The sentence imposed was manifestly excessive or inadequate. (See R v. Ball [1951] 35 Cr App. R 164; Loo Weng Fatt v. Public Prosecutor [2001] 3 SLR 313 at para [65]; Public Prosecutor v. UI [2008] 4 SLR (R) 500). [15] In similar vein, the Court of Criminal Appeal in Dookes v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2010] SCJ 71 said at para 177: “... sentencing is not a science of mathematical application of any set formula. It is a normative science rather than a physical science which takes into account the circumstances of the offender as well as the offence and the impact of the offence on the community. A sentence may look to be lenient because it is tailored to fit the offender, the offence and the offended but, in our system of justice, the trial court is the only constitutional institution which is empowered and sovereign in determining which sentence to impose on an offender on the facts of the particular case. An appellate court would scarce intervene unless the sentence is wrong in principle or manifestly harsh and excessive or unduly lenient. However, even if there is nothing wrong with the principle, the sentence may be increased by the appellate court if it is unduly lenient. The principle of proportionality pervades through the whole system of justice, in procedure, substance and sanctions.” (emphasis added) [19] In Bhandulananda Jayatilake v. Public Prosecutor [1981] 1 LNS 139; [1982] 1 MLJ 83, Raja Azlan Shah A.g. LP (as His Royal Highness then was) had offered guideline in dealing with appeals against sentence: “Is the sentence harsh and manifestly excessive? We would paraphrase it in this way. As this is an appeal against the exercise by the learned judge of a discretion vested in him, is the sentence so far outside the normal discretionary limits as to enable this court to say that its imposition must have involved an error of law of some description? I have had occasion to say elsewhere, that the very concept of judicial discretion involves a right to choose between more than one possible course of action upon which there is room for reasonable people to hold differing opinions as to which is to be preferred. That is quite inevitable. Human nature being what it is, different judges applying the same principles at the same time in the same country to similar facts may sometimes reach different conclusions (see Jamieson v. Jamieson [1952] AC 525, 549). It is for that reason that some very conscientious judges have thought it their duty to visit particular crimes with exemplary sentences; whilst others equally conscientious have thought it their duty to view the same crimes with leniency. Therefore, sentences do vary in apparently similar circumstances with the habit of mind of the particular judge. It is for that reason also that this court has said it again and again that it will not normally interfere with sentences, and the possibility or even the probability, that another court would have imposed a different sentence is not sufficient, per se, to warrant this court's interference. For a discretionary judgment of this kind to be reversed by this court, it must be shown to our satisfaction that the learned judge was embarking on some unauthorised or extraneous or irrelevant exercise discretion. We are far from convinced that any criticism of the learned judge is warranted. He took the course he did, in outweighing the plea of mitigation in favour of the public interest with a desire to uphold the dignity and authority of the law as administered in this country. We agree. That must receive the greatest weight. It is a serious offence to give false testimony, for it is in the public interest that the search for truth should, in general and always, be unfettered. The courts are the guardians of the public interest (see the Exclusive Brethren case [1980] 3 All ER 161 at p 172)." [18] Based on the authorities mentioned above, we find that the sentence meted out by the learned Sessions Court Judge (affirmed by the learned Judicial Commissioner) is proportional to the commission of the beastly act by the Appellant on the children. Considering the alarming increase of sexual offences against children, deterrence has to be the sole aim. Sentence passed shall be deterrent to the Appellant specifically so that he would re-offend and likewise it has to be a clear message to would be offenders, to be deterred from committing such crimes. [19] It is beyond doubt that the utmost factor to be taken into consideration is public interest. Circumstances that mitigate the crime such as hardship to the offender and family members if he were sent to long incarceration should not be given undue weight in assessing sentence. The severity of the offence herein outweighs the needs and interest of the appellant particularly in regard to offences of a sexual nature such as in this case. [20] The Appellant cannot be allowed to commit an offence only to hide behind the possible repercussions of a lengthy custodial sentence on his family to lighten the sentence imposed. No doubt the Appellant has played significant parts in caring for various members of his family, and no doubt his absence will be difficult to his family. [21] Sad to say, the Appellant only has himself to blame for that and he should live with the consequences of his own fault. Reference is made to the case of PP v. Teh Ah Cheng [1976] 1 LNS 116 where the Court had this to say: “The respondent also puts forward in his plea in mitigation the fact that he is employed and supports an aged mother and step-brothers. He should of course have thought of this before committing the offences and not after; he is in fact pleading hardship arising from the consequences of his own acts and I would reiterate what I had occasion previously to observe in another case that an offender should not expect to excite or harness any sympathy on an ipse dixit by taking the stance of the impetuous youth who killed his parents with an axe and then pleaded in mitigation that he was an orphan. In any event from the probation report it would appear that his family is certainly not without other means of support. The respondent further undertakes to turn over a new leaf, as he puts it. That is as it should be and he should certainly do so but only after the proper and necessary correction has been administered to him in accordance with established principles of law for the offences under consideration in this matter." Trend of sentencing [22] In Maliki bin Suratman v. PP, Case No: B-09-216-05/2019, the Court of Appeal on 10 March 2022 had found that the sentence of 10 years imprisonment imposed against the accused who had touched the child's breast and private part. In this case, the accused was 68 years old and the child was 15 years old at the material time. [23] In Ismail bin Jali v. PP, Case No: C-09(H)-76- 02/2019, the Court of Appeal on 27 January 2022 had affirmed the sentence of 10 years imprisonment and 3 strokes against the accused who had touched the child's breast. In this case, the accused was 56 years old and the child was 14 years old at the material time. [24] In Sulaiman bin Aswari v. PP, Case No: B-09-29-02/2020, the Court of Appeal on 26 October 2021 had affirmed the sentence of 14 years imprisonment and 5 strokes of whipping imposed against the accused who had touched, licked and inserted his finger into the child's private part. In this case, the accused was 41 years old and the child was 8 years old at the material time. [25] In of Mukhtar bin Ismail v. PP, Case No: D-09-507-10/2019, the Court of Appeal on 1 October 2020 had affirmed the sentence of 11 years imprisonment imposed against the accused who had touched the child's breast and private part. In this case, the accused was 64 years old and the child was 15 years old at the material time. [26] In PP v. Ahmad Hafizal bin Darusalam, Case No: B-09(H)-269- 06/2019, the Court of Appeal on 18 February 2020 had affirmed the sentence of 12 years imprisonment and 4 strokes of whipping imposed against the accused who had inserted his finger into the child's private part. In this case, the accused was 25 years old and child was 8 years old at the material time. [27] In Md Jahangir v. Pendakwa Raya [2020] 10 MLJ 210, Mohd Nazlan Mohd Ghazali J (as he then was) held as follows: “[54] My own research shows that the punishment recorded in recent cases for Section 14 offences include Mohamad Izzaini bin Zainudin v. Public Prosecutor [2019] 7 MLJ 366 where the sentence was a jail term of 7 years and one stroke of whipping for each of the three charges, Helerryak Bungkok v. Public Prosecutor [2019] 1 LNS 315; [2019] 10 MLJ 308 where the imprisonment was for 10 years, accompanied with two strokes of whipping for each of the two charges under Section 14 (d); and Razali bin Silah v. Public Prosecutor [2019] 1 LNS 1508; [2019] 12 MLJ 205, where a jail term of 4 years and one stroke of whipping was ordered by the Court.” “[59] In my judgment, the sentence meted out against the appellant-of 6 years' imprisonment from the date of arrest and two strokes of whipping is in consonance with a careful attempt to strike a balanced determination of the most proportionate, fair and appropriate punishment for the appellant for having pleaded guilty to the commission of the offence under Section 14(a) of the Sexual Offences against Children Act 2017.” [29] In Azman Mahedin v. PP [2020] 1 LNS 1673, Dr Hj Alwi Hj Abdul Wahab J held as follows: “[26] The relevant case law for consideration is the case of Public Prosecutor v. Mad Salleh Naif [2019] 5 LNS 16 where the accused in that case was charged under the same section of Act 792 as in the instant appeal. In that case, the accused pleaded guilty for the offence of touching, kissing and licking the victim's private part and was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment with 2 strokes of whipping.” [30] In Muhammad Shahrani bin Muhammad Sani v. Public Prosecutor [2021] 1 LNS 72 Aslam Zainuddin JC (as he then was) held as follows: “[1] The Appellant was found guilty by the Sessions Court below on two charges under section 14 of the Sexual Offences Against Children Act 2017 and section 377B of the Penal Code respectively and was sentenced to ten (10) years imprisonment and ordered to be whipped with two (2) strokes of the rotan on each charge. The imprisonment term was ordered to run concurrently from 14 June 2019. [17] An appellate court will not interfere with the sentence imposed by the court below unless it is shown that the sentence imposed was unreasonable or manifestly excessive. [18] Based on the above case law, I reduced the sentence of the accused on both the charges from ten to eight years imprisonment and for case number WA-42JSKS-6-07/2019 I reduced the whipping from two to one stroke. Both the imprisonment sentences were ordered to run concurrently.” [31] In Suresh Karpaya v. PR [2022] 1 LNS 193 Abu Bakar Katar J held as follows: “[2] Perayu tidak mengaku bersalah atas pertuduhan dan telah diwakili peguamnya iaitu Tetuan Amarpreet Singh & Co. Perbicaraan penuh telah dijalankan di hadapan Tuan Hakim, Mahkamah Sesyen, Johor Bahru, Johor [Tuan HMS itu]. Di akhir perbicaraan Tuan HMS itu memutuskan Perayu bersalah dan disabitkan atas pertuduhan s. 14(a) Akta Kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-Kanak 2017 [Akta itu]. Tuan HMS itu telah menjatuhi hukuman penjara 6 tahun mulai tarikh sabitan (21.10.2021) dan 2 sebatan rotan. [3] Perayu yang terkilan dengan keputusan Tuan HMS itu telah memfailkan Notis Rayuan ke Mahkamah Tinggi, Johor Bahru atas sabitan dan hukuman [Rekod Rayuan] [RR] [JILID 1] (muka surat