Hotel Sentral Pudu Sdn Bhd v Teknologi Tenaga Baru Che Lifang (Beijing) Sdn bhd (24NCC(ARB)-37-12/2016)

That the arbitration award dated 30 July 2015 published by China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission ("CIETAC”) be set aside;

That the cost of this action and this application be paid by the

Any other relief that the Court thinks are reasonable and suitable. [3] Aggrieved by the decision of the said decision of this court, the Respondent appealed. 4 Factual background [4] The facts as stated below are gathered from the affidavits filed by both parties. [5] On 30 July 2015, the Respondent was awarded with an arbitration award by Mr. Xiao Jian Guo and Madam Cheng Guang of CIETAC (Arbitration Award). [6] By way of an ex-parte order dated 23 November 2016 (the Ex-Parte Order) in OS No. WA-24NCC(ARB)-32-10/2016 (OS 32) the court ordered the Arbitration Award be recognised as binding and be enforced by entry as a judgment in pursuant to Section 38 of the Arbitration Act 2005 (AA 2005). [7] On 9 December 2016, the Applicant filed two applications under Section 37 and Section 39 of the AA 2005 to set aside the Ex-Parte Order and the Arbitration Award in the OS 32. As stated in their affidavit is support of this OS the Applicant intend to withdraw the applications made in OS 32. 5 The Applicant’s Submissions [8] The Applicant’s application to set aside the Arbitration Award is mainly based on the argument that there is no relationship, contractual or otherwise, that ever existed between the Applicant and the Respondent and that the Respondent is not known to the Applicant. [9] In support of their position, the Applicant produced two contracts, namely, the Mechanical Parking Equipment Sales and Installation Contract dated 19 May 2010 (Sales Contract) and the Sales Contract dated 26 May 2010 (the Supplemental Sales Contract) as shown at Exhibit ‘MYA-6’ to the Applicant’s Affidavit In Support dated 16 December 2016 (the Applicant’s Affidavit In Support). According to the Applicant the Exhibit MYA-6 clearly indicates that parties to the said contracts were Eramaz Development Corporation Sdn Bhd and another entity, Beijing SUN TIMING Machinery Manufacturing Co Ltd. It is not disputed by the parties that Eramaz Development Corporation Sdn Bhd is the former name of the Applicant company and the Applicant do not deny that they had entered into the Sales Contract with Beijing SUN TIMING Machinery Manufacturing Co Ltd., but not with the Respondent. 6 [10] As the Respondent is not a party named in the Sales Contract and the Supplemental Sales Contract, they have no locus standi and no cause of action against the Applicant. There is no privity of contract between the Applicant and the Respondent. As such the Respondent, as a non-party, should be struck out from the proceeding and the Arbitration Award granted is challenged and ought to be set aside. [11] The Applicant also highlighted that the document Exhibit ‘FQW-1’ annexed to the Respondent’s Affidavit in Reply dated 25 January 2017, clearly shows that the claimant in the arbitration proceedings of CIETAC is Auto Cube (Beijing) New Energy Technology Co Ltd formerly known as Beijing SUN TIMING Machinery Manufacturing Co Ltd. Therefore the Respondent in this OS is not the claimant in the CIETAC arbitration proceedings. [12] Thus, the Applicant further submits that the Arbitration Award and the Ex-Parte Order granted have no effect and are not binding on them. [13] The Applicant contends the Arbitration Award was obtained fraudulently. The Applicant lodged a police report (at exhibit ‘MYA-7’ of the Applicant’s Affidavit In Support) on 8 December 2016 (the Police Report). In the Police Report, the Applicant denied receiving all the 7 relevant cause papers including the Arbitration Award and the Ex Parte Order. [14] It is the Applicant’s case that they had never received the cause papers of the CIETAC arbitration proceedings, the Arbitration Award and the Ex parte Order. The Applicant’s Front Office Assistant Manager who has been with the Applicant company since 2013 has deposed an affidavit (Enclosure 5) to the effect that he has never received any documents as stated in the Respondent’s affidavit opposing the OS. Under such circumstances the Applicant submits they are prejudiced by the grant of the Arbitration Award and the Ex Parte Order as the Applicant’s right to natural justice was denied. [15] With regards to the Respondent’s allegation that there has been changes in the Respondent’s name, the Applicant raised two preliminary objections –

the Respondent had failed to produce evidence as to the Respondent’s change of names in its affidavit. Instead, the evidence was only tendered in its written submission; and 8

the evidence in relation to the change of the Respondent’s names was in the Chinese language with no translation attached. [16] The Applicant relies on the case of Koay Hean Seng v Kerajaan Malaysia [2016] 8 CLJ 861 and submit that a party should only use exhibit or evidence adduced in affidavit. [17] In response to the issue of burden of proof raised by the Respondent in its written submission, the Applicant argued that it has showed to the Court evidence that the Respondent has no locus to bring this action. Therefore, the Applicant stressed that the burden now shifts to the Respondent to show that the Respondent is the claimant in the CIETAC arbitration proceedings and the Arbitration Award. The Respondent’s Submissions [18] In their affidavit opposing the OS the Respondent submits that the Applicant’s claim that they were never served with any of the cause papers must fail because under Order 69 Rule 8 (1) and (6) (b) of the Rules of Courts 2012 (ROC 2012), an application for permission to enforce an award in the same manner as a judgement may be made 9 without notice and the Respondent is only required to serve the Ex Parte Order on the Applicant. Therefore it is not mandatory for an application under Section 38 (1) of the AA 2005 to be served on the Applicant. [19] The Respondent also submits that the Applicant’s contention that they have no contractual relationship with the Respondent is a mere bare denial as the Sales Contract and the Supplemental Sales Contract exhibited by the Applicant itself had clearly showed the parties involved. [20] The Respondent’s name was changed twice on 18 June 2010 and 21 December 2011 with the approvals of the Beijing Municipal Industrial and Commercial Administration Bureau Tongzhou Branch. [21] The Respondent explained that they were initially known as Sheng Taiming Beijing Manufacturing Machinery which according to the Respondent the translation to Chinese is identical to Beijing SUN TIMING Machinery Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Subsequently Sheng Taiming Beijing Manufacturing Machinery was changed to Sheng Taihongming Beijing Manufacturing Machinery Sdn Bhd. [22] The Respondent further explained that subsequently the name Sheng Taihongming Beijing Manufacturing Machinery Sdn Bhd was 10 changed to Che Lifang (Beijing) New Energy Technology Sdn Bhd, which when translated to the national language is Teknologi Tenaga Baru Che Lifang (Beijing) Sdn Bhd which is the Respondent company in this OS. To substantiate their claim regarding the changes in the name of their company, the Respondent annexed documents which are purportedly proof of the said changes. [23] Thus, the Respondent submits that the Applicant is prevented from denying the existence of a contractual relationship with the Respondent. Issues and the law [24] This OS is premised on s. 37 of the AA which provides as follows – 37 Application for setting aside

An award may be set aside by the High Court only if-

the party making the application provides proof that-

a party to the arbitration agreement was under any incapacity;

(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it, or, failing any indication thereon, under the laws of Malaysia;

(iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the 11 arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present that party's case;

(iv) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration;

subject to subsection (3), the award contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration; or

(vi) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Act from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Act; or

the High Court finds that-

the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the laws of Malaysia; or

(ii) the award is in conflict with the public policy of Malaysia.

Without limiting the generality of subparagraph (1)(b)(ii), an award is in conflict with the public policy of Malaysia where-

the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption; or

a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred-

during the arbitral proceedings; or

(ii) in connection with the making of the award.

Where the decision on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside. 12

An application for setting aside may not be made after the expiry of ninety days from the date on which the party making the application had received the award or, if a request has been made under section 35, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal.

Subsection (4) does not apply to an application for setting aside on the ground that the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption.

On an application under subsection (1) the High Court may, where appropriate and so requested by a party, adjourn the proceedings for such period of time as it may determine in order to allow the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the arbitral tribunal's opinion will eliminate the grounds for setting aside.

Where an application is made to set aside an award, the High Court may order that any money made payable by the award shall be brought into the High Court or otherwise secured pending the determination of the application. [25] In the Applicant’s Affidavit In Support, the Applicant cited s. 37(1)(a)(iii) and (vi), s. 37(2)(a) and (b), s. 37 (4) and (5) as the relevant provision under which this court could exercise its powers to set aside the Arbitration Award. It goes without saying that the burden is on the Applicant to prove their case under s. 37 of the AA 2005. 13 The law [26] In Garden Bay Sdn Bhd v Sime Darby [2017] MLJU 1998 the Court of Appeal states that even though s. 37 of the AA 2005 vested upon the court the discretion to set aside an arbitration award, by virtue of s. 37(3) and 37(6), the scheme of the said statutory provision is to save the award as far as practical. Be that as it may, the court recognised in certain circumstances the award made should be set aside as of right. This relates, among others, to the incapacity of a party to the arbitration agreement or notice of the arbitration proceeding not given. [27] The court in Garden Bay case referred to the cases below –

Petronas Penapisan (Melaka) Sdn Bhd v Ahmani Sdn Bhd [2016] 3 CLJ 403 case, where the Court of Appeal held – [14] The threshold to satisfy under s. 37 is very low (though the courts are slow in setting aside the award) and upon proof if successful, the court has an option to send back the matter to the arbitral tribunal to eliminate the grounds for setting aside, as set out in s. 37(6). This was not done in this case. To put it in another way when a party to the arbitration complains of breach related to s. 37(1)(a)(iv) and or (v) etc, he must invite the courts 14 attention to s. 37(6) and cannot rely on s. 42 as it will be an abuse of process, as he is relying on omission or excess of jurisdiction which is covered under s. 37 and not s. 42 of the AA

2005.

In Jan De Nul (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & Anor [2017] MLJU 1542, where the Court of Appeal made the following observations in respect s. 37 of the AA 2005 – [9] … Section 37 grounds relates to arbitral process. The threshold to satisfy the grounds may appear to be low. However, the court is given discretion not to set aside the award notwithstanding the applicant can establish one or more of the grounds set out in section 37. Some of the grounds stated under section 37, if established, may require the court to set aside the award as of right. For example, incapacity of a party to the arbitration agreement or no notice of the arbitration proceedings was given at all… [10] In considering whether or not to set aside the award, the court is obliged to look at other provisions of the Act and take a holistic approach as far as practical to sustain the award. Very importantly the court must consider sending the award back to the arbitral tribunal to eliminate the grounds for setting aside. There may be instances where the award cannot be sent back to the tribunal. For example, incapacity of one of the party’s to the arbitration agreement or where no notice of arbitration was given, etc. … 15 Findings of this court [28] The Applicant has invoked s. 37 of the AA 2005 to set aside the Arbitration Award. Pursuant to s. 37(4) of the same such application aside may not be made after the expiry of ninety days from the date on which the party making the application had received the award. The Applicant did not participate in the CIETAC arbitration proceedings out of which the Arbitration Award was published. Based on the facts, the Applicant received the Arbitration Award from the Respondent’s solicitor Messrs Chia & Lee on 9 December 2016. The OS was filed on 16 December 2016, which is within the mandatory time limit imposed under s. 37(4) of the AA 2005 (JHW Reels Sdn Bhd v Syarikat Borcos Shipping Sdn Bhd [2013] 7 CLJ 249. [29] The crux of the Applicant’s case may be summarised as follows –

the Applicant was not informed of the CIETAC arbitration proceedings purportedly initiated by the Respondent and that they had never received the cause papers of the same including the Arbitration Award;

there is no contractual relationship whatsoever between them and the Respondent; 16

the Arbitration Award was fraudulently obtained; and

breach the rules of natural justice. [30] In respond to the Applicant allegations that they had never received the cause papers of the CIETAC arbitration proceedings, the Respondent produced the following documents which the Respondent claims as proof that the Applicant was notified of the arbitration proceedings –

a copy of the arbitration notice and a translation in the English language, arbitration rules, the Board and the Arbitral Panel of the CIETAC and the relevant documents were sent to the Applicant vide courier on 27 November 2014 which was received by the Applicant’s representative name Batty on 2 December 2014. A copy of the acceptance confirmation slip of the courier service of Worldwide Express Mail Service (EMS) No. GJ 2014-760 is produced and marked as Exhibit FQW-1 to the Respondent’s affidavit

a copy of the notice in respect of the constitution of the arbitration court was sent to the Applicant vide courier dated 17 30 January 2015 which was received by the Applicant’s representative by the name Mokhtar on 4 February 2015. A copy of the acceptance confirmation slip of Worldwide Express Mail Service (EMS) No. GJ 2015-82 is produced and marked as FQW-2 to the Respondent’s affidavit

a copy of the notice in respect of the arbitration proceedings was sent to the Applicant vide courier on 4 March 2015 and received by the Applicant’s representative by the name Atikah on 6 March 2015. A copy of the acceptance confirmation slip of Worldwide Express Mail Service (EMS) No. GJ 2015-147 is produced and marked as FQW-3 to the Respondent’s affidavit Enclosure 3;

a copy of the letter sent to the Applicant vide courier on 9 April 2015, among other, informing the status of the arbitration proceedings. The Applicant was also informed that if they wish to re-open the arbitration proceedings they would have to do so before 8 May 2015. The letter was received by the Applicant’s representative by the name Mokhtar on 13 April 2015. A copy of the acceptance 18 confirmation slip of Worldwide Express Mail Service (EMS) No. GJ 2015-246 is produced and marked as FQW-4 to the Respondent’s affidavit Enclosure 3;

a copy of the reply letter from the Respondent was sent to the Applicant vide courier on 29 May 2015 and received by the Applicant’s representative by the name Mokhtar on 1 June 2015. A copy of the acceptance confirmation slip of Worldwide Express Mail Service (EMS) No. GJ 2015-379 is produced and marked as FQW-5 to the Respondent’s affidavit Enclosure 3;

a copy of the Arbitration Award was sent to the Applicant vide courier vide courier on 30 July 2015 and received by the Applicant’s representative by the name Anita on 3 August

A copy of the acceptance confirmation slip of Worldwide Express Mail Service (EMS) No. GJ 2015-531 is produced and marked as FQW-6 to the Respondent’s affidavit Enclosure 3. [31] My perusal of Exhibits FQW-2 to FQW-6 shows, whilst the acceptance confirmation slips issued by the courier service provider 19 contained brief information in the English language, there is no indication in the acceptance confirmation slips as to the specific/nature of the documents which were sent vide courier. Besides that, the said documents produced are in the Chinese language without any translation in the national language or the English language accompanying the said documents. [32] In this respect Order 92 Rules of Court 2012 (RoC 2012) which deals with language of documents provides as follows – Language of documents Order 92 rule 1

Subject to paragraph (2), any document required for use in pursuance of these Rules shall be in the national language and may be accompanied by a translation thereof in the English language, except that the translation for the purpose of Order 11, rule 6(4) and rule 7(1) shall be prepared in accordance with rule 6(5) of that Order: Provided that any document in the English language may be used as an exhibit, with or without a translation thereof in the national language.

For Sabah and Sarawak, any document required for use in pursuance of these Rules shall be in the English language and may be accompanied by a translation thereof in the national language except that the translation for the purpose of Order 11, rule 6(4) and rule 7(1) shall be prepared in accordance with rule 6(5) of that Order. 20

An affidavit prepared in a foreign language shall be filed with a translation of such affidavit by a qualified translator or solicitor by annexing the affidavit and the translation thereof as exhibits to an affidavit by the translator or solicitor verifying the translation.

In cases of urgency, proceedings may be commenced or conducted partly in the English language or wholly in the English language provided that:-

a certificate of urgency explaining the urgency of the matter is filed by the solicitor; and

copies of all such documents in the national language shall be filed within two weeks or within such extended period as the Court may allow: Provided that :

any document in the national language may be used as an exhibit, with or without a translation thereof in the English language; and

any document in the English language may be used as an exhibit, with or without a translation thereof in the national language. [33] Pursuant to the above provision, an exhibit annexed to an affidavit which is in a language other than the national language and English language, has to be translated into either the national language or English language. [34] In Sykt Telekom Malaysia Bhd v. Business Chinese Directory Sdn Bhd [1994] 2 CLJ 729; [1994] 2 MLJ 420, the appellant sought an 21 injunction to restrain the respondent from printing a directory in the Chinese language known as the "Malaysian Business Chinese Directory" (the Directory) on the grounds that the respondent had obtained the information contained in the Directory from telephone directories published by the appellant without first obtaining the permission or authority of the appellant. The respondent argued that the Directory should not have been admitted in evidence because it had not been translated into the national language as required by O. 92 r. 1 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (which is similar to Order 92 RoC 2012). The Supreme Court held that the Directory without a certified translation of the same in the national language should not have been admitted as exhibit on the following ground – We find that O. 92 r. 1 of the Rules of the High Court 1980, is a mandatory provision which requires that any document which is not in the National language or in the English language must be translated into the National language before it can be admitted as an exhibit. Further, it has been held by the Courts that Rules of Court are to be obeyed. Failure to comply with them will lead to chaos in the conduct of litigation. See Lee Guat Eng v. Tan Lian Kim [1985] 2 MLJ 196, Ratnam V. Cumarasamy & Anor [1962] 1 LNS 146. [35] Accordingly the exhibits annexed to the Respondent’s affidavit which are in the Chinese language are not admissible as evidence in this OS and cannot be considered by this Court. 22 [36] The only exhibits annexed to the Respondent’s affidavit which has documents in the English language is Exhibit FQW-1. With regards to the said exhibit, there is annexed a document which the Respondent referred to as the acceptance confirmation slip (issued by the courier service provider), some documents in the Chinese language and also in the English language. There is no indication that the English language documents are the certified translation of the Chinese language document. The English language documents appear to be a notice for Arbitration dated 27 November 2014 issued by CIETAC (Notice of Arbitration) to the Applicant and the Respondent. Assuming for a moment it is, a perusal of the acceptance confirmation slip in Exhibit FQW-1 does not indicate that the document sent vide courier to the Applicant is the Notice of Arbitration. [37] Besides that, although on the acceptance confirmation slip the Applicant’s name appears to be the recipient –

there is no indication that the Notice of Arbitration was received by the Applicant. The Respondent alleged the said document was received by the Applicant’s representative by the name “Batty” (as averred by the Respondent in their affidavit) on 2 December 2014 as alleged by the 23 Respondent. Close scrutiny of the acceptance confirmation slip shows the word “Datty” appears at the top right hand corner of the slip but the identity of this person is not known, in particular whether this “Datty” is the Applicant’s representative as alleged by the Respondent. In fact there is no evidence on the said slip where inference can be drawn that this “Datty” is the Applicant’s representative, in particular the slip is not endorsed with the chop of the Appellant company, which is the normal practice of a company signifying acceptance of documents; and

it is also noted that the address of the Applicant stated in all the acceptance confirmation slips in Exhibits FQW-1 to FQW-6 which is No. 310 Jalan Pudu 55100 is not the address which appears in the Sales Contract between the Applicant and the Respondent, which is 99 Jalan Pudu Lama 50200 Kuala Lumpur Malaysia. [38] Taking into consideration the totality of the facts before this court I am of the considered opinion there is no credible evidence to show that the Applicant was duly and properly notified of the CIETAC arbitration proceedings as well as the appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal. This 24 explains the Applicant’s absence and their non-participation in the CIETAC arbitration proceedings. [39] Under the circumstances the Applicant has proven a case within the ambit of s. 37(1)(a)(iii) of the AA 2005, in so far as it relate to not being given proper notification given in relation the CIETAC arbitration proceedings. This has adversely prejudiced the Applicant. On this ground alone, and bearing in mind the underlying principle of s. 37 of the AA 2005 as set out in the authorities cited above, I allowed the Applicant’s application to set aside the Arbitration Award as of right. For completeness, the other grounds forwarded by the Applicant is discussed below. [40] The Applicant’s other contention is that there exists no contractual relationship between them and the Respondent. As stated above it is the Applicant’s contention that they had contracted with Beijing SUN TIMING Machinery Manufacturing Co Ltd. (see Exhibit MYA-6 to the Applicants Affidavit in Support) and not with the Respondent company. [41] To my mind the issue of contractual relationship would inevitably relate to the question of the existence of an arbitration agreement in the context of s. 9 of the AA 2005 which is a critical issue at the stage of the 25 Respondent’s application under s. 38 of the AA 2005 for the Arbitration Award be recognised as binding and enforceable as a judgment in terms of the award or by action. However, since the Respondent had already obtained leave to enforce the Arbitration Award the issue of non-existence of a contractual relationship between the Applicant and the Respondent at this stage does not arise. This is despite the fact that the documents produced by the Respondent to show they are indeed the party with whom the Applicant had contracted are inadmissible because the documents are in the Chinese language (see discussion at paragraph 32 to 34 above). By the provisions of the AA 2005, it is for the Applicant to challenge such order and/or the Arbitration Award in accordance with the specific provisions provided in the AA 2005. [42] Under s. 37(1)(b)(ii) and s. 37(2) of the AA 2005, an arbitration award is in conflict with the public policy of Malaysia where the making of the award is induced or affected by fraud and that breach of natural justice occurred during the arbitral proceedings or in connection with the making of the award. [43] In PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank SA [2007] 1 SLR(R) 597 the Singaporean Court of Appeal held the concept of public policy is to be construed in a narrow scope and it should only 26 operate in instances where the upholding of an arbitral award would "shock the conscience" or clearly injurious to the public good or violates the forum's most basic notion of morality and justice. As the term public policy relates to the fundamental of law and principles of justice instances of corruption, bribery or fraud and similar serious cases would constitute ground for setting aside an arbitration award. [44] In so far as fraud is concerned, s. 37 of the AA 2005 requires the Applicant to prove that the making of the Arbitration Award was fraudulently induced of affected. However the affidavit evidence adduced by the Applicant did not offer any evidence to the effect. In fact no details or particulars of fraud were averred by the Applicant in its affidavits. It is trite that for an action of fraud to succeed, details of fraud must be pleaded and proven. The Applicant merely alleges fraud without giving any details. [45] From the Applicant’s affidavits, it appears the allegation of fraud is made due to the Applicant’s allegation that they had no contractual relationship with the Respondent and that they are not aware of the arbitration proceedings as they were not served with the cause papers of the arbitration proceedings and the Arbitration Award. I am of the view such ground is not sufficient to allege fraud what more to prove fraud. 27 As such, the Applicant failed to prove fraud in the making of the Arbitration Award. [46] In respect of breach of natural justice, the High Court in Sime Darby Property Berhad v Garden Bay Sdn Bhd [2017] MLJU 145 referred to the Singaporean Court of Appeal decision in Soh Beng Tee & Co Pte Ltd v Fairmount Development Pte Ltd [2007] 3 SLR 86 for guidance. In the case of Soh Beng Tee, it was held that a party challenging an arbitration award as having contravened the rules of natural justice is required to prove the following criteria –

the rule of natural justice which was alleged to have been breached;

how such rule was breached;

to demonstrate in what way the breach was connected to the making of the award; and

how the breach prejudices the applicant’s rights. [47] In so far as breach of natural justice is concerned, I am of the view the Plaintiff’s affidavits failed to specifically provide evidence, to the satisfaction of this court, the occurrence of breach of natural justice 28 during the arbitral proceedings or in connection with the making of the Arbitration Award. Conclusion [48] Premised on the reasons stated above, it is my considered view that the Applicant has proven, on balance of probabilities, that the Applicant was not duly and properly notified of the CIETAC arbitration proceedings which is one of the grounds stipulated under s. 37 of the AA 2005 for setting aside an arbitration award. As such I am constrained to allow the OS and set aside the Arbitration Award as of right. ( KHADIJAH BINTI IDRIS ) JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH COURT (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) DATED 23 APRIL 2018 Counsel: Plaintiff/Applicant : Siti Syafiqah Sofia with C H Loh of Messrs Stanley Chang & Partners Defendant/Respondent :