Hong LIM Timber Industries Sdn Bhd v Ketua Menteri Pulau Pinang (Pemerbadanan) (PA-22NCVC-187-09/2017)

This is an application by the Defendant to strike out the Plaintiff’s claim. 2

The Plaintiff is a private limited company and has been in occupation of the land that formed part of Lot 10013, Section 11E, Georgetown, North East District, Penang (“Property”).

The Defendant is a statutory corporation incorporated pursuant to the Chief Minister of Penang (Incorporation) Enactment 2009.

By a writ dated 13 November 2017 filed by the Plaintiff against the Defendant (“Suit”), the Plaintiff principally sought for a declaration that the Plaintiff has valid legitimate expectation that the Defendant must make reasonable compensation for actions taken to evict the Plaintiff from the Property together with damages including aggravated and exemplary damages.

As the result and after having filed its defence dated 19 October 2017, the Defendant filed a notice of application dated 14 November 2017 (enclosure 10) to strike out the Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Order 18 Rule 19(a), (b) or (d) of the Rules of Court 2012 (“Application”). 3

The affidavits that were filed for purposes for the Application are as follows:

Defendant’s supporting affidavit affirmed by Bharathi a/p Suppiah dated 14 November 2017;

(ii) Plaintiff’s affidavit in reply affirmed by Tan Si Tee dated 11 December 2017;

(iii) Defendant’s affidavit in reply affirmed by Bharathi a/p Suppiah dated 29 December 2017; and

(iv) Plaintiff’s affidavit in reply (II) affirmed by Tan Si Tee dated 17 January 2018.

After having read the written submissions filed by the parties, I heard oral submissions of counsel on 12 March 2018. At the opening of counsel’s oral submissions, I specifically sought clarification from them as to whether they wish to recuse me because I have previously decided upon a related matter as elaborated in paragraphs 16 and 17 4 below. Both of them unequivocally confirmed they have no objection to me hearing the Suit including this Application. Thus and after hearing their oral submissions, I adjourned my decision to deliberate on the arguments advanced by counsel.

Having now done so, I furnish below my decision together with the supporting grounds.

The Property was originally part of the sea and the Plaintiff reclaimed the Property in 1938 at its costs and built 9 open sided timber stores as well as 1 two storey sawdust collector together with sawdust conveyor pipes. Thereafter the Plaintiff occupied and continuously utilized the Property free from interference till 3 August 2016.

During the Plaintiff’s occupation, the State of Penang on 6 March 2013 alienated the Property to the Defendant for a lease of 99 years from March 2013 to March 2112. The Defendant in 2012 by a Request for Proposal invited bidders for the development and 5 management of State land in the Sandiland Foreshore, Jalan C. Y. Choy (“Project”) that included the Property on a public-private partnership basis.

The Defendant however on 18 September 2015 surrendered the Property back to the State of Penang. The Defendant’s registration as proprietor of the Property was cancelled on 3 February 2016.

Consequently the Penang Development Corporation made another Request for Proposal inviting bidders to undertake the Project.

The Project was eventually on 16 January 2015 awarded to Tanjung Villa Development Sdn Bhd (“TVDSB”).

As the result TVDSB notified the Plaintiff that TVDSB required the Property for development purposes and was willing to discuss on the surrender of possession of the Property on an amicable basis. The parties however could not resolve the matter. 6

The District Land Administrator hence on 14 June 2016 issued a notice to the Plaintiff pursuant to s. 425 of the National Land Code 1965 to recover possession of the Property.

The Plaintiff thereafter appealed against the District Land Administrator’s notification vide Penang High Court Originating Summons no. PA-24NCVC-716-07/2016 (“OS”) which came before me. In the OS, the Plaintiff, amongst others, sought for the following orders and reliefs:

The District Land Administrator’s notice dated 14 June 2016 declared invalid, null and void and unenforceable by reason that the Plaintiff isn’t a trespasser;

(ii) The District Land Administrator declared to have acted mala fides in abuse of the National Land Code to intimidate the Plaintiff; 7

(iii) The District Land Administrator prohibited from demolishing the structures and buildings built by the Plaintiff on the Property; and

(iv) Damages

On 31 March 2017, I dismissed the OS as reported in Hong Lim Timber Industries Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Pejabat Daerah dan Tanah Daerah Timur Laut Pulau Pinang [2017] MLJU 408. Subsequent thereto, the Plaintiff appealed against my decision to the Court of Appeal but the Plaintiff’s appeal was also dismissed on 27 October 2017.

In consequence, the Plaintiff filed this Suit.

The Defendant primarily contended that the Plaintiff commenced this Suit again in attempt to seek compensation but from a new party, to wit, the Defendant here. The basis of the Plaintiff’s claim in this Suit is 8 similar to that in the OS that the Plaintiff had legitimate expectation to be compensated for the loss of the Property including the structures and buildings built thereon. Thus the Plaintiff must be prohibited from so pursuing because of res judicata and issue estoppel following Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189, Government of Malaysia v. Dato’ Chong Kok Lim [1973] 2 MLJ 74 and Dato’ Sivananthan a/l Shanmugam v. Artisan Fokus Sdn Bhd [2016] 3 MLJ 122.

That notwithstanding, the Defendant submitted it is plain as found in the Suit that the Plaintiff is a mere squatter on the Property and has no right in law or equity to claim compensation. Furthermore, the Defendant wasn’t the registered proprietor of the Property when the Plaintiff was evicted from the Property on 3 August 2016 following from the notice that was issued by the District Land Administrator on 14 June 2016. In any event there couldn’t be any legitimate expectation by the Plaintiff whatsoever from the Defendant by reason that the Defendant never intimated anything concerning the Property to the Plaintiff. There is also no evidence that the Defendant acted mala fide as alleged by the Plaintiff. 9

The Defendant therefore contended that the Application is frivolous as well as an abuse of process and must accordingly be struck out.

On the other side, the Plaintiff cross contended that the nature of its claims in the OS is different from that in this Suit in that the OS was principally an appeal permitted by the National Land Code 1965 against the notice of the District Land Administrator. In this Suit, the Plaintiff is claiming for compensation for the loss of the Property because the Honourable Chief Minister of Penang had on several occasions made public announcement that compensation for eviction would be given to occupiers of the Project land and no development order would be given to the developer who failed to resolve the issue with the occupiers. This promise of compensation has been incorporated in the Request for Proposal to bidders. In consequence, the Plaintiff has the legitimate expectation to be compensated. As a matter of fact, 76 occupiers were compensated except the Plaintiff.

In the premises, the Plaintiff contended that this Suit ought to proceed to trial. 10

The Defendant relies on Order 18 Rule 19 of the Rules of Court 2012 which provides: “Striking out pleadings and endorsements (O. 18 r. 19)

The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the endorsement, of any writ in the action, or anything in any pleading or in the endorsement, on the ground that-

it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be;

it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious;

it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or 11 d) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court, and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be.

No evidence shall be admissible on an application under subparagraph (1)(a).”

The law on striking out based on the aforesaid Rule is trite. In the Supreme Court case of Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36, Mohamed Dzaiddin SCJ (later CJ) held as follows with emphasis added by me: “The principles upon which the court acts in exercising its power under any of the four limbs of O 18 r 19(1) of the RHC are well settled. It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule (per Lindley MR in Hubbuck & Sons Ltd v Wilkinson, Heywood & Clark Ltd 7 ), and this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it ‘obviously 12 unsustainable’ (see AG of Duchy of Lancaster v L & NW Rly Co 8 ). It cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case, in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence (see Wenlock v Moloney & Ors 9 ). The authorities further show that if there is a point of law which requires serious discussion, an objection should be taken on the pleadings and the point set down for argument under O 33 r 3 (which is in pari materia with our O 33 r 2 of the RHC) (see Hubbuck & Sons Ltd v Wilkinson, Heywood & Clark Ltd 7 ). The court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious or that the defences raised are not arguable.” Subsequently in the Court of Appeal case of Enersafe Sdn Bhd v Megarina Sdn Bhd [2006] 2 CLJ 1021 Zulkefli Makinudin JCA (now PCA) nicely summed it up as follows: “We find it is most appropriate here to state the well established principle in that the power of striking out pleadings under O. 13 18 r. 19 of the RHC as invoked by the appellant in this case is too well-known that it can only be exercised when the respondent’s claim on the face of it is obviously bound to fail.” In another Court of Appeal case of Khairy Jamaluddin v. Dato’ Seri Anwar Bin Ibrahim [2013] 4 MLJ 172 Anantham Kasinather JCA held as follows with emphasis also added by me: “The Court of Appeal in England in the case of European Asian Bank AG v Punjab and Sind Bank (No 2) [1983] 2 All ER 508 opined that, in an appropriate case, a court of law should decide a point of law in O 14 proceedings even: ‘if the question of law is at first blush of some complexity and therefore takes ‘a little longer to understand’. Our Supreme Court in the case of Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail & Ors [1992] 1 MLJ 400 accepted this proposition of law as good law through the judgment of Mohamed Azmi FCJ (as he then was) when His Lordship said: 14 Where the issue raised is solely a question of law without reference to any facts or where the facts are clear and undisputed, the court should exercise its duty under O 14. If the legal point is understood and the court is satisfied that it is unarguable, the court is not prevented from granting a summary judgment merely because ‘the question of law is at first blush of some complexity and therefore takes a little longer to understand (see Cow v Casey and European Asian Bank AG v Punjab & Sind Bank at p 516 ). In our judgment, the aforesaid principle of law pronounced by our Supreme Court in Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail & Ors is not limited in its application to O 14 proceedings but extends to applications under O 18 r

We opine to this effect because both applications are summary in nature…”

I am hence mindful that this is a summary Application and would only be allowed if the Suit is so plainly and obviously bound to fail. The 15 Plaintiff implored upon me that this Suit is different in nature from that in the OS. Essentially this Suit is only on the Plaintiff’s claim for compensation for the loss of the Property based on legitimate expectation consequential upon representations made to the Plaintiff by the Defendant. This is significantly distinguishable from the Plaintiff’s claims in the OS based on the Plaintiff’s alleged legal and/or beneficial interest in the Property. In addition, the defendant in the OS was the District Land Administrator only.

In the premises, it is plain to me that res judicata or issue estoppel in the ordinary sense as set out in Asia Commercial Finance (M ) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd (supra) involving re-litigation between the same parties is not attracted. As to res judicata or issue estoppel in the wider sense established in Dato’ Sivananthan a/l Shanmugam v. Artisan Fokus Sdn Bhd (supra) that captures re-litigation between differing defendants, I reiterate what I held in Lim Guan Eng & Anor v Ganesan Narayanan [2017] 6 MLRH 685 that the application of the principle set out in Dato Sivananthan Shanmugam v. Artisan Fokus Sdn Bhd (supra) is fact sensitive depending on the unique circumstances of each case. The Court in 16 that case refused the plaintiff’s reassertion of his claim for damages for breach of contract arising from failure to refund deposit paid pursuant to a joint venture agreement because summary judgment was already obtained by another related party for dishonoured cheque on the refund of the same deposit. It is clear that the Court was adverse to the mischief of double recovery of the same claim which would be patently unjust.

It is clear that there is no double recovery of any claim by the Plaintiff himself or through any other connected person here. In fact, the Plaintiff lost in the OS. Be that as it may, I am also satisfied that the nature of its claim here in this Suit is starkly different from that earlier pursued in the OS. Therefore, I am of the view that res judicata or issue estoppel is not attracted to justify striking out the Suit as that alleged by the Defendant.

That aside, there are however still two further issues as to whether legitimate expectation is a reasonable cause of action as well as whether the Defendant should correctly be sued by the Plaintiff in this Suit. 17

In respect of legitimate expectation as a cause of action, the Plaintiff referred to the case of Darahman Ibrahim & Others v Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan Perlis & Ors [2008] 4 CLJ 538 as well as the Court of Appeal case of The State of Sarawak v Lah Anyie & Ors [2013] 6 CLJ 133 where Hamid Sultan Abu Backer JCA held as follows: “[20] We must say the doctrine of legitimate expectation in the recent years is being widely used in cases other than purely relating to administrative law. For example, in Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1969] 2 Ch 149 Lord Denning MR was of the view that the ambit of natural justice extended not merely to protect rights but any legitimate expectation of which it would not be fair to deprive a person without hearing what he has to say. In Kesatuan Sekerja Pembuatan Barangan Galian Bukan Logam v. Director General of Trade Unions & 3 Ors [1990] 2 ILR 97; [1990] 3 MLJ 231, Justice Edgar Joseph Jr traced the concept of legitimate expectation and opined that it has been evolved by the court to assist in identifying interests which do not constitute rights in 18 the strict sense but nevertheless deserve legal recognition in the context of legal expectation. His Lordship asserted that it was in Schmidt that Lord Denning first applied this concept which was recognised by our Supreme Court in JP Berthelesen. (See John Peter Berthelsen v. Director-General of Immigration Malaysia & Ors [1986] 2 CLJ 409; [1986] CLJ (Rep) 160; [1987] 1 MLJ 233). In Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corp AIR 1994 SC 988, the Indian Supreme Court recognised the jurisprudence that the doctrine of 'legitimate expectation' imposes in essence a duty on public authority to act fairly by taking into consideration all relevant factors relating to 'legitimate expectation'. In Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Delhi Auto & General Finance Pvt Ltd [1994] 4 SCC 42, the Indian Supreme Court was of the view that the plea of legitimate expectation relates to procedural fairness in decision-making and forms part of the rule of non-arbitrariness, and it is not meant to confer an independent right enforceable by itself. 19 [21] What is important to note in all the above cases is simply that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot create a right when such right does not exist but may give some form of limited relief to the litigant if there is some unfairness or conduct which led the litigant to suffer inconvenience or damages.”

Therefore I am of the opinion that the Plaintiff cannot prima facie on its pleadings be said to have no reasonable cause of action based on legitimate expectation which would plainly and obviously fail. It is in my view a triable issue and striking out is inappropriate even if the prospect of success on the issue is weak on its merits as held in Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd (supra).

As to whether the Defendant is the wrong party that has been sued in this Suit, the Plaintiff relied on several speeches and publications made by the Honourable Chief Minister of Penang. Firstly, the Plaintiff referred to the following excerpts of the “Ucapan Penggulungan YAB Ketua Menteri Tuan Lim Guan Eng di 20 Persidangan Dewan Undangan Negeri Pulau Pinang, Mesyuarat Kedua, Penggal Kedua, Dewan Negeri Ketiga Belas”: “Ancaman Kepada Kampung Tradisional

Berkaitan dengan tindakan tuan tanah menggunakan perintah mahkamah mengusir penduduk, Kerajaan negeri serius dalam perlindungan Kampung Tradisional dan membela nasib penduduk yang terlibat. Walaupun telah terdapat beberapa kes di mana Mahkamah Tinggi yang memihak kepada pemilik tanah, Kerajaan Negeri telahpun mengambil intitiative bagi membantu penduduk, antaranya Kerajaan Negeri telah menjadi perantara perundingan di antara pemilik tanah dan penduduk yang terlibat. Kerajaan Negeri juga telah memberi keutamaan kepada penduduk yang terlibat untuk dipertimbangkan tawaran rumah kos rendah/sederhana rendah dan rumah mampu milik yang di bawah kawalan Kerajaan Negeri. 21

Kerajaan Negeri telah melaksanakan dasar baru untuk pembangunan swasta dengan menolak sebarang permohonan kebenaran pembangunan (development order) yang diduduki oleh setinggan. Kerajaan BN sebelum ini menerusi MPPP dan MPSP, akan memberikan kebenaran pembangunan, sungguhpun masih ada setinggan dan masalah setinggan belum diselesaikan.

Perubahan ketara daripada dasar BN sebelum ini, berusaha menggalakkan pemaju mengadakan rundingan dan selesaikan secara baik satu formula munasabah dengan setinggan. Malangnya, beberapa pemaju dan tuan punya tanah yang ada kaitan dengan BN dan UMNO enggan mengadakan rundingan dengan setinggan dan sebaliknya menggunakan tindakan mahkamah untuk menghalau setinggan tanpa bayaran pampasan yang munasabah.

Untuk kes-kes pemaju yang “pro-BN atau UMNO” sedemikian, Kerajaan Negeri bukan sahaja mengaturkan peguam untuk membela setinggan tetapi juga tidak akan 22 memberikan “development order” sekiranya si pemaju “pro-BN atau UMNO” ini berjaya dalam mahkamah. (our emphasis).” Secondly, the Plaintiff referred to the following excerpts of the posting by the Honourable Chief Minister of Penang in the internet social media: “Ini tidak benar sekali kerana kerajaan negeri PR tidak mengeluarkan sebarang kelulusan pembangunan (development order) kepada pemaju untuk sebarang permohonan ke atas tanah yang melibatkan setinggan. Ini adalah perubahan ketara daripada dasar BN sebelum ini yang memberikan “development order” sungguhpun masalah setinggan belum diselesaikan. Perubahan dasar ini adalah untuk menggalakkan pemaju mengadakan rundingan dan selesaikan secara baik satu formula munasabah dengan setinggan. Malangnya beberapa pemaju dan tuan punya tanah yang ada kaitan dengan BN dan UMNO enggan mengadakan rundingan dengan setinggan dan 23 sebaliknya menggunakan tindakan mahkamah untuk menghalau setinggan tanpa bayaran pampasan yang munasabah. Untuk kes-kes “BN atau UMNO” sedemikian, kerajaan negeri bukan sahaja mengaturkan peguam untuk membela setinggan tetapi juga tidak akan memberikan “development order” sekiranya si pemaju ala “BN atau UMNO: ini berjaya dalam mahkamah. Saudara Iszuree sedia maklum tentang perubahan dasar ini dan beberapa kampong yang disebutnya yang melibatkan kes mahkamah jelas sekali melibatkan mereka yang ada hubungkait dengan UMNO atau BN. Untuk setinggan yang menduduki tanah kerajaan menjadi polisi Kerajaan Negeri bahawa bayaran pampasan atau rumah akan disediakan sekiranya mereka terpaksa berpindah atau tidak memiliki rumah. (our emphasis). ” Thirdly and more importantly, the Plaintiff referred to the following excerpts of the speech given by the Honourable Chief Minister of Penang during the signing ceremony of the award of the Project 24 between Penang Development Corporation (“PDC”) and TDVSB on 2 July 2015: “I wish to congratulate PDC and Syarikat Tanjung Villa Development Sdn Bhd on this simple, but high impact social programme, signing ceremony for the development of 4.23 acres of land at Sandiland Foreshore for the purpose of providing affordable housing for the people as well to alleviate the problem of 54 squatter houses at the site. In line with the State Government CAT (Competency, Accountability, and Transparency) policy as well as to harness creativity and innovation of the private sector, PDC had invited Request for Proposal (RFP) for a joint development of 4.23 acres government land at Sandiland Foreshore, Jalan C.Y Choy, George Town. The Request for Proposal was called on 21st July 2014 and on the closing date on 3rd September 2014, a total of nine (9) companies responded to the RFP. On 14th January 2015, the 25 State of Government approved the award of RFP to Syarikat Tanjung Villa Development Sdn Bhd for a tender amount of RM 36 million. The total GDV of the project is RM 245,675,000.00. I am happy to note that the development components of this Sandiland project will comprise 482 units of Medium Cost Apartments (MC) and 321 units Low Medium Cost (LMC) and related commercial facilities, thus enhancing the provision of affordable housing in Penang. The breakdown of the components are: Medium Cost Apartments (MC) a. 241 units = 1000 sq.ft (RM 400,000) b. 161 units = 900 sq.ft (RM 300,000.00) c. 80 units = 800 sq.ft (RM 200,000.00) Low Medium Cost (LMC) 321 units = 700 sq.ft (RM 72, 500.00) 26 The affordable units and LMCs will be provided with specific criteria and guidelines for furnishings, amenities and services. The maximum total built up for the commercial content will not exceed 90,014 sq.ft. The developer is also not allowed to set up SOHO, service apartment, business or medical suites and any other development which are similar to SOHO will not be allowed. The commercial is also subject to the terms of the Council, State Government and Technical Departments. Syarikat Tanjung Villa will be required to provide at least one complimentary car park for each unit of the MC with an additional 10% allocation for visitors car parks, besides other stipulated arrangements for the allocation/sale of the car parks. Syarikat Tanjung Villa at its own cost and expenses will undertake to resolve the following matters: i) Compensation to the residents, squatters, temples, shrines, offices, warehouse, buildings and other structures in the site. 27 ii) Complete the proposed development/access route as stipulated by Council. iii) Hand over 150 units LMC and car parks (1:1+10%) free to the State Government. iv) Pay minimum RM 700 rental to tenants until the completion of LMC. v) Pay one-time minimum RM 1,500 relocation cost house owners. vi) Families, tenants, owners of warehouses/workshops and other family members are given the priority to buy units at no discounted price, and subject to the Jabatan Perumahan Negeri’s approval. vii) Responsible for repair and construction of temples and shrines at their own cost. 28 viii) Pay compensation to the owners of warehouses and workshops based on the agreed amount. Syarikat Tanjung Villa will undertake to build, construct and complete the development within 5 years (60 months) from the date of this Joint Development Agreement. I am confident that the development of this Sandiland Foreshore project will synergise with the surrounding developments i.e. at KOMTAR whereby PDC is embarking on a major revitalisation programme; the Penang Heritage Centre Project at Komtar Phase 5 with a planned tallest man-made waterfall in the World; Macallum Street Development as well as to the close proximity to the George Town World Heritage site. This Sandiland Foreshore project will represent a benchmark to create viability and vibrance to the surrounding areas, while complementing Penang’s aspiration of a clean, green, safe and healthy environment. 29 Thank you, LIM GUAN ENG”

In this respect, it is also pertinent that I reproduce below the letter of award given by PDC to TDVSB dated 16 January 2015. 30 31 32

The Plaintiff contended that the Honourable Chief Minister of Penang spoke and wrote on all the aforesaid occasions on behalf of the Defendant because of s. 3(1) of the Chief Minister of Penang (Incorporation) Enactment 2009 (“Enactment”) that the officer for the time being discharging the duties and functions of the Chief Minister of Penang shall be a body corporate. However and as contended by the Defendant, I find that the Honourable Chief Minister spoke in the aforesaid State Legislative Assembly meeting and posted in the aforementioned social media as a politician in his own capacity generally and not as the agent representing the Defendant. There is no specific mention of the Defendant therein. In other words, there is no nexus connecting him and the Defendant. This can be contrasted with the speech at the aforesaid signing ceremony of the development of the Project where the Honourable Chief Minister arguably spoke as a politician and/or on behalf of the PDC in which he is also the Chairman. In addition and as contended by the Defendants, the Plaintiff did not also lead any evidence to show that the Honourable Chief Minister 33 of Penang acted in connection with the Project as envisaged by s.7 of the Enactment that reads: “Notification of the appointment in Gazette

A notification in the Gazette of the appointment of any person to-

hold or act in the office of the Chief Minister of Penang; or

execute any deed, document and other instruments for the purpose of section 6. shall be conclusive evidence that such person was duly appointed.”

I observed that the Plaintiff is substantially relying on the letter issued by the PDC dated 16 January 2015 particularly paragraph 2(d)(i) and

(vii) to underpin its claim based on legitimate expectation. Very pertinently, I find that there is no involvement of the Defendant 34 therein. At that material time, the Defendant was no longer the registered proprietor of the Property too.

In the circumstances, it can be summarily concluded from the evidence adduced and relied upon by the Plaintiff that the Defendant has wrongly been sued and I so find and hold accordingly. In other words, there was mis-joinder of the Defendant in the Suit.

For the foregoing reasons, I am satisfied that it is plain and obvious that the Suit against the Defendant is bound to fail. I therefore allow the Application with costs of RM 4,000.00. Dated this 29 March 2018 t.t LIM CHONG FONG JUDGE HIGH COURT GEORGETOWN PENANG 35 COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF: KEK BOON WEI SOLICITORS FOR THE PLAINTIFF: KEK OOI & LEE HONG COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT: TEH CHIEW YIN