relief lanjut dan/atau relief lain sebagaimana yang difikirkan sesuai oleh Mahkamah. [3] Having considered the amended cause papers, the affidavits filed by both parties, the documentary exhibits, and the written submissions of counsel, I allowed the Plaintiff's application and entered judgment in terms prayed, with costs. These are my grounds. The parties [4] The Plaintiff, Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad, is a licensed Islamic financial institution incorporated in Malaysia. [5] The 1st Defendant, Uten Holdings Sdn Bhd, is a company incorporated in Malaysia. The 2nd Defendant, Tee Swee Hong, and the 3rd Defendant, Tee Swee Huat, are individuals and were at all material times directors and shareholders of the 1st Defendant. [6] It was not disputed that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants stood as guarantors for the financing facilities granted by the Plaintiff to the 1st Defendant. Background facts [7] Pursuant to, inter alia, Letters of Offer dated 5.10.2020 and 14.3.2023, Supplemental Letters of Offer dated 11.11.2020, 31.12.2020, 29.8.2022, 14.3.2023, 5.4.2023 and 27.3.2024, and the Plaintiff's Letters of Notification dated 28.10.2020, 11.12.2020, 22.6.2021, 22.7.2021, 14.1.2022, 6.7.2022, 19.12.2022 and 11.12.2023, the Plaintiff granted to the 1st Defendant several Islamic financing facilities. [8] The facilities presently material were: a) Hong Leong CM Cashline-i Facility ("CMCL-i") b) Hong Leong CM Flexi Term Financing-i (1) Facility ("CMFTF-i (1)") c) Hong Leong CM Flexi Term Financing-i (3) Facility ("CMFTF-i (3)"); and d) Hong Leong CM Flexi Term Financing-i (5) Facility ("CMFTF-i (5)"). [9] In respect of the facilities, the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant entered into a Facilities Agreement dated 7.12.2020. [10] As security for the facilities, there were, inter alia: a) a third-party legal charge created by Uten Properties Sdn Bhd over land held under GM 14781, Lot 43930, Mukim Sri Gading, Daerah Batu Pahat, Johor, together with buildings erected thereon; b) a debenture dated 7.12.2020 creating fixed and floating charges over the assets of the 1st Defendant; and c) a Deed of Assignment of Proceeds dated 19.1.2021. [11] The 2nd and 3rd Defendants executed Letters of Guaranteed dated 7.12.2020 and 3.4.2023 in favour of the Plaintiff. [12] It was the Plaintiff's case, supported by contemporaneous documents, that the facilities were granted and duly utilised by the 1st Defendant, but the 1st Defendant subsequently defaulted in repayment despite indulgences, reminders and demands. [13] The Plaintiff issued a letter of demand dated 5.11.2024 to the 1st Defendant. Thereafter, by letters dated 20.11.2024, the Plaintiff recalled or terminated the facilities and demanded payment of all sums due and owing from the 1st Defendant. Separate letters of demand dated 20.11.2024 were also issued to the 2nd and 3rd Defendants as guarantors. [14] The Plaintiff's claim, as reflected in the Amended Statement of Claim dated 18.8.2025 and the Plaintiff's Statement/Certificate of Indebtedness as at 17.11.2024, was for: a) RM2,328,934.29 under CMCL-I; b) RM56,604,576.42 under CMFTF-i (1)l; c) RM3,242,471.59 under CMFTF-i (3); and d) RM1,059,971.91 under CMFTF-i (5). together with compensation charges as pleaded. The application [15] The Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the footing that the Defendants had no defence to the claim and had raised no bona fide triable issue. [16] The Plaintiff relied principally on: a) the Agreements; b) the Guarantees; c) the letters of demand and recall; d) the conclusive evidence clauses in the Facilities Agreement and the Guarantees; and e) the Plaintiff's Statement/Certificate of Indebtedness dated 17.11.2024. [17] The Defendants resisted the application on several broad grounds, namely: a) that the amount claimed was incorrect and not sufficiently particularised; b) that the compensation or late payment charges were wrongful or unlawful; c) that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants had been discharged as guarantors due to variation of the facilities without their consent; d) that there was no valid consideration for the guarantees; and e) that issues concerning the Plaintiff's enforcement of other securities rendered the matter unsuitable for summary disposal. The law [18] The principles governing Order 14 of the ROC 2012 are settled. Where the plaintiff has satisfied the preliminary requirements under Order 14 of the ROC 2012, the burden shifts to the defendant to show why judgment should not be entered. The defendant must show that there is a fair or reasonable probability of a real or bona fide defence. A bare denial is insufficient. (See National Company for Foreign Trade v Kayu Raya Sdn Bhd [1984] 2 MLJ 300). [19] In considering whether a triable issue exists, the court is entitled to scrutinise the quality of the defence put forward. Assertions which are equivocal, lacking in precision, inconsistent with undisputed contemporaneous documents, or inherently improbable may be rejected as not constituting triable issues. [20] This matter was addressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail & Ors [1992] 1 MLJ 400, as follows :- In our view, basic to the application of all those legal propositions, is the requirement under O14 for the court to be satisfied on affidavit evidence that the defence has not only raised an issue but also that the said issue is triable. The determination of whether an issue is or is not triable must necessarily depend on the facts or the law arising from each case as disclosed in the affidavit evidence before the court. On the treatment of conflict of evidence on affidavits, Lord Diplock speaking in the Privy Council on Eng Mee Yong & Ors v Letchumanan 5 had this to say at p 217: Although in the normal way it is not appropriate for a judge to attempt to resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavit, this does not mean that he is bound to accept uncritically, as raising a dispute of fact which calls for further investigation, every statement on an affidavit however equivocal, lacking in precision, inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or other statements by the same deponent, or inherently improbable in itself it may be. Under an O14 application, the duty of a judge does not end as soon as a fact is asserted by one party, and denied or disputed by the other in an affidavit. Where such assertion, denial or dispute is equivocal, or lacking in precision or is inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or other statements by the same deponent, or is inherently improbable in itself, then the judge has a duty to reject such assertion or denial, thereby rendering the issue not triable. In our opinion, unless this principle is adhered to, a judge is in no position to exercise his discretion judicially in an O14 application. Thus, apart from identifying the issues of fact or law, the court must go one step further and determine whether they are triable. This principle is sometimes expressed by the statement that a complete defence need not be shown. The defence set up need only show that there is a triable issue. [21] In banking and financing cases, a contractual clause providing that a statement or certificate of indebtedness shall be binding and conclusive evidence is valid and enforceable in the absence of manifest error. Such a clause relieves the plaintiff of proving the debt in the traditional manner. Issues for determination [22] The central issues before me were: a) whether the Plaintiff had satisfied the requirements for summary judgment under Order 14 of the ROC 2012; b) whether the Defendants had raised any bona fide triable issue on liability or quantum; c) whether the defences raised in relation to the compensation charges, the guarantees, and the enforcement of securities disclosed any arguable defence; and d) whether there was any other reason why the matter should go for trial. Findings Preliminary requirements under Order 14 of the ROC 2012 [23] There was no dispute that the Plaintiff had satisfied the procedural requirements of Order 14 of the ROC 2012. The Amended Statement of Claim had been served, appearance had been entered, and the Plaintiff had filed affidavits in support complying with the Rules. [24] Accordingly, the Plaintiff had established a prima facie entitlement to judgment, and the burden shifted to the Defendants to show cause to the contrary. (See National Company for Foreign Trade v Kayu Raya Sdn Bhd [1984] 2 MLJ 300) The Plaintiff's claim and the Certificate of Indebtedness [25] The Plaintiff's claim was supported by comprehensive and contemporaneous documents evidencing: a) the grant of the facilities; the terms governing repayment, compensation charges, rebate and default; b) the execution of the guarantees by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants; c) the issuance of the letters of demand and recall; and d) the amount due as certified in the Plaintiff's Statement/Certificate of Indebtedness. [26] The Facilities Agreement contained a conclusive evidence clause. Clause 19.1 expressly provided that a statement of account or certificate in writing by the Plaintiff stating the amount payable by the customer or any security party under the agreement or facilities, duly signed by an officer of the Plaintiff or its solicitors or computer-generated notices, shall in the absence of manifest error be binding and conclusive evidence of such indebtedness in a court of law. [27] Likewise, clause 11 of each of the Guarantees provided that a statement signed by the Plaintiff as to monies and liabilities for the time being due from the customer shall be conclusive evidence in legal proceedings against the guarantors. [28] The Plaintiff produced the Statement/Certificate of Indebtedness dated 17.11.2024. In law, that sufficed to establish the debt unless the Defendants showed manifest error. (See Citibank N A v Ooi Boon Leong & Ors [1981] 1 MLJ 282 and Cempaka Finance Bhd v Ho Lai Ying (trading as KH Trading) & Anor [2006] 2 MLJ 685) [29] The Defendants did not show manifest error. [30] Their principal complaint was that the Plaintiff had not produced full transactional ledgers or detailed computations, and that the figures in certain periodic statements differed from the amounts claimed. That complaint, without more, did not meet the legal threshold. [31] The Plaintiff explained in the replying affidavit that the periodic statements relied upon by the Defendants expressly stated that the "settlement as at statement date" excluded unbilled profit, compensation charges, miscellaneous charges and other incidental charges. The Plaintiff further deposed that the claim sums in the Amended Writ, the Amended Statement of Claim and the Statement/Certificate of Indebtedness included principal sums, accrued and unearned profit, miscellaneous charges and late payment compensation calculated as at 17.11.2024. [32] That explanation was entirely consistent with the contract documents. The Defendants did not file any affidavit evidence properly demonstrating that the explanation was wrong. [33] The Defendants also did not set out with specificity: a) which payment had not been credited; b) for which facility account; c) in what amount; d) on what date; or e) what amount they admitted remained due. [34] Their affidavit did not provide an alternative computation or identify any specific manifest error in the Statement/Certificate of Indebtedness. [35] In those circumstances, the Defendants' challenge to the quantum was no more than a bare denial dressed up as a complaint about lack of particulars. Such a challenge does not amount to a triable issue. (See Bangkok Bank Bhd v Chuan Kee Co Sdn Bhd [2000] 2 MLJ 113 and Citibank N A v Ibrahim bin Othman [1994] 1 MLJ 608) [36] To the extent that the Defendants attempted in written submissions to go further into figures and discrepancies not specifically deposed to in their affidavit, those matters could not avail them. A party cannot manufacture a triable issue through submissions in the absence of supporting affidavit evidence. [37] This issue was considered by the Court of Appeal in the case of Ribaru Bina Sdn Bhd & Anor v Bakti Kausar Development Sdn Bhd & Anor [2007] 1 CLJ 552, wherein the Court held as follows:- [4] The first ground advanced by the defendants as constituting a triable issue is that there was no privity of contract either between the plaintiffs and the second defendant or between the second plaintiff and the defendants. This ground was however not pleaded in the defendants' defence. Nor was it raised in the affidavits filed on their behalf. The defendants however raised this issue by way of argument. Their counsel submitted that he was entitled to do this because of the phrase "by affidavit or otherwise" appearing in r. 4(1) of RHC O.14. With respect we are unable to agree with this submission. In our judgment, on a summons for judgment, a triable issue must be raised by a defendant either by way of an affidavit filed in opposition to the summons or alternatively in a statement of defence. We would here respectfully follow and apply the decision of this court in Penang Port Commission v. Kanawagi Seperumaniam (No.3) [1998] 4 CLJ 8, where Abdul Malek Ahmad, JCA, said: In an application for summary judgment, O.14 r.4(1) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 ('RHC') applies and it is to the effect that a defendant may show cause against the application by affidavit or otherwise to the satisfaction of the court. That means that cause against the application can be shown by affidavit or in a statement of defence. [5] To raise triable issues by way of submission on a point not raised in a defence or an affidavit would not, in our judgment, meet the requirements of procedural fairness which is the essence of any litigation. In the present case, we are of the opinion that the learned judge ought not to have taken any notice of the submission on the privity of contract point as it had not been raised in the affidavit or the defence. There is therefore merit in the plaintiff's complaint on this part of the case. In the course of argument, learned counsel for the appellant referred us to a body of material, including the letter of 1 July 1999, which taken in its totality clearly shows that the defendants, at all material times, accepted that there was privity of contract between them and the plaintiffs. However, in view of the view we have already expressed on the privity point we find it unnecessary to dwell any longer on this part of the case. [38] I therefore found that the Defendants had failed to displace the binding and conclusive effect of the Plaintiff's Statement / Certificate of Indebtedness. Compensation or late payment charges [39] The Defendants next contended that the compensation or late payment charges were wrongful and contravened Section 75 of the Contracts Act 1950 ("CA 1950"). [40] I rejected that contention. [41] The facilities documents expressly entitled the Plaintiff to impose compensation charges in the event of default, whether during the tenure of the facilities, after maturity, or post - judgment, subject to the applicable mechanisms stated in the Agreements. [42] The relevant clauses were part of the bargain accepted by the 1st Defendant. The Defendants did not identify any specific misapplication of those clauses by affidavit evidence. [43] Where parties have expressly agreed upon such charges in a commercial financing arrangement, a defendant cannot, without more, avoid liability by a general invocation of Section 75 of the CA 1950. In Pusat Bandar Damansara Sdn Bhd & Anor v Yap Han Soo & Sons Sdn Bhd [2000] 1 CLJ 346, the Court of Appeal held that where a rate was agreed, the party who had agreed to it could not later complain that it was excessive to attract Section 75 of the CA 1950 as follows :- To bring that increased or penalty interest within the ambit of s.75, it must first be shown that it was excessive in nature. The fact that it was an agreed penalty interest as opposed to one that was fixed unilaterally by the appellants, lends support to my conclusion that it could not have been that excessive to enable the respondent to agree to that rate of interest to be charged. On that reasoning the respondent cannot now be heard to complain that the rate of 19% per annum on all instalments due as at 30 June 1990, is excessive and under those circumstances that rate of interest cannot be caught by s.75. [44] Here, the Defendants did not show how the compensation charges were outside the contract, contrary to the agreed mechanism, or otherwise affected by manifest error. Their objection was bare and unspecific. [45] I therefore held that no triable issue arose in respect of the compensation charges. Liability of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants as guarantors [46] The 2nd and 3rd Defendants contended that they had been discharged as guarantors because of variations to the facilities without their knowledge or consent, and that there was no valid consideration for the guarantees. [47] Those contentions were devoid of merit. [48] First, the Guarantees were explicit in their terms. They provided, inter alia, that:- a) the guarantees were continuing guarantees; b) the guarantors were liable not merely as sureties but as principal debtors; c) the guarantors would not be released or exonerated by indulgence, compromise, composition or arrangement made with the customer, with or without notice to them; d) the Plaintiff might at any time vary, decrease or increase any facility granted to the customer without prejudice to the guarantees and without discharging the guarantors; and e) the guarantors irrevocably and unconditionally undertook to indemnify the Plaintiff. [49] These clauses answered, on their face, the Defendants' reliance on variation and discharge. [50] Secondly, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants were not strangers to the transactions. The Companies Commission documents exhibited by the Plaintiff showed them to be directors and shareholders of the 1st Defendant. The documentary record also showed that they executed the relevant facility documents for and on behalf of the 1st Defendant. [51] In particular, the Supplemental Letter of Offer dated 27.3.2024, upon which the Defendants relied as constituting a variation, was itself executed by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants as directors of the 1st Defendant. It therefore did not lie in their mouths to contend that the variations were made without their knowledge or consent. [52] Thirdly, the argument on lack of consideration was equally untenable. The Guarantees expressly stated that they were given in consideration of the Plaintiff agreeing to grant, continue or make available the facilities to the 1st Defendant. That was sufficient. [53] I therefore held that the defences raised by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants in relation to the Guarantees were afterthoughts and did not disclose any bona fide issue for trial. Concurrent enforcement and other securities [54] The Defendants also attempted to rely on the existence and enforcement of the third - party legal charge and other securities to argue that the Plaintiff's claim was premature or amounted to unjust enrichment. [56] It is trite that a lender may pursue all available remedies unless restricted by contract. The Facilities Agreement and the Guarantees here expressly preserved the Plaintiff's cumulative rights and remedies and made clear that the Plaintiff was not bound first to proceed against any security before suing the customer or guarantors. [55] That argument was misconceived. [57] The Federal Court in Chan Boi Loi v Public Bank Bhd & Another Application [2009] 6 CLJ 81 reaffirmed that a lender is entitled to pursue all remedies available against a borrower simultaneously, contemporaneously or successively unless there is an agreement to the contrary. [58] No such agreement existed here. As such, issues concerning the Plaintiff's legal charge or its enforcement against third-party security did not constitute a defence to the present personal claim against the Defendants. Conclusion [59] On the totality of the evidence, I found that this was a straightforward financing recovery case supported by contemporaneous documents and contractual conclusive evidence clauses. [60] The Plaintiff had established a clear prima facie case. [61] The Defendants, on the other hand, failed to raise any bona fide triable issue. Their contentions on quantum, compensation charges, variation, discharge, consideration and concurrent remedies were either bare denials, legally untenable, contradicted by the documentary record, or impermissibly elaborated only in submissions. [62] This was not a case involving any genuine dispute fit for trial. It was an appropriate case for summary judgment under O 14.