaan Plaintif. [25] Defendan pula menyatakan bahawa gantirugi yang akan diperolehi adalah tidak setimpal. Ini ditambah pula tiada sebarang keterangan dalam affidavit sokongan Plaintif yang menunjukkan siapakah pelanggan-pelanggan Plaintif dan bagaimanakah ia akan menyebabkan reputasi Plaintif akan terjejas serta gantirugi yang bakal diberikan kepada Plaintif tidak memadai. [26] Dalam hal ini Mahkamah merujuk kepada panduan yang diberikan dalam kes American Cyanamid Co. v Ethicon Ltd (supra) yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “As to that, the governing principle is that the court should first consider whether, if the plaintiff were to succeed at the trial in establishing his right to a permanent injunction, he would be adequately compensated by an award of damages for the the loss he would have sustained as a result of the defendant's continuing to do what was sought to be en joined between the time of the application and the time of the trial. If damages in the measure recoverable at common law would be adequate remedy and the defendant would be in a financial position to pay them, no interlocutory injunction should normally be granted, however strong the plaintiff's claim appeared to be at that stage. If, on the other hand, damages would not provide an adequate remedy for the plaintiff in the event of his succeeding at the trial, the court should then consider whether, on the contrary hypothesis that the defendant were to succeed at the trial in establishing his right to do that which was sought to be enjoined, he would be adequately compensated under the plaintiff's undertaking as to damages for the loss he would have sustained by being prevented from doing so between the time of the application and the time of the trial. If damages in the measure recoverable under such an undertaking would be an adequate remedy and the plaintiff would be in a financial position to pay them, there would be no reason upon this ground to refuse an interlocutory injunction. It is where there is doubt as to the adequacy of the respective remedies in damages available to either party or to both, that the question of balance of convenience arises. It would be unwise to attempt even to list all the various matters which may need to be taken into consideration in deciding where the balance lies, let alone to suggest the relative weight to be attached to them. These will vary from case to case.” [27] Penilaian kepada affidavit balasan Chen Mee Chee menunjukkan bahawa Defendan-Defendan dalam kes ini telah menyatakan di perenggan [10.1] bahawa Defendan Pertama mencadangkan kemungkinan untuk memasukkan pembeli lain bagi membolehkan pembiayaan selanjutnya bagi jentera untuk mengembangkan kilang Defendan Pertama. Ia juga adalah konsisten dengan affidavit sokongan Li Lirong di perenggan [15] yang menyatakan Defendan Pertama memerlukan sokongan kewangan tambahan daripada pembeli lain untuk melaburkan pembelian mesih baharu dengan harga RM 7 juta. Ini mencadangkan bahawa kedudukan kewangan syarikat Defendan Pertama tidak kukuh dan ia menggambarkan bahawa sekiranya gantirugi perlu diberikan kepada Plaintif, Defendan Pertama tidak dapat memberikan gantirugi yang setimpal. [28] Bagi memahami apa yang dimaksudkan dengan ketidaksetimpalan gantirugi oleh pihak-pihak seperti yang dinyatakan dalam kes American Cyanamid Co. v Ethicon Ltd (supra) tersebut dalam Injunctions by David Bean, Isabel Parry, Andrew Burns, 11th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell di halaman 35 telah menyatakan seperti berikut: “If however, damages would not adequately compensate the claimant for the temporary damage, and he is in a financial position to give a satisfactory undertaking as to damages, and an award of damages pursuant to that undertaking would adequately compensate the defendant in the event of the defendant succeeding at trial, an interim injunction may be granted. If the claimant is not in a financial position to honour his undertaking as to damages, and appreciable damage to the defendant is likely, an injunction will usually (Morning Star Co-operative Society Ltd v Express Newspapers Ltd [1979] F.S.R. 113) but not always (Allen v Jambo Holdings Ltd [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1252) be refused.” Adakah imbangan kesenangan (balance of convenience) memihak kepada Plaintif atau Defendan-Defendan [29] Defendan-Defendan menyatakan dalam hujahannya bahawa imbangan kesenangan ini sepatutnya terpakai kepada pihak Defendan. Ini adalah disebabkan Plaintif akan menyatakan bahawa bijih besi yang dihantar oleh Defendan Pertama kepada Plaintif adalah tidak mematuhi standard yang ditetapkan. [30] Sebaliknya pihak Plaintif dalam hujahannya pula menyatakan bahawa imbangan kesenangan itu adalah memihak kepada Plaintif. Ini disebabkan gantirugi yang akan diperolehi sekiranya injunksi interlokutori ini tidak dibenarkan adalah tidak memadai untuk Plaintif. Ia juga akan menyebabkan Defendan Pertama akan terus melanggar terma-terma perjanjian tersebut dengan menjualkan bijih besi itu kepada pihak ketiga yang didakwa oleh pihak Plaintif melanggar terma-terma perjanjian. [31] Lord Diplock juga dalam American Cyanamid Co. v Ethicon Ltd (supra) menyatakan berkenaan dengan perkara ini seperti yang berikut: “It is where there is doubt as to the adequacy of the respective remedies in damages available to either party or to both, that the question of balance of convenience arises.” [32] Penjelasan berkenaan dengan penghakiman Lord Diplock dapat dilihat dalam Injunctions by David Bean, Isabel Parry, Andrew Burns, 11th Edition (supra) di halaman 35 seperti yang berikut: “By definition, once the investigation has reached this third stage, the decision of the court, whether in favour of or against an injunction, will inevitably involve some disadvantage to one or the other side which damages cannot compensate. The extent of this “uncompensatable disadvantage” either way is a significant factor in determining the balance of convenience. In many cases it has been the decisive question.” [33] Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa sekiranya perintah injunksi interlokutori ini tidak diberikan terhadap Defendan-Defendan, Defendan-Defendan akan terus berurusan dengan pihak ketiga bagi membekalkan bijih besi tersebut dengan kepercayaan bahawa Plaintif tidak mempunyai perjanjian jual beli bijih besi itu dengan Defendan Pertama. Sekiranya Plaintif berjaya dalam tindakannya di Mahkamah untuk menguatkuasakan Perjanjian Pengambilalihan Eksklusif di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama sedangkan bijih besi yang menjadi perkara utama dalam perjanjian itu sudah tidak lagi berada bersama-sama Defendan Pertama, ia akan menyebabkan Plaintif tidak dapat menguatkuasakan perjanjian tersebut walaupun Plaintif berjaya membuktikan kesnya terhadap Defendan-Defendan. Ini ditambah pula dalam perjanjian tersebut terdapat spesifikasi yang dinyatakan berkenaan dengan kualiti bijih besi yang perlu dibekalkan oleh Defendan Pertama kepada Plaintif. [34] Sebaliknya sekiranya perintah injunksi interlokutori ini diberikan pihak Defendan-Defendan, ia akan mengekalkan status quo perjanjian di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama. Sekiranya pihak Plaintif berjaya dalam tuntutannya terhadap Defendan-Defendan, ia akan mendapat bijih besi yang telah diperihalkan kualitinya seperti dalam perjanjian tersebut. [35] Oleh itu dengan setelah menimbangkan imbangan kesenangan di antara Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan Mahkamah ini berpendapat ia lebih memihak kepada Plaintif untuk injunksi interlokutori ini diberikan. Begitu juga Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa gantirugi yang akan diperolehi oleh pihak Plaintif sekiranya berjaya dalam tindakan ini adalah tidak mencukupi atau tidak memadai. [36] Oleh itu setelah menggunapakai pertimbangan dan ujian yang perlu digunakan semasa Mahkamah meneliti permohonan injunksi interlokutori seperti yang dinyatakan di atas, Mahkamah berpendapat permohonan injunksi interlokutori oleh pihak Plaintif seperti di KM 4 adalah dibenarkan dengan kos. Bertarikh: 28 hb. Februari 2025 (ROSLAN BIN MAT NOR) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA TEMERLOH, PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi Pihak Plaintif Kong Kai Yan Tetuan HL Lee & Co No. 34, 3rd Floor, Jalan SS19/1D 47500 Subang Jaya Selangor Darul Ehsan Bagi Pihak Defendan Pertama Chang Koon Mun Tetuan Gregory Chan, Tam, Moo & Ang 15.02, Level 15, Menara Maxisegar Jalan Pandan Indah 4/2 Pandan Indah 55100 Kuala Lumpur